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This study endeavours to examine Britain's wartime and postwar policies towards Japan,
China and Korea between 1944 and 1949. From planning for the defeat of Japan to the
creation of a Chinese communist state in October 1949, the development of British
policy in East Asia was dictated by the need to rejuvenate and protect Britain's imperial
position in Asia. Britain's imperial aims were essential iii pursuing its foreign policy
objective of maintaining Britain's world power status. But, both in the Second World
War and emerging Cold War, Britain diverted its resources and attention to Europe, the
Middle East and Southeast Asia. Consequently, the British were happy for the United
States to assume a major responsibility for the direction of policies towards China, Japan
and Korea. This did not mean that the British could remain indifferent to the politics of
the region. The Japanese threat, its possible re-emergence, large economic investments in
China and the contiguous nature of Soviet and American forces in postwar Korea,
compelled the British to take an interest in the East Asian area. The failure of the United
States to devise a comprehensive postwar plan for the region, other than the
containment of Japan, and the emergence of an East Asian communist bloc by 1949, also
forced the British to become much more involved in a region that was a traditional
imperial concern. With valuable colonial economic holdings and Commonwealth
interests in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, the British could not afford the Asian
mainland to turn 'red' or see the revival of the Japanese menace. However, the British
were slow to perceive a Cold War threat in East Asia. The British were reluctant to
embrace postwar Japan as a Cold War asset, underestimated the potential of the Chinese
communists and proved unable to recognise the long term implications of a
communist-dominated Korea. For its part, the United States proved reluctant to work
with 'imperialist' Britain in an area where America's huge effort in the war against Japan
tended to reinforce a strong conviction that they had the exclusive right to restructure
the East Asian region. By 1949, a co-ordinated Western policy for East Asia appeared to
be a dim prospect.
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Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, Britain's interests in East Asia had not
been extensive. Apart from the Japanese crisis in East Asia during the 1930s, Britain's
policies for the region were regularly formulated under the branch of imperial strategy.'
Britain, however, was more familiar with the region than the United States through its
traditional relations with China and a short-lived alliance formed with the Japanese in the
early twentieth century. 2
 By 1941, with the entry of the United States and the Soviet
Union into the Second World War, Britain's ability to maintain itself at the forefront of
international politics was facing new challenges. 3
 A financial crisis, brought on by the
combination of the Great War, the 1930s Depression and the Second World War, had
left Britain particularly vulnerable.' Therefore, to help combat the most ominous threats
of the twentieth century, Britain needed allies. The British tactic of acquiring allies was
not a new phenomenon, as the Napoleonic and Crimean wars illustrated during the
nineteenth century. Britain's small population, scarcity of raw materials, except for coal,
and insubstantial army, continually left British power at a disadvantage. 5 But, during the
1 See Anthony Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harboi Avoiding War in East Asic 1936-41 (London,
1995); Peter Lowe, Great Britain and the Ongins of the Pacific Wae A Stud3 of British Polity in East
Asia, 1937-1941 (Oxford, 1977); Nicholas Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Pacific
War (Cambridge, 1996); Ann Trotter, Britain and East Asia, 1933-1937 (Cambridge, 1975) and
Christopher Baxter, 'A Question of Blame? Defending Britain's Position in the South China Sea,
the Pacific and Southeast Asia, 19 19-1941', The Journal of the Rojal United Sen'ices Institute for Defence
Studies, VoL142 No.4 (August 1997), pp.66-75.
2 Classic accounts of Anglo-Japanese relations in the early 1900s are Ian Nish, The Anglo-Japanese
Alliance: The Dplomay of Twe Island Empires, 1894-1907 (London, 1966); idem, Alliance in Decline:
Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1 908-1 923 (London, 1972) and Peter Lowe, Great Britain and Japan,
191 1-1915:A Sttalj of British FarEastern Policy (London, 1969).
3 Michael Howard, 'Europe in the Age of the Two World Wars' in Michael Howard and Wm
Roger Lows(eds.), The Oxford History of/he Twentieth Centwij (Oxford, 1998), pp.103-116.
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500
to 2000 (London, 1989); David Reyolds, Britannia Ovemdsd British Polity and World Power in the
Twentieth Centuey (London, 1991); Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (London, 1972) and
idem, TheAudit of Wari The I&ion and Reality of Britain ac a Great Nation (London, 1986).
Even in 1914, Britain had never possessed the same manpower potential as Russia, Germany,
France and later America. In 1913, Britain's Territorial Army numbered 248,340 men, making
Britain's immediate total approximately 480,000. If the continental European powers conscripted
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nineteenth and early-to-mid twentieth centuries, Britain, supported by the strength of the
Royal Navy, a large Empire and financial security, could wield a pie-eminent global
influence.6
 By the I 940s, these tenets of British power had begun to visibly crumble. The
British were broke, dependent upon American loans to maintain their wax effort, and the
Japanese had dispossessed Britain of large parts of its Asian Empire between late 1941
and early 1942. Furthermore, the final defeat of Germany and Japan in 1945 saw the
British government concentrate on postwar demobilisation and the popular creation of a
welfare system. These policies meant that the Royal Navy would suffer cuts at the hands
of a postwar Britain that did not give priority to defence or rearmament until late 1 949•7
In 1944, the British government, presided over by Winston Churchill, saw Britain's
decline as a temporary feature and hoped that after the Second World War, a powerful
and friendly United States would take on new global responsibilities while helping to
preserve Britain's traditional international status in some form. This trend of thinking
continued in the summer of 1945, with the incoming postwar Labour government, under
the leadership of Clement Attlee, and the latter along with his Foreign Secretary, Ernest
Bevin, hoped for active co-operation between the United States, the Soviet Union and
Britain. At the Foreign Office, policy was set in terms of maintaining world power status
and equality with the United States and the Soviet Union. In the Middle East and the
Mediterranean, Britain hoped to achieve this policy objective by upholding its imperial
all available manpower, the wartime strength of the German Army for 1910 could number
4,146,000, the French, 3,869,000 and the Russians, 5,529,732. See David French, The British Waj
in Warfare, 1688-2000 (London, 1990); Keith Neilson, "'Greatly Exaggerated": The Myth of the
Decline of Great Britain before 1914', The International History Review, Vol.13 No.4 (November
1991), pp.698, 717-718 and John Young, 'Twentieth Century International Policy and the Issue
of Decline', The British International History Groô Newsletter, No.1 (March 1997).
6 Brian McKercher, Traruition of Power Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States,
1930-1945 (Cambridge, 1999) and idem, Wealth, Power and the New International Order:
Britain and the American Challenge in the 1920s', Dlilomatic Hutoy, VoLI2 No.4 (Fall 1988),
p.4.12. See also John Ferris, Men, Money, and Dplomag: The Evol.wtion of British Sfrategic Polüy,
1919-1926 (New York, 1989) and idem, "'The Greatest Power on Earth": Great Britain in the
1920s', The International I-Iistog Review, VoLI3 No.4 (November 1991), pp.726-750.
7 Correlli Barnett, The Lost VicIoy: British Dreams, British Realities 1945-1950 (London, 1995).
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position. Britain needed American help to support these imperial interests while the
former rebuilt its economic strength to secure its rightful place as a power of the first
rank. John Kent has consequently argued that the emerging Cold War should therefore
be seen in terms of imperial rivalries and ways to maintain world power status rather than
just Soviet 'behaviour' in Europe which saw the collapse of the wartime Grand Alliance
in February 1948 after the Prague coup. 8
 In East Asia, Britain's role was less discernible
and yet more subtle, aiming to restrain what British officials saw as America's inflexible
and sometimes extreme reaction to the communist threat. In a region that was
traditionally a low priority for Britain and with economic difficulties at home and huge
overseas commitments, East Asia was one area where the British were happy for the
United States to take the lead. Although the British were not prepared to give the United
States government unlimited power of attorney to act on its behalf, historians have
shown that Britain's attempts to exert influence over American policies in this area were
mixed.9
The difficulties that Britain encountered in trying to impinge its influence on East
Asian affairs started during the Second World War and has tended to reinforce the
devolution of the war agaiJapan into a purely American-Japanese encounter.'° This
8 John Kent, British Imperial Strategy and the Ongins of the Cold War, 194449 (Leicester, 1993) and
Henry Ryan, The Vicion ofAnglo-America: The US-UK Alliauce and the Emeiging Cold lY/ar, 1943-1946
(New York, 1987), pp.18-20 and Donald Watt, Succeeding John Bulb America in Britain's Place,
1900-1975 (Cambridge, 1984).
most famous works on the wartime period that highlighted Anglo-American tensions were
Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kimb The United States, Britain, and the (VarAgainst Japan, 1941-1945
(Oxford, 1978) and Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at By: The United States and the Decolonisation of
the British Empi??, 1 941-1945 (Oxford, 1977). See also Christopher Thorne, Border Crossings: Studies
in International History (Oxford, 1988); idem, Racial Aspects of the Far Eastern War of 1941-1945
(London, 1982); idem,, The Far Eastern War: States and &cie&4194 145 (London, 1986) and Win.
Roger Louis, 'American Anti-Colonialism and the British Empire', International Affairs, Vol.61
No.3 (Summer 1985), pp.39S-42O. See Roger Buckley, Occz4alion Dplomay: Britain, the United
States and Japan 1945-1 952 (Cambridge, 1982); Peter Lowe, Containing the Cold War in East Asia:
British Policies towards Japan, China and Kocea, 1948-1953 (Manchester, 1997) and Lanxin Xiang,
Recasting the Imperial Far East: Britain and America in China, 1945-1950 (London. 1995), for recent
studies of British attempts to influence American policy after the Second World War.
The head of the Far Eastern Department at the Foreign Office, John Sterndale Bennett,
emphatically minuted just five days after Japan's surrender that 'the Americans are claiming that
they won the war "in the Pacific" practically single-handed'. Sterndale Bennett, minute, 20
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narrow analysis has been exacerbated by the close relationship established between the
United States and the Japanese during the Cold War in East Asia." American scholars3
.,nti!ce Vra,Ji h,s/or,ajaJsjohbii4 earlier access to documented material on the
al Cold War. From the early 1970s, more primary material opened to researchers in
the United States for the Cold War, while during the same period, British academics were
denied access to documents under the thirty-year rule. It was not until Donald Watt's
famous call in 1978 for Britain's historians to examine the new documents steadily
becoming available, that a British angle to the Cold War slowly began to develop by the
mid198Os.0
 Indeed, numerous historians have made good use of the plethora of British
records that became available at the Public Record Office dealing with the allied
occupation of Japan, the Japanese peace settlement and the recognition of communist
China.13
Until the late 1990s, there had been very little on British postwar policies towards
East Asia in its entirety. This was corrected by Peter Lowe when, in 1997, he produced a
study on British policies towards China, Japan and Korea for the period 1948-1953.
Lowe consulted a large number of official and private papers in both the United States
and Britain. He observed that British officials were often critical of American policies
towards East Asia. By the late 1940s, for example, the British appeared unimpressed with
the American desire to follow a policy of drift in a China that was rapidly turning
August 1945, F5023/69/23, FO 371/46440, National Archives, Public Record Office, London.
See also Jon Robb-Webb, The Loneliness of Long Distance Command: Admiral Fraser and the
British Pacific Fleet', W/ar Studies Journal VoL2 No.1 (Autumn 1996), pp.61-75.
Akira Iriye, 'Continuities in U.S.-Japanese relations, 1941-49' in Yonosuke Nagai and Akira
Iriye(eds.), The Orgins ojtbe Cold War in Aria (New York, 1977), pp.378-407.
12 See Donald Watt, 'Rethinking the Cold Wac A letter to a British Historian', Po/itical.,Qualer!y,
VoL49 No.4 (1978), pp.446456 and Christopher Baxter, 'Did British History in Asia and the
Pacific "End" in February 1942?' War Studies Journa4 Vol.3 No.1 (Winter 1997), pp.101-104. The
first British books to appear on the Cold War using documented material were Elizabeth Barker,
The British Between the Supeepowees, 1945-1950 (London, 1983); Ritchie Ovendale, The Engli.th
Speaking Alliance: Bntain, the United States, the Do,mnions and the Cold War, 1945-51 (Leicester, 1984)
and Victor Rothwell, Britain and the Cold Wat 194 1-7 (London, 1982).
13 See footnote 9 and Ritchie Ovendale, 'Britain, the United States, and the Recognition of
Communist China',HistoricalJournai Vol.26 No.1 (1983), pp.139-158.
13
INTRODUCTION
communist while also proceeding with plans to withdraw from Korea under the cover of
the United Nations (UN). More alarmingly, in the opinion of British officials, the
Truman administration were intent on rehabilitating a former enemy, Japan, to
compensate for a United States withdrawal from the Asian mainland. Although the
British exerted a moderating influence on significant occasions, in most cases, Britain
was not prepared to contemplate a serious rift with the United States for fear of
jeopardising their help in the protection of Western Europe from communism. Indeed,
the task of achieving this protection proved formidable and it would not be until January
1951 that the Truman administration finally agreed to an American military commitment
for the defence of Western Europe. The main theme of Lowe's work illustrated a familiar
predicament for the British in late wartime and postwar Anglo-American relations:
Britain often felt there was little room to manoeuvre, since it was forced either to follow
or, if possible, to modify American policies.14
The origins of this Anglo-American framework can be found in two important
pioneering works that emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which dealt with
Britain's struggle to influence the evolution of East Asia amidst increasing United States
power in the region. Christopher Thorne's Allies of a Kind demonstrated how Britain,
with a lack of resources and its attention turned towards Europe and the Middle East,
found it increasingly hard to execute an imperial strategy during the war against Japan.
The task was complicated further by a strong anti-colonialist United States who, after its
humiliation at Pearl Harbor in December 1941, successfully wielded complete control
over allied strategy to defeat Japan.' 5
 Following on from this work, in 1982, Roger
14 See Lowe, Containing the Cold iVar in EastAcia.
See Thorne, Allies of a Kind For Britain and the United States, the war against Japan was
epitotnised by the contrasting domestic reactions to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the
British loss of Singapore in February 1942. In the United States, Pearl Harbor sparked outrage
and a desire for revenge while in Britain, defeat at Singapore was shrouded in shame and
humiliation. See Louis Allen, The Campaigns in Asia and the Pacific' in John Gooch(ed.),




Buckley produced the first analysis of Britain's role in the allied occupation of Japan.
Despite its remit for the period 1945-1952, the bulk of Buckley's study concentrated on
the period from 1944-1947. It examined Britain's often unsuccessful attempts to gain a
greater say in the control of Japanese affairs and the evolving relations between its
increasingly vociferous Commonwealth partners, such as Australia. Similar to Lowe, the
main theme showed that although there remained a diversion of Anglo-American
opinion over how the occupation was run, the British never allowed it to reach a level
where it could imperil more important United States economic, and later military, help
for Europe.1'
This thesis hopes to integrate these existing works into establishing an additional line
of argument to British policy in East Asia. In the chapters that follow I will be examining
the emerging hostile relations between the Anglo-American powers and the Soviet
Union in the context of the Cold War, with special emphasis on East Asia. By analysing
Britain's perceptions of American, Soviet and Chinese intentions in East Asia, the thesis
will attempt to understand Britain's imperial motives behind the formulation of its goals
for China, Japan and Korea. Using primary sources from private papers, the Public
Record Office, the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Studies, the Fomn Relations of the
United States and recent secondary sources that draw on material from Russian and
Chinese archives, this study aims to concentrate on British foreign policy in East Asia
and to analyse whether it correctly assessed the evolution of the region during this
period. Newly released British intelligence and defence material, that Lowe, Buckley and
Thorne did not incorporate into their studies, helps lead this thesis to develop a more
critical outlook of British policy towards East Asia rather than analysing the usual British
critique of United States policies for the region.'7
16	 Buckley, Ocation Dth,macy.
11 Malcolm Murfett has used recently released defence material to study the decline of the Royal
Navy in the Asia-Pacific region during 1945-1951. See Malcolm Murfett, In Jeopardy The Rojal
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There is no doubt that from 1944-1949, British policy in East Asia was dominated by
the maintenance of its imperial and economic interests. Imperial policy was an important
part of British foreign policy and, together with economic concerns, deemed an essential
component in preserving Britain's world power status. Yet, this thesis will attempt to
show that the imperial dynamic driving British attitudes towards the region blinded
officials at Whitehall to the wider implications of East Asia turning Communist. Britain's
age-old imperial experience of ruling large parts of Asia undoubtedly led British officials
to underestimate the political potential of the region in international affairs other than its
possible effect on Britain's imperial, economic and world power position. This British
mindset was, in part, responsible for Britain's neglect of Korean affairs, never a
traditional imperial concern, its underestimation of the ability of the Chinese communists
to rule China and its desire to recoil from the idea of embracing Japan as a Cold War
asset. I will therefore argue that adding this imperial dynamic to what we already know
about British policy for East Asia, explains far more comprehensively the reasons behind
the Anglo-American failure to devise an effective and co-ordinated Western strategy for
the region.
The structure of the thesis revolves around the mid-twentieth century framework of
Britain's declining position amongst the Soviet Union and the United States. My starting
point, therefore, deals with the eclipse of Britain as a power of the first rank during the
Second World War and its attempt to preserve its imperial and world power status. By
1944, the Soviet Union and the United States gradually began to discuss Chinese and
Korean affairs without Britain. In the same year, planning for the defeat of Japan would
see the emergence of a familiar dilemma for British strategists: how to maintain Britain's
imperial position in Asia and preserve anti-colonialist American help so essential for the
next war. Indeed, by 1944, British fears over German and Japanese designs had receded
Naz3 and Bntisb FarEastern Defenee Poli9', 1945-1951 (Kuala Lumpur, 1995).
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somewhat to become replaced by anxieties regarding the future actions of the Soviet
Union. As one historian notes, in 1944 the Soviet Union could best be defined as a
potential ally but also the potential enemy. 18
 The thesis ends in 1949, after the Chinese
communists had achieved their remarkable victory for the control of China. This event
saw Britain involved in East Asian affairs much more than it had anticipated in 1945,
largely because of the pressures of the Cold War and the need to protect its imperial
position in Asia from communism. The thesis does not continue until the outbreak of
the Korean war. Surveying the documents, during the first six months of 1950, the
British showed hardly any interest in Korea and could not move forward on Japanese
affairs until the United States resolved its policy on Japan which occurred after the
Korean war broke out In China, by the end 1949 the British had already effectively
decided to recognise the Chinese communists and formally announced this decision in
January 1950. Once again major policy changes, such as the American determination to
deny Formosa to the Chinese communists, did not appear until June 1950.
A final word on terminology. The conflict against Japan during the Second World
War will be referred to as the war in Asia and the Pacific. This embraces the fact that
Japan fought widely in East Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific.'9 When referring to
Whitehall, this is taken to mean the administrative and policy-making apparatus of the
British government, with special reference to the Foreign, War, Admiralty, Air, Colonial,
Dominion and Treasury offices. For this period, the region of East Asia refers to China,
Japan and Korea. Southeast Asia includes Burma, Siam, French Indo-China, the
Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and the Dutch East Indies.
South Asia denotes the Indian subcontinent. Siam refers to present day Thailand.
18 flt Bntisb Imperial Strategy, p.211.
19 For a debate over the terminology used for the war against Japan see Thorne, The Far Eastern
[Var and Saki Dockrill, 'One Step Forward - A Reappraisal of the Pacific War' in Said




Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia constituted the former French colony of Indo-China while
the archipelago of Indonesia was formally known as the Dutch East Indies. Formosa
refers to present day Taiwan. Finally, the Japanese, Chinese and Korean style of writing
last names first is adopted throughout this study. For Chinese names the Wade-Giles
system is preferred to the Pinyin system which is in keeping with the source materials of
the period 1944-1949.
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Source: S.Woodburn Kirby,The War 4gainst Japan, VoLII/ The Reconquest ofBwma(London, 1965).
Reproduced by kind permission of the Historical and Records Section at the Cabinet Office.
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Winston Churchill's alignment with the Soviet Union and the United States in 1941
guaranteed Britain's survival during the Second World War. It was a decision that saw
Britain's eclipse as a power of the first rank and witnessed its increasing inability to
influence East Asian affairs. By 1944, the United States and the Soviet Union frequently
discussed the future of China and Korea between themselves, which had a direct bearing
on British imperial prestige in China. This did not mean that East Asia had become
unimportant to Britain. The difficulty for Britain in attempting to restore its position on
the Asian continent after the Japanese successes in 1941 and 1942, lay in the fact that its
efforts were hampered by the policy to defeat Germany first, a lack of resources and the
American domination of the command system. On the one hand, American officials
perceived that Britain's contribution to the war against Japan was small and more
devoted to the imperial aim of reconquering its Southeast Asian colonies. On the other
hand, British officials presumed that the Americans wanted to dominate East Asian
politics and therefore deny Britain a role in the defeat ofJapan. Even though Britain was
unable to play a major role in East Asian affairs, its Prime Minister, Winston Churchill,
the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff were all anxious to rehabilitate Britain's
imperial position in Asia. However, their timing and method were different and this
caused considerable friction within Whitehall. The creation of a British Pacific fleet and
the Chiefs of Staff's proposals for army and air units to be used in the invasion of Japan,
21
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derived more from a British effort to restore its imperial prestige in the region, than for
any purely operational reasons. Despite these efforts to rebuild British power, amidst the
growing strength of the United States and the Soviet Union, Britain's postwar planning
for a defeated Japan remained tardy. Dependent on the release of human resources once
the war in Europe had ended, postwar planning was further undermined by an American
conviction that the occupation of Japan would be almost exclusively controlled by the
United States. When Japan surrendered, British ideas on postwar planning for East Asia
had barely surpassed basic concepts.
IL The GrandAlliance and its Influence on British Poluy in East Asia
According to Churchill, the fall of France in June 1940 witnessed a new era in
Anglo-American relations. Britain, fighting for its life and unable to conserve foreign
exchange, was in desperate need of American assistance to ensure its survival. Churchill,
with his firm belief in an Anglo-American 'special relationship', remained determined to
accept the economic and political costs that this help would entail. 1 In the 1990s,
Churchill's enthusiasm for American support and his decision to align with the Soviet
Union has been challenged, the contention being that it precluded an independent
foreign policy while significantly diminishing British power. 2 It is, though, not unnatural
'Winston Churchill, The Second World War, VoLTh Their Finest Hour (London, 1949), pp.492-493.
For a good critique of the Anglo-American alliance see David Reynolds, 'Roosevelt, Churchill,
and the Wartime Anglo-American Alliance, 1939-1945' in Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley
Bull(eds.), The 'Special Re! o,Lchb Anglo-American Rehilions Sina 1945 (Oxford, 1986), pp.17-41.
The 'destroyers-for-bases' deal and the lend-lease of American war material were early indications
of these costs in September 1940 and March 1941. See J.Butler, Grand Strategy, VoLI1: September
1939-June 1941 (London, 1957), pp.4l7-422; Robert Dallek, Frank/in D.Roosevelt and American
Foreign Polig, 1932-1945 (Oxford, 1979), pp.243-272; David Reynolds, The Creation of the
Anglo-American Alliance 1937-194 1: A Studj in Competitive Co-operation (Chapell Hill, 1982),
pp.113-3l, 145-168; A.Dobson, US WartimeAidto Britain 1941-1946 (London, 1986) and Warren
Kimball, The Most UnsordidAct Lend Lease, 1939-194 1 (Baltimore, 1969).
2 &e for example,John Charmley, Chunhilk The End of Gloy.A Political Biographjv (London, 1993),
pp.559-570 and idem, Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationsbp 1940-57
(London, 1995), pp.3-192. Charmley's thesis was not new. In the 1960s, John Grigg, for example,
stated that '[Churchill] successively defied the power of our enemies, but he could not defy the
power of our friends'. See John Ramsden, 'I-low Winston Churchill Became "The Greatest
Living Englishman", Contemporarj British Histay, VoL12 No.3 (Autumn 1998), pp.1-40.
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to presume that any Anglo-German agreement would have produced the same or
possibly worse result. 3 Certainly by the summer of 1940, the Anglo-American powers
had symmetrical interests in the Western Hemisphere. Both wanted to prevent the
development of a German-controlled Europe, to safeguard North Atlantic lines of
communication and guarantee Britain's national existence. 4 Defence of the homeland and
maintaining the integrity of Empire were, in essence, the main tenets of British grand
strategy. Since the late seventeenth century, the success of this policy haLl depended on
the stability of Europe and a strong Empire. 5 Until 1941, Britain believed that
international affairs had centred upon itself and the other great European powers. Once
Singapore had fallen to the Japanese in 1942 and Britain's war effort began to reach its
peak during 1943,6 this traditional outlook was increasingly influenced by Soviet and
American policies. As early as December 1941, Moscow had made demands on the
British for territory in Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, from 1942, although the British
Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, accepted the fact that the United States would become
the dominant partner in the Anglo-American relationship, he worried how this
domination might affect British policies towards the Soviet Union, France and the
Commonwealth.7
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the Twentieth Centurj (London, 1997), p.130.
See Butler, Grand Strategy, VoL1I, p.423 and McKercher, Transition of Power, p.309.
5 French, The British Waj in Waifiu.
6 See Baxter, 'A Question of Blame?' pp.66-75 and 'Man-Power Policy for 1944', Anderson
memorandum, \XP(43)539, 27 November 1943, CAB 66/43.
Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs. The Reckoning (London, 1965), pp.316-317, 334-352; John
Ramsden, The Age of Churchill and Eden, 1940-1957 (London, 1995), pp.34-36; Lydia Pozdeeva,
m1e Soviet Union: Territorial Diplomacy' in David Reynolds, Warren Kimball and
A.Chubarian(eds.), Allies at Wa The Soviet, American and British E,.perience, 1939-1945 (New York,
1994), pp.357-360.
23
STRATEGIC POLICY AND POSTWAR PLANNING FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN
Britain's basic wartime strategic concept, which the United States endorsed, was to
defeat Germany first and remain on the defensive against Japan. 8 Churchill's efforts to
weld the United States firmly to the 'Germany-first' strategy had important implications
for British policy in East Asia. At the Casablanca conference in January 1943, by
supporting the American President, Franklin Roosevelt, in his call for the unconditional
surrender of Germany and Japan, Churchill was attempting to allay American fears that
Britain would not share the burden of beating Japan, once Germany had been defeated.°
This was essential in order to reinforce America's commitment to the European front,1°
but it tied an economically devastated Britain to possible long-term operations in Asia.11
Nevertheless, this decision, along with Roosevelt's concurrence at Quebec during August
1943 regarding the appointment of Lord Louis Mountbatten as the Supreme
Commander in Southeast Asia Command(SEAC), placed Britain in a position to restore
its Asian imperial possessions. It was a poor consolation for Churchill, who had
attempted but failed, to secure the services of a British commander to head the invasion
of Northwest Europe, operation Overlord. 12 Churchill could not ignore the fact that the
United States would eventually provide the preponderance of forces for operations in
France. 0
 Britain's ebbing power was further demonstrated at the Teheran conference
during November 1943, when Joseph Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union, had pressed
s Churchill, minute for Eden, 21 October 1942, PREM 4/100/7 and Butler, Grand Strategy,
VoL II, pp.423-427.
Roosevelt and Churchill also set out to reassure the Soviet Union that the Anglo-American
powers would not sign a separate peace with Germany. See Michael Howard, Grand Stntgy,
VoLIV.Agust 1942-September 1943 (London, 1972), pp.282-283.
10 The United States Navy had strongly argued for American resources to be poured into the
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his Western allies to set a date for Overlord in May 1944. Roosevelt agreed, seven
British-American divisions were removed from the Mediterranean, a principal area of
British imperial interest, and Churchill's hopes for a British-led advance towards Vienna
gradually receded. Although the British possessed larger forces th-â-zis the Americans in
Italy and Burma, the decisive theatres remained in Northwest Europe and the Pacific.
The growing material and economic power of the United States within the
Anglo-American relationship meant that these 'decisive theatres' were headed by
American Supreme Allied Commanders.'4
Britain's visible loss of power relative to the United States caused concern in
Whitehall. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, John Anderson, wrote to Eden, anxious
that if the Americans believed 'they have done all the real fighting themselves, they may
perhaps in the mood of victory treat us generously as dependent relatives but we can
hardly expect them to regard us as partners who deserve something better'.' 5
 By 1944,
Britain's volume of exports had been depressed to below one-third of their level before
the war while lend-lease would cover 54 per cent of the country's total deficit payments
during the war.'6 At the Board of Trade, Britain's financial crisis was seen as a passing
phase,'7
 but wiser heads in the Economic Section of the Cabinet Office predicted far
greater economic difficulties for postwar Britain.' 8 Churchill doapondently told his
private crtary in the fall of 1944 that: 'all he could do now was to finith the war, to get
See John Ehrman, Grand StratD, VoLV: August 1943-Sptember 1944 (London, 1956),
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School of Economics(LSE).
25
STRATEGIC POLICY AND POSTWAR PLANNING FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN
th oldisr home and to s that they housøa to which to return. But materially and
financially thø protipectu were blnck..'The repercussions of this economic weakness on
British imperial policy in East Asia manifested itself in two ways. By the end of 1943,
Eden was aware that the contribution which Britain could make towards retrieving its
Empire in Asia was slight. He concluded that: 'there was nothing for it but to wait and
hold our end up as best we could, leaving most of the talk and proposing to others'.2°
This British predicament increasingly witnessed the settlement of Chinese and Korean
affairs by the Soviet Union and the United States. To the dismay of the Foreign Office,
the British were rarely consulted, signifying yet another instance of Britain's declining
influence and its eclipse as a first rank power.21
With their defeat at Kursk in the summer of 1943, the German Army finally began to
move over to the defensive on the Eastern Front. This battle had an important
consequence for East Asia because it allowed the Soviets to seriously contemplate a
possible role in the war against Japan. Henceforth, by October 1943 Stalin, and his
Foreign Minister, Vyachesl2v Molotov, were intimating to senior American officials their
intention to join the conflict in Asia. 24
 The price for this intervention began to surface at
the Teheran conference ott 30 November 1943. The American Ambassador to Moscow,
Averell Harriman, recalled that Stalin had made it clear that he wanted to abrogate the
Treaty of Portsmouth imposed upon Russia in 1905 by Japan. The use of Manchurian
i? Diary entry for 7 September 1911, CLVL 1/6, Cok-ille papere, Churchill Acehivei Centre,
Churchill College, Cambridge Unirersity(CAC).
20 Earl of Avon, Memoirs, pp.425-426.
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24 See David Rees, The Defeat ofJapan (London, 1997), p.64.
26
STRATEGIC POLICY AND POSTWAR PLANNING FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN
ports and railroads would also have to be discussed and Churchill, according to
Harriman, thought that the Soviet Union's legitimate needs should certainly be satisfled.
The American State Department did not object to Soviet running rights through the
Chinese railway to Vladivostok and Harbin and a free port at Dairen, provided that it
was not accompanied by any threat to Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria. Britain's
ability to discuss terms with Stalin that would directly affect its imperial prestige in China
was demonstrated at Moscow, during October 1944, when Harriman suggested to
Churchill that the British ought to step aside once the matter of Soviet entry into the
Asian-Pacific conflict came up.V
However, a Soviet declaration of war against Japan had important advantages for the
British. The unreliability of the Nationalist Chinese Army, combined with the decision
by the United States to invade Japan, had focused British and American leaders on
securing the entry of powerful Soviet forces into Northeast Asia. It was hoped that the
opening of a front in Manchuria and the manpower resources of the Soviet Union could
vastly accelerate the defeat of Japan? This would then reduce Britain's financial and
manpower burdens in the Asian-Pacific war. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
British Joint Planning Staff foresaw that the Red Army, with a force of perhaps 55-60
divisions amounting to I million men, could tie down large number of Japanese divisions
25 W.Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envy to Churchill and Stalin 194 1-1946 (London,
1976), pp.364., 371.
26 Record of discussion between Hornbeck, Jebb and Webster, 26 August 1944, Charles
Kingsley Webster papers at Dumbarton Oaks, personal memoranda, August-October 1944,
Webster papers, 12/4, LSE.
27 H	 and Abel, Specia/Envoy, p.364.
28 
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on mainland China to help alleviate the pressure on allied forces invading Japan? To
achieve this end, in October 1944, Churchill thought that: 'it will be absolutely necessary
to offer Russia substantial war objectives in the Far East'. 3° Stalin was also concerned that
American leaders might attempt a negotiated peace with Tokyo that would leave Japan
strong enough to challenge the Soviet Union. Only Soviet participation in the war and
writing the terms of peace could ensure against Japan's revivaL31
Recent evidence appears to suest that Stalin's minimum postwar aims were to
dominate the periphery of the Soviet Union.32
 Stalin's policies resulted from the genuine
fear of a resurgent Germany and Japan. A sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and
Northeast Asia were, for Stalin, the key to Soviet security. During July 1945, for example,
Stalin envisaged Japan's restoration to its full might within thirty years. 33 In this respect,
the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIg correctly observed that apart from the
acquisition of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, Stalin would try to obtain some form of control
over Manchuria and Korea in order to gain access to Dairen and Port Arthur. Manchuria
and Korea were rich in raw materials and supplies of food that made much of Northeast
Asia self-supporting. In fact, the JIC, the Chiefs of Staff's planners and the Foreign
Office all hoped that Stalin would not establish a direct threat to Britain's important
29 Possible Russian Participation in the War Against Japan', JP(45)140(Final), 10 July 1945
F4445/1057/23, FO 371/46462 and 'Russian Strength in the Far East', JIC(45)210(0)(Final), 27
June 1945, CAB 81/129. This figure was confirmed by Stalin's Army Chief of Staff, General
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strategic sea routes and colonial possessions in Southeast Asia. To guarantee this, the
Foreign Office presumed that if Britain adopted an understanding attitude towards
Soviet desires in Northeast Asia, 'she seems unlikely to make trouble for us in the
southern regions where our interests lie'.35 This analysis took little account of the fact
that a powerful communist bloc in Northeast Asia might, in the long term, pose a threat
to Britain's imperial position in Asia. Still, in early 1945, Soviet power appeared to
threaten British interests in Asia much less than it did in the Middle East and
Mediterranean, where Soviet influence was likely to expand as a result of the advance of
the Red Army.36
Churchill and Roosevelt were prepared to accommodate Soviet spheres of influence
in Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia.37
 Churchill visited Moscow during October 1944
and his 'percentages' agreement attempted to curtail Soviet expansionism into the
Mediterranean by recognising Soviet ascendancy in Romania and Bulgaria while Stalin
accepted British primacy in Greece.38
 For his part, Roosevelt, tending to rely on personal
diplomacy towards the latter part of his presidential career, was prepared to meet Stalin's
See ibid; 'Strategic Interests in the Fat East', JP(44)278(Final)(Restricted), 1 January 1945,
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demands in Northeast Asia to secure the Soviet leader's goodwill and the Red Army's
entry into the war against Japan. These were offered at the Yalta conference in February
1945, when Stalin requested control over southern Sakhalin, the Kuriles, the Manchurian
ports of Dairen and Port Arthur, and the maintenance of the status quo in Outer
Mongolia. Britain was exduded from these discussions and Churchill was not consulted
but he put his signature to the terms, claiming later that 'It was regarded as an American
affair...It was not for us to claim or shape it...To us the problem was remote and
secondary'. 4° Eden, together with his permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office,
Sir Alexander Cadogan, clearly disagreed with Churchill. Both thought it wrong to take
decisions that took no account of China's wishes.4t In effect, Stalin and Roosevelt were
shaping postwar East Asian matters between themselves that largely ignored the Chinese
and the resultant consequences for Britain's postwar imperial influence.
The concessions that Roosevelt and Churchill were prepared to give to Stalin, had
brought forth concern in British and American governmental circles. 42
 Roosevelt had
been reluctant to show any distrust towards Moscow until shortly before his death, while
Churchill's attitude fluctuated between hope on one the hand and fear on the other.43
Stalin's demand for a lease over the Chinese Eastern Railway as well effectively granted the
Soviets extraterritorial rights in China. Goncharov, Lewis and Litai, Unce,i4in Pan!ners, pp.2-3 and
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40 See Churchill, The Second World Wa, VoL VI, p.342.
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42 Eden worried that the Soviet Union had vast aims, including the domination of Eastern
Europe and the Mediterranean. Eden, minute, 3 April 1944, N1908/36/38, FO 371/43304. See
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Stalin and Molotov desired a defacto spheres of influence agreement that recognised a
Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe and an Anglo-American sphere in Western Europe and
the Mediterranean. This concept did not preclude postwar co-operation but the ultimate
aim for the Soviet Union was to secure a buffer of friendly regimes along its borders.'
Although both Churchill and Roosevelt were reconciled to the idea of spheres of
influence, they did object to a closed Stalinist bloc developing in Eastern Europe and
Northeast Asia.45
 British and American policy-makers feared that once the Soviet Union
entered the war against Japan, a weakened Chinese Nationalist government could not
effectively check the creation of a chain of 'independent' Soviet Socialist Republics
including Sinkiang, Mongolia, Manchuria and Korea. Despite these concerns,
Roosevelt's successor, Harry Truman, accepting advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
24 July 1945, still felt it was essential to obtain Soviet military help in the Japanese
conflict as soon as possible. 47
 The American Secretary of State for War, Henry Stimson,
wrote to the under-secretary of state at the State Department, Joseph Grew, on 21 May
1945, arguing that: 'Russian entry will have a profound military effect in that almost
certainly it will materially shorten the war and thus save American lives'. For this reason,
Truman and Stimson implicitly rejected attempts by Grew to revise the Yalta accords.
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Truman was not experienced in international diplomacy and relied heavily on advisers
such as Stinison, Harriman and Grew. Their views had turned more hard-line towards
the Soviet Union than Roosevelt's but, the armed service ministers in particular,
remained unsure of the potential Soviet danger and wondered if Japan or Germany could
still pose the greater threat° Truman's dilemma was to restrain Soviet ambitions in
Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia but at the same time maintain a co-operative
relationship consistent with the interests of the United States.51
A sign that all was not well between the parties in the Grand Alliance occurred on 26
July 1945 when, without consulting the Soviet Union, who was not yet at war with Japan,
the United States and Britain released the Potsdam declaration stating the terms for a
Japanese surrender. It was a move that indicated a desire on the part of the
Anglo-American powers to obtain a separate peace from Japan. 52
 Such a deduction is
reinforced by Churchill's reaction to the news that the Americans had successfully tested
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the atomic bomb in New Mexcio duringJuly 1945. ChurchillAbelieved that:
It was no longer necessary for the Russians to come into the Japanese war...we now had
something in our hands which would redress the balance with the Russians! Now we
could say if you insist on doing this or that, well we can just blot out Moscow, then
Stalingrad, then Kiev.
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There is no doubt that Truman, to some degree, shared Churchill's enthusiasm about
using the bomb to restrain Soviet ambitions in Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia.
However, Truman's decision to drop the atomic bomb in Hiroshima on 6 August 1945
was motivated more by his anxiety to save American Jives in the war against Japan. 5 ' As a
matter of courtesy, the United States had informed Britain that it would drop the atomic
bomb on Hiroshima. The British had given their consent on 4 July 1945 but the
Americans did not consult the British when they dropped a second bomb in Nagasaki on
9 August 945. Once the Soviet Union had declared war against Japan on 8 August
1945 and the Red Army advanced into northern China and Korea, Britain found it
increasingly difficult to influence events in East Asia.
III. Bntain China and the Politics ofImperialism
A DEVISING A STRATEGYFOR CHiNA
By arranging for lend-lease to begin arriving in China from March 1941, Roosevelt and
his Army Chief of Staff, General George Marshall, had attempted to make the Chinese
Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek, a useful ally. In December, after Pearl Harbor,
General Joseph Stilwell was sent to China as a senior adviser to Chiang and during 1942
he commanded Chinese forces in their retreat from Burma. American forces in East Asia
were then amalgamated into an overall command, the China-Burma-India Theatre (CB1).
At this time, the German advance to Stalingrad had left the United States with little
reason to believe that the Soviet Union would break its neutrality with Japan and tie
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down Japanese forces in northeast China. Consequently, between 1942 and 1943,
Roosevelt and Churchill regarded it necessary to keep China in the war, thereby
containing as many Japanese troops as possible. The Americans also wanted to secure
Chinese air bases which would allow them to attack the Japanese mainland. 57 As Japan
tried to mobilise Asian nationalism against the Anglo-American powers, it was also
essential to keep China firmly on the side of the United States and Britain. By 1944,
there were 21 American-equipped and trained divisions, 5 of them in northern Burma.
The American supply of these divisions depended on the British, who provided facilities
to fly transport aircraft from India into southern China.59
However, American, British and Chinese strategies for the China-Burma region
encompassed many divergent aims that precluded an integrated military policy for East
Asia. Stilwell argued for an advance towards Lashio, so his forces could link Burma's two
main northern supply routes, the Ledo Road and the Burma Road. Churchill considered
that such a task, through treacherous jungles, would not be finished until the need for it
had passed. He preferred to contain Japanese forces in Burma and advance across the
Charles Romanus and Riley Sunderland, United Stales Armj in [Vorid War II: China-Bui'na-India
Tbeate, StiLwell's Miision to China (Washington, 1966); Xiaoyuan Liu, A Pa,inersb for Disorder
China, the United Staies, and their policies for the postwar disposition of the Japanese Empire, 1941-1945
(Cambridge, 1996), pp.l6-l9; Edward Dreyer, China at [Var, 1901-1949 (London, 1995), p.267
and Peter Calvocoressi, Guy Wint and John Pritchard, Total Wa, The Causes and Couryes of the
Second World War; VoL1I: The Greater East Asia and Pacific Conflict (London, 1989), p.542. See also
Anthony Beevor, Stalingrad (London, 1998); Overy, Russia's War, pp.99-185 and John Erickson,
Stalin's W"ar,arth Germaiy, VoLI: The Road to Stalingnid (London, 1975).
See 'Role of China in Defeat of Japan', Stilwell memorandum, CCS 405, 22 November 1943,
CAB 88/20; 'Operations in South-East Asia', United States COS memorandum, CCS 452/6, 17
February 1944, CAB 88/22 and 'Strategy in South-East Asia Command', Joint Staff Planners
(JSP) memorandum,JCS 774, 16 March 1944, RJCS: 1941-1945, MF 156, KCL At no time were
less than 850,000 Japanese soldiers in China and by October 1944 that total had risen to 1.5
million men. See Churchill, The Second World War, Vol V, p.494; Wenzhao Tao, The China
Theatre and the Pacific War' in Dockrill(ed.), From Pearl 1-larborto Hiroshima, pp.134-149.
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Bay of Bengal to regain the more prestigious British imperial prizes of Malaya and
Singapore.6° Chiang favoured another strategy, promulgated by the American General,
Claire Chennault. The latter argued he could defeat Japan with strategic bomber forces
flown from China. Chiang presumed that as lonJapanese troops were tied down on the
mainland, China served an important military purpose by not allowing those units to be
redeployed. Chennault's strategy allowed Chiang to preserve the Nationalist Army for its
fight with the Chinese communists after the war and would preclude Stilwell from
reorganising his Army, endangering Chiang's personal control over it. 6' Throughout the
war, the British JIC were aghast that the bulk of Chiang's forces had been employed
against blockading the communists in the wilds of Shensi, while second-rate troops were
left to oppose the Japanese.62
 This JIC attitude was thus symptomatic of Britain's
disbelief in China's offensive capacity and it led the British Chiefs of Staff to prefer
Formosa rather than the Chinese mainland, as a base for strategic bombing against
Japan.
There were undoubtedly differences of opinion between the United States and Britain
over the status of China in the war against Japan, but this chasm should not be
overestimated. At the Cairo conference in November 1943, Eden noted that: 'our
American allies were impressed, almost to the point of obsession, with the merits of
General and Mme. Chiang Kai-shek and their govemment'. The American public had
Churchill to his wife, letter, 17 August 1944 in Mary Soames(ed.), Speaking For Tbemselves. The
Personal Letters of Wrtan and Clementine Churchill (London, 1998), p.501 and Churchill, The Second
World War, VoL V. pp.494-495.
61 Jespersen, American Images of China, 1931-1949 (Stanford, 1996), p.124; Tao, 'The China
Theatre and the Pacific War', pp.l38-139; Sainsbury, Churchill and RooseIt at Wae, pp.113-ll4;
Calvocressi, Wint and Pritchard, Total Wa, The Causes and Courses of the Second World War, VoLH,
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andJapanese Imxrialism, 1931-1937 (Cambridge, Mass, 1991).
62 
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F7701/25/10, FO 371/53564. See also Dreyer, China a! War p.290.
63 See 'Operations in South-East Asia', memorandum by representatives of British COS, CCS
452/7,20 February 1944, CAB 88/22 and Howard, Grand Strategy, VoLIV, pp.540-542.
Earl of Avon, Memoirs, p.426.
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been led to believe, through media sources such as Time magazine and various
missionaries, that China was united behind Chiang. Indeed, Roosevelt had envisaged
China as one of the 'four policeman' in the postwar world. Churchill, the Chiefs of Staff
and the Foreign Office, though, were unable to reconcile themselves with Roosevelt's
concept.65 It led a correspondent from the New York Times to argue in 1944 that: 'the
United States looks upon China as a great power; Britain does not'. This clear-cut
disagreement between the Anglo-American powers needs to be qualified. Privately, both
Churchill and Roosevelt were irritated by Chiang's stubbornness, his poor grasp of
strategy and the incompetence of his Chinese military staff. At Cairo, Roosevelt told
Stilwell that he felt 'fed up with Chiang and his tantrums', while Churchill had attempted
to persuade Chiang to visit the Pyramids instead of attending the conference!67
 The
difference between Churchill and Roosevelt was that the latter constantly tried to
promote an image of Sino-American co-operation for the overall war effort Roosevelt's
intentions were focused on the long-term prospects of China, a point that Churchill was
unwilling to grasp and one that Stalin feared. Roosevelt told Mountbatten in 1943 that 'I
really feel is it a triumph to have got the four hundred and twenty-five million Chinese
on the Allied side'. But in recognising their present military capabilities, he conduded
65 See Keith Sainsbury, Churchill and Roosevelt at Wa, The War Tby Fought and the Peace Tby Hoped
to Make (London, 1994), pp.160-l78; 'Report on COS(44)51', Jebb, minute, 19 February 1944,
U1751/748/G, FO 371/40740; Sterndale Bennett to Seymour, letter, 21 October 1944,
F4794/34/l0, FO 371/41582; Scott, minute, 23 January 1945, F454/36/l0, FO 371/46170 and
Thyne Henderson, minute, 29 January 1945, ibid.
Hanson Baldwin, Confusion over Burma Warfare', New York Times, 12 April 1944.
67 See Ronald Spector, Eggle Against the Sun. The American War with Japan (London, 1985),
352-353; Warren Kimball, The Juggler Franklin Roosevelt as Wailime Statesman (Princeton, 1991),
p.l42; idem, Fo,ed in War, p.236 and Churchill, The Second World War, Vol Vi, pp.289-290. Ismay
wrote of his experiences at Cairo that. 'Chiang Kai-shek struck me as knowing damn little about
the war, and Madame, in spite of her acute mind, rather less. However, we managed to get rid of
them after two or three days craziness'. Ismay to Somerville, letter, 20 December 1943,
IV/Som/4, Ismay papers, KCL
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that: 'this will be very useful twenty-five or fifty years hence, even though China cannot
contribute much military or naval support for the moment'.68
B. THE VALUE OF CHiNA IN THE WAR A GAINSTJAPAN
By 1944, China was inherently weak and divided. Chinese communist forces were
gaining in strength, while inflation, prices and taxes began to rise to staggering
proportions in Chiang's China.69 British and American officials who visited China
continually highlighted disunity, corruption and economic bankruptcy. 7° For instance, the
British Ministry of Supply noted that: 'the number of rackets going on in China passes
comprehension and that almost everybody is in it up to the hilt'. 71 The Chinese
Nationalist Army was also poor, containing elements with differing degrees of loyalty
towards Chiang. The American General, Albert Wedemeyer, described Nationalist
officers as 'incapable, inept, untrained, petty [andi altogether inefficient'. 72 Sir Horace
Seymour, the British Ambassador at Chungking, wondered how 'these half-fed,
half-armed and diseased troops can put up any show of resistance at all'. In April 1944,
when the Japanese launched their east China offensive, operation Ichigo, to clear
68 Jespersen, American Images of China, p.124; Liu, A Pailnersbp for Disorder, p.21; Sainsbury,
Churchill and Roosevelt at Wa1', pp.160-178 and Westad, Cold War ô Revolution, pp.8-9.
69 See Plan of Propaganda to China', Overseas Planning Committee, Ministry of Information
paper no.501A, 25 May 1944, F2675/28/10, FO 371/41578; Uoyd Eastman, J.Ch'en, S.Pepper
and LVan Slyke, The Nationalist Era in China, 1927-1949 (Cambridge, 1991), p.152 and William
Kirby, 'The Chinese War Economy' in James Hsiung and Steven Levine(eds.), China's Bitter
Victory: The War with Japan, 193 7-1945 (London, 1992), pp.192-198.
The Situation in China: November 1944', Keswick memorandum, 30 November 1944,
F6140/34/10, FO 371/41583 and Seymour to his wife, letter, 5 December 1944, SEYR 2/7,
Seymour papers, CAC. Mansfield to Roosevelt, 3 January 1945, Foreign Relations of the Umted States
(FRUS), VoL VII: The Far East, China, 1945 (Washington, 1969), pp.2-11.
71 Elliott to Douglas, letter, 19 October 1943, F71/2/10, FO 371/41535. When the American
Vice-President, Henry Wallace, returned from a visit to China, he remarked that cthe higher one
went to the more disgusted one became'. Wallace quoted in Halifax to Foreign Office, telegram
no.230, 20 August 1944, F3976/357/10, FO 371/41632.
72 Albert Wedemeyer, Wedemger Reports! (New York, 1958), p.325. See 1-isi-sheng Ch'i, 'The
Military Dimension, 1942-1945' in 1-Isiung and Levine(eds.), China's Bitter I/it1oy, pp.168-174 for
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Chennault's air force bases south and southeast of Chungking, they virtually sliced China
in half and by November were threatening the wartime capital of China. 74 Watching the
Japanese advance in China, Britain's acting Consul-General at Chungking depressingly
recorded that: 'China's armies, like her roads in summer, are still frequently quite
undependable and a washout...The best that can be said of them is that they move so
rapidly that their personnel are difficult to capture'.75
As Chiang Kai-shek found himself in an ever worsening military, economic and
political situation, he requested the withdrawal of all 5 Chinese divisions from the Burma
front. Roosevelt, exasperated, ordered Chiang to place his army under Stilwell.
Sii Ljel ,oppt k	 h,Qranaultjid Cflaivj, ws also seeg by 4nec,ct ofkIs
Humiliated, Chiang lobbied for Stilwell's removal.
	 as an obstacle to co-operative
Sino-American relations. Roosevelt,r4, split CBI into a China and India-Burma
Theatre and appointed General Wedemeyer to head the American military effort in
China.76
 The British had also been outraged by Chiang's request and considered it
strategically unsound, in view of the disruptive effect it would have on their offensive
operations in Burma. It led to a heated disagreement between the British Chiefs of Staff
and the Foreign Office over the value of China in the war against Japan. +he Chiefs of
Staff considered that even if China was knocked out of the war, this loss would be
increasingly offset by the development of air bases in the Philippines and Pacific island
chains. The advantages of a Chinese collapse to Japan, the Chiefs argued, would be more
political than military, such as the bolstering of Japanese morale and the consequent
' The success of Ichigo revealed the bankruptcy of the Chennauk strategy. See Paul Kennedy,
Japanese Strategic Decisions, 1939-45' in Paul Kennedy(ed.), Strategy and Dplomqy, 1870-1945:
E:gbt Studies (London, 1989), pp.191-i94; Spector, Ea1e Against the Sun, pp.365-381 and Ellis, One
Dqyina VerjL.ong War,pp.460-461.
Ronald Hall to Seymour, letter, 13 June 1944, F3048/34/10, FO 371/41581. The chairman of
the JIC held much the same opinion, arguing that the Chinese Nationalist Army was a 'useless
rabble' apart from the 5 Burma divisions. Cavendish-Bentinck, minute, 2 December 1944,
F5663/119/23, FO 371/41803
76 Dreyer, China at lVar, p.300.
Sterndale Bennett, minute, 2 December 1944, F5663/119/23, FO 371/41803.
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lowering of Anglo-American prestige in Asia.78
 The Foreign Office, and in particular, the
Far Eastern Department, suspected that the British military had been out to prove 'at all
costs' that China could be 'written off' with comparative equanimity. 79 The head of the
Far Eastern Department, John Sterndale Bennett, remained convinced that a weak and
disunited China would be a constant source of trouble. He felt that the Chiefs of Staff
based their views on the short term potential of China's value in the war and on the
natural desire to see no unnecessary diversion of Britain's own war effort.
Sterndale Bennett's robust reactions against the Chiefs of Staff were undoubtedly
reinforced by American accusations that Britain did not want a strong and united
China.8' The second secretary of the United States Embassy to China, John Davies, had
written in January 1945 that: 'the British may get what they want - a disunited China with
the southern half of the country a British and, if we so desire, American sphere of
influence'. The United States Ambassador to China, Patrick Hurley, went further,
claiming the he had uncovered British 'plots' to keep China divided against itself. When
Hurley learnt that the Chiefs of Staff were appointing Major-General Hayes as
Commander of British Forces in China, he saw it as a British attempt to re-establish the
o.cenhc	 rf-wi, lp4I,t,t
prestige of imperialism. Hurley was anAIrish-Americanwith a strong nationalist outlook
but his fears were misplaced. By July 1945, Hayes felt that the British were being 'pushed
78 
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around' by the Americans and losing prestige daily. TM
 In fact, SEAC had seen Chiang's
request to transfer its Burma divisions as an American-inspired attempt to hamstring the
British effort in Burma to ensure that it would play no major role in the defeat of Japan.85
These mutual suspicions transcended into other areas of policy. The American
intelligence service, the Office of Strategic Services(OSS), created a British Empire
Section which collected regular information on Britain's intentions towards its imperial
possessions throughout Asia. Similarly, British secret services had set up the British
Security Co-ordination Office in New York, and this organisation carefully monitored
American ambitions in the East. This atmosphere of mutual distrust that surrounded the
Anglo-American intelligence community had the negative effect of focusing both the
British and American secret services, not on the war against Japan, but on ways of
advancing their own national interests in the Asian-Pacific region.
Within SEAC and the CBI, American distrust and criticism of British operations
against Japan were less covert. In November 1943, Mountbatten complained to Eden
that the Americans were very critical of Britain's conduct in Asia, while his political
adviser, Ester Dening, was convinced that the United States were loathe to recognise the
fact that Britain had a part to play at all in the region.87
 Stilwell, a well-known
misanthropist, was an avid critic of Britain's role in the war againstJapan and summed up
Mountbatten's planning conferences as 'cock-eyed' and sad.TM Mountbatten possessed
Hayes to Seymour and Carton de Wiart, letter, 26 July 1945, WO 208/29 1.
85 Dening to Foreign Office, telegram no.246, 4 December 1944, F5702/34/10, FO 371/41583.
Cadogan lamented the air of suspicion that fomented between SEAC and CBL Cadogan, minute,
14 December 1944, F5802/993/61, FO 371/41746.
Mountbatten to Eden, letter, 26 November 1943, F757/757/61, FO 371/41739 and
'American Attitudes Toward the British', Office of War Information survey, 6 May 1943,
A5721/32/45, FO 371/34117.
Dening to Foreign Office, telegram no.87, 6 March 1945, F1417/127/61, FO 371/46325. See
also Halifax to Foreign Office, telegram no.430, 2 May 1944, F2300/993/61, FO 371/41746,
who reported from Washington that the Americans envisaged Britain in the most subordinate of
roles in the war against Japan.
88 Diary entries for 17 October 1942 and 1 August 1944 in Theodore White(ed.), Tbe Sti/well
Papers (London, 1949), pp.162, 286. On Stilwell, Dening wrote that We cannot have an
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great personal charm but was considered a lightweight by many senior generals and
admirals, who resented his rapid rise to prominence. Under Mountbatten's command,
American and British officers at SEAC argued over petty details and drew up endless
operational plans that never came to fruition. Major disagreements sprung from the
American supposition, endorsed by Roosevelt and other leading figures such as Marshall,
Admiral Ernest King, the American Chief of Naval Operations, and General Douglas
MacArthur, Supreme Allied Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, that Britain was more
interested in recovering its lost imperial territories than the primary purpose of defeating
Japan.9° Even Japanese propaganda began to capitalise on material from the American
Press that suggested the British were trying to induce the United States to bear the brunt
of the war against Japan. 9 ' These impressions remained difficult to refute, especially in
the shadow of American victories at Midway, Leyte Gulf, the Philippine Sea and Iwo
Jima. As late as March 1945, when the British had defeated the Japanese Army at
Mandalay and Meiktila, one Foreign Office official complained that: 'American treatment
of our Burma campaign is a thorn in our flesh and an unfairly poisonous one'. 93 At the
battle of Sittang in Burma in July 1945, the Japanese lost 17,000 men for the loss of only
American general fighting against us on our own territory'. Dening, minute, 23 February 1944,
P993/993/61, FO 371/41746.
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95 British lives. Burma represented the biggest defeat for the Imperial Japanese Army in
1945 and was the most protracted campaign fought by the British military in the Second
World War.9' Fortunately, Anglo-American tensions in SEAC waned by the middle of
1945. With the Japanese offensive faltering in China because of the necessity to redirect
their forces to the north and Chinese east coast to meet possible threats from the
Philippines and the Soviet Union,95
 the United States gradually scaled down their effort
in the China-Burma region. With the ability to bomb the Japanese Islands from the
Marianas Islands in November 1944 and Stalin's decision to enter the war against Japan,
China no longer held the same importance for American strategists as it had done in
1942.
IV. The Development ofBritith Strategic Poluy for the Defeat ofJapan
A BREAKING THE DEADLOCK 0 VERA STRATEGY FOR JAPAN
Just one month after the British had surrendered Singapore to the Imperial Japanese
Army, Charles Peine wrote that: 'Not even at Saratgoa and Yorktown, those ill-omened
names on the pages of British history, was so much surrendered. fl'his] may be the first
step in the collapse of an empire. In any event our whole imperial position has been
jeopardised'.97
 At the time, most British officials saw the defeat at Singapore as a setback
in a global war and certainly did not associate it with the end of British imperial rule on
the Asian continent. Eden vehemently wrote in 1944 that there was 'not the slightest
question of liquidating the British Empire'.98
 The problem for British planners in their
See Louis Allen and David Steeds, 'Burma: The Longest War, 1941-45' in Dockrill(ed.), From
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efforts to re-establish Britain's Asian Empire was that they were forced to work with few
resources, in an unpopular theatre, against the strategic backdrop of the 'Germany-first'
poIicy. By 1944, British planning for Japan's defeat was considered to be at the same
juncture as its plans for Germany between 1942 and 1943. Furthermore, the successful
conclusion of the war against Germany still required Britain's active participation in
Northwest Europe, the Mediterranean and the Arctic.' Strategic questions that arose in
1944 were predetermined by the need to protect the metropolitan centre from V-I and
V.2 attacks, the ability to defend local sea lines of communication and the necessity of
securing Germany's final defeat.10'
Nevertheless, 1944 did mark the beginning of efforts by Whitehall to develop a
long-term strategy for the defeat of Japan. Overlord and Soviet advances into Eastern
Europe had now brought forth the possibility of an end to the war against Germany.
This allowed Churchill, the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff to focus their
attention on the release of resources from Europe and how best to use them in the war
against Japan. A debate emerged that took shape in two forms. Churchill, Eden and the
Foreign Office wanted British forces to advance upon north Sumatra towards Singapore,
in an operation code named Culverin. To Churchill, Singapore was the 'supreme British
objective' and its recapture was the only prize that could restore British imperial prestige
and maintain Britain's world power status.'° 2
 This was reinforced by Churchill's fear that
if the Americans recaptured British territories they might demand the dominating say in
Allen, 'The Campaigns in Asia and the Pacific', p.163; Mountbatten's arguments in 'Future
Conduct of Far Eastern Policy', Clarke memorandum, 13 January 1944, F757/757/61, FO
371/41739 and 'Public Attitudes to the Far Eastern War and Japan', Ministry of Information
home intelligence special report, 11 July 1944, F4093/208/23, FO 371/41804.
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their future.'°3
 Both Churchill and the Foreign Office's political adviser at SEAC firmly
believed that Culverin would have immediate psychological and political effects, by not
leaving the Japanese unassailed in the Southeast Asian region. 1°' Consequently,
Mountbatten and his staff, despite strong protests from Stilwell, decided to press for
Culverin. 105
 Lacking adequate intelligence on Japanese troop strength in Malaya and
Sumatra, and in view of American opposition to British imperialism, the Chiefs of Staff
strongly disagreed with the concept of Culverin. From a Commonwealth point of view,
the Chiefs of Staff thought it would be desirable to send land and air forces to operate
with the Australians in their advance on MacArthur's flank towards the Philippines and
Formosa.' Hoping for the continuation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the postwar
period, the Chiefs of Staff saw the United States as an ally to be supported, arguing that
British imperial possessions could be recovered after the defeat of Japan.'°7
 By the spring
of 1944, in a heated exchange of notes, tensions began to rise between Churchill and the
Chiefs of Staff. 108
 No less interested in maintaining Britain's position as world power of
the first rank, the Chiefs of Staff were animated by the possibilities of substantially
shortening the war and recognised that the Pacific was the decisive theatre. The Chiefs
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to Somerville, letter, 14 November 1944, SMVL 9/2, Somerville papers, CAC.
Churchill, The Second World Wa VoL V, p.506 and Political Implications of Far Eastern
Strategy', Dening memorandum, 17 February 1944, F1040/100/23, P0 371 /41795.
105 Rees, The Defeat ofJapan, pp.57-58.
106 See Mark Jacobsen, Winston Churchill and the Third Front', The Journal of Strateçc Studies,
VoLI4 No.3 (September 1991), p.350 and John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, VoLV, pp.439-440,
461-465.
107 See Alanbrooke, minute, COS(44)79(0), 13 March 1944, CAB 79/89. On the Chiefs of
Staff's desire to maintain the Combined Chiefs of Staff system see 'Report on COS(44)51',Jebb,
minute, 19 February 1944, U1751/748/G, FO 371/40740.
Churchill, minute for Alanbrooke, 20 March 1944, 14/20, Alanbrooke papers, KCL and
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warned Churchill that if Germany was still fighting at the end of 1944, Culverin would be
out of the question unless the Americans were prepared to lend Britain large resources
for it.'°9
Roosevelt was not enthralled with Culvenn, the main objection being the immensity
of resources such an operation would require. The Americans told Mountbatten in
March 1944 that they wanted him to help capture upper Burma, in order to build up air
strength in China and ensure the essential support for the westward advance to the
Formosa-China--Luzon area."° Churchill's affiliation to Culverin, tended to reinforce
American assumptions that Britain had no concern for their China strategy while
attempting to gain a position of postwar imperial advantage.' 1 ' However, the arguments
put forward by the Chiefs of Staff led to a firm American conviction that MacArthur's
position in the Southwest Pacific would be undermined. 2
 As the summer of 1944
approached, Ismay tried to persuade the Chiefs of Staff that a third strategy or 'middle
course' was possible. This would involve a British-Dominion advance from Australia to
North Borneo that could assist in the main operations against Japan or push
south-westwards to recapture Malaya and Singapore." 3
 Ismay worried that the
uncertainty in British strategy would provoke a reaction that: 'will be so terrific that it will
be appallingly hard to keep the nation well into the collar for the Japanese affair'."4
Britain's commanders in Asia had already warned that British troops were 'looking over
their shoulder' waiting for the defeat of Germany in the belief that this meant they could
return home."5
109 COS, minute for Churchill, 28 March 1944, 14/21, Alanbrooke papers, KCL
110 Churchill, The Second World IVar, VoL V, pp.506-507.
Howard, Grand Stratty, VoLIV, p.542.
112 See British Participation in the War against Japan', memorandum by the United States COS,
8 September 1944, FRUS: Confernwe atQuebec,1944 (Washington, 1972), pp.257-260.
113 Isniay to Pownafl, letter, 27 May 1944, IV/Pow/4/2, [smay papers, KCL.
114 Ismay to Auchinleck, letter, 27 July 1944, N/Con/luG, Ismay papers, KCL.
115 
'Morale and the War Against Japan', Amery memorandum, WP(43)232, 5 June 1943, CAB
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At a Defence Committee meeting on 6 July 1944, it appears that Eden began to move
towards the idea of employing British forces alongside MacArthur's advance. Although
he had favoured Culverin, Eden was prepared to accept the Chiefs of Staff's military
advice that the proposed operation into north Sumatra was beyond Britain's strength.
Eden recalled that '[Churchill] kept muttering that resources were available, but
produced no evidence and ended up by accusing us all of trying to corner the Prime
Minister'."6
 Eden was attracted by the fact that the Chiefs of Staff plan provided the
nucleus of an imperial force upon which Britain could build. He also considered that
since Culverin was remote from the centre of con flict with Japan, if Britain could not see
it through, the Americans would conclude that British forces had played virtually no part
in the defeat of Japan. 7 Eden's &vlte face on strategy undoubtedly sprang from his
concern that l3ritish power tis-à-ts the United States might be severely diminished in
Asia and at the peace table, if Britain pursued the wrong policy. It was an important shift
that helped the British to finally compromise on a coherent strategy for the war against
Japan.
As the Defence Committee convened on 10 August 1944, Mountbatten, since his
failure to obtain from the Americans the resources for Culverin and recent success on
the battlefield at Kohima and Imphal, proposed a strategy for an amphibious landing at
Rangoon. Churchill, Eden and the Chiefs of Staff backed this plan because it avoided a
long arduous campaign in the north of Burma. Meanwhile, the Defence Committee fully
endorsed the decision to build up a naval task force for the Pacific." 8
 Mountbatten's
66/37; Wavell, minute, WM(43)61, 29 April 1943, CAB 65/38 and Mountbatten to Eden, letter,
26 November 1943, F757/757/61, FO 371/41739.
116 Earl of Avon, Memoirs, pp.4.61-462. Even when Churchill had accepted that a full-scale
Culverin could not be launched he still proposed the capture of Simalur, an island west of north
Sumatra, to act as an air base to support future operations into Malaya See Ehrman, Grand
Strategy, VoLV, pp.421-487 and Mark Jacobsen, Winston Churchill and the Third
Front',pp.337-362.
Earl of Avon, Memoirs, p.462.
A British Pacific fleet did not depend on the defeat of Germany. Naval forces were already
available. Jacobsen, Winston Churchill and the Third Front', pp.353-354 and Ehrman, Grand
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plan, operation Dracula, was accepted by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, so long as it
did not prejudice the security of the existing air supply route to China, including the air
staging post at Myitkyina. Roosevelt also welcomed the presence of a British fleet in the
Pacific. 9
 The American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, had already warned Roosevelt
that if Britain was prohibited from playing a substantial role in the defeat of Japan,
regional postwar collaboration and harmonious economic ties would be severely
compromised.' 0
 Henceforth, Mountbatten's strategy allowed the British to embark on an
offensive against the Japanese in Burma, supporting Churchill's and the Foreign Office's
policy of actively recovering territory. A strong fleet enabled the British to take part in
operations throughout the Pacific, falling in line with the Chiefs of Staff's strategy, and
hoped to quell American suspicions that Britain was not interested in the rapid defeat of
Japan. Henceforth, at the Quebec conference in September 1944, the Anglo-American
powers agreed to an overall strategy for the defeat of Japan by:
1. Lowering Japan's ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades,
conducting air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.
2. Invading and seizing objectives in industrial heart of Japan.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff at Quebec also set the planning date for the defeat of
Japan as 18 months after the defeat of Germany. It showed that the allies were preparing
for a long struggle against Japan. An agreed overall strategy for the defeat of Japan was
essential for the British, especially as the United States had begun to step up its offensive,
scoring an important naval victory at the battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944. The
Strategy, VoL V, pp.493-504.
For detailed accounts of the battles at Imphal and Kohima see S.Woodburn Kirby, The FVar
Against Japan, VoL III: The Decisive Battles (London, 1961), pp.297-361 and Allen, Burma,
pp.191-315.
120 
'Lend Lease and General Economic Relations with the United Kingdom in 'Phase 2", Hull
memorandum for Roosevelt, 8 September 1944, FRUS, 1944, VoL1II, pp.53-56.
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British could now stake their claim in the main operations and attempt to recover their
prewar impethil position in Asia.121
B. TWE ALUED STRATEGY TO DEFEAT JAPAN
The allies had hoped to start moving resources to Asia by the end of 1944 but with the
failure of operation Market Garden at Arnhem in September, Germany would not be
beaten before the winter. The setback at Arnhem immediately removed resources for
Dracula.' The landing craft needed for Dracula were now earmarked for operations on
the Scheldt, while an airborne division due to arrive in Asia was held back after the allies
failed to turn the northern flank of the Siegfried Line. Firm German resistance in Italy on
the Gothic Line also held up the transfer of British-Indian divisions to the Asian-Pacific
region. 124
 After Germany launched its Ardennes offensive in the winter of 1944-1945,
even the American Joint Chiefs of Staff found it necessary to divert two infantry
divisions to Europe, which bad been originally scheduled for the Pacific in May 1945.'
These drawbacks in Europe came at a time when clearing the Japanese from Eastern and
Southeast Asia still presented immense difficulties for the allies, while an invasion of
Japan was viewed with extreme foreboding. American and British planners indicated that
the Japanese continued to reinforce the home islands, giving the impression that the
121 See Ehrman, Grand Strategy, VoLT", pp.498-524; Rees, Defeat of Jajan, p.67 and Jacobsen,
Winston Churchill and the Third Front', pp.354-357. For an in-depth narrative of the second
Quebec conference see 'OCTAGON: Record of Proceedings on board ss."Queen Mary" and at
Quebec between 5th and 20th September, 1944', COS(44)575(0), 9 October 1944, CAB 99/29.
122 The American I and III Armies had already been halted at Aachen, the Ardennes, Metz and
south of Nancy. See Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol V, pp.377-403. 524-533.
123 Churchill's decision to postpone operation Dracula can be found in Churchill, minute,
COS(44)324(0), 2 October 1944, PREM 3/149/8.
124 Churchill to Mountbatten, telegram no.T1847/4, 30 September 1944, PREM 3/149/8 and
Ehrman, Grand StraUgy, Vol V, p.533.
125 Charles Brower, 'Sophisticated Strategist General George A.Lincoln and the Defeat of Japan,
1944-45', Dplomatic History, Vol.15 No.3 (Summer 1991), p.324.
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country was ready to fight to a bloody finish. 1
 Such assessments were not disputed,
especially after the bitter battle for Okinawa between March and June 1945.127
A major problem for allied strategists was how to achieve the defeat of Japan in the
shortest possible time. The spectacle of a long drawn out war over many years haunted
the American Joint Chiefs of Staff throughout 1944 and 1945.' The solution for
Truman was to approve General Marshall's plan for a two-phase invasion of Japan,
attacking Kyushu in November 1945, operation Olympic, and Honshu four months
later, operation Coronet. t
 The British JIC and American Joint Staff Planners estimated
that before Olympic would be launched, the Japanese would have 96 divisions available
for the defence of Japan, Korea and north China.'30
 To face this force, the Joint Staff
Planners noted that the United States and the Soviet Union could put 91-96 divisions
into the field.'3' Despite naval and air superiority, Marshall calculated that the Japanese
would only surrender in the late autumn of 1946.2 Japan's determination to resist well
into 1946 is a contentious one. Although, on the 8 June 1945, the Imperial Conference
endorsed the Japanese Army's decision to fight to the last, Emperor Hirohito, Foreign
126 Marshall told Eden that the Japanese were bringing divisions back from Korea and
Manchuria and had about 25 divisions in Japan, though of varying quantity. Earl of Avon,
Memoirs, pp.530-531 and Japanese Intentions and War Making Capacity', JIC(45)219(0), 2 July
1945, CAB 81/130; intelligence diplomatic summary, No.9, 6-11 May 1945, HWIO/1 and
intelligence diplomatic summary, No.17, 14-16 June, ibid.
127 Attlee, minute, COS(45)169, 4 July 1945, PREM 8/29. Between March and June 1945 Allied
forces had fought a savage battle against the Japanese at Okinawa. Japanese dead on Okinawa
numbered 70,000, along with at least 80,000 Okinawans. United States Army and Marine losses
amounted to some 7,000 killed. The American naval casualties amounted to approximately 5,000
killed and 5,000 wounded. Spector, EtgIe Against the Sun, p.540.
128 Brower, 'Sophisticated Strategist', p.322.
129 See memorandum by secretary of JCS, 18 June 1945, FRUS, 1945: The Conference of Berlin, The
Potsdam Conference, 1945, VoLI(Washington, 1960), p.903 and Harriman and Abel ,Special Envoy,
p.491.
130 Japanese Strategy and Capacity to Resist', JIC(45)136(0)(Final), 28 April 1945, CAB 81/128;
'Details of the Campaign Against Japan', JSP memorandum, JCS 1388/4, 11 July 1945, RCJS:
1941-1945, MF 146, KCL and Possible Russian Participation in the War Against Japan',
JP(45)140(Final'), 10 July 1945, F4445/1057/23, FO 371/46462.
131 Rees, The Defeat ofJapan, pp.t59, 98, 119-120.
132 Marshall told Eden that he also felt that the Soviets would experience heavy losses once they
entered the war in north China and Manchuria. Earl of Avon, Memoirs, p.531.
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Minister Togo, Navy Minister Yonai and many Japanese overseas diplomats sought ways
in which to end the war. American submarine operations had, by the summer of 1945,
reduced Japanese shipping to 1.2 million tons, a figure, according to the JIC, that was
totally inadequate to maintain Japan's imports of food and raw materials from the Asian
continent. In five of Japan's leading cities, strategic bombing had also burnt to the
ground some 83 square miles and left 1.19 million houses destroyed.' 3 ' However, in the
face of declining Japanese morale there were still concerns about the price of surrender
amongst Japan's officials, such as the future of the Imperial system, and except for
Yonai, the military, with strong influence from its middle-echelon officers, was
determined to fight to the end. Meanwhile, the leader of Japan from April 1945, Admiral
Kantaro Suzuki, although aware that Hirohito desired an end to the war, also made a
series of statements that Japan must battle on.'35
The cardinal problem for the British JIC was their belief that the allied insistence on
unconditional surrender would make it difficult for any Japanese Cabinet to adopt a
policy of peace. During the last months of the war against Japan, controversy had
emerged over the issue of unconditional surrender. A group of Republican leaders,
headed by Senator Capehart, contended in July 1945 that unconditional surrender was
not the best weapon for ensuring Japan's defeat.' 7
 British Foreign Office officials agreed,
Robert Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford, 1954), pp.96-102; Ian Nish, Preparing
for peace & survival: the Japanese experience 1943-46',Annual Lecture (Liddell Hart Centre for
Military Archives, 4 November 1996), p.3; Akira Iriye, 'East Asia and the Emergence of Japan,
1900-1945' in Howard and Louis(eds.), The Oxford History of the Twentieth Cemury, p.149; John
Dower, Empire and Afteimath: Yosbida Sbgeru and the Japanese E4enence, 1878-1954 (Cambridge,
Mass, 1979), pp.258-259 and Lawrence Freedman and Saki Dockrill, 'Hiroshima: A Strategy of
Shock' in Dockrill(ed.), From Pearl Harborto Hiroshima, p.201.
'i" A fire-raid on Tokyo between 9 and 10 March 1945 had killed 83,000 and wounded 40,000.
See Japanese Intentions and War Making Capacity', JIC(45)219(0), 2 July 1945, CAB 81/130:
Rees, The Defeat ofJapan, pp.103-109 and Freedman and Dockrill, 'Hiroshima', p.203
135 Suzuki was possibly fearful of assassination but also may have envisaged a peace that was not
at all consistent with what the allies wanted. See Butow,Japan's Decision to Surrender, p.71.
136 Japanese Strategy and Capacity to Resist', JIC(45)136(0)(Final), 28 April 1945, CAB 81/128.
See also 'The Japanese Attitude to Unconditional Surrender', JIC(45)204(0)(Final), 27 June 1945,
CAB 81/129.
See Halifax to Foreign Office, telegram no.4754, 8 July 1945, F4212/325/10, F0371/46227.
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sensing that the term 'unconditional surrender' was a hopeless slogan. Linton Foulds in
the Far Eastern Department at the Foreign Office felt that a military occupation could
not 'be more repulsive for a people brought up to believe that their country was divinely
created for their own peculiar use'.' These views, receiving widespread support in
Whitehall, hoped that unconditional surrender would not categorically imply a demand
for the abolition of the Imperial system.' 39
 British officials were supported by American
ncL the li/Icr, et dtnnj tle R4jnisththôri-,
figures such as Stimson and Grew,
	 held that the retention of Emperor Hirohito
could save thousands of American lives. This course of action, however, would be
continually frustrated by Truman's Secretary of State, James Byrnes, and the American
military. The latter maintained that only a decisive battlefield engagement would
convince Tokyo to surrender. Byrnes, a long time leader in Congress, was convinced that
a retreat from unconditional surrender could have devastating consequences for Truman,
since the vast majority of the public was still opposed to the retention of the Emperor.'4°
l?un)a4 self re911aneLL re/uctant /ocI e e ord,a
A he mood of the American public effectively thwarted any initiative by the Foreign
Office to press home their concerns about unconditional surrender because it feared that
Britain would be accused by the United States of wanting a soft peace for Japan.'4'
After Germany's collapse in May 1945, with a modification of the allied surrender
terms unrealisable and the prospect of Japan's military ready to fight to the last, the
British prepared for operations on all fronts against the Japanese. Japan's stiff opposition
had also made the Americans more receptive to British plans for Pacific forces.142
Consequently, the Chiefs of Staff now aimed to strengthen the British Pacific fleet and
138 Foulds, minute, 10 November 1944, F5234/94/23, F0371/41793.
139 Dc la Mare, minute, 7July 1945, F4058/584/61, FO 371/46346.
Grew to the Secretary of State, 3 January 1945, FRUS, VoL VI:The Bniisb Commonwealth, The
Far East, 1945 (Washington 1969), p.516 and Schaller,TheAmerican Occupation ofJapan, pp.9-10.
Dc Ia Mare, minute, 17 July 1945, F4783/364/23, FO 371/46447. See Buckley, Occupation
Diplomagi, chp.1 for a survey of the debate between the American and the British over the
adoption of a hard or soft peace forJapan.SeeaI) /t	 LLo.,1h4mn. ,i-25
'42 John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, VoL VI: October 1944-Auguat 1945 (London, 1956), p.220.
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deploy a strategic bombing force that would coincide with operations Olympic and
Coronet. 143
 Despite the Americans granting a base at Okinawa for 10 heavy bomber
squadrons,"' the Chiefs of Staff recognised that a British role in the bombing of Japan
was more to do with the political aspect of being actively involved in the main operations
against Japan than any purely military considerations.' 45 In June 1945, American raids on
Japan involving 500 or 600 B29 strategic bombers were common." For the Chiefs of
Staff, the use of a British bomber force and the Pacific fleet would also ensure an
influential voice for Britain at the peace table. 147
 However, to reassure the Americans of
Britain's resolution to share in the heavy cost of an invasion of Japan, planners for the
Chiefs of Staff proposed that a British Commonwealth force of 3 to 5 divisions could be
formed to take part in Coronet." If this proposal was accepted, the Joint Planning Staff
contentiously lobbied for the establishment of a Combined Chiefs of Staff system. They
argued that once Britain had opened the Straits of Malacca, there would be no
geographical division between SEAC and the Pacific. All operations against the Japanese
would form one strategic concept.149
These ambitions inaugurated another heated debate within Whitehall over the
effective strategy to be pursie4 for the defeat of Japan. The Chiefs of Staff argued that
once Singapore had been captured, priority should be given to the creation of a
'Manpower-Answer to Prime Minister's Directive', JP(45)108(Final), 2 May 1945, CAB 79/33
and COS minutes, COS(45)117, 4 May 1945, ibid.
'British Participation in VLR Bombing of Japan', CSA(45)98(0), 11 June 1945, CAB 79/35.
See also Probert, The Forotien Air Force, pp.29 I-295. These bases would also have had to be
self-contained, providing their own airfields and installations, ports, roads and pipelines.
Churchill, The Second World Wa,' VoL VI, pp.S43-544.
145 Portal, minute, COS(45)103, 19 April 1945, CAB 79/32 and 'British Participation in VLR
Bombing of Japan', JSP memorandum, JCS 1120, 19 October 1944, RCJS: 1941-1945, MF 145,
KCL
1 Rees,Tbe Defeat ofJapan, p.109.
" Cunningham, minute, COS(45)103, 19 April 1945, CAB 79/32.
'Draft Minute to the Prime Minister', Annex to War Against Japan - British Proposals',
JP(45)157(Final), 28 June 1945, F4236/69/23, FO 371/46440,.
149 War Against Japan - British Proposals', JP(45)157(Final), 28 June 1945, F4236/69/23, FO
371/46440.
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Commonwealth invasion force, on the assumption that the occupation of Japan itself
would lead to the speedy collapse of resistance in the outer areas. The Chiefs of Staff did
not want to divert resources for mopping up operations in Southeast Asia. 15° Officials at
the Foreign Office reacted cautiously to these suggestions. They thought that British
participation in Coronet was completely dependent upon the punctual capture of
Singapore, operation Zipper. Any delay would prevent Britain from making available the
forces it had offered. The most serious objection from the Foreign Office's point of
view was the inevitable curtailment of operations in SEAC through a lack of personnel
shipping, assault lift and administrative troops." Cut off from the rest of Japan's
Empire, the strategic value of the Japanese Southern Army had greatly diminished by
December 1944 after the loss of Leyte in the Philippines.' 52
 Still, despite the inadequacy
of Japanese forces in Southeast Asia, through lack of munitions and replacements of
men, staff planners at SEAC and the JIG anticipated that the Japanese would attempt to
delay the advance of the British for as long as possible, in Burma, Malaya, Indo-China
and Siam." This analysis proved correct. In an effort to divert allied resources away
from the homeland, the Japanese ordered a division from Sumatra to reinforce Siam and
a division from Celebes to reinforce Singapore. In March 1945, the Japanese also
assumed military control of Indo-China from the Vichy regime and reinforced the
French colony with 3 divisions. 154
 Even when the British reached Rangoon in May 1945,
Portal, minute, COS(45)124, 11 May 1945, CAB 79/33 and Cunningham, minute,
COS(45)124, 11 May 1945, ibid.
151 
'British Participation in the Far Eastern War', Allen, minute, 29 June 1945, F4236/69/23, FO
371/46440.
152 The Japanese plan for the defence of the Philippines had failed by October 1944. Japanese
naval losses at Leyte Gulf had been crippling. Japan had lost 1 heavy cruiser, 3 light carriers, 3
battleships, 10 cruisers and 9 destroyers. More than 10,000 Japanese sailors had been killed and it
witnessed the end of the Japanese Navy as a coherent fighting force. Rees, The Dfea/ of Japan,
p.50.
153 The Effect of Current Operations in Burma and Operations Against Conrad on Japanese
Strategy in South-East Asia', SAC(45)10/ 1(0), 27 March 1945 in JIC(45)1 13(0), 3 April 1945,
CAB 81/128.
' Japanese Intentions and War Making Capacity', JIC(45)219(0), 2 July 1945, CAB 81/130.
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the JIC, in line with Marshall's earlier pessimistic calculations, argued that it would take at
least another twelve months to force a collapse of Japan's position in Southeast Asia.155
This JIC estimate coupled with domestic events exacerbated the Foreign Office's
concerns about the British war effort in SEAC. On the 23 May 1945, the British coalition
government had dissolved itself in preparation for a general election in July. The fight for
political advantages led the intervening caretaker government to announce the release of
long-service combat personnel while the War Office reduced the length of its overseas
tour by four months to three and quarter years. These measures removed 2 divisions
from SEAC and damaged the morale of British forces in the Asian-Pacific region
because of an anxiety that by the time they returned home, there would be a shortage of
jobs. Such considerations led the Foreign Office to recoil from the idea of British
military participation in the final assaults on Japan. The Foreign Office wondered if
involvement in Coronet was the most rajid way of bringing the war to an end for the
British. The head of the Far Eastern Department feared that: 'after the main excitement
was over, the British would be left with a difficult and prolonged mopping-up process in
Southeast Asia in which Britain's material interests are greatest'. Sterndale Bennett felt
that there was unlikely to be any American support for this mopping-up while delays
could have an unfavourable reaction on British prestige.' 57
 By 1945, world grain was
Mountbatten reported to the Defence Committee that for operation Zipper, he still needed a
reinforcement of light fleet carriers because of the vulnerability to suicide bombers and warned
that the British were only likely to have a superiority of eight to five over the Japanese in the
strength of forces. Mountbatten, minute, DO(45)2, 8 August 1945, F5740/69/23, FO
371/46441. Despite the estimated use of up to 800 aircraft for Kamikay attacks, many were still
in Java and concentration would have been difficuk See Kirby,Tbe IVar Agarnst Japan, VoLIV,
pp.226. 229-230 and idem,Tbe W'ar Againsi Japan, VoL V. The Surrender of Japan (London, 1969),
pp.91-92.
' Japanese Strategy and Capacity to Resist', JIC(45)136(0)(Final), 28 April 1945, CAB 81/128.
See Kirby, The JVarAgainst Japan, VoLIV for a detailed study of Britain's advance on Rangoon.
If it had been necessary to carry out Zipper against determined opposition, these reductions
in strength might have had serious repercussions, for even the unopposed landings in September
1945 ran into considerable difficulties. See Kirby, WarAgainstJapan VoL J/, pp.83-92, 426.
157 Stemdale Bennett, minute, 29 June 1945, F4236/69/23, FO 371/4644; 'British Participation
in the War Against Japan', COS(45)423(0), 30 June 1945 and Sterndale Bennett, minute, 3 July
1945, F4056/69/23, FO 371/46440.
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already in short supply. With Burma, Indo-China and Siam forming the main rice
producing areas of the world, averaging a pre-war exportable surplus of some 6 million
tons, the control of rice supplies would be a fundamental stabilising influence
throughout Asia." 8
 Consequently, a continued disruptive Japanese presence in Southeast
Asia would be disastrous, if the return of the British was associated with postwar
famine.'59 Continual American criticism of Britain's role in the war against Japan also left
Sterndale Bennett with the uneasy feeling that Britain might not receive the degree of
credit which pimafacie it might be justified in expecting. Finally, British concern over
American postwar plans for Japan, led the head of the Far Eastern Department
to conclude that: 'it may not be wise for us to take more than a token share Fin the assault
on Japanese homeland] if we fail to move the Americans from their insistence on total
occupation and total control of Japan'.'6°
Dismissing Sterndale Bennett's fears, General Alanbrooke, the Chief of the Imperial
General Staff, pressed on with his demand for a more prominent British role in the
Pacific. At the Potsdam conference in July 1945, he wrote that. We want a greater share
in the control of this strategy in the Pacific'.'6' Alanbrooke's call for a European style
Combined Chief of Staff proved totally unrealistic. The Foreign Office were sure that the
Americans would strongly object One official realised that the Americans were bound to
take the lead in the Pacific, in view of their very much larger contribution. He concluded
that: 'we shall never be in a position to criticise effectively any strategy they propose,
because we have not the requisite knowledge of the operational possibilities'.'62 This
158 
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Nicholas Tarling, Britain, Sowbeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold Wa, 1945-50 (Cambridge,
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161 Diary entry for 17 July 1945 in Alanbrooke diary, 9 May 1945 to 23 December 1945, 5/11,
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reasoning proved accurate as the Americans made it perfectly clear that they were
extremely unwilling to entertain a command system in the Pacific similar to the one in
Europe. It was Alanbrooke's colleague, Sir Charles Portal, the Chief of Air Staff; who
eventually recognised the improbability of a dominant say in Pacific operations. On 7
August 1945, Portal reported to the Cabinet that Britain's strength in first line aircraft
would roughly equal about 8 per cent of the total Anglo-American strength, concluding
that 'we should not therefore be in a position to claim effectively to influence decisions
as regards operations'.1"
When the British government did accept MacArthur's offer of a British
Commonwealth corps, that included a division each from Britain, Australia and Canada,
the incoming British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, knew this decision was primarily
political. Attlee, siding with arguments from the Foreign Office, told members of the
Defence Committee in August 1945, that he remained more concerned about
mopping-up operations after the defeat of Japan.'65 Attlee's new Foreign Secretary,
Ernest Bevin, also felt that 'owing to the Commonwealth divisions being completely
equipped from American sources, there was a great danger of our identity being lost with
so small a force in so large an operation'.'" The British Pacific fleet, for example, with a
strength of 4 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, 5 cruisers and 14 destroyers, was the largest
force put together by the British Commonwealth in the Second World War. However,
163 
'Control and Command in the War Against Japan', memorandum by United States COS, CCS
890/1, l7July 1945, CAB 88/38.
164 Portal, minute, CM(45)18, 7 August 1945, CAB 128/1.
165 See 'British Participation in the War Against Japatt General MacArthur's Proposal',
JP(45)179(Final), 31 July 1945, CAB 84/73 and Attlee, minute, DO(45)2, 8 August 1945,
F5023/69/23, FO 371/46440.
166 To rectify this problem, Bevin thought it was necessary to take steps to emphasise the part
that Britain was playing in the Japanese war and enquired what steps had been taken to ensure
the right publicity had been given to our contribution. Bevin, minute, DO(45)2, 8 August 1945,
F5023/69/23, FO 371/46440. In line with the general trend of Britain's indifferent attitude
towards the war against Japar, Alanbrooke replied that no steps had yet taken place. Alanbrooke,
minute, DO(45)2, 8 August 1945, F5023/69/23, FO 371/46440.
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the expansion of the United States Navy after Pearl Harbor had been so huge that the
British Pacific fleet was only equivalent in strength to a Task Force within the United
States Fifth fleet. 167
 Conscious of Britain's declining power in East Asia, when Japan
surrendered on the 15 August 1945, Sterndale Bennett emphatically pronounced that:
'the Americans are claiming that they won the war "in the Pacific" practically
single-handed'.'
V. Postwar Planningfor a Defeated ofJapan
When Esler Dening reviewed the state of British postwar planning for Asia in August
1944, he was left despondent. He wrote to the head of the Far Eastern Department at
the Foreign Office that 'my fear is that we shall not be ready for the great many things
which...will be of direct concern to the South East Asia Command, and the legacies of
which we civilians will have to inherit'.'69
 Eight months earlier, Eden had issued a
directive to re-establish the Far Eastern Committee (FEq.' 7° This move was designed to
help the co-ordination of postwar planning with the United States, but it was not until
November 1944 that the FEC's first meeting took place, illustrating the low priority it
received within the confines of Whitehall.'7' The relative failure of the FEC to achieve its
principal objective was demonstrated in May 1945, by a confession from Sir Orme
Sargent, the deputy under-secretary at the Foreign Office, that he was 'getting somewhat
anxious from the political point of view at the absence of any planning here and
consultation with the Americans about the treatment of Japan after her defeat'.' 72 One
167 See Calvocressi, Wint and Pritchard, Total W'ar, VoZII, pp.569-57O; John Winton, The Fo,otten
Fhet (London, 1969) and Arthur Marder, Old F,iends, New Enemies: The RyalN and the Impeiial
Japanese Nay, VoLTh The Pacifle [Var (Oxford, 1990).
Sterndale Bennett, minute, 20 August 1945, F5023/69/23, FO 371/46440.
169 Dening to Stemdale Bennett, letter, 26 August 1944, F4234/295/10, FO 371/41627.
170 Mountbatten's proposals were summarised in 'Future Conduct of Far Eastern Policy', Clarke
memorandum, 13 January 1944, F757/757/61, FO 371/41739.
The FEC had been disbanded in December 1941 after the Japanese thrust into Asia and the
Pacific. See Eden, minute, 18 January 1944, F757/757/61, FO 371/41739.
172 Sargent to Isinay, letter, 9 May 1945, Fl 834/364/23, FO 371/46447.
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month after Germany had been defeated, the Foreign Office anticipated that real
progress on postwar Asian-Pacific issues had to await the assembly of the necessary staff
now beginning to slowly arrive.'73
British planning for a defeated Japan was dictated particularly by the British priority to
plan for the defeat of Germany first and the prolonged debates over Asian-Pacific
strategy.'74
 These impediments were compounded by two other factors. The first was a
complete lack of collaboration between relevant departments in Whitehall to prepare for
the implications of Japan's surrender. Hence no single policy was pursued but rather an
aggregation of policies, particularly for Southeast Asia. As late as June 1945, Sterndale
Bennett noted that although the Foreign Office consulted the India, Burma and Colonial
Offices on foreign affairs issues which may have repercussions in their spheres, the
converse was not true. 175
 The second problem was Churchill's obstructive attitude to any
form of postwar planning which resulted directly from his unwavering desire to
concentrate on winning the present war.'7' This indifference to postwar planning meant
that by the time Japan surrendered in August 1945, Britain's ideas had barely surpassed
basic concepts. Indeed, early forays into post-war assumptions had been extremely
tentative. In November 1942, the British Military Sub-Committee,' 77
 simply presumed
' 'Organisation for Dealing with Far Eastern Affairs', Sterndale Bennett memorandum, 8 June
1945, P3943/149/61, FO 371 /43628.
174 In 1943, the head of the Far Eastern department, Ashley Clarke, believed it was 'too soon yet'
to set up a committee on Asian-Pacific affairs and concluded that 'I hardly think that a planning
committee will be able to take useful decisions until our war in the Far East begins in real
earnest, when Germany has been defeated'. Clarke, minute, 26 August 1943, F3805/102/1O, FO
371/35785. The Admiralty even complained that postwar planning could not begin in earnest
until they had finished preparations for the war against Japan. Admiralty committee on postwar
problems, third report, 31 December 1944, ADM 167/124.
175 Tarling,Betain,SoutheastAsia and the Onset of/he Cold War, pp.45-5O.
176 See Christopher Thorne, Wartime British Planning for the Post-War Far East' in Ian
Nish(ed.), Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952: Papers of the Anglo-Japanese Conference on the History of
the Second World War (Cambridge, 1982), pp.199-225.
Military Sub-Committee was reluctantly set up as a post-war planning body by the Chiefs
of Staff at the request of the Foreign Office. For a survey of the Military Sub-Committee's
post-war planning see Julian Lewis, Changing Direction. Beuisb Militarj Planning for Post-War Strategic
Defence, 194247 (London, 1988), pp.l-54.
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that after the defeat of Japan, Britain's Empire would be 'substantially unaltered' while its
relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, China and the Dutch East Indies
would be closer. 178
 By 1943, British political figures had attempted to devise bolder plans.
In July, Eden recommended a regional defence system for Asia and the Pacific, stating
that: 'all suitable bases in the Western Pacific and in Eastern Asia might be put at the
disposal of a United Nations Pacific Council of Defence...which would command the
necessary air and naval forces', to prevent future Japanese aggression.' 79 Charles Webster,
who worked under Gladwyn Jebb in the Economic and Reconstruction Department at
the Foreign Office, endorsed Eden's scheme, suggesting that a Pacific system', in which
the United States was bound to take the lead, would ensure the security of Australia, New
Zealand and British possessions in Southeast Asia. Both Webster and Eden agreed that a
military occupation of Japan would not be necessary. They argued that the Japanese,
without the command of the sea, could not commit any act of aggression and in Eden's
view, the import of armaments and strategic raw materials could be monitored through
international economic controls.'°
Eden's and Webster's political thought on postwar East Asia remained rudimentary.
In contrast, the State Department had established as early as February 1942 an advisory
committee on postwar foreign policy, of which the Far East Area Committee, under
Stanley Hornbeck, began to examine all possible problems that could arise from the
defeat of Japan. In March 1944, the State Department's Postwar Progammes Committee,
drew up a detailed study for the occupation of Japan. It argued for a nearly exclusive
178 Postwar Strategic Requirements in the Middle East', MSC(42)3(Third Revise), no date,
November 1942, CAB 119/65.
Eden thought the United Nations Pacific Council of Defence should be composed of
America, Britain, the Soviet Union, China, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands and
possibly France and Portugal. He also contended that 'it might even be desirable to associate
this system with some South American state with a Pacific seaboard such as Mexico, Chile or
Peru'. 'United Nations Plan for Organising Peace', Eden memorandum, WP(43)300, 7 July 1943,
CAB 66/38.
'° 'Regional Organisation', Webster memorandum, 17 June 1943, Webster Papers, 11/8, LSE.
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American occupation with little foreign participation. There would be no zonal divisions
while the Postwar Programs Committee favoured utilising the Japanese government for
administration purposes. Once Japan had been disarmed, democratised and economically
reformed, it could then rejoin the community of Asian-Pacific nations. 18' In 1944, the
Foreign Office had not produced an equivalent planning paper and this state of affairs
constantly forced officials to discuss Asian postwar planning with the United States on
an informal basis. Lacking the requisite planning apparatus, the British could not
confidently converse with the Americans on any other leveL
When post-war issues such as the World Organisation came up for discussion in
Cabinet, Cadogan would continually complain that ministers knew little about it and on
one occasion, he resembled proceedings to 'a complete madhouse'.' Churchill later
admitted that he 'was made to go with the question of a World Organisation' because he
was running the war.' The attempt by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff (PHP) to
outline basic assumptions for post-war planning in June 1944 also met with stiff
opposition.' TM Even Cadogan minuted that: 'Must such estimates be made now? What can
we assume about our rights and obligations in the Far East after the war? When is
America going to pull Out of Europe? One would have to take 101 assumptions now, and
I can't help thinking this is a waste of time and manpower'. 185 The Colonial Secretary
similarly felt that it was 'wholly impracticable' to discuss the formation of a regional
181 Akira Iriye, 'Continuities in U.S.-Japanese relations, 1941-49' in Nagai and Iriye(eds.), The
of the Cold [Var in Asia, pp.380-381 and Schaller, The American Ocsbation ofJapan, p.7.
182 See diaiy entries for 4 August 1944, 7 December 1944 and 20 December 1944 in David
Dilks(ed.), The Diaries of SirA/sxander Cadogan, O.M. 1938-1945 (London, 1971), pp.653-654, 685
and 688-689. Webster made the same observations and when he produced papers on the
post-war World Organisation for Eden, he noted in his diary that 'Eden is to read my papers
tonight I wonder if he will understand them?' Diary entry for 25 April 1944 in Webster diary,
VoLNo.10, Webster papers, Vol. II, LSE.
183 Diary entry for 18 April 1944 in Webster diary, VoLNoAO, Webster papers, VoL II, ibid.
184 
'Basic Assumptions for Postwar Strategical Planning', PHP(44)12(0)(Revised Draft), 1 June
1944, U4978/748/G, FO 371/40740. See Lewis, Changing Direction, pp.98-107 for a wider
discussion of this controversy.
185 Cadogan, minute, 9 June 1944, U6253/748/G, FO 371/40740.
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organisation for Southeast Asia while that territory was occupied by Japan. 1 This
unenthusiastic stance towards post-war questions amongst the higher levels of Britain's
political hierarchy did not bode well for British planners attempting to grapple with the
sensitive issues that would arise after the defeat of Japan.
The only body to seriously study strategic postwar problems in the Asian-Pacific
region was the PHP. The PHP, a committee dominated largeiy by the military and under
the guidance of the Chiefs of Staff, had been set up in 1943 and reorganised in 1944, as a
clearing house for many questions arising out of the cessation of hostilities.' 87
 The
difficulty for the PHP, which would undermine many of its planning appreciations, was
the definition of its scope. There was little liaison with Britain's armed services and the
terms 'strategic' and 'military' were left open to broad interpretations while political
factors were rarely taken into account.' Most PHP planning centred upon the full
colliiboration of the United States to help defend Britain's interests and this policy
remained in line with the Chiefs of Staff's desire for high-level Anglo-American postwar
co-operation. For example, the PHP's call for the creation of a protective chain of bases
along the general axis Marshalls-Carolines-Philippines-Formosa, as a bather against
Japanese aression, was completely dependent upon the wholehearted collaboration of
America. 1
 The Admiralty and the Foreign Office wondered whether this support would
Regional Bodies in Colonial Areas', Stanley memorandum, DPM(44)12, 3 April
1944, Webster papers, 11/8, LSE.
187 See Lewis, Changing Direction, chps.3 and 4, for a thorough discussion of the workings and
appreciations produced by the PI-IP during 1943-1945.
Morrison, minute, 29 July 1943, ADM 1/12853 and 'Post Hostilities Planning Organisation',
Vice-COS memorandum, COS(44)59,1 April 1944, ADM 1/12853. The War Office had
attempted to link PHP planning with an inter-service consultative body in July 1943, but their
efforts never took proper shape, especially as the Admiralty was unwilling to participate in such a
scheme. See Anthony Gorst, 'British Military Planning for Postwar Defence, 1943-1945' in Anne
Deighton(ed.), Bntain and the First Cold War (London, 1990), pS)9,
PHP argued that two main naval task forces would operate from the Philippines and the
Carolines with a strategic air force based on Formosa. The return of Formosa to China under the
Cairo declaration had not been taken into account. 'Security in Southeast Asia and the Southwest
Pacific',PHP(44)6(0),28 April 1944,U4150/748/G, FO 371/40740 and Butler minute, 5 June
1944, U4150/748/G, FO 371/40740. See 'Security of British Commonwealth and Empire
Interests in Southeast Asia and the Pacific', PHP(44)6(0)(Final), 31st January 1945, U890/36/70,
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be immediately forthcoming, especially after recent experience in the two world wars.'9°
Although Sterndale Bennett had felt the PHP was too dismissive of help from the Pacific
Dominions, during 1942-1 943, the Australians had not been able to assure the defence of
their home territories against a potentially strong Asiatic power.' 91 Meanwhile, financially
and economically drained from the war, Britain would be forced to concentrate on its
vital strategic commitments, namely the defence of the homeland and the maintenance of
imperial lines of communications. These facts forced British officials to conclude that
Britain would have to rely primarily on the Americans for defence in East Asia.'
The problem for British planners was their concern over American policies towards a
defeated Japan.'93
 By 1945, American planners maintained that a stern total occupation of
Japan was a prerequisite to peace in postwar Asia. Their general policies had called for
the abdication of the Emperor, the dismantling of Japan's Empire, the removal of its
heavy industry and the strict control over Japanese imports.' 94
 The Foreign Office and
even the Chiefs of Staff had major doubts about the feasibility and probable success of
this American policy.'95
 Foulds believed that American peace terms resembled a group of
doctrines without any regard for the realities of the situation.' The Chinese Nationalists
FO 371/50774. The final version was approved by the Chiefs of Staff as a staff study. See COS
minutes, COS(45)48, 21 February 1945, CAB 79/29.
Sterndale Bennett, minute, 8 January 1945, U36/36/70, FO 371/50774 and °The Post-War
Navy and the Policy Governing its Composition', Naval Staff memorandum, Plans Division
(final draft), 29 may 1945, ADM 167/124.
191 Sterndale Bennett, minute, 10 October 1944, U7658/748/G, FO 371/40741A and JCS to
1-lull, 11 March 1944,FRUS, 1944, VoLlil, p.174.
192 Allen, minute, 28 February 1945, U890/36/70, FO 371/50774. See also Kent, British Imperial
Strategy, p.3.
Sir Horace Seymour though that for most Americans it was 'almost an article of faith...that
British and American policies in the Far East were so different as to be irreconcilable'. Seymour
to Cadogan, telegram no.1380, 20 December 1944, F234/127/61, FO 371/46325.
Memorandum by the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, I May 1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol
VI, p.536 and report by the State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Sub-Committee for the Far East, 11
June 1945, ibid, pp.549-SS4.
195 Sterndale Bennett to 1-bus, letter, 4 July 1945, F3998/364/23, FO 371/46447 and COS
minutes, COS(45)175, 12 July 1945, ibid.
Foulds, minute, 31 May 1945, F3238/364/23, FO 371/46447.
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also wanted severe economic measures against Japan and to replace the latter in the
international environment, while hoping to rebuild a Sino-Japanese relationship on
favourable Chinese terms.'97
 Stability was a crucial element for many British postwar
planners concerned with the future of Japan. Foreign Office officials argued that Japan
was an integral part of the Asian-Pacific international economic environment and should
be allowed to achieve a reasonable standard of living. If Japan became isolated
economically, British officials perceived that the mechanism behind Asian-Pacific trade
would not work effectively and this was essential for postwar reconstruction, especially
in Britain's Southeast Asian colonies.' 98
 Sir George Sansom, the principal Asian-Pacific
expert at the British Embassy in Washington, became convinced that: 'we must see to it
that Ijapan] recovers, economically and in other ways under some kind of supervision.
We must in fact really count on her recovery'.' Sansom was adamant that a total
occupation of Japan was unnecessary and considered that Japan, poor in natural
resources and deprived of its overseas territories, could be kept in check by economic
controls at key points, enforced through the presence of allied warships and massed
aircraft demonstrations.°
In spite of these disagreements, the Foreign Office thought that owing to the part
played by the British Commonwealth in the war against Japan, there was no reason to
suppose that: 'the United States government would wish to oppose British participation
in the occupation and control of Japan...in what is bound to be a difficult and thankless
task'. But the Foreign Office was unsure of how the occupation would evolve and was
forced to concede in April 1945 that it had no clear idea of American, Chinese or Soviet
197 Liu,A PannershpforDisorder, pp.48-49, 53-54.
See Blackburn, minute, 29 March 1944, F1461/168/61, FO 371/41727A and Butler, minute,
17 April 1944, ibid.
199 Sansom's comments were handed informally to the State Department. Balfour to Dunn, 2
August 1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol 1/1, pp.582-584.
200 Policy Towards Japan', Sansom memorandum, 20 June 1945, F3768/364/23, FO 371/46477.
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intentions regarding the treatment of a conquered Japan.20' On the other hand, the
Americans, who viewed the occupation as strictly their enterprise, also appeared reluctant
to divulge their plans to the British and ChineseY An official at the British Embassy in
Washington noted that he was 'a little disappointed by the way the State Department say
in one breadth that we are so far behind that is hardly worth talking and in the next that
they really have no policy and are therefore not ready to talk'. 203
 Finally, it was debatable
whether British manpower would be available for an occupation of Japan. The British
government had asked for more than a 30 per cent reduction in the armed forces after
the defeat of Japan and estimated that 1.5 million jobs alone would be needed for the
urgent reconstruction of houses. By May 1945, Eden had become extremely concerned
over the poor co-ordination of postwar East Asian policies between London and
Washington. Eden warned Churchill that if Britain failed to gain its share in the political
and economic control of Japan, there would be a real risk that: 'American views may
crystallise before we have time to influence them'. 205 Churchill approved the study of
problems on the occupation of Japan, but six days before Japan surrendered the new
British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, still told the Cabinet that: 'It was urgently
necessary that His Majesty's Government should define their policy in this matter'.207
201 
'Occupation and Control of Japan', Sterndale Bennett draft memorandum, 16 April 1945.
Fl 834/364/23, FO 371/46447.
202 At the planning level, the postwar foreign policy preparations of the Nationalists and
American governments never made direct contact. See Liu,A Partnersbfor Disorder, pp.30-31.
203 Gore Booth to Sterndale Bennett, letter, 30 July 1945, F4797/4664/61, FO 371/46383.
204 Cavendish Bentinck, minute, 11 April 1945, F1834/364/23, FO 371/46447 and 'Report to
the Secretary of State by Under-Secretary Stettinius on his Mission to London, April 7-29,
1944',Stettinius to Hull, 22 May 1944,.FRUS, 1944, Vol.111, p.26.
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'Occupation and Control of Japan', Eden, minute for Churchill, 26 May 1945, PREM
3/252/6A.
206 Churchill had replied, 'Yes, but pray report to the Cabinet'. Churchill, minute for Eden,
F3220/364/23, FO 371/46447. Sterndale Bennett, minute, 1 June 1945, F3235/364/23, FO
371/46447.
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Eden's concerns proved correct as the American interdepartmental planning body for
Japan, the State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee (SWNCC), paid little attention to
Britain when drawing up its plans.208
 DuringJune 1945, the State Department confidently
assumed that British policy at the end of the war would be in harmony with American
policies in Japan, stating that: 'the British government will in general probably go along
with the United States, although the emphasis of their policy will be different. British
sentiment against Japan is neither unanimous nor so strong as American opinion'. The
major shock for the British government came in the summer of 1945. On the 29 May
1945, the State Department categorically told the British Ambassador in Washington that
they were not aware of any intention on the part of the United States government to
invite other powers to participate in the control of Japan. The State Department argued
that the American government felt the main responsibility for the defeat of Japan lay
with them. Even if the formation of an allied advisory body took place, the State
Department contended that it would only serve as a guide for the Supreme Allied
Commander in occupied Japan. 21° This attitude disturbed Foreign Office officials to the
extent that they were reluctant to involve British forces in the invasion of Japan.
Although the British were often critical towards American policies for Japan, they did
not provide thorough or comprehensive alternatives themselves. 211
 Sansom's ideas
produced the only British paper that tabled a policy for the occupation of Japan during
208 first Sterndale Bennett knew of the important SWNCC paper 'US Initial Post-Surrender
Policy for Japan' was through the BBC and Press reports. Stemdale Bennett, minute, 23
September 1945, F7331/364/23, FO 371/46449 and Foulds, minute, 18 September 1945,
F7141/630/23, FO 371/46459.
209 
'An Estimate of Conditions in Asia and the Pacific at the Close of the War in the Far East
and the Objectives and Policies of the United States', policy paper prepared by the State
Department, 22 June 1945,FRUS, 1945, VoL 1/1, p.579.
210 HalifaX to Foreign Office, telegram no.3755, 29 May 1945, F3238/364/23, FO 371/46447.
211 Sterndale Bennet argued that the British should simply aim to 'revive and recover our
territories, to beat the Japanese and to build a better world. I do not see that we need to hesitate
to proclaim the programme to the Americans or despair of co-operating with them on the basis
of it'. Sterndale Bennett, minute, 16 January 1945, F214/127/61, FO 371/46325.
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the Second World War. Sansom's experience and knowledge of Japan enabled his
criticisms of American policies to transcend the echelons of Whitehall and the British
Press. Consequently, British officials frequently adopted a critical outlook when it came
to discussing American occupation planning.212
The handling of the Japanese surrender by the United States in August 1945 finally
exposed an American determination to deal with Japanese affairs unilaterally. At Byrnes's
urging no mention of the Emperor had been made in the Potsdam declaration. Truman
had also been bolstered by news of the successful testing of the atomic bomb and felt it
was no longer necessary to issue compromises. 2t3
 When Attlee was shown a draft copy of
the American surrender terms, the British government had doubted the wisdom of
enforcing Hirohito to personally sign them and sent the United States an amendment.214
Byrnes subsequently made an 'unimportant change in language' but 'in order to save
time' did not seek the approval of the British government. 215
 Despite the fact that the
Soviets and Chinese remained highly sceptical of this move, the Americans accepted the
British modification claiming that all allied powers were in agreement.216 Pierson Dixon,
Bevin's private secretary, noted in his diary on the 11 August 1945, that: 'It was cool of
the Americans to go ahead without consulting us or the other two, but it is characteristic
212 See Buckley,Occupa/ion Dplomafy, chp.1, for a wider survey of Sansom's influence.
213 Schaller,TbeAmencan Occupation ofJapan, p.l6.
214 Recalling the Great War, Bevin stated that by driving out the Kaiser in 1918, the allies had
pre-empted a constitutional monarchy and unintentionally opened the 'doors to a man like
Hitler'. Harriman and Abel ,Special Envoj, p.486. The decision to agree not to insist oi the
abdication of the Emperor was reached at CM(45)20, 10 August 1945, CAB 128/1. At this stage,
Molotov was 'sceptical' of the Japanese surrender and informed the British that the Soviet
offensive in Manchuria would continue. Clark Kerr to Foreign Office, telegram no.3522, 11
August 1945 F4977/630/23, FO 371/46453. The Soviets did eventually agree to the surrender
of Japan and accepted MacArthur as the Supreme Allied Commander for Japan. See Clark Kerr
to Foreign Office, telegram no.3525, 11 August 1945, F4977/630/23, FO 371/46453 and
Harriman and Abel ,SpecialEnvoy, pp.499-500.
215 Foreign Office to Washington Embassy, telegram no.8294, 11 August 1945, F4974/630/23,
FO 371/46453.
216 Diary entry for 11 August 1945, ACAD 1/15, Cadogan papers, CAC.
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of their healthy aggressive mood to wish to take the lead and be the spokesman'. 217
 At a
Cabinet meeting on 10 August 1945, Truman further explained that his inclination to
meet the Japanese part way was due to his dread of the Soviets pushing 'too far into
Manchuria'. According to Truman, a softening of the Potsdam terms was about the only
leverage Washington possessed to restrain Soviet movement southward. 218
 As the United
States and the Soviet Union contested issues in East Asia, it was becoming clear that the
British could do little to affect their outcome.
In conclusion, all aspects of British policy towards East Asia were affected by events in
Europe. A lack of material and human resources constantly left Britain's full-scale
attention towards the conflict against Japan dependent upon the defeat of Germany.
Frustrated by this dilemma, figures such as Churchill, postulated strategic plans for the
defeat of Japan that took little account of Britain's capabilities and commitments. The
alternative of securing American collaboration for the restoration of Britain's position in
Asia also brought forth difficulties. British officials presumed that Britain's power
derived from its overseas territories. Churchill's rigid conservatism on imperial issues and
his insistence that Britain's Southeast Asian colonial possessions be recaptured during
the war against Japan, left the United States with the suspicion that British strategy had at
its root imperialist aims and not the desire to beat the Japanese in the shortest possible
time. The Chiefs of Staff attempted to rectify this suspicion but the United States
deemed that any British forces employed in the Pacific were an intrusion on a theatre
which was deemed an American preserve. As Britain struggled to revive its power in the
region, the possibilities of a Soviet entry into the war against Japan focused Roosevelt on
dealings with Stalin for the East Asian region at Britain's and China's expense. However,
217 Diary entry for 11 August 1945 in Piers Dixon, Double Dloma: The Life of Sir Pierson Dion.
Don and Dilomai (London, 1968), p.180.
218 e Truman, Memoirs, VoLI, pp.429-430 and Harriman and Abel,SpecialEnvoj, pp.499-500.
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the American desire to maintain the controlling hand in the evolution of East Asian
affairs also saw Truman exclude the Soviets from the Potsdain declaration. British hopes
of embarking on a glorious liberation of Southeast Asia were dashed with the sudden
Japanese surrender. Consequently, the British were unprepared for the postwar Asian
world.
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II
THE BILATERAL DIVISION OF KOREA
AND POSTWAR EASTASIA, 1941-1947
I. Introduction
Traditionally, Korea had not held much historical interest for Britain. During the Second
World War, British policy-makers were unsure about the American concept of a
trusteeship for Korea that could exclude or involve Britain more deeply in the affairs of
Northeast Asia than it thought desirable. After the defeat of Japan, economic problems
and strategic over-stretch forced British military planners to recoil from the idea of
providing occupation forces for Korea. But British policy-makers were aware of Korea's
potential for igniting an international crisis which grew stronger as Soviet and American
troops occupied the province north and south of the 38th paralleL Increasing hostility
between the Anglo-American powers and the Soviet Union meant that Britain found it
necessary to formulate a view about the occupation of Korea and thus there followed a
considerable amount of debate in Whitehall. But Japan's sudden surrender meant that the
United States was no more ready than Britain to occupy or become involved in Korean
affairs. Moreover, Washington did not regard Korea as strategically important to the
United States. Britain might have thought more of Korea in this respect. However, the
State Department found it difficult to retreat completely from Korea due to reasons of
prestige and the effect it would have on their policies in China and Japan. In similar
circumstances, the British had been reluctant to withdraw from Egypt and Iran because
of its effects on the surrounding region and Britain's world power and imperial status.
There remained, though, a major difference of approach to both these areas. By 1946, in
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the Middle East, the Anglo-American powers made a concerted stand against Soviet
incursions which forced the latter to back down. In Korea, the United States did not
always inform Britain of its major decisions and it was not possible to co-ordinate
Western policy. By the end of 1947, both British and American military planners had
effectively written off Korea as a strategic asset in the Cold War
II. Britith Wartime Planningfor Koa
A EARLY PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Korea had not played a prominent
part in British strategic, political and economic thinking. Only in two instances did Korea
attract the attention of the British government and on both occasions it was the
perceived threat of a hostile Russia that dictated a measured British response. During the
latter nineteenth and early twentieth century, ominous Russian attempts to expand into
Northeast Asia prompted the British to sign the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902. For
Britain, increasingly preoccupied with the strength of Germany, the alliance aimed to
counterbalance Tsarist policies that appeared to threaten the Crown's interests in China
and India. Defeat in the Russo-Japanese war effectively ended a positive Russian policy
in this region after 1905 and the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 was accepted by
the British as a consequence of its partnership with Japan.' The Japanese occupation was
efficient but repressive and Korean uprisings during 1919 against Japan's colonial rule
were ruthlessly suppressed. 2
 Throughout the interwar years, Whitehall paid little attention
For an overview of Japanese, Russian and British policy during this period with regard to
Northeast Asia see David Walder, The Short Vidoriouc War The Russo-Japanese Conflict 1904-5
(London, 1973); RConnaughton, The War of the Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear A Militarj I-Iistoy of
the Russo-Japanese War 1904-5 (London, 1988); Raymond Esthus, Double Eagle and Rising Sun: The
Riicsianc and Japanese at Portsmouth in 1905 (London, 1988); Ian Nish, The Ongins of the Russo-Japanese
War (London, 1985); idem, The Anglo-Japanese Alliana-, idem, Alliance in Decline and Lowe, Great
Bntain andJapan.
2 In the 1919 demonstrations, the Japanese killed approximately 1,200 Koreans, arrested 19,500,
jailing 3,500, and burned thousands of homes, churches, temples and schools. Alan Millett,
¶Jnderstanding Is Better Than Remembering The Korean War, 1945-1954', The Dwgbt
D.Eisenbower Lectures in War & Peace, no.7 (Manhattan, KS, 1997). See also Bruce Cumings, The
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to Korea and it was not until the re-entry of Soviet forces into Northeast Asia during the
middle of 1945 that the British once again began to closely monitor events on the
Korean peninsula. There was, however, a subtle difference in circumstances for the
British during the intervening crises over Korea. In the early 1 900s, Britain had been a
world power of the first rank and using traditional balance of power policies, enlisted the
support of an ally, Japan, to check Russian dominance in East Asia. By the end of the
Second World War, although a friendly power, this time the United States, provided the
counterbalance to Soviet domination, the British had less influence in East Asian
regional affairs and could not play a prominent part in directing policies towards Korea.
According to Robert Vansittart, a former permanent under-secretary at the Foreign
Office, developments in Korea epitomised the fact that: 'the Big Three had become the
Big Two'.3
As early as 1942, Sir George Sansom recognised that Korea occupied a dominating
strategic position in relation to China and Japan, but due to its demographic and
economic character, would remain a weak country dependent upon the protection of
other powers for a considerable period. For this reason, Sansom concluded that Korea
was liable to constitute 'a danger point'. 4
 Joseph Ballantine and Max Bishop at the
Division of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department, saw this 'danger point'
emanating from a Soviet desire to gain control of Korea and the neighbouring areas of
Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. 5
 Taking these concerns into account, in October 1943,
Ongiizc of the Korean War, VoLI: Liberation and the Emergence of Stparate Regimes 1945-1947 (Princeton,
1989), chps.1-2. A detailed study of Japan's colonial policies from 1895-1945 can be found in
R.Myers and M.Peattie(eds.),TbeJanese ColonsalEmpire, 1895-1945(Guilford, 1984). For a classic
account of Korean cultural and political evolution see Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of
Vortex (Cambridge, Mass, 1968).
Robert Vansittart, 'The Way We Have Gone', Manchester Guardian, 5 January 1946.
' For various references on Korea by Sansom see George Sansom,Posvar RelalioPLc with Japan
(New York, 1942), passim.
'USSR Aims in the Far East', Ballantine and Bishop memorandum, 19 August 1943, FRUS:
Washington and Quebec, 1943 (Washington, 1970), pp.627-629. See also James Matray, The Rth,ctant
Crusade:American Fomgn P0/if, jfl Korra 194 1-1950 (Honolulu, 1985), pp.5-27.
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Sansom, supported by Eden, suested that the immediate postwar solution might be to
allow the Koreans to take over the country at once, provided that 'allied' advisers could
temporarily oversee and direct the administration. The State Department did not disagree
with Sansom's ideas but showed no eagerness for the United States to have the honour
of acting as a mandatory.6
 However, reflecting the fears of Ballantine and Bishop, the
Foreign Office and the Russian Department at the Chinese Ministry of Information,
wondered if the real question seemed to be whether the Soviet Union would permit any
other nation to have a share in the occupation of Korea at all. Whereas the Korean
groups in China and the United States were merely exiles, the Soviet Union had a
substantial resident Korean population, mainly in the Vladivostok area, and this was
bolstered by the fact that a number of Korean officers and men had served in the Red
Army.7
To offset Foreign Office concerns, Harriman drafted a memorandum for Roosevelt
at Cairo in November 1943, stating that it would be prudent to agree to the
independence of Korea under some type of trusteeship in which the four great powers
would participate. 8
 This proposal had the dual purpose of attempting to prevent a Soviet
domination of Korea while allowing the politically divided Koreans time to establish
their own independent state. 9 Beyond shared opposition to Japanese rule, popular
6 Record of discussion between Sansom, Hornbeck and Clarke on the postwar administration of
Korea, 13 October 1943, F5471/723/23, FO 371/35956; Eden minute, WM(43)53, 13 April
1943, CAB 65/38 and Hamilton to Hull, 22 April 1943, FRUS, 1943, VoL III, pp.1090-1096.
The resident Korean population numbered around 180,000. See Hudson, minute, 3 November
1943, F5471/723/23, FO 371/35956 and Thyne Henderson, minute, 12 December 1944,
U8583/648/G, FO 371/40741B. See also Anthony Farrar-Hockley, The Bntisb Pail in the Korean
IVar VoLT: A Distant Ob4gation (London, 1990), p.2. For Chinese Nationalist opinion see Robert
Slussor, 'Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1945-50: Soviet Goals in Korea' in Nagai and Iriye(eds.), The
Ongins of the Cold War in Asia, p.131. On the role of Korean partisans in Soviet territory during
the 1930s and 1940s see Erik Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Polify in Korea, 1945-1947
(Oxford, 1989), pp.17-32.
The Chinese Ambassador at Moscow had also expressed opinions along these lines. See
Harriman and Abel, SpecialEnvoy, pp.261-262.
Record of discussion between Sansom, Hombeck and Clarke on the postwar administration of
Korea, 13 October 1943, F5471/723/23, FO 371 /35956.
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Korean figures from Nationalist China and the United States, such as Sygnman Rhee,
Kim Kyu-sik and Kim Ku, had little in common with their leading communist
counterparts, Kim il-sung and Pak Hon-yong. Disunity was also prevalent in both these
opposing political blocs.'0
 Factionalism amongst Korean political groups and uncertainty
about the role of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan, led Churchill to subscribe to
the Cairo declaration of December 1943. The declaration pledged that the United States,
Britain and China, 'mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined
that in due course Korea shall become free and independent'.' 1
 Responding to a question
from Churchill at Teheran, Stalin said he had read and thoroughly approved the Cairo
communiqué. It was right, Stalin cautiously stated, that Korea should be independent
The Soviet leader said little else on the subject.' 2
 It was not until October 1944, that
Korea was discussed again between the United States and the Soviet Union. Britain was
not involved in the proceedings that briefly dealt with military operations in East Asia.'3
During talks with Harriman at Moscow, Stalin explained that Soviet forces would embark
on major operations in North China as far as Peking and secure the northern Korean
ports. Harriman said little in response to Stalin's military plans and merely informed him
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not considering joint land operations in Northeast
Asia. Harriman's remark must have encouraged Stalin to believe that the Red Army
would play a major part in Korea's liberation.'4
Despite the British being excluded from military planning in Northeast Asia, six
months after the conclusion of the Cairo conference, an informal committee was set up
by the Foreign Office to investigate the future of Korea. The wartime committee, for
10 See Millett, 'Understanding Is Better Than Remembering'. For a concise survey on the
factionalism within these blocs see Peter Lowe, The Orz,gins of the Korean War (London, 1997),
pp7-l2.
" 
'British Foreign Policy in the Far East', Far Eastern Civil Planning Unit (FECPU)
memorandum, GEN 77/94, 14 January 1946, CAB 130/5.
12 j 	 and Abel, Speaa1Envy, p.275.
13 See Leahy,I [Var There, pp.478-479.
'4 See Van Ree, Soda/is,,, in One Zone, pSi.
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reasons that have already been examined in chapter one, took several months to produce
a policy preparation and held its first meeting as late as December 944.' The
committee's first and only appraisal concluded, in line with American planners, that it
would be impossible for the Koreans to set up an effective government immediately after
liberation. 16
 The British, Chinese and United States governments had continually refused
to recognise bodies such as the Korean provisional government during wartime. There
were severe Anglo-American doubts over how genuinely representative this group was in
Korea. The British had made it clear that they were not prepared to contemplate
recognition of the Korean provisional government and notes addressed by Kim Ku, the
Chairman, and To So-wang, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the provisional government,
to the British Foreign Office would remain unanswered. 17
 Apart from the disunity
amongst Korean political groups, a major problem that led British planners to approve
of some form of international tutelage, was that the whole of the Korean economy had
been closely integrated with that of Japan. Japanese nationals had been in control of
most of the industry, finance and public services. Therefore, the task of constructing a
Korean state which could stand by itself would, according to the newly formed Korean
committee at the Foreign Office, be a formidable one. In addition, the committee
pointed out that Korea was the closest point on the Asiatic mainland to Japan while
flanking the approaches to Tientisn, Dairen and Vladivostok. For this reason, the
committee felt that: 'control of Korean bases and ports by any one power is likely to be
received with jealousy by some of the others'.18
The committee was composed principally of Arnold Toynbee (chairman), Sir Paul Butler,
Geoffrey Hudson and Charles Webster. See Diary entry for 9 December 1944 in Webster diary,
Vol 12, Webster papers, VoLII, LSE, for complaints on the slow progress of British policy
towards Korea.
16 
'Future of Korea', Webster memorandum, 20 December 1944, F6012/102/23, FO
371/41801. See also Lowe, The Ongins of the Korean JVar, p.l3.
' Winant to Secretary of State, 9 April 1945, FRUS, 1945, VoL VI, p.lO26. The Chinese fell into
line with American policy on this issue. See Ballantine memorandum, 5 February 1945, ibid,
p.1019.
' 'Future of Korea', Webster memorandum, 20 December 1944, F6012/102/23, FO
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American official thinking on Korea did not differ widely from British perceptions at
this stage. Within the State Department, the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far
East, argued that: 'as the security of the North Pacific will be of concern to [America]
and as Korea's political development may affect this security, the United States
would...be interested in active participation in any Korean administration authority'. The
Soviet Union and China, who both had territory contiguous to Korea would, noted the
Area Committee, have a primary interest in its future political status. There were serious
American reservations about leaving the occupation of Korea to one power. The
Chinese were correctly considered too weak while a purely Soviet occupation might, the
Area Committee claimed, be perceived as a major security threat to both China and the
United States.'9
 Charles Webster at the Foreign Office agreed with this analysis,
recognising that 'China will be mainly concerned to reduce...Soviet influence in the
whole area [and] will be so conscious of her own weakness that she will be glad to see
other great powers sharing the responsibility for Korea, and in particular the United
States'. 2° Webster's analysis highlights the fact that he saw Britain playing no more than a
subsidiary role in the Korean region. Yet, during 1944, despite the State Department's
interest in Korea, it did not want the latter to become a major American responsibility
and the Area Committee still felt that a combined occupation by the United States,
Britain, China and the Soviet Union was the most sensible course to adopt.21
Although the Area Committee had presumed that Britain would take an interest in the
military occupation of Korea, either directly or through the Dominions, there are no
371/41801.
19 
'Korea: Political Problems: Provisional Government', Inter-Divisional Area Committee
memorandum, 4 May 1944, FRUS, 1944, VoL III, pp.1240-1241.
20 
'Future of Korea', Webster memorandum, 20 December 1944, F6012/102/23, FO
371/41801. Dr Wu, the Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, had indicated these very
intentions to the British in late 1944. Seymour to Eden, letter, 4 December 1944,
U8786/4320/70, FO 371/40798.
21 
'Korea: Political Problems: Provisional Government', Inter-Divisional Area Committee
memorandum, 4May 1944, FRUS, 1944, VoLIII, pp.l240-124l.
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British or American official records to suest that the British government had told the
United States it was willing to provide forces for such an enterprise. A root problem
between the British and the Americans was the question of a trusteeship for Korea.
Churchill and Eden did not feel comfortable with the idea of trusteeship as they feared it
could be applied in turn to the colonial possessions of the British Empire. However,
the Foreign Office was divided. Those officials in charge of Asian affairs were adamant
that if Britain did not take a military or political part in the occupation of Korea: 'it will
be an admission of weakness which will have an immediate effect on our position in
China'. The Far Eastern Department at the Foreign Office minuted that 'if the
postwar set-up is going to succeed this time, we shall not be able to adopt an
"isolationist" policy towards any problem which may contain the seeds of international
dispute'. 24 For this very reason, the North American Department and the Economic and
Reconstruction Department were not so enthusiastic. Aware of Britain's economic
problems and the area's potential for conflict, they advised that the United Kingdom
would be 'well advised to keep out'. The head of the Economic and Reconstruction
Department, Gladwyn Jebb, believed that Britain was trying to punch above its weight
without the available material means. Jebb strongly felt that: 'we should stop fussing
about Korea and leave it to the Americans, Russians and Chinese to try to hammer out a
solution'.
Earl of Avon, Memoirs, p.438 and Kimball, Fotedin War, p.314.
'Future of Korea', Webster memorandum, 20 December 1944, F6012/102/23, FO
371/41801.
24 Sternda]e Bennett, minute, 8 January 1945, F6012/102/23, FO 371/41801 and Foulds,
minute, 8 January 1945, F6012/102/23, P0 371/41801.
25 Ward, minute, 10 january 1945, P6012/102/23, FO 371/41801.
Jebb, minute, 12 January 1945, F6012/102/23, FO 371/41801. The North American
Department also dismissed the Far Eastern Department's ideas as too grandiose. See Butler,
minute, 22 January 1945, F6012/102/23, FO 371/41801. For the disappointed reaction of the
Foreign Office's Asian officals see diary entry for 13 January 1945 in Webster diary, VoL No.12,
Webster papers, VoL11, LSE and diary entry for 16 August 1945 in Webster diary, Vol. No.14,
Webster papers, VoL II, ibid.
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B. YALTA, BRiTISH ISOLATIONAND THE PL4CE OF KOREA IN THE
DEFEAT OF JAPAN
At Yalta, Roosevelt, dismissing the influence of British power in East Asia and
attempting to secure Stalin's military support in the war against Japan, appeared to be
moving towards a trusteeship comprising just the United States, the Soviet Union and
China. In his first meeting with Stalin on 8 February 1945, Roosevelt put this idea to the
Soviet leader and argued that the trusteeship might last up to thirty years. Both Stalin and
Roosevelt agreed that no foreign troops would be stationed in Korea. The exclusion of
the British worried Roosevelt and he sought Stalin's advice. Stalin replied that the British
would most certainly be offended and argued that they should be invited, otherwise
Churchill might 'kill us'. These discussions were not related to the British and nothing
was entered in the record as the Soviet Union remained at peace with Japan. Stalin,
nevertheless, seemed apathetic about the idea of trusteeship and consented to it in an
uncommitted way. 27
 Documented evidence from the Soviet Foreign Ministry suggests
that at the very least Stalin was interested in maintaining the balance of power in the
Korean peninsula favourable to the Soviet Union and to restore its pre-1904 position.
There is no evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union wanted the whole of Korea under
its controL However, Stalin's cautious attitude at Tehran and Yalta was probably
attributable to a belief that once Soviet forces had entered the war against Japan, Korea
might be fully occupied by the Red Army? This belief was undoubtedly reinforced at the
Potsdam conference in July 1945, when General Marshall told his Soviet counterpart,
General Antonov, that the United States did not contemplate making an offensive
against Korea until well after the landings at Kyushu. Marshall explained that an
Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, pp.38-40 and Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korran [Var,
Part I, p.3.
2R See Weathersby, 'Soviet Aims in Korea', p.7 and 1-larrirnan to Byrnes, 12 November 1945,
FRUS, 1945, VoLI/I,pp.1121-1122.
Slussor, 'Soviet Far Eastern Policy', pp.128-130.
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American operation against Korea would require an undue amount of shipping and it
was the belief of United States planners that Korea could be brought under control
without difficulty once aircraft could operate from Kyushu. British opposition to the
concept of trusteeship was also mounting when Churchill, at Potsdam, impatiently
brushed aside proposals for such a scheme in the former Italian colonies of North
Africa. An attempt by Stalin to turn the discussion to Korea was equally unsuccessful. As
the Soviets were not at war with Japan, Stalin had yet to formally associate himself with
the Cairo declaration.30
In early 1945, the Foreign Office was sure that: 'if Russia is determined to assume
virtual control over Korea neither we nor the Americans nor the Chinese nor all three
will be able to stop her'.3 ' The Chinese Foreign Minister, T.Soong, agreed, believing that
2 Siberian-trained divisions would be left in Korea along with Moscow political
personnel. Under these conditions, Soong was fearful that in the long term, even with a
four-power trusteeship, the Soviets would dominate Korean affairs. Korea's border with
north China, where Chinese communism was gradually expanding, presented obvious
implications.32
 Soviet planners no doubt thought they would be firmly established in
Korea, basing their assumption on the Anglo-American planning criteria that the conflict
against Japan would continue for at least eighteen months after the defeat of Germany.
Notwithstanding this perception, Stalin evidently grew concerned about his timetable for
the entry of Soviet forces into Manchuria and Korea, when Japanese attempts at
mediation began to surface in I 945•3 In February 1945, Stalin immediately pressured his
military planners to speed up preparations for the participation of Soviet forces in the
3° See Truman, Memoirs, Voll, p.383. See Van Ree, Sociah:cm in One Zone, pp.3847; Michael
Sandusky, America's Parallel (Alexandria, 1983), p.150 and Slussor, 'Soviet Far Eastern Policy,
1945-50: Soviet Goals in Korea', pp.133-135.
' Foulds, minute, 8 January 1945, F6012/102/23, FO 371/41801.
32 TrUr Memoirs, VoLI, pp.316-317.
u See Chapter 1.
See Nish, Preparing for peace & survival', pp.6-7.
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war against Japan. 35
 On 8 August 1945, two days after the first atomic bomb was
dropped on Hiroshima, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and began to launch
attacks on Manchuria, Korea and Sakhalin. When Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945,
the Red Army had only managed to cross the Yalu River and advance as far as Chongjin
in the far Northeast of Korea. With British and Chinese Nationalist forces focused on
the recovery of lost territory in Southeast Asia, the Southwest Pacific and mainland
China, the Americans were conceivably the only other power that could provide troops
for the occupation of Korea. But MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, faced with
manpower restrictions and their desire to occupy Japan first, did not regard Korea as a
priority and despatched troops to the peninsula only on 8 September 1945. Stalin made
no attempt to occupy the whole of Korea and readily accepted an American dividing line
of the 38th parallel between Soviet and American forces?
Until MacArthur had accepted Japan's formal surrender on 2 September 1945, Soviet
forces in Korea, outnumbered by three to one, might well have faced a bitter struggle
over hundreds of miles of inhospitable terrain, had an attempt been made to reach Seoul.
More importantly, Moscow controlled the ice-free ports of Chongjin and Wonsan as a
guarantee against the Manchunan ports obtained at Yalta. The successful testing of the
atomic bomb had motivated Truman and Byrnes to believe that they could minimise the
35 Just before the Yalta conference, Stalin had approached his Army Chief of Staff with a view to
speeding up military plans for an attack against Japan. See Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, p.38 and
Westad, Cold War & Revolution, p.78.
See Calvocoressi, Total War I/oh, p.6O1; Westad, Cold War & Revolution, pp.77-98 and Peter
Denis, Troubled Dajs of Peace: Mounthauen and Southeast Asia Comman4 1945-46 (Manchester, 1987).
37 James Schnabel and Robert Watson, The History of the Joint Chiefi of Staff The Joint Chiefi of Staff
and National Poliy, VoLIJI: Tbe Korean [Var, Pa,i I (Wilmington, 1979), pp.3-10. Michael Sandusky
considers this American move a lost opportunity, arguing that if MacArthur had spared forces
for Korea, they could have occupied the greater part of the peninsula. Sandusky, America's
Para/1e4 pp.239-245. Peter Lowe disagrees, pointing out that the American priority had always
been Japan, especially if it meant preventing Soviet forces from directly involving themselves in
that country. Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War, p.19. See also John Gaddis, cKorea in American
Politics, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1945-1950' in Nagai and Iriye(eds.), The Origins of the Cold War
inAsia, pp.277-278 and idem, We Now Know, chp.3.
SWNCC draft memorandum to the JCS, undated, FRUS, 1945, I/oh/I, pp.1037-1039.
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amount of territory in East Asia to come under Soviet control. At Potsdam, American
officials were reluctant to go into details regarding a trusteeship for Korea. Stalin,
therefore, was probably reluctant to jeopardise more important issues in Europe,
American aid for Soviet postwar reconstruction or a possible place in the occupation of
Japan over disagreements in Korea. Furthermore, the Red Army had brought with
them a host of Korean communists from the Soviet Union and Yenan who were already
setting up pre-selected People's Committees in North Korea in an attempt to consolidate
the area.4° By the time the Soviet Union and the United States had agreed on a dividing
line for Korea, British impact on discussing the fate of Korea had been considerably
reduced. Th British, proccupisd with economic problm and boIstring - impwial
position in Southeast Aria, Py sending forces to Malaya, the Dutch East Indies,
the BriEit, pr xupuett Jt ecorrinic
Indo-China, Siam and Japan,Acould not and did not want to play a major role in the
occupation of Korea. Even the Far Eastern Department at the Foreign Office was forced
to admit that: 'Korea will come very low on our list of priorities'.4'
III. The Postwar Defence Budget and British Poliiy in Kona
A. L4BOUR Th POWER. BR1TATh'S STRATEGIC PRIORiTIES
In July 1945, a new Labour administration, headed by the dry and undemonstrative
premet-sh4p
Clement Attlee, witnessed a revival of the party's fortunes ' eIJ1y/lfrk/cI
Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Ki?m/in's Cold War, p.32; Matray, The Rthctant Cnsade,
pp•42-45; William Stueck, The Korean EVar An International History (Princeton, 1995), pp.18-19;
Sandusky, America's Paralk4 pp.225, 248-252; Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, p
.67; Mark Paul,
'Diplomacy Delayed: The Atomic Bomb and the Division of Korea, 1945' in Bruce
Cumings(ed.), Child of Conj1ict.' The orean-Ametican Re/ationsbp, 1943-1953 (London, 1983),
pp.67-9l; Barton Bernstein, 'The Perils and Politics of Surrender Ending the War with Japan',
Pacific Historical Rwiew, VoL46 No.1 (February 1977), pp.1-28; idem, 'Understanding the Atomic
Bomb and the Japanese Surrender', pp.227-273; Slussor, 'Soviet Far Eastern Policy', p.133 and
James Matray, 'Captive of the Cold Wax The Decision to Divide Korea at the 38th Parallel',
Pacific Historical Review, VoL5O No.2 (May 1981), pp.145-168.
4° Political Developments in Korea: Period 15th August 1945, to 15th March 1945', Kermode to
Bevin, despatch no.33, 16 March 1948, F4990/511/81, FO 371/69940.
' Foulds, minute, 8 January 1945, F6012/102/23, FO 371/41801.
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t929-)3I 42 According to Cadogan, his new masters were a 'funny looking lot' and he
didn't know half of them by sight 43
 These concerns apart, the Atdee administration had
to guide Britain through some of the most economically difficult years of its history.
Elected on the back of a pledge to build a welfare state, the problems of rebuilding
houses, inadequate fuel and the shortage of food would haunt the Labour administration
throughout its tenure in office.4 ' At the end of the Second Wodd War, Britain had
accumulated debts of some £4.7 billion.45 Consequently, Lord Keynes, the Treasury's
principal economic adviser, stated that the cessation of lend-lease material, could leave
Britain facing a 'financial Dunkirk', culminating in retrenchment overseas, charity from
the Dominions and a greater degree of austerity at home. 45 The new Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, advocated that the solution to this crisis was the reconversion
of British industry from war to peace, the demobilisation of Britain's armed forces and
the rapid reduction in overseas expenditure. Dalton later lamented that these remedies
met with 'stubborn, and sometimes quite stupid resistance' from ministerial colleagnes.
It was, of course, difficult for many British officials to contemplate hardship, especisily
after Britain had emerged victorious from the Second World War with its powerful fleet,
army and air force still intact.
Resistance to Dalton's proposals was somewhat alleviated when Truman, under
pressure from Congress, terminated lend-lease supplies on 21 August i945. The result
42 See KHarris, Alt/se (London, 1982) for a good biography of Attlee.
Diary entry for 7 August 1945 in Dilks(ed.), The Diaries ofSirAlexander Cadogan, p.780.
Notes by Dalton of an Informal Discussion on Future Policy and Problems, 30 July 1945,
Dalton papers, Vol.11,9/i, LSE.
Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, p.159.
'Our Overseas Financial Prospects', Keynes memorandum, CP(45)112, 14 August 1945, CAB
129/1.
47 Hugh Dalton, H:b Tide and After Memoirc 1945-1960 (London, 1962), p.70.
' Young, Britain and the World, p.145. For an overview of British foreign policy during this
period see Barker,The British Between the Setpowers, 1 945-50; Deighton(ed.), Britain and the First
Cold War, Michael Dockrill and John Young(eds.), British Foregn Po/ify, 1 945-56 (London, 1989)
and Ritchie Ovendale(ed.), The Fomgn Polify of the British Labour Governmenc, 1945-1951 (Leicester,
1984).
' See Barneit, The Lost Victory, pp.1-4 and Thorne, Allies of a Kind, pp.505-506.
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was a clamour within the Labour Cabinet for a United States loan and a readiness to
demobilise Britain's armed forces as quickly as possible. Bevin espoused a lone warning,
suggesting that Britain should not be left in a position analogous to 191 8-1919, when the
government was seriously weakened by the rapid demobilisation of its forces. 5° Thanks
to his wartime experience in the coalition government, Bevin spoke with authority on
manpower and economic questions. 5' However, those within the Attlee administration,
of whom many were convinced internationalists and proponents of the UN, found it
hard to justify substantial military expenditure, when Britain's principal enemies,
Germany and Japan, had been annihilated. 52
 Although Bevin realised that Britain could
not sustain huge military forces, he thought it was wholly unrealistic to suppose that the
UN could at once take over postwar international responsibilities. Bevin felt this task lay
with the great powers who had the resources and experience to deal with the postwar
world. Once a settlement had been agreed, then the UN could police it. 53 Overestimating
British capabilities, Acheson, Stimson, Grew, the State Department and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff all expected the British to play a decisive role in upholding the postwar balance
of power while checking Soviet influence. 5 ' British and American planners, aware of the
devastation heaped upon the Soviet Union during the last war, correctly surmised that
Stalin would want to avoid a war for at least ten to fifteen years.'5
Despite American hopes and Bevin's analysis, Dalton was reluctant to embrace a bold
foreign policy and told the Cabinet that he wanted to reduce the total expenditure of the
° Bevin, minute, CM(45)23, 16 August 1945, CAB 128/1 and Cabinet minutes in CM(45)26, 30
August 1945, CAB 128/1.
Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevrn: Fore:,, Secretarj 1945-1951 (Oxford, 1985), p.98.
52 Attlee, minute, DO(45)7, 5 October 1945, CAB 69/7 and diary entry for 7 December 1945 in
Dalton diary, Part I, VoL33,July-December 1945, Dalton papers, LSE.
" Bevin, minute, CM(45)36, 28 September 1945, CAB 128/1 and Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p.111.
Leffler has pointed out how Administration officials exaggerated British strength, carped at its
imperial practices and wanted Britain to eschew economic blocs. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power,
p.61.
During late 1945, intelligence reports indicated that Soviet forces were rapidly demobilising.
ibid., pp.25, 96, 111 and Lewis, Changing Direction, pp.359-369. For the Soviet position see Zubok
and Pleshakov, Inside the Kmnlin's Cold Wa,, pp.28-29,31.
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forces in peace-time to £500 million. Between 1945 and 1947, Dalton, supported by
Attlee, would continually attack the spending programmes produced by the armed
services which in his view were damaging the prospects of economic recovery. 57
 When
the draft statement on defence for 1946 announced that the total strength of Britain's
armed forces in June 1946 would be I ,900,0(land 1,100,000 in December 1 946, Dalton
complained that the annual expenditure of £1,091 million, was more than double the
sum which had been regarded as a reasonable peacetime figure by the wartime coalition
gosrernment. 59 Dalton's relentless pressure to decrease military manpower meant that a
British role in the occupation of Korea was singled out as one example of an entirely
unnecessary obligation.60
 Notwithstanding a reluctance to participate in the occupation of
Korea, British commitments across the globe remained staggering after the end of the
Second World War. Britain provided forces for the occupation of Germany, Austria,
Italy, Iran, Libya, Japan, French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies while deploying
troops throughout the world to defend its imperial interests in the Mediterranean, Africa,
the Middle East and Southeast Asia.6'
Dalton, minute, CM(45)36, 28 September 1945, CAB 128/1.
Diary entry for 5 October 1945 in Dalton diary, Part 1, Vol.33, July-December 1945, Dalton
papers, LSE; Diary entry for 27 January 1947 in Dalton diary, Part I, Vol.35, January-October
1947, ibid and Dalton, minute, CM(47)9, 17 January 1947, CAB 128/9. See also Anthony Gorst,
"We must cut our coat according to our cloth": the making of British defence policy, 1945-8' in
Richard Aldrich(ed.), British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold EVa,; 1 945-5 1 (London, 1992),
pp.145-147.
cost would be Navy £255 million; the Army £682 million; the Air Force £256 million and
supply and aircraft production £474 million. See the Dnrfi Statement Rrlatin,g to Defince: 1946 in
Defence Policy in 1946', note by Attlee and Alexander, CP(46)65, 15 February 1946, CAB
129/7.
Dalton, minute, CM(46)16, 18 February 1946, CAB 128/5.
60 
'Occupational Forces forJapan and Korea',JP(45)217(Final), 28 August 1945, CAB 79/38.
61 See Michael Dockrill, British Defence since 1945 (Oxford, 1988), p.22 and David Sanders, Losing
an Empire, Finding a Role: British Foreign Polify since 1945 (London, 1990), pp.50-52. The classic text
on British defence policy before the release of archival material is Corelli Barnett, The Lon,g
Retreai A Short Histoy of British Defence Pokey (London, 1972).
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B. KOREA IN BRiTISH PLANS FOR POSTWAR EASTASIA
Once Japan had surrendered in August 1945, the Chiefs of Staff had been extremely
anxious about involving Britain in an occupation of Korea. The Chiefs of Staff told the
British Joint Staff Mission in Washington that: 'we have no military interests in Korea
and the provision and maintenance of forces of occupation would be an embarrassment
to us'.62
 The Foreign Office united behind this military appraisal in September 1945. A
Foreign Office memorandum stated that British economic interests in Korea were
negligible. During the years 1935-1939 the average annual exports from Britain to Korea
had amounted to just £156,000 while imports from Korea to the United Kingdom
peaked at £9,000. These figures led the Foreign Office to conclude that: 'The United
Kingdom has little interest in the future of Korea except for the fact that she is a
signatory of the Cairo declaration'. But the Foreign Office was loathe to contemplate a
complete indifference over matters on Korea. There was still a fear that Korea contained
the seeds for an international dispute and this fact alone, according to the Foreign
Office, prevented the adoption of an entirely isolationist policy.63
The immediate interests of the British government lay with events in Southeast Asia.
The importance of restoring the Empire which could accrue economic benefits and
bolster a British presence in world affairs, directed most of Britain's limited resources
and manpower to this region. For the same reasons, Britain's secondary priority in Asia
centred upon a return to China and the provision of occupational forces for Japan. The
Foreign Office did not see Korea as a tool that could help re-establish British power and
rather saw it as an area that presented more problems than any credible advantages. The
See 'Occupational Forces for Japan and Korea', JP(45)217(Final), 28 August 1945, CAB
79/38. COS toJSM, COS('W)85, 30 August 1945, F6257/2426/23, FO 371/46476.
63 
'Future of Korea', Foreign Office memorandum, 8 September 1945, F6911/2426/23, FO
371/46476.
64 See Chapters III and IV for a detailed analysis of Britain's attitude regarding the restoration of
its position throughout Southeast Asia, Japan and China in the immediate aftermath of the war
against Japan.
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Foreign Office thought it would be impossible, after forty years of Japanese rule, to find
a sufficient number of Koreans with the requisite experience to undertake the
administration. The various Korean factions in China and the United States were not
considered to be representative of the bulk of the Korean people and seemed continually
engaged in inter-party conflicts. The Korean provisional government at Chungking, for
example, had not been recognised by any allied powers and the Foreign Office argued
that it exercised no authority inside Korea and aroused the suspicion of the Soviet
Union, partly on account of certain anti-Soviet statements by some of its leaders.65
Apart from these problems, the British also became disillusioned with the American
attitude towards them over Korea. On 13 September 1945, John Vincent, the Director of
the Office of Far Eastern Affairs at the State Department, tardily informed the British
Embassy at Washington that the United States would institute a four-power trusteeship
for Korea, and that he had already received Soviet and Chinese agreement to the
proposal. Vincent apologised for not having consulted Britain earlier but thought this
proposal had been discussed at Yalta, although no decision was taken. At the Far
Eastern Department in the Foreign Office, the initial reaction to Vvk.Eilt's approach was
one of dismay and scepticism. Linton Foulds minuted that: 'The State Department now
lamely apologise for not having consulted us earlier, while suggesting that the matter was
discussed in an indeterminate manner at Yalta'.67
 Churchill had already expressly told the
Attlee government that an occupation for Korea was not discussed at Yalta. Frank
Roberts, the chargé d'affairs at the British Embassy in Moscow, correctly observed that:
65 
'Future of Korea', Foreign Office memorandum, 8 September 1945, F6911/2426/23, FO
371/46476. Cumings, The Oagiizc of the Korean lVar, Vol.1, pp.179-189. Millett explains that as
Japanese oppression in Korea had been so ruthless that it had eliminated all but symbolic
resistance inside Korea. As a result, there was no Mahatma Gandhi, Aung S9n, Ho Chi Minh and
Mao Tse-tung in Korean history. Millett, 'Understanding Is Better Than Remembering'.
Halifax to Foreign Office, telegram no.6193, 13 September 1945, F6911/2426/23, FO
371/46476; Acheson to Winant, 13 September 1945, FRUS, 1945, VoL VI, pp.1046-1047 and
Harriman and Abel, SpecialEnvoy, p.471.
67 Foulds, minute, 15 September 1945, F6911/2426/23, FO 371/46476.
68 Peck to Sterndale Bennett, letter, 26 August 1945, F5586/364/23, FO 371/46448.
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'at Yalta there were surely Soviet-American conversations about the Far East, including
Korea, to which we were not privy'.'9 Foulds therefore surmised that: 'the motive for
bringing us in now is not difficult to discern. The Americans find themselves faced by a
Russian Army in Korea along the 38th parallel and want our support for the purpose of
changing the situation'. Indeed, Moscow attempted to consolidate its position in the
north and prevented any successful liaison with the Americans in the south to
co-ordinate Korea's economic rehabilitation. 70
 Foulds, therefore, angrily concluded that
the British government was in no way committed to the American proposal, especially as
the Foreign Office had already stated that Britain had little interest in the matter.71
Foulds superior, Sterndale Bennett, in a calmer frame of mind, still worried that
Korea could become a source of international trouble in which Britain would find it hard
to maintain a policy of neutrality. He argued that it was perhaps important to quickly fall
into line with the ideas of the United States. The head of the Far Eastern Department
realised that Britain's maximum contribution could only be in the form of advisers for
Korea, while Australia, now demanding a greater say in Asian-Pacific affairs, was likely to
lobby for a place as a trustee. 72
 The Economic and Reconstruction Department in the
Foreign Office confirmed that, however damaging it might be to Britain's prestige in
East Asia, British troops could not be spared for an occupation of Korea. The Economic
and Reconstruction Department explained that: 'we have not men or resources to throw
about in every corner of the world: we can't even get enough good men for our zone in
Germany'.73
 The British, therefore, advocated that Australia should now take Britain's
Roberts to Sterndale Bennett, letter, 26 November 1945, F11191/1394/23, FO 371/46469.
° The Soviet command in North Korea increased its political power through the provincial
police, which it controlled and began to force out political opponents. See Van Ree, Socialism in
One Zone, pp.125-131 and Farrar-Hoddey, The Bntish Pa,i in the Korean Wa, Pa, I, pp.5-6.
Foulds, minute, 15 September 1945, F6911/2426/23, FO 371/46476.
72 Sterndale Bennett, minute, 17 September 1945, F6911/2426/23, FO 371/46476 and Winant
to Secretary of State, 14 November 1945, FRUS, 1945, I/aL VT, pp.l124-ll25.
Ward, minute, 17 September 1945, F6911/2426/23, FO 371/46476. In 1946, the British
taxpayer had to provide for 70 per cent of northwest Germany's food needs which was costing
100m annually. In July 1946, despite French and Soviet objections, the Anglo-American powers
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place as a trustee in Korea, despite a recognition that this would be unwelcome to the
Americans. 74
 In October 1945, the Far Eastern (Ministerial) Committee, chaired by
Bevin, finally agreed that Korea should be subject to a four-power trusteeship, though
some doubt was expressed by British officials as to whether such an agreement would
work in practice. Indeed, the Korean people themselves were adverse to such a policy
and most had supported a hastily formed interim committee for the preparation of
Korean independence in August 1945 which was headed by the moderate left-winger, Yo
Un-hyong.75
American policy in Korea did, as the British had feared, start to run into trouble by
December 1945. Positional papers such as the one produced by the Inter-Area
Divisional Committee on the Far East in 1944, rarely touched upon the practical
problems that might confront the Americans in an occupation of Korea. America's first
political adviser in Korea, H.Benninghoff, described Korea as: 'a powder keg ready to
explode at the application of a spark'. Benninghoff informed Byrnes that the Korean
translation of independence in the Cairo declaration regarding the term 'in due course'
was the equivalent to 'in a few days' or 'very soon'. 76 The Korean realisation that 'in due
course' meant a considerably longer period brought forth a wave of bitterness.
Lieutenant-General John Hodge, the commander of American forces in the United
States zone in Korea, who had no knowledge of, or regard for, Korea and was
fused their two zones in Germany together. See Anne Deighton, The Impossible Petite: Britain, the
Division of Genna,y, and the On gins of the Cold War (Oxford, 1993).
Ward, minute, 20 September 1945, Broadmead, minute, 20 September 1945, Sterndale
Bennett, minute, 22 September 1945 and Cadogan, minute, 22 September 1945, F6911/2426/23,
FO 371/46476.
" See minutes in FE(M)(45)3, 25 October 1945, CAB 96/9; Bevin, minute, FE(M)(45)4, 11
December 1945, CAB 96/9 and minutes, FE(M)(45)4, 11 December 1945, CAB 96/9. See also
cKorea Sterndale Bennett, minute, 20 December 1945, F1697/199/23, FO 371/54249 and
Winant to Secretary of State, 14 November 1945, FRUS, 1945, VoLVI, pp.1124-1125. For a
thorough analysis of initial Korean attempts to clamour for reform and independence, before the
Soviet-American forces arrived, see Cumings, The Ongiezc of the Konan War, VoLI, pp.68-100. The
interim committee collapsed in late 1945 after Yo Un-hyong resigned and Kim Il-sung attacked it
as pro-American and pro-Japanese. Hodge finally outlawed it in December 1945. See Van Ree,
Socialism in One Zone, pp.131-133.
76 Benninghoff to Byrnes, 15 September 1945, ibid, pp.1049-1053.
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anti-communist, impressed upon his superiors that the dual occupation of Korea
thwarted the establishment of a sound economy which in turn hindered preparations for
future Korean independence. Hodge pointed out that the Americans were already being
blamed for the partition of Korea and resentment was growing fast. He felt that as this
situation continued, the United States position in Korea would become increasingly
untenable. In his opinion the Koreans did not want communism, but the unsettled
conditions and receding hopes for early national sovereignty would push many in Korea
to radical leftism, if not raw communism. Hodge threatened that if no corrective action
was forthcoming, America and the Soviet Union should: 'leave Korea to its own devices
and an inevitable internal upheaval for its self purification'.'7
Hodge had little experience in politics and was frequently bereft of direction from the
State Department Some of Hodge's own policies and public outbursts proved
disastrous.78 In the autumn, Hodge was quoted as saying that as far as he was concerned,
the Japanese and the Koreans were 'all the same breed of cats'. This story was bolstered
by Hodge's continued employment of the Japanese and collaborationist Korean
conservatives in administrative posts. Hodge was responding to local conditions and dire
economic circumstances while remaining determined to undermine the left. Dermot
MacDermot, who had been attached to the British Pacific fleet as a political adviser,
Hodge's remarks are contained in 'Current Situation in Korea', JCS 1483/18, 10 December
1945, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 158, KCL A Korean account of Korea's political development
during this period can be found in Joungwon Kim, Divided orea. The Politics ç[ Development,
1 945-1972 (Cambridge, Mass, 1975), pp.4.7-lóS.
7a Harrimazl
 and Abel, SpecialEnivy, pp.543-544.
De Ia Mare, minute, 5 September 1946, F12585/199/23, FO 371/54251. William Langdon,
Benninghoff's replacement later looked in to the origins of the 'breed of cats' story. It appeared
that from the press conference record, the subject discussed at that moment was the Korean
police in Japanese service. According to Langdon, Hodge remarked that 'Koreans consider them
the same breed of cats as Jap policemen'. Langdon to Secretary of State, 26 November 1945,
FRUS, 1945, VoL VI, p.1 135.
° Hodge's counterpart in the Soviet zone, Colonel-General Ivan Christiakov, immediately
replaced the Japanese officials with exiled Koreans. See Stueck, The Korean War, pp.20-23 and
Weathersby, 'Soviet Aims in Korea', p.13. For a defence of I-lodge see Lowe ,Containing the Cold
War in East Asia, p.170 and Matray, The Reluctant Cncade, pp.57-58. The most thorough analysis
of the turmoil in Korea at this time is to be found in Cumings, The Ongins of the Korean Wa,' VoLI,
chps.3,5 and 8.
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passed through Korea in December 1945 and confirmed many of the problems that
Hodge faced. He told Bevin that: 'the economic condition of the country is governed by
the 38th parallel bather which, if maintained, would cripple it. Most of the mines and
industrial equipment are in the north. In southern Korea there are adequate food stocks,
but transportation and distribution are in a very unsatisfactory condition'. 8' Officials at
the State Department concerned with Korea were aghast at some of Hodge's actions.
They held the same fears as Hodge but felt that his policies would lead to a permanent
division of Korea and a prolonged Soviet presence in northern Korea. Despite these
problems and Hodge's opposition to trusteeship, at the Council of Foreign Ministers in
Moscow during December 1945, Byrnes put forward proposals to Molotov for
establishing Korea as an independent state within five years. In the intervening period,
the two Foreign Ministers agreed that the territory would be placed under a four-power
trusteeship. Byrnes had already told Attlee in November that a trusteeship was the only
solution that could prevent Soviet control of Korea but the British were excluded from
the Korean discussions in Moscow. Unsure of trusteeship and faced with a huge variety
of overseas military commitments, Bevin wanted Australia to undertake the burden of
the fourth power within Korea. TM
 However, the British with their long tradition of
experience in East Asia, clearly felt they had something to offer and did not intend to
disassociate themselves entirely from the settlement for Korea. The Foreign Office, for
example, were not prepared to let Australia replace Britain in the preliminary
MacDermot to Bevin, telegram no. 80, 29 December 1945, F729/199/23, FO 371/54249.
There was also hardship in the north, where the Red Army 'lived off the land', requisitioned food
and caused unrest Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, pp.95-97.
See Matray, The Rthaant Cnsade, pp.64-68 and Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p.90.
" Harriman to Secretary of State, 27 December 1945, FRUS, 1945, VoL VI, p.1150-1151 and
Lowe, The Ongins ofthe CoW War, p.27.
84 Bevin, minute, CM(46)1, 1 January 1946, CAB 128/5 and Dominions Office to Australian
government, telegram no.87,4 March 1946, F1936/199/23, FO 371/54249.
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recommendations to be put forward by the four powers for the trusteeship on the
United States-Soviet Joint Commission.
Still, it was clear by early 1946 that the British ability to maintain a military presence in
East Asia was rapidly diminishing. In February, Keynes warned the Cabinet that Britain's
obligations abroad, together with the prospective military expenditure overseas, would
exceed the whole of the projected £937 million American loan which aimed to help
Britain during 194&1951. This led the Chiefs of Staff to recoil from major
responsibilities in East Asia. The Admiralty had already been forced to reduce its total
manpower in the Asian-Pacific region by 100,000 to 34,000. The Chiefs of Staff solemnly
concluded that: it will be necessary to reduce our naval forces in commission to a
strength which will allow no margin for emergencies'. Without a long-term strategy in
place and a visible enemy in the Pacific and Indian Oceans after the defeat of Japan, the
Admiralty found it hard to justify a presence in these waters. Once Mountbatten had
completed his post-surrender duties in 1946, even the commander of the British Pacific
fleet saw little need for a strong naval presence in East Asia. Meanwhile, occupational
requirements in French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies and Siam meant that the
Chiefs of Staff could muster only two brigades for the occupation of Japan, one brigade
85 The Foreign Office would consult the Australians on any proposals which the Joint
Commission put forward and would take into account any observations that they might have to
offer. De Ia Mare to Davies, letter, 25 February 1946, F1936/199/23, FO 371/54249.
Political and Military Expenditure Overseas', Keynes memorandum, 8 February 1946, Annex
to The Overseas Deficit', Dalton note, CP(46)58, 8 February 1946, CAB 129/7 and 'The Import
Programme, 1947', Dalton memorandum, Ministerial Committee on Economic Planning,
MEP(46)10, 23 October 1946, Appendix to 'The Import Programme 1947', Morrision
memorandum, CP(46)401, 29 October 1946, CAB 129/4.
'Size of the Armed Services', COS memorandum, COS(46)39(0), 10 February 1946, CAB
80/99.
Alexander, minute for Attlee, 4 September 1945, Annex to 'Hong Kong - Basing of British
Pacific Fleet', DO(45)10, 4 September 1945, F6859/1147/10, FO 371/46254 and Attlee,
minute, DO(45)7, 5 October 1945, CAB 69/7 and Alexander, minute, COS(46)176, 3 December
1946, CAB 79/54.
Fraser to Alexander, letter, 23 January 1946, AVAR 5/11/7(a), Alexander papers, CAC. The
Admiralty had not been completely oblivious to such a scenario. 'Composition of the Post-War
Navy',Director of Plans memorandum, undated, ADM 205/51. For an indepth discussion of
British naval policy in Asia and the Pacific see Murfett,InJeoJary.
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for Hong Kong and a single infantry brigade to meet any other crises in Asia. The
consequences of failing to rapidly demobilise made themselves clearly evident in 1946.
Uncomfortable climatic conditions, relative inactivity and the desire to return home hit
British morale hard in Asia. These factors had led the commander of the British Pacific
fleet to request the immediate reduction of manpower in his naval units. 91
 When the RAF
defiantly attempted to slow down releases during 1946, a Iate number of airmen at
Mauripur, near Karachi, refused to return to duty leaving the Air Ministry facing an open
revoltY As the British desperately tried to defend its imperial commitments, a military
responsibility in Korea, that had little bearing on the revival of Britain's economic or
international political position, was seen as an entirely unnecessary obligation.
IV. British Strategic Interests, Korea and the Origins ofthe Cold War
A THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR
After the defeat of Japan, the British politico-military planners had hoped that the United
States would continue to co-operate with them in international affairs.93
 The British
government presumed that its historical experience in diplomacy could be allied to the
power of the American novice.' It was unlikely, though, that the United States, with its
9° Alexander, minute, DO(45)6, 14 September 1945, CAB 69/7. Even the introduction of
conscription did not alleviate the problem. See Gorst, "We must cut our Coat according to our
cloth": the making of British defence policy, 1945-8', p.150.
91 Fraser to Alexander, letter, 23 January 1946, AVAR 5/11/7(a), Alexander papers, CAC.
The RAF argued that they had suffered from a poor recruiting campaign.. "'Strikes" in the
RAF', Secretary of State for Air memorandum, CP(46)25, 27 January 1946, CAB 129/6; 'The
Size of the Royal Air Force at the end of 1946', DeFreitas memorandum,CP(46)312, 30 July
1946, CAB 129/12 and Tedder, minute, CM(46)76, 1 August 1946, CAB 128/6. .*L
The FECPU had been working with PHP assumptions which called into question much of its
strategic thinking. 'British Foreign Policy in the Far East', FECPU memorandum, GEN 77/94,
14 January 1946, CAB 130/5.
Donnelly, minute, 5 September 1945, AN2560/22/45, FO 371/44557 and Penney to his wife,
letter, 3 September 1945, 4/35, Penney papers, KCL See also Michael Hopkins, 'Focus of a
Changing Relationship: The Washington Embassy and Britain's World Role Since 1945',
Cozeemporarj British Histoy, Vol.12 No.3 (Autumn 1998), p.lO5; idem, 'The Washington Embassy:
The Role of an Institution in Anglo-American Relations, 1945-55' in Michael Hopkins and
Richard Aldrich(eds.), Inlel4gence, Defence and DpIomaej: British Po/ify in the Postwar World (London,
1994), pp.79-99 and Ryan, The Vision ofAnglo-America, pp.18-20.
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strong opposition to imperialism, would readily prop up Britain's position in East and
Southeast Asia.95 In other areas, such as atomic research, the Americans, through the
McMahon Act of August 1946, decided to abandon the wartime co-operation between
Britain, Canada and the United States. Lingering isolationism and a public clamour for
rapid demobilisation, limited the Truman administration's ability to defend its strategic
concerns.96
 Without an American commitment to the defence of Western Europe, and
given the weakness of the French and British armies, the construction of a British bomb
appeared to be the only means of resisting a potential Soviet military threat.97
 In the
initial postwar period, Truman and Byrnes, like Roosevelt, did not want to give Stalin the
impression that the Anglo-American powers were ranging against the Soviets.98
 This was
prevalent in Bymes's attempts to deal unilaterally with the Soviet Union over Korea in
Moscow. On Korea and other issues, Bevin began to resent Byrnes's independent
actions that inflicted damage on Britain's world power status and ostracised the latter
from international policy-making. However, Koreans in the south violently protested
against the Moscow proposals for trusteeship while Truman, also alarmed by Byrnes's
unilateral control of foreign policy, was not enamoured with the concept either.'00
Sumner Welles, 'Course of Empire: British Self-Government Policy', Wasbinrnn Post, 2 July
1946.
Robert Pollard, 'The national security state reconsidered: Truman and economic containment,
1945-1950' in Lacey(ed.), The Truman Precidençy, pp.207-208.
Accordingly in 1946, a secret Cabinet Committee of senior ministers, headed by Attlee,
authorised the production of a British nuclear device and the huge expenditure was buried in
miscellaneous estimates. See Dockrill, B,itisb Defence Since 1945, pp.25-26.
Gaddis, The insecurities of victory', pp.244-24S.
Byrnes had also made demands for British bases in the Pacific during October 1945 and he
had failed to consult Bevin regarding his proposal for another meeting with Molotov in
December 1945. 'United States Requests for Bases', Bevin memorandum, DO(45)38, 29
November 1945, CAB 69/7. See Bullock, Ernest Been, pp.17- 1 8, 125, 199-200.
100 After Byrnes had returned from Moscow, his influence with Truman was never quite the
same and he had less freedom to manoeuvre in the field of foreign policy. See Truman to Byrnes,
letter(unsent), 5 January 1946, Ferrell(ed.), Off the R,con pp.79-80; James Byrnes, Speaking Frank/y
(London, 1947), chp.6; Messer, The End of an Alliance, chp.9 and James Chace, Atheson. The
Secretw of State Who Created the Ame,ican World (New York, 1998), p.130. Stalin would later
grumble to Harriman that the Americans appeared to be backtracking on the idea of trusteeship.
See Harrinian and Abel, SecialEnvoy, pp.532-533. On Korean opposition to trusteeship see Van
Ree, Soda/is,,, in One Zone, pp.142-143; Cumings, The Orgjnc of the Korean Wa, VoLI, pp.220-227
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The cooling of Anglo-American relations should not be overestimated. United States
officials did realise that British and American interests were mutual and interdependent.
What London objected to, the State Department argued, was that Washington desired
future co-operation to be on American terms. 101 Furthermore, although Britain had little
in the way of financial resources, its global geo-strategic position was of particular value
to the United States. 102 If war broke out between the Anglo-American powers and Soviet
Russia, United States Air Force planners wanted British bases in the Middle East to
attack Soviet oil supplies. Meanwhile, the possibility of using bases in northwest India
similarly allowed Britain and America to reach Siberian industrial areas. 103 Underground
collaboration between the American and British Chiefs of Staff also continued after the
Second World War, especially as Britain's intelligence capabilities remained considerable.
Co-operation at this level continued secretly unabated, along with operational analysis,
officer training and research and development.'04
 By July 1946, the American loan had
come to the rescue of the struggling British economy and in September 1946 Byrnes
announced that American forces would not be speedily evacuated from Europe.'°'
These American policy decisions had resulted from the rapidly changing international
picture in 1946.106 Stressing the need for a strong Anglo-American stand against Soviet
101 Leffler,A Pre)onderance of Power, p.62.
102 
'Analysis of the present attitude of the United States', Balfour memorandum in Halifax to
Foreign Office, telegram no.1588, 12 December 1945, Roger Bullen and M.Pelly(eds.), Documents
on Beitish Policy Overseas (DBPO), Series I, Volume IV: Britain and America: Atomic Ene,y, Bases and
Food 12 December 1945-3 1 July 1946 (London, 1987), p.3. See Richard Aldrich, "'The Value of
Residual Empire": Anglo-American Intelligence Co-operation in Asia after 1945' in Aldrich and
Hopkins(eds.), Intel4gence, Dfence and Dplomacj, pp.226-258.
103 
'Future Defence Policy', DO(47)44, 22 May 1947, DEFE 4/4 and Richard Aldrich and
Michael Coleman, 'Britain and the Strategic Air Offensive Against the Soviet Union: The
Question of South Asian Air Bases, 1945-9, I-Iistoy: The Journal of the Historical Association, VoL74
No.242 (October 1989), pp.400-426.
'° Alex Danchev, 'In the back room: Anglo-American defence co-operation, 1945-51' in
Aldrich(ed.), British Inielhgence, StraIey and the Cold War, p.221 and Joint Staff
Mission(Washington) to Cabinet Office, telegram no.JSM 182, 9 February 1946, Bullen and
Pelly(eds.), DBPO, Series I, Volume IV, p.93.
'°5 Dockrill, British Defence Since 1945, pp.25-26 and Young,Britain and the World, p.155.
106 Byrnes had not endeared himself to an increasingly anti-Soviet American public after his
concessionary policies at Moscow in December 1945. See Messer, Tbe End of an
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ambitions in East Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, Churchill delivered his
'Iron Curtain' speech at Fulton in Missouri during March 1946 and argued that Soviet
expansion was limitless. This speech helped to strengthen the determination of Truman
and his advisers to contain the Red Army on the Soviet periphery. On the same day as
Churchill's speech, the State Department sent notes to Moscow, demanding explanations
for the continued presence of Soviet troops in Manchuria and northern Iran. 107
 George
Kennan and Frank Roberts, at the American and British Embassies in Moscow, had long
been sending warning's about Soviet behaviour since 1945.108 Confrontation over Soviet
attempts to establish a puppet regime in northern Iran marked a new phase in the Cold
War. Churchill's speech, Stalin's February declaration of the incompatibility of
communism and capitalism and Kennan's 'Long Telegram', embodied a new emphasis of
confrontation rather than co-operation.'°9
 Kennan had suggested that genuine security
for Soviet Russia could only be obtained when it had achieved the total destruction of
the democratic world. This analysis now received widespread support from the State,
War and Navy Departments."° Similarly, the Chiefs of Staff had, since 1944, seen the
Soviet Union as am emerging threat, but the Foreign Office was reluctant to dismiss the
pp.31-155.
'° See Fraser Harbutt, The Iron Cmain Churchilh America and the Orgins of the Cold War (New
York, 1986), pp.179-223; Truman, Memoirs, VoLI, pp.551-552 and Gaddis, We Now Know, p.31.
See also Robert Frazier, 'Did Britain Start the Cold War?', Historical Journa Vol.27 No.3(1984),
pp.71 5-727.
'08 See Kenneth Jensen(ed.), Ongins of the Cold Ww The Noiikov, Kinnan and Roberts Long Telegrams'
of 1946 (Washington 1991); Frank Roberts, Dealing wth Dictalors. The Dest,wction and Revival of
Europe, 1930-1970 (London, 1991), pp.107-hO. Kennan joked with Roberts that it was rather a
waste of time having two Embassies when one would do. See S.Greenwood, Prank Roberts and
the "Other" Long Telegram', Journal of Contemporarj History, VoL25 No.1(1990), pp.103-122 and
John Zametica, Three Letters to Beviit Frank Roberts at the Moscow Embassy, 1945-46' in
John Zametica(ed.), British Officials and British Foragn Poliy, 1 945-50 (London, 1990), pp.39-97.
'® Harbutt,Tbe Iron Curtain, pp.26O-26l and Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Knmlin's Cold War,
p.35.
110 Kennan also argued that the very insecurity of Soviet leadership, born from Russia's past and
the régime's paranoid fear of contact with outside world made co-operation impossible. George
Kennan, Memoirr 1925-1950 (Boston, 1967), pp.290-297. See also Michael Cox, 'Requiem for a
Cold War Critic: The Rise and Fall of George F.Kennan 1946-1950', Irish Slavonic Studies, No.11,
1990(1991), pp.2-5 and Leffler,A Preponderance of Power, p.109.
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concept of 'Big Three' co-operation until 1946.111 The Foreign Office did not believe
that Stalin wanted war, but now presumed that the Soviet Union would attempt to
extend its influence, taking advantage of the postwar chaos in Europe and Asia..'12
Henceforth, a Russia Committee was set up by the Foreign Office in April 1946 to
monitor all aspects of Soviet policy and Britain actually took the lead in mounting an
anti-communist propaganda offensive during this period. At this stage, Bevin still had
doubts about an open policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union. 1-lowever,
American help in obstructing Soviet expansionist aims in the Middle East, a principal
area of British imperial interest, was seen as essential in order to preserve the British
Empire, whatever the long term implications.'14
As ecpressions of doubt began to saircace ove' 3t.iIn'5 post w tentio, the Chiefs
of Staff and the Poreign Office ba 1 ed to preserve Britain's strategic interests During
1946 and 1947, for example, the Chiefs of Staff argued for a continued British presence
iathe Middle East against Attlee's objections The granting of independence to India and
(aci	 eih4*iJk Afl*I	 11i €Ih'I?I fteri4,1 	 4-tIe
Ceylon in 1947 had lcd Atticc to t4dJE	 cVntd	 on thc
defence of the weetern Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean." 5
 Both Bevin and the
" See Hood, minute, 5 October 1944, U77658/748/G, FO 371/40741A Foulds, minute, 14
February 1945, U890/36/70, FO 371/50774 and 'British Postwar Strategic Interests in Southeast
Asia and the Pacific: Summary of minutes on PHP(44)6(0)(Final)', Foreign Office memorandum,
no date, ibid. See also diary entry for 27 July 1944 in Bryant, Triunpb in the West, p.242; Warner,
'From ally to enemy' Brituin'a Relatione with thc Sovict Union, 1941 1948', pp.221-232; G.Ross,
The Foreign Office and the Kremlin (London, 1984) and Rothwell, Bntain and the Cold [Var 1941-7.
112 Sargent to Hoilis, letter, 1 October 1946 in 'Strategic Aspects of British Policy',
COS(46)239(0), 5 October 1946, U2930/2390/10, FO 371/57315.
113 See Ray Merrick, Fhe Russia Committee of the British Foreign Office and the Cold War,
1946-47'JoiawilofConiemporarj History, VoL2O No.4 (October 1985), pp.4 .53-468 and Christopher
Andrew, 'Intelligence and international relations in the early Cold War', Renew of International
Studies, Vol.24 No.3 Ouly 1998), p.323. By 1947 the Foreign Office were briefing journalists
about the need to defend Britain's policies against 'scurrilous' Soviet propaganda and attempted
to counter-attack this by informing the public of the true nature of Soviet intentions. See Tony
Shaw, Fhe British Popular Press and the Early Cold War', History: The Journal of the Hictorical
Association, Vol.83 No.269 (January 1998), pp.66-85.
114 Kent, British Impetia/Strateg, , pp.96-97.
115 Attlee gueationed the soeial fabrie of Egypt and Iraq as well. See Attlee, minute, COS(47)71,
11 June 1947, DEFE 1/'t, Howe, minute for Sargent, 17 May 1946, N6733/110/38,FO
71/56781 and Dockrill, BriII.ck Defence Situ. 1P'15, pp.28 31.
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6rh4k	 l&4k+
Chiefs of Staff were sure that euth. awithdrawalAwould allow the Soviets to fill the
vacuum and prepare the way for further infiltration into both Asia and Africa. 11' Bevin
was on good terms with the Chiefs of Staff, kept in close touch with Eden, and saw
foreign policy in national not party terms. 117
 Britain's world power status depended on a
dominant position in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The Middle East provided
Britain with valuable oil supplies from Iran and the Persian Gulf, acted as a visible sign
of British victory against German and Italian forces in North Africa and, most important
of all W ce(t a t41L	 &aus thi (:.J: (& 9kbaL Lr
Soviet attempts to set up secessionist movements in northern Iran and ite demande
fo temtonal GOnGesiOns in eastern Turkey to gain acce to the Meditecanean,
reinforced Bevin's and the Chiefs of Staff's fear regarding Soviet expansion in the Middle
East. Yet, when Stalin was confronted with Anglo-American objections to his ambitions
in Iran and Turkey during 1946, he backed down. According to Molotov, this did not
mean that Stalin had limited objections, only that he had no timetable for achieving
them: 'Our ideology stands for offensive operations when possible, and if not, we
wait'."9
 Although Attlee had a case in point, when he argued that the Soviet Union might
see a British military presence in the Middle East as provocative, withdrawal from the
116 
'Future Defence Policy', DO(47)44, 22 May 1947, DEFE 4/4. See also 'Relations with the
Russians', JIC(45)299(Final), 18 October 1945, CAB 79/40; 'Summary of the Principal External
Factors Affecting Commonwealth Security', JIC(47)65(0)FinaL, 29 October 1947, CAB 158/2
and Bevin, minute, COS(47)74, 11 June 1947, DEFE 4/4. See Richard Aldrich, 'British
Intelligence and the Anglo-American "Special Relationship" during the Cold War', Review of
International Studies, VoL24 No.3 Ouly 1998), pp.332-333. Although Bevin realised that a reduction
in overseas commitments could not be resisted indefinitely, he was opposed to abrupt
withdrawal from any British sphere of influence at least until alternative arrangements could be
made to prevent a vacuum being filled by a hostile power. Bullock, Ernest Bevin, pp.11l-112, 237.
117 ibid., pp.56, 98.
118 Tizard, minute, COS(47)74, 11 June 1947, DEFE 4/4 The report was finally appro'ed.ad.,
COS minutes, COS(47)74, 11 June 1947, /bk(.. See Richard Aldrich and John Zametica,
'The rise and decline of a strategic concept the Middle East, 1945-51', in Aldrich(ed.), British
Inie/4rnee, Strafgy and the Cold War, pp.236-274; Leffler, A Preponderanee of Power, pp.80-81; Kent,
Batith Imperial Stmtgy, chps.3 & 4; Wm Roger Louis, British Empire in the Middle East, 1 945-51:
Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford, 1984) and David Devereux, Tbe
Formulation of British Defenee PoIi-j in the Middle East, 1948-1956 (London, 1990) for a detailed
analysis of British policy in the Middle East and Africa during this period.
"9 Gaddis, We Noev Know, p.31 and Mastny, The Cold Wai, p.23.
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region would have undoubtedly indicated weakness and presented Moscow with a
chance for 'offensive operations'.120
B. THE EARLY POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT OF KOREA
Developments in Korea reflected similar tensions between the West and the Soviet
Union. By 1946, Sir Orme Sargent felt sure that: 1'be Far East seems destined to be the
principal scene of a conflict of interests between the Soviet Union and the United States'.
Sargent correctly argued that Soviet and American policies in Korea had now become
contiguous and that a direct clash between the two powers was to be expected.'2'
Harriman, in conversation with General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander
Allied Powers in Japan(SCAP), believed that the Soviets were determined to establish
'political domination' as they had in Eastern Europe, in order 'to expand their narrow
strategic position in the Far East'.' The deliberations of the American-Soviet Joint
Commission in Korea during early 1946 confirmed these deepening suspicions. The
Soviet delegation, headed by General Shtikov, opposed all schemes for unification, the
free movement of goods, services and ideas. Shtikov also insisted upon the deliveries of
impracticable quantities of rice, rejecting American evidence that such quantities could
not be spared.' Hodge had wanted to form a 'Korean Consultative Union' that would
represent all democratic parties, offer advice to the Commission and choose members
for a Korean government. The Soviet delegation demanded separate consultation with
120 Aldrich and Zanietica, Fhe rise and decline of a strategic concept the Middle East, 1945-51',
pp.251-252 and Zubok and Pleshakov, I,zcide the Knmlin's Cold War p.43.
121 Sargent to Hollis, letter, 1 October 1946 in 'Strategic Aspects of British
Policy',COS(46)239(0), 5 October 1946, U2390/2390/10, FO 371/57315. Frank Roberts held
the same opinion as Sargent See Roberts to Steindale Bennett, letter, ii April 1946,
F6082/199/23, FO 371/54250. In fact, the British Foreign Office believed that a major clash of
arms between the Western democratic powers and the Soviet Union was more likely to occur in
Asia where America was playing the leading hand. Foreign Office memorandum, 1 April 1946,
Bullen and Pelly(eds.), DBPO, Series I, Vobme IV, pp.202-204.
'Harriman and Abel, SpecialErnvy, p.542.
' Roberts to Sterndale Bennett, letter, 11 April 1946, F6082/199/23, FO 371/54250.
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each party, no mter-zonal meetings of Korean leaders, and the exclusion of all parties
hostile to the policy of trusteeship which effectively meant every right-wing political
party.'24
 Stalin had backed the strong line taken by the Soviet delegation and baulked
against the idea of a unified Korea that gradually marked the polarisation of the
country.'2S
 British intelligence correctly concluded that: 'it appears that the Russians were
under definite instructions to bring about the failure of the conference'. Shtikov and his
staff were described as having been arrogant and unco-operative from the start. They
avoided social contacts with the Americans and complained incessantly about their
reception and accommodation.'26
The United States-Soviet Joint Commission, in a state of deadlock, adjourned for a
year in May 1946, to which Frank Roberts noticed a distinct sharpening in the tone of
the Soviet Press towards America in connection with Korea.'27 As relations between
America and the Soviet Union worsened, Roberts surmised that the long term prospects
in Korea were gloomy. He recognised that the Soviets had a close knit organisation in
the north and with the gradual relaxation of American control, would probably be able to
dominate the whole coutry.'2 Roberts made no mention of the possible implications
that such an outcome would have on British and American interests in East and
Southeast Asia. These facts led the American War Department to question the presence
of American forces in Korea.'29 Indeed, this American indifference left the Far Eastern
Department of the Foreign Office feeling that the United States was prepared to 'sell out'
to Stalin over Korea in order to consolidate their position against the Soviets in Japan.
Strategically, the Far Eastern Department questioned the desirability of such a move. It
124 Weathersby, 'Soviet Aims in Korea', p.17; Van Ree, Soda/ira in One Zone, pp.143-144, 147 and
Harriman and Abel, Specia1Emy, pp.543-544.
125 Van Ree, Soda/isa in One Zone, pp.208-209.
' DNI to MacDermot, letter, 22 August 1946, F12380/199/23, FO 371/54251.
127 Roberts to Foreign Office, telegram no. 1771, 18 May 1946, N6502/971/38, FO 371/56840.
128 Roberts to Sterndale Bennett, letter, 11 April 1946, F6082/199/23, FO 371/54250.
'29 Lffler,A Prvponderanee of Power, p.167.
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saw South Korea as 'an excellent jumping-off place' for possible operations directed
against Japan, the Chinese seaboard and southwards into the Pacific. Soviet domination
of the whole Korean peninsula would also bring the Red Army to within one hundred
miles of the prefectures of western Japan administered by the British Commonwealth
forces of occupation.'3°
During 1946, United States intelligence estimates received by the British Embassy at
Moscow, anxiously confirmed that the Red Army was still keeping a large number of
troops in North Korea approximating 250,000 men.' 3' Meanwhile, the British
Consul-General in Seoul, Derwent Kermode, reported that ordinary people in the north
of Korea could only secure a rice ration by joining the Communist Party or other
approved societies.' 32
 American agents were struck by the volume of Soviet propaganda
in North Korea and gained the impression that the revival of industry in the region was
strictly on Soviet lines.' 3
 These developments led one British official to minute that: 'it
does not of course follow that the Russians in fact intend to attack the Americans, but
they do appear to be in a dangerous frame of mind'. 134
 In June 1946, attempting to
remedy the situation, William Langdon, Hodge's new political adviser, asked Kermode if
the British government, as a party to the Moscow decisions, would consider approaching
the Soviet Union in order to bring about a resumption ofAUnited States-Soviet Joint
Commission. Kermode immediately advanced his own personal opinion that the British
' De Ia Mare, minute, 30 April 1946, F6082/199/23, FO 371/54250 and 'Korea', Foreign
Office memorandum, 21 May 1946, F8060/199/23, FO 371/54250.
131 Roberts to Foulds, letter, 24 May 1946, F7994/199/23, FO 371/54250.
'32 Clges of 'collaboration' were levelled at all prominent persons for class ends, thus emptying
the north of talent and administrative experience. Kerinode's views transmitted by Morland to
Foreign Office, telegram no.615, 6June 1946, F8473/198/23, FO 371/54247.
133 American agents had been attached to the Edwin Pauley Commission on reparations that
visited Korea in 1946. See Morland to Foreign Office, telegram no.689, 21 June 1946,
F92471199/23, FO 371/54250. Five Soviet Ministries had their representatives in North Korea.
The Soviets formed their own communities in Pyongyang Hungnam and Chongjin that also
harnessed a network for hundreds of military and civilian advisers. The propaganda machine was
entitled the Society for Cultural Relations that had its roots even in the villages. See Van Ree,
Socialism in One Zone, chp.1 1.
'' Dc Ia Mare, minute, 6 June 1946, F8473/198/23, FO 371/54247.
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government would be too busy with its own problems to risk entanglement in Korea.
Kermode had arrived in Korea during April 1946. His residence was depressing and
water shortages made baths difficult while a lack of glasses forced him to use jam jars to
serve drinks. Furthermore, without a safe, Kermode could not use cyphers, precluding a
secure means of communication and almost all telegraphic material had to be sent to
Tokyo for transmission. Kermode would inform London that the Soviet-American
impasse over Korea was part of'a general world pattern' and that the longer the situation
was left to drift, the more difficult a solution would become.L35
Kermode's colleagues at the Foreign Office agreed with his analysis.' But Foulds,
still reeling from American actions towards Britain over Korea in the immediate
aftermath of the Japanese surrender, thought it was clear that: 'neither the Russians nor
the Americans appeared at [any] time to want our help, and it is difficult to see why we
should now take up Mr.Langdon's hole-in-the-corner suggestion just because the
Russians and the Americans find themselves unable to agree'.' 37
 Foul&snew superior, the
under-secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, Esler Dening, concurred and recorded
that:
One always had this feeling that [the Americans] did not realise the full implications of
what they were taking on. Today it would almost seem that, realisation having come to
them, they are unready or unwilling to face the consequences of their action in planting
themselves in an area where the Soviet Union is determined to dominate. It will be a sad
blow to the Western democracies if America beats a retreat
But if the United States did not 'beat a retreat', Dening felt that they must be prepared to
face up to a bitter struggle, in which the Americans would look to Britain for at least
135 Kermode's view in Morland to Foreign Office, telegram no.683, 20 June 1946,
F9219/199/23, FO 371/54250 and J.Hoare, Embassies in the East The Story of the British Embassies
in Japan, China and Korrafnrns 1859 to the Present (Surrey, 1999), p.196.
136 The underlying fear was that if a serious dispute did break out over Korea it was difficult to
see how Britain could remain neutral. De la Mare, minute, 24 June 1946, F9219/199/23, FO
371/54250.
'"Foulds, minute, 27June 1946, F9219/199/23, FO 371/54250.
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moral support. The British were not prepared, however, to get entangled in attempts to
save the Joint Commission.° There was little discussion about the repercussions of a
Soviet-dominated Korea on bolstering communist elements in China and Southeast Asia
that directly affected British interests.
The Commission's failure brought forth a wave of nationalism in South Korea.
Rightist parties combined to form a new united front, called the Racial Nationalist
Union, and on 12 May 1946, it held a monster demonstration that began with
inflammatory speeches and ended in rioting.' 39 The re-establishment of a viable rightist
party in Korean politics was augmented by Dr Syng man Rhee. A firm opponent of
Japanese colonialism, Rhee had participated in the Korean government-in-exile at
Shanghai, but eventually severed his ties with this organisation. Rhee spent a large
proportion of his life in America, gaining a doctorate from Princeton University. He
made valuable contacts with senior American officials, such as the deputy head of OSS,
Colonel M.Goodfellow, and during February 1946, the latter along with Hodge, helped
install Rhee as the leader of the Representative Democratic Council. This American
attempt to construct a viable anti-communist rightist party received much support from
Washington at a time when global relations with the Soviet Union were deteriorating
rapidly.'4° But as Kermode observed, Rhee was more interested in his own fortunes than
in the welfare of the people to commend himself as the nation's future leader.'41
 The
138 Dening, minute, 29 June 1946, F9219/199/23, FO 371/54250.
' The Great Eastern Dai?y News also conducted an increasingly bold campaign, inciting the
murder of leftist leaders. On 13 May it openly praised a would-be assassin for his attempt on the
life of Lyuh Woon Hyeung, the People's Party Leader. Hodge felt that the time had now come
to cool the rising passions. The offending newspaper was suspended for three weeks and the
whole Press were given warnings. Kermode to Far Eastern Department, telegram no.8, 5 June
1946, F10408/199/23, FO 371/54251.
'4° See Cumings, The Ongins of the Korean tVar, VoLI, chp.6; Lowe, The Ongins of the Korean War,
pp.25-26, 33-36; idem, Containing the Cold War in East Asia, p.l68 and for a detailed study on
Rhee see R.Oliver, Sjrman Rhee andAmerican Involvement in Koret 1942-1960 (Seoul, 1978).
141 The Korean Press had already accused Rhee of forming a company with Goodfellow, which
was mostly concerned with gold and silver, and claimed that when Rhee's government was
established he would give this company monopoly rights. Kermode certainly witnessed the
constant and close association between the two and British intelligence had also noted the
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British Consul-General described Rhee as a 'megalomaniac' bent on achieving his
ambitions of Korean unity at any price. 142
 Rhee's attempts to gain recognition met with
strong opposition from the British government When Rhee sent a representative to
London on the pretext of discussing Anglo-Korean trade, the Foreign Office did not
accord him any official status.'43
On the other side of the 38th parallel, Kim 11-sung, named the secretary of the
'Northern Bureau' in the Korean Communist Party during August 1945, took less than a
year to remove all opposition to his rule in the north. An assassin killed the leading
14.brt thun-hyok,
communist leaderAin northern Korea and Kim's faction, the 'Soviets', pushed many of its
rivals from Yenan into peripheral positions. 1" As Korean leaders consolidated their
positions in the north and south, British intelligence assessed that there could be no
restoration of the country's prosperity until the two occupation zones were reunited.'45
The south, for example, was deprived of access to northern electric power, coal and
minerals. With the Chinese and Japanese economies stru1ing to recover from the war,
inflation and limited American economic aid did not auger well for Korean prosperity.'"
By late 1946, the Far Eastern Department at the Foreign Office perceived that America
was gradually losing the ideological strule in Korea, stating quite bluntly that: 'the
rumours. Ketmode to Far Eastern Department, telegram no.8,5 June 1946, F10408/199/23, FO
371/54251. DNI to MacDermot, letter, 22 August 1946, F12380/199/23, FO 371/54251.
142 Kermode to Foreign Office, telegram no.7, 6 February 1947, F1712/54/81, FO 371/63831.
The only outstanding Korean leader was thought to be Cho Man Sik of the Chosun Democratic
Party. He had been renowned as the 'Korean Ghandi' but had unfortunately been imprisoned in
North Korea during February 1946. DNI to MacDerinot, letter, 22 August 1946,
F12380/199/23, FO 371/54251.
143 Foreign Office reported that Rhee's representative, Mr. Limb, on the assumption that the
British could know nothing about Korea, made no effort to separate fact from fiction and
painted a picture of the ability of his Democratic Party to unite with North Korea and rule the
country which bore no resemblance to the facts. Foreign Office to Kermode, telegram no.17,27
February 1946, F2095/54/81, FO 371/63831.
' 44 Millett, 'Understanding Is Better Than Remembering'.
" DNI to MacDermot, letter, 22 August 1946, F12380/199/23, FO 371/54251.
' The Red Army had stripped their zone of economic assets and left businesses and farms in
northern Korea also struggling to survive. Harriman and Abel, Spedal Ern'oj, p.543 and Millett
'Understanding Is Better Than Remembering'.
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United States military government is not up to its job'. America's lack of experience in
Korean affairs, the influx of over 2 million refugees, widespread poverty and the fact that
the Soviet zone possessed all the material advantages, left United States personnel in
Korea with a feeling of frustration and despair. 147
 The Foreign Office had no alternative
answers and although Britain possessed a wealth of experience in East Asian affairs it
was unwilling to become involved in the Korean imbroglio. This clearly indicated that
the British thought Korea possessed little strategic advantage in the emerging global Cold
War.
V. The Move Towar& a Permanent Division of Korea
In 1946, the Foreign Office agreed with a new American policy for Korea which
encouraged the development of an interim policy specially suited to the southern zone.
SWNCC aimed to encourage the employment of Koreans suitable for high government
posts which would work towards a unified administration for Korea. This would be
backed up by liberal assistance to educational establishments. SWNCC also argued for
the rehabilitation of agricultural and industrial areas without attempting to set up units in
the
south that undermined those already existng in the north. Approving these
recommendations, Truman defiantly stated that: 'our commitment for the establishment
of an independent Korea requires that we stay in Korea long enough to see the job
through and that we have adequate personnel and funds to do the job'.' It was
unfortunate that the Foreign Office belatedly learnt of this American shift in policy and
only then, through an article in the Scotsman. Disappointed by the lack of frankness, the
Foreign Office argued that this attitude was symptomatic of an American conviction
147 The Far Eastern Department felt that the Americans understood Korean manners, traditions
and customs far less than did the Japanese De Ia Mare, minute, 5 September 1946,
F12585/199/23, FO 371/54251. See 'United States Policy in Korea', note by secretaries to JCS,
JCS 1483/49, l5January 1948, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 51, KCL.
148 Proposed Negotiations with the USSR over Korea on a Governmental Level', SWNCC
176/22, 22 July 1946, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 51, ibid. Dominions Office to Australian
government, telegram no.282, 19 August 1946, F10974/199/23, FO 371/54251.
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across East Asia that Britain would fall into line with American policy. The Foreign
Office angrily concluded that: 'we must sooner or later let them know that our
subservience cannot always be taken for granted'. Yet, the Foreign Office did not
disagree with these American policy decisions and at a time of confrontation with Stalin
in the Middle East and Mediterranean, did not want to be accused of destroying a united
front against the Soviets.149
Despite a change in United States policy, communist attempts to undermine South
Korea continued throughout 1946. On 14 August 1946, Kermode reported that a plot
had been uncovered to sabotage American military installations and stir up trouble in
southern Korea. One of the men arrested admitted that he had attended a sabotage
training course in northern Korea and had received instructions from there. Kermode
remained convinced that, as soon as all forces were withdrawn from Korea, the country
would fall very quickly under communist domination. Britain's Consul-General explained
that Koreans in the south had been left in no doubt by events in the Soviet zone of the
communist capacity for liquidating political opponents. Kermode concluded that:
'whatever cause for suspicion the Western allies may have given Russia in the past, the
fact remains that a steady outward expansion, clearly visible here in Korea, is in
progress'.' 5° The Foreign Office commented that it was difficult to see what more the
Americans could do in Korea to stem the tide of the Soviet advance, other than increase
their forces in Korea to a size approximating the Red Army in the northern zone. Yet,
the Foreign Office recognised that: 'This they would never surely do, and it is only by so
doing that they could prevent in the long run the whole of Korea from being
contaminated by the Soviet virus'. 151
 However, both Kermode and the Foreign Office
showed no signs of panic about a possible Soviet domination of Korea.
De Ia Mare, minute, 3OJuly 1946, F10974/199/23, FO 371/54251.
150 Kermode to Bevin, telegram no.16, 14 August 1946, F13224/199/23, FO 371/54251.
' Uoyd, minute, 16 September 1946, F13224/199/23, FO 371/54251.
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Indeed, military reports continued to suggest during 1946 that the Soviets intended to
forcibly unify the whole of Korea. Colonel Figgess, the British acting military adviser in
Japan, reported that Hodge had evidence that the Soviets were preparing for an invasion
to take place in the autumn of 1946 after the rice harvest had been collected. The
invasion would not be undertaken by Soviet troops but by a force of Koreans armed and
trained by the Red Army and led by former commanders of the old Chinese communist
Eighth Route Army.' 52
 Meanwhile, six members of the House of Military Affairs
Committee from the United States Congress had already publicly expressed their grave
concern over Stalin's intentions in East Asia. One member considered that there was an
imminent danger of another 'Pearl Harbor' in Korea while another wondered why the
Soviets were maintaining five times the number of occupational troops the Americans
had.'53
 British officials suspected that MacArthur had primed these Congressmen to gain
American support for his campaign against communism in Japan and to warn the
Japanese that, if their occupation was unduly prolonged, it would be because of the
Soviet menace. Although the Foreign Office did not think the Congressmen had
exaggerated the danger they did not seem unduly concerned and continued to dismiss
Korea's strategic importance in the Cold War.
By 1947 as the Chinese communists advanced on Manchuria and the crises in Turkey
and Greece deepened, the new American Secretary of State, George Marshall, ordered a
complete reassessment of United States policy in Korea. 155 Despite Bevin's efforts to
152 Although United States intelligence authorities at Tokyo regarded lodge's pronouncements
as 'alarmist in tone', they still argued that there seemed to be every possibility of events coming
to pass as foreshadowed. A significant fact which lent colour to possible Soviet intentions was
the fact that Red Army troops had already withdrawn a battery along the 38th parallel frontier
and replaced with Korean guards. Gascoigne to Foreign Office, telegram no.1283, 1 November
1946, F1733/54/81, FO 371/63831.
's Gascoigne to Foreign Office, telegram no.1012, 3 September 1946, F12837/199/23, FO
371/54251.
De Ia Mare, minute, 4 September 1946, F12837/199/23, FO 371/54251. MacDermot,
minute, 5 September 1946, ibid.
155 Vincent to Marshall, 27 January 1947, FRUS, VoLT/I: The Far East, 1947 (Washington, 1972),
pp.601-603 and memorandum by the special inter-departmental committee on Korea, 25
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enlist United States support within the 'Big Three' framework to combat Soviet
expansionism,1
 it was not until 1947 that the Americans finally discarded their
traditional desire to hold themselves aloof from foreign entanglements and announced
the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. These acts came to fruition, in part, when
Britain informed the United States that it could no longer provide aid for Greece and
Turkey. 57
 These American offers highlighted Britain's and Europe's failure to recover
from the war and now saw the United States determined to avoid another 1930s Great
Depression while reconstituting a balance of power in Europe by economic means.'
Although the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department and the Pentagon wanted to
concentrate on the recovery of Western Europe, Marshall, recognising the Cold War
implications, remained determined to hold the periphery in Northeast Asia, to prevent an
'outfianking' of Japan. 1
 A special inter-departmental committee argued that the United
States should not retreat from Korea as it would represent a direct breach of
commitments to establish a united and independent Korea. A withdrawal, the committee
noted, would indicate 'a complete political defeat' and they therefore lobbied Truman for
a $600 million aid package to help Korea, $250 million of which would be for the fiscal
year 194& This economic aid could then be reinforced by appointing a civilian high
commissioner and despatching business groups to Korea to make recommendations on
economic and financial rehabilitation. Negotiations with the Soviet Union would still
February 1947, ibid, pp.608-610.
' See Peter Taylor, Britain and the Cold lVar 1945 w Geographical Transition (London, 1990), p.107.
157 Robert Frazier explains that the British government did not deliberately set out to provoke a
shift in American policy, but was merely responding to Britain's own economic imperatives. See
Robert Frazier, 'Did Britain Start the Cold War? Bevin and the Truman Doctrine', Historical
Journal Vol.27 No.3 (l984),pp.7l5-727. See also 'United States: Weekly Political Sununary No.1:
Annual Survey for 1947 - Part I: American Attitude to Foreign Affairs', Inverchapel to Foreign
Office, telegram no.38, 19 February 1948, AN 667/6/45, FO 371/68013B.
The bitter winter of 1946-1947 had paralysed the British economy, creating a massive coal
shortage and massive unemployment. Henceforth, Britain was forced to cut its military
manpower by 20 per cent from 1.5 to 1.2 million. Gaddis, The Le,g Peace, pp.41, 56; idem, Fhe
insecurities of victory', p.267 and Thomas Christensen, UsefzdAdversaties. Grand Strate&y, Domestic
Mobi/isation, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, 1996), pp.34-35.
See Leffler,A Preponderance of Power, pp.147-149, 167.
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continue and American diplomatic efforts redoubled to unite the two zones. 16° This
approach seemed logical at a time when America was contemplating rebuilding Japan
industrially, especially as the Korean and Japanese economies could effectively be
integrated.16t
Dening was encouraged that the State Department now felt ready to press for a
consistent and strong policy ts-â-&s the Soviet Union in Asia as well as Europe but
correctly pointed out that: 'The success of this plan will depend upon competent and
farsighted administration at least as much as upon the signing of the cheque'. Dening saw
no signs of the emergence of such an administration in the American zone of Korea.
Yet, if successful, Dening thought that the plan might be a real setback to Soviet
expansion in Asia and loosen the Soviet hold on the people of northern Korea.162
Whereas in the Middle East, the United States could rely on British assets, American
officials were operating on their own in Korea and the perception of the threat was
much greater. 163
 British and American planners were still producing negative assessments
on the situation in Korea. The Foreign Office, the Chiefs of Staff and the JIC argued that
Korea, with its ice-free harbours, was an essential extension of the Soviet Pacific
seaboard. The JIC stated that the Soviet Union's immediate objective was consolidation
but thought that it would in the long term seek to eliminate, by all available means, any
threat to its security in the area. 1" The consequences for Britain's imperial position and
the spread of communism in Asia were once again rarely touched upon, suggesting that
Korea held little concern for the British. Meanwhile, the American Joint Intelligence
160 Draft report of the special inter-departmental committee on Korea, 25 February 1947, ibid,
pp.610-618.
161 Matray, Tbe Rduthint Cnisade, p.116.
162 Dening to Dixon, letter, 26 March 1947, F3550/54/23, FO 371/63832.
163 Leffler, A Preponderanee of Power, p.246.
See 'Soviet Policy in Korea', Kermode to Bevin, telegram no.22, 28 March 1947,
F5826/5826/81, FO 371/63850 and 'Korea', Japan and Pacific Department memorandum, 22
May 1947, F7634/54/81, FO 371/63835. All these arguments also appear to have been
incorporated in the JIC report 'Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities', JIC(47)7/1.Final., 6
August 1947, CAB 158/1 which the Chiefs of Staff approved.
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Staff considered that the Soviet Union could conceivably occupy Korea and push to the
Yellow River in north China by 1950.165 The retention of just under one million air force
personnel, a one and half million man army and a not inconsiderable submarine force in
Northeast Asia was enough to engender American suspicion of Soviet intentions and
intelligence assessments from MacArthur's headquarters in Japan reflected this.1'1
These unpalatable assumptions were not without foundation. When the United
States-Soviet Joint Commission reconvened in 1947 it soon assumed a state of deadlock
which prompted Marshall to complain to Molotov about the continual Soviet refusal to
consult with political parties who opposed trusteeship."7
 As the Joint Commission
degenerated into a political quagmire, Kermode learned from his American counterpart
that Rhee had decided to boycott the Commission and would probably do his utmost to
sabotage it. Kermode at once visited Rhee to see if he could help ease the tension.
According to Kermode, Rhee thought that the southern Koreans had been deceived by
Washington as they had agreed to a condition that parties who wished to be consulted
must sign a declaration which refrained from active opposition to the work of the Joint
Commission. That meant that all Koreans opposed to trusteeship, in other words all
Koreans except communists and their associates, would automatically be denied a
hearing. Kermode attempted to convince Rhee that he would be far more likely to win
world sympathy by supporting the Joint Commission than flatly refusing to have
anything to do with it. Britain's Consul-General impressed upon Rhee that 'If agreement
was reached in their absence the world would say that they had elected to absent
165 
'Military Requirements within the Pacific Theater', JIS memorandum, JIS 218/2, 19
December 1945, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 51, KCL
"Hal Friedman, 'The "Bear" in the Pacific? US Intelligence Perceptions of Soviet Strategic
Power Projection in the Pacific basin and East Asia, 1945-1947', Inte/hgence and National Securi!y,
VoL 12 No.4 (October 1997), pp.75-101.
167 Marshall to the American Embassy at Moscow, 11 August 1947, FRUS, 1947, VI,
pp.748-749. Kermode to Foreign Office, telegram no.66, 28 June 1947, F8715/54/81, FO
371/63835. Gascoigne to Foreign Office, telegram no.990, 13 July 1947, F9362/54/81, FO
371/63836.
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themselves and must therefore lose their case by default'. Rhee was unmoved but
appeared flattered by Kerrnode's visit Kermode had instigated the meeting with Rhee
because he worried that if the latter persisted in his endeavours the result would either be
a landslide for Moscow or, at Rhee's instigation, bloody civil strife.' Although lodge
approved of Kermode's visit, at the Foreign Office, Dermot MacDermot, the head of the
Japan and Pacific Department, minuted that: 'it is in our interests to steer very clear of
Korean politics at this stage. Dr Rhee is a puppet in a more important quarrel'.'69
As political turmoil increased inside Korea and Hodge struled to maintain order,
concerted American attempts to resolve the deadlock in the Joint Commission took
shape during the summer of 1947.170 With conditions in Greece ,Italy and Palestine
reaching disturbing levels, an additional commitment to Korea was not conducive to
Army and State Department thinking. Korea was considered a low strategic priority,
especially as American war plans called for the withdrawal of troops from Korea in a
global conffict.' 7' MacArthur informed General Gairdner, Attlee's personal representative
in Japan, that he thought it was a mistake to deal with Korea on a low leveL MacArthur
told Marshall that in his opinion the Korean question should be treated as a part of the
whole Asian-Pacific question. MacArthur argued that the general propinquity of the
Soviets would enable them to dominate Korea whenever they wanted to do so.'72
Therefore, in July 1947, the United States moved to send identical notes to the
governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China, proposing that the
' Kermode to Foreign Office, telegram no.44, 19 May 1947, F6931/54/81, FO 371/63834 and
Killick, minute, 23 May 1947, F6931/54/81, FO 371/63834.
169 MacDermot, minute, 23 May 1947, F6931/54/81, FO 371/63834.
170 Clashes between leftist and rightist, assassinations and communist infiltration from the north
were common in the first half 1947. See MacArthur to Marshall, 2 July 1947, FRUS, 1947,
VoL VI, pp.682-684; Jacobs to Marshall, 7 July 1947, 14 August 1947, 8 September 1947, ibid,
pp.59O-t59l, 752-753, 783 and Bruce Cumings, The Orzgin.c of the Korean Ww VoLI, chp.6 & 7 and
idem, The Oninc of the Korean W'a VoL1I: The Roaving of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton, 1990),
pp.185-208.
171 Steven Ross, American War Plans 1945.1950 (London, 1988), pp.3-23 and Leffler, A
Preponderance of Power, p.251.
172 Gascoigne to Foreign Office, telegram no.990, 13 July 1947, F9362/54/81, FO 371/63836.
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Korean situation be discussed by the State Department with the Embassies of these
powers. If the Soviets refused to accept, the Americans would then submit the problem
to the UN.' 73
 Molotov naturally contended that the proposed four power talks were not
in accordance with the Moscow agreement of December 1945 and argued that the
possibilities of reaching agreement in the Joint Commission had not been exhausted.174
Molotov's answer was not unexpected. The American strategy had undoubtedly been
designed to illustrate to the world the unco-operativeness of the Soviet Union and at the
same time allowed the State Department, through the vehicle of the UN, to proceed with
creating an independent South Korean state.'75
The Soviet Union, however, had yet to play one of its most important cards and this
inevitably came in the form of Shtikov's proposal to withdraw all occupational forces.
MacDermot thought that Shtikov's decision had to be based on the fact that the
communist régime in northern Korea was now sufficiently established while also aiming
to undermine the American case on Korea in the UN.' 76
 Kermode depressingly recorded
that: 'under Shtikov's proposal, a strong Korean communist army in the north of Korea
would be free to sweep down on the virtually unarmed south and quickly overrun it'.
Some rightist leaders now advocated the supply of arms for equipping a southern force
to equal the northern communist army, which according to Kermode would lead to
bloody civil war.' 77
 John Killick at the Foreign Office minuted that: 'The cat is now
173 Memorandum by the assistant chief of Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, 29 July 1947,
FRUS, 1947, VoL VI, pp.734-736 and Clark to Marshall, 28 August 1947, ibid, pp.774-775. The
British proposed to attend as signatory of the Cairo and Potsdam declarations, while keeping
Australia informed. Dening, minute for Sargent, 11 August 1947, F10470/54/81, FO 371/63836
and Australian High Commissioner to Dominions Office, telegram no.683, 2 September 1947,
F12044/54/81, FO 371/63837 and Bevin to Douglas, letter, 5 September 1947, ibid.
' Molotov to Marshall, 5 September 1947, FRUS, 1947, VoL VI, pp.734-736. Roberts to
Foreign Office, telegram no.2009, 6 September 1947, F12408/54/81, FO 371/63837.
175 
'United States Policy in Korea', report by the ad hoc committee on Korea, 4 August 1947,
FRUS, 1947, VoL VI, pp.738-741. See also 'United States Policy in Korea', note by Secretaries to
JCS,JCS 1483/49, 15 January 1948, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 51, KCL
176 MacDermot, minute, 30 September 1947, F13232/54/81, FO 371/63838.
' Kermode to Foreign Office, telegram no.98, 3 October 1947, F13473/54/81, FO 371/63839.
British military intelligence supported Kermode's analysis. 'Korea', DM1 memorandum, no.0047,
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amongst the pigeons. Southern Korean right-wing leaders, who had previously been in
favour of a withdrawal of occupying forces, are now confronted with the realisation of
the consequences of such a move, and are imploring the Americans to stay'. 178 British
military intelligence added weight to the possible strength of a North Korean Army. A
report indicated that the communist Korean Volunteer Army and the Korean Garrison
Corps operating within Chinese communist-controlled areas were receiving both material
and political support from the Red Army and the Chinese communists. 179 A
memorandum by the British Directorate of Military Intelligence also claimed that Korean
communist participation in Manchuria was dependent upon the fact that the Chinese
communists would agree to join the Korean communists in a future revolution.' 80
 The
Korean Volunteer Army, an experienced army operating in the Chinese civil war, which
numbered as high as possibly 100,000 men, 181
 would surely have reinforced a British
belief that once this force had been released its employment in Korea would be decisive.
The Americans nonetheless pressed ahead with their proposals at the UN, attempting
to remove themselves from their problems in Korea. On 6 October 1947, Inverchapel
reported that the United States delegation at the UN was preparing a resolution for the
General Assembly, recommending that a UN committee be appointed and that this
committee supervise elections in both zones to facilitate establishment of provisional
government.' 82
 As the Foreign Office was aware, it would be impossible to hold
multi-party elections in the northern zone, even under UN supervision, and a sweeping
29 September 1947, WO 208/4834.
' Killick, minute, 7 October 1947, F13473/54/81, FO 371/63839.
' 'Korea/Manchuria. The Koreans in Manchuria', M12(b) report, 29 November 1946, WO
208/4752.
'°'China. Military The Korean Volunteer Army in Manchuria', DM1 memorandum, 3 July 1947,
WO 208/4752.
'' Field to Tarver, letter, 2 December 1947, WO 208/4922. North Korean forces were also
considerably more developed. A Defence Department had been set up in February 1946 and
Korean youths had also been sent to the Soviet Union for military training. See Farrar-Hockley,
The British Part in the Korean War, Part I, p.16
' Washington to New York, telegram no.258, 6 October 1947, F13571/54/81, FO 371/63839.
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communist victory in the north would be counterbalanced by a right-wing victory in the
south, which would inevitably handicap the formation of a central government.'
Thomas Brimelow at the Northern Department wondered whether the Americans were
giving any thought to what they would do when a final deadlock was reached: 'Do they
think they will be both willing and able to hang on indefinitely in control of southern
Korea? iM
 On this question, the British attitude remained pessimistic. In reply to
Brimelow's enquiry, his colleague, John Killick, explained that the British had no definite
information, but he thought the Americans realised that they were fighting a rearguard
action. Military and economic support, Killick realised could not be given indefinitely,
especially in view of the attitude of Congress to further large appropriations. Killick
concluded that if the attempt to reach a settlement in the UN failed, the Americans
would be obliged to cut their losses and evacuate Korea.' 85 These views were roughly in
line with the predominant thinking of the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The latter claimed in September 1947 that: 'from the standpoint of military security, the
United States has little strategic interest in maintaining present troops and bases in
Korea'. The only worry for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and one which a Foreign Office
official pointed out, was that for reasons of prestige, the United States might have to stay
in Korea because a departure could have repercussions in both China and Japan.'
' Killick, minute, 8 October 1947, F13571/54/81, FO 371/63839.
' Brimelow, minute, 9 October 1947, F13571/54/81, FO 371/63839.
185 Killick, minute, 16 October 1947, F13571/54/81, FO 371/63839.
186 
'The Interest of the United States in Military Occupation of South Korea from the Point of
View of the Military Security of the United States', draft memorandum for the Secretary of
Defence in 'Military Importance of Korea', JSP memorandum, 1483/44, 22 September 1947,
RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 51, KCL This was memorandum was approved by the Secretary of
Defence on 29 September 1947, JCS 1483/46, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 51, ibid. Butterworth,
memorandum for Lovett, 1 October 1947, FRUS, 1947 VoL VI, pp.820-827. Rundall, minute, 17
October 1947, F13571/54/81, FO 371 /63839. Bedell Smith thought that the most serious result
of an American withdrawal from Korea would probably be the effect on China. Though in the
long run, argued Bedell Smith, the United States would get over this by stating that it had only so
much money to spend in Asia and if aid to Korea were to be continued the cost would have to
be deducted from funds to Nanking. Peterson to Foreign Office, telegram no.2347, 29 October
1947, F14555/54/81, FO 371/63840.
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British concern over America's attitude towards Korea was justly illustrated when Sir
Maurice Peterson in the British Embassy at Moscow reported that the American
Ambassador, Walter Bedell Smith, had told him that the policy towards which the United
States government was ming, represented little more than 'a face saving device'.
Smith thought Korea was certain to fall under communist domination once American
troops had withdrawn. The underlying reason for American policy, explained Smith, was
financial and Peterson recorded that: 'with so much else on their hands they cannot
afford the $500 million which has been estimated as the cost of an "Aid to Korea"
programme'. 187
 British officials were aghast at Peterson's revelations. 'There is no
disguising', minuted MacDermot, 'that it is a major American capitulation'. 1
 It was the
Northern Department at the Foreign Office that finally began to see wider repercussions,
stating that: 'this will much encourage the Russians to dig their toes in Europe... e.g. in
their forthcoming discussions about Germany'.' Still, these minutes did not prompt the
British to offer any alternative solutions to the Korean problem and during 1947, the
British endorsed the establishment of a United Nations Temporary Commission on
Korea (UNTCOK). This body aimed to ensure the integrity of the election process for
all of Korea and the establishment of a national assembly and government in the spring
of 194S.'° From the Korean viewpoint, UNTCOK appeared to be yet another device to
defraud them of independence. Kermode recognised that: 'the effort to give them the
best possible deal that difficult circumstances allow is little understood'. Kermode
concluded that Britain was not responsible for 'the tragic muddle' that had developed,
187 Peterson to Foreign Office, telegram no.2347, 29 October 1947, F14555/54/81, FO
371/63840.
'MacDermot, minute, 31 October 1947, F14555/54/81, FO 371/63840.
189 Hankey, minute, 1 November 1947, F14555/54/81, FO 371/63840.
190 cUnited States Policy in Korea', note by secretaries to JCS, JCS 1483/49, 15 January 1948,
RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 51, KCL
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but realised it had been one of the powers that promised freedom and independence to
Korea and now found itself unable to fuffil its promise.191
In conclusion, Bntish policy in Korea during 1945-1 947 was influenced by the fact that
Korea had never been one of Britain's traditional concerns. This view was reinforced by
the fact that officials believed economic considerations and other global commitments
prevented the British government from taking an active part in the occupation of Korea.
The exciusionist attitude adopted by Soviet Russia and more importantly, the United
States, bolstered a British conviction that they should try to stay Out of the Korean
imbroglio. All this meant that Britain, more often than not, simply regarded Korea as one
issue of the peace settlement and despite the division of Korea, it did not see the wider
implications in the development of the Cold War. The relative unimportance that Korea
held in British strategic priorities was highlighted by the fact that Bevin and the Chiefs of
Staff rarely involved themselves in this issue until the tumultuous events of 1950. This
disinterest was undoubtedly bolstered by the lack of a clear cut United States policy.
Korea had not been seen as 'vital' to American security interests but the major problem
for the United States government was the fact that Korea represented an area where the
Soviet Union and the Americans directly opposed each other. Any form of climb
down on either side of the 38th parallel would have signalled a major political defeat for
both ideological camps.
191 
'Promised Independence of Korea: Statement by General Hodge', Kermode to Bevin,
despatch no.161, 2 December 1947, F594/511/81, FO 371/69937.
192 Russell Buhite, "'Major Interests": American Policy toward China, Taiwan and Korea,
1945-1950',Paafic Historical Rsview, Vol.47 No.3 (August 1978), pp.439, 442.
120









BRITAIN AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE CHINESE CWIL WAR



























Source: S.Woodburn Kirby,Tbe W'arAgarnst Japan, VoL Jf: The Surrender ofJapan(London, 1969).
Reproduced by kind permission of the Historical and Records Section at the Cabinet Office.
122
BRITAIN AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR
III
THE MARSHALL MISSION AND THE
OUTBREAK OF THE CHINESE CIVIL
WAR, 1947-1947
L Introduction
Britain's immediate imperial and Commonwealth interests in postwar Asia focused south
of the Tropic of Cancer. A return to China was subordinated to that aim, where British
policy, apart from the Japanese crisis in the 1930s, had been historically predominated by
commercial interests. After 1945, the Treasury, faced with domestic economic problems
and an increasing preponderance of American power in East Asia, was reluctant to invest
in China's war-tom economy. Still, Britain aimed to rehabilitate its economic interests on
the mainland and Hong Kong, in order to restore trade and imperial prestige. Chiang
Kai-shek and the United States did not welcome the return of Britain to China, especially
after the British had dismissed China's strategic importance during the war against Japan
and had renounced extraterritoriality in 1943. The onset of the Chinese civil war in 1946
and the communist threat in north China saw Chiang relax his obstructionist attitude
towards Britain somewhat. But British officials found it hard to identify the scale and
nature of the Chinese communists and their affiliation to the Soviet Union. With a
shortage of Consuls, London had a fragmentary view of internal China, often having to
rely on newspaper reports. Britain, therefore, attempted to maintain a stance of
non-intervention in the Chinese civil war and did not hold high hopes for the success of
the Marshall Mission to resolve the Nationalist-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) dispute.
The Mission's subsequent failure saw Britain reluctant to follow an American lead over
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its policies in China. As in Korea, by 1947, the British were clearly worried about
declining American influence in East Asia and annoyed by America's failure to consult
with them. This did not mean that the British could remain indifferent to Chinese issues.
Chiang's abortive attempt to recapture Manchuria, brought forth possibilities of a
communist-dominated China that could threaten British capital interests and its colonies
in Southeast Asia. However, during 1946-1947, British planners rarely devised their
policies towards China in a Cold War context underestimating Chinese communist
capabilities. Meanwhile, United States' policy towards China, caught in a state of flux
since the failure of the Marshall Mission, left the Western powers unready to deal with
the rapid communist advance in China in late 1948-1949.
II. Britain, Southeast Asia and the Return to China
A POSTWAR SOUTHEI4STASIA
The sudden capitulation of Japanese forces on 15 August 1945, had left SEAC woefully
unprepared for the postwar Asian region.' Southeast Asia represented the heart of
Britain's colonial empire but Japan's precipitate surrender had prevented the British, with
the exception of Burma, from completing a spectacular liberation of their territories over
the Japanese. As the United States concentrated on the occupation of Japan, South
Korea and China, SEAC's responsibilities were extended to include the Dutch East
Indies, Siam, Borneo and French Indo-China south of the 16th paralleL 2
 The British
'Major-General H.Pyman, the Chief of the General Staff for Allied Land Forces in Southeast
Asia, observed that SEAC was 'quite unready for surrender'. Diary entry for 15 August 1945 in
Pyman diary, 11 August 1945 to 31 October 1945, 5/1, Pyman papers, KCL.
2 The extended boundaries had been agreed at the Potsdam conference and a major reason for
this was so the United States could concentrate on the defeat of Japan. See Michael Yahuda, The
International Politics of the Asia-PacifIc, 1945-1995 (London, 1996), p.22 and Robert McMahon,
rFoward a post-colonial order. Truman administration policies toward South and Southeast Asia'
in Lacey(ed.), The Truman P,?sideny, p.342. The recovery of Empire in Southeast Asia for the
Dutch and the French was essential. Defeated by the Germans in the Second World War, they
saw the restoration of their interests in the East Indies and Indo-China as a symbol of prestige.
Tarlin& Bn'ta,n, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, p.52.
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were content to let the United States play a leading role in East Asia and focused their
efforts south of the Tropic of Cancer where their imperial and Commonwealth interests
lay. 3 Yet, as a consequence of SEAC's new commitments, the British became burdened
with re-starting rice production from the three principal exporting countries, Burma,
Siam, and Indo-China. This task was essential in order to avoid major outbreaks of
famine and procure regional stability but SEAC had meagre resources with which to
achieve its aim.4
 In November 1945, Hong Kong, for example, had no more than a
surplus of fourteen days rice, possessed minimal facilities to resume trade and was short
of civilian staff, hundreds of whom were detained in India owing to a lack of transport'.5
Inadequate shipping, food and numbers of personnel combined with the problems of
prisoners of war and Japanese repatriation, provided major logistical difficulties for
SEAC during 1945-1946. These problems had been exacerbated by the late arrival of
British forces across Asia due to General MacArthur's insistence upon accepting Japan's
formal surrender first, in Tokyo, on 2 September 1945.6 SEAC worried that the longer
Britain waited to reoccupy Southeast Asian territory, the accompanying difficulties with
the local populations, prisoners of war and internees would inevitably increase.7
Nationalist forces in both the Dutch East Indies and Indo-China had already taken full
'British Foreign Policy in the Far East', FECPU memorandum, GEN 77/94, 14 January 1946,
CAB 130/5.
See Chapter I. American involvement in SEAC was terminated by the United States Chiefs of
Staff in October 1945 and this also precluded any direct American assistance to Mounibatten.
See Peter Dennis, Troubled Day of Peace, pp.20-21 and John Keay, Last Post The End of Empire in
the Far East (London, 1997), p.215. See also Philip Darby, British Defence Poliy East of Sue?
1947-1968 (London, 1973); F.Donnison, British Milita!y Administration in the Far East, 1943-46
(London, 1956); Gary Hess, The United States' Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940-1950
(New York, 1987) and Tilman Remme, Britain and Regional Co-operation in SoutbeastAsia 1945-1 949
(London, 1995).
Harcourt to Alexander, letter, 7 November 1945, AVAR 5/10/70(c), Alexander papers, CAC.
6 by The lVarAgainst Japan, VoL 1/, pp.229-231.
' SEAC projected that British forces would not arrive in Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong until
the 3, 5 and 10 September 1945, respectively. SACSEA to COS, telegram no. SEACOS 461, 3
September 1945, F6417/630/23, FO 371/46457.
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advantage of the delay and proclaimed independence. 8 Asian nationalism and food
shortages left SEAC determined to extricate itself from non-British commitments. The
Foreign and Colonial Office, concerned about a knock-on effect in Malaya, thought it
most desirable that Britain should prevent revolutionary outbreaks and get French and
Dutch troops into southern Indo-China and the East Indies with the utmost despatch.9
In 1945, the peaceful restoration of Britain's position in Southeast Asia was seen as a
necessary component to augment Britain's world power status. The Colonial Office
hoped that this would win the support of the local inhabitants and secure goods, such as
tin and rubber, that were an important source of dollars in the dependant Empire.1°
B. BRITISH PLANNING FOR A RETURN TO CHINA
Britain's preoccupation with the problems of Southeast Asia hindered British efforts to
re-establish its pre-war presence in China. In 1937 British investment in China had
reached £300 million, the majority invested in import/export business, real estate,
manufacturing, transportation, banking, public utilities and insurance. During wartime,
° Keay, Last Post, p.2l5 and Tarling, Britainoutbeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, p.53.
Frustrated, SEAC thought that British forces should not wait for MacArthur. See Dening to
Foreign Office, telegram no.369, 20 August 1945, F5458/630/23, FO 371/46454 and SACSEA
to COS, telegram no. SEACOS 448,20 August 1945, F5474/630/23, FO 371/46454. The major
stumbling block was a fear that the Japanese would not capitulate until they received orders from
Tokyo and the Chiefs of Staff reluctantly heeded this advice. See COS to SACSEA, telegram no.
COSSEA 329, 21 August 1945, F5474/630/23, FO 371/46454 and COS minutes in
COS(45)203, 22 August 1945, F5558/630/23, FO 371/46455.
See Dening to Foreign Office, telegram no.530, 25 September 1945, F7445/11/61, FO
371/46308; Young, minute, 20 September 1945, F7161/11/61, FO 371/46308 and Bevin,
minute, DO(45)8, 10 October 1945, CAB 69/7. See also Ian Nish(ed.), Indonesian Experience: The
Role of Japan and Britain, 1943-1948 (London, 1980) and Robert McMahon, Colonialsim and Cold
Wa, The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 194549 (Ithaca, 1981). The British
appointed a Special Commissioner to Southeast Asia to help solve this dilemma and alleviate the
problem of food supply. See Bevin, minute, CM(46)14, 11 February 1946, CAB 128/5.
'°Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, p.55 and Xiang, Recasting the I#berial
Far East, pp.38,40. As early as 1937, Malaya and Singapore had taken central place in balancing
the Empire's trade, Britain having a dollar deficit of $591 million in that year, and Malaya a
surplus of $247 million, based on sales of rubber and tin. See Karl Hack, 'Southeast Asia and
British Strategy, 1944-1951' iii Aldrich(ed.), British Intel4gence, Strategy and the Cold War, p.308.
'Memorandum on Present China Situation and on British and American Policies in China', Far
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Eden had been anxious to see British influence and trade restored in China while hoping
to avoid a 'selfish rivalry' with the United States. 12 Since the Opium war of 1840, Britain
had been the leading Western power in Chinese affairs but by 1945, American political,
economic and military penetration throughout China was mounting. 13
 Geoffrey
Wallinger, the British Minister in China, warned Eden that the United States had
practically established a monopolistic control over the external economy of China.
Despite Britain's decision to renounce extraterritoriality in 1943, Wallinger noted that the
Chinese also remained suspicious of British imperialism, which reinforced doubts over
whether Britain either could, or wished to, help develop China. Notwithstanding these
drawbacks, Wallinger and officials at the British Security Co-ordination in New York,
argued that Britain could still compete with America in export services, such as business
management, shipping, banking and insurance. Favourable taxation abroad, Treasury
investment and a joint Anglo-American approach to the Chinese over economic matters,
were natural requirements to the success of this strategy.14
The Far Eastern Department at the Foreign Office welcomed these proposals but
external and internal factors intervened to prevent their realisation. 15
 On the external
level, the Americans were reluctant to co-operate with imperialist Britain in China,
especially regarding preparations for a Chinese commercial treaty. 16 Internally, problems
Eastern Department memorandum, 7 July 1945, F4207/186/10, FO 371/46211.
12 Eden to Seymour, telegram no.426, 6 December 1944, F1903/57/10, FO 371/46180.
13 Americans were politically immersed in an attempt to effect a truce between the CCP and
Nationalists. Wedemeyer was the Chief of Staff to the Nationalist Army while the United States
also created a Chinese War Production Board as well as a Board of Transport. Xiang, Ricastin the
Impe?7alFar East, p.23.
14 Wallinger to Eden, telegram no.93, 14 February 1945, F962/57/10, FO371/46179; Wilkinson
to Sansom, letter, 28 December 1944, F222/57/10, FO 371/46178 and Sansom to Far Eastern
Department, letter, 29 December 1944, F222/57/10, FO 371/46178.
Scott, minute, 15 February 1945, F962/57/10, F0371/46179 and Broadmead, minute, 30
March 1945, ibid..
16 See Balfour to Foreign Office, telegram no.5556, 11 August 1945, F5053/235/10, FO
371/46221. Still, the British did not despatch their first draft of a commercial treaty to Bevin
until 5 October 1945. See FO 371/46220-46223 for information on the formulation of a British
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emerged between the Far Eastern Department and the Treasury. During 1945, although
the Financial Aid agreement of May 1944, which provided Nationalist China with a £50
million credit, had been intended for wartime use only, the Far Eastern Department
lobbied for its continuation into the postwar world. The Department hoped to check
America's monopoly of Chinese markets and exercise greater British influence within
China.'7
 The Treasury immediately dismissed such an idea and bluntly explained that
Britain's poor balance of payments position would preclude any long term loans to
China and a major British role in its postwar reconstruction. Britain had only been able
to supply China during the war due to lend-lease imports. The Treasury, therefore,
considered that: 'it would be very difficult for us to seek orders for China, in competition
with the Americans, who would take the line that we would be doing so at the expense
of lend-lease.18
Officials at the Economic and Reconstruction Department accepted the Treasury's
arguments, recognising that credits to China would unnecessarily drain Britain's scarce
external resources. The Economic and Reconstruction Department did not advocate a
British withdrawal from China and hoped for an economic 'come back' in later years.
For the same reasons, the Overseas Reconstruction Committee(ORC) was happy for the
United States to take the leading role in China. Basing their assumptions on the state of
the Chinese Nationalist economy, British economic specialists were aghast at pouring
great sums of money into China for illusory commercial benefits.' 9 Finally, military
planners pointed out that China was not a vital strategic concern in the maintenance of
commercial treaty for China.
17 Scott, minute, 27 January 1945, F492/57/1O, FO 371/46178 and 'British Policy Towards
China', Stemdale Bennett memorandum, 2 March 1945, F1331/409/1O, FO 371/46232 and
Sterndale Bennett, minute, ASE(C)(45)1, 7 March 1945, F1482/12/1O, FO 371/46129.
See Young, minute, ASE(C)(45)1, 7 March 1945, ibid. and 'British Commercial Policy in
China', Anderson memorandum, APW(45)51, 5 April 1945, F2181/57/1O, F0371/4618.
Coulson, minute, 6 March 1945, F1331/409/10, FO 371/46232; Hall-Patch, minute, 10
March 1945 and minutes for ORC(45)2, 24 July 1945, F4712/57/10, F0371/46183.
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Britain's Empire. Although the British wanted a China friendly to the West, the JIG
dismissively stated that: 'so long as we can maintain control of the seaways, a direct threat
from the direction of China is not serious'. If the Soviets penetrated into north China,
the JIC felt that Britain would not be in a position to prevent it. 20 The weight of these
arguments effectively ended the Far Eastern Department's hopes for a major British role
in postwar China and six days after Japan's surrender, the Treasury categorically
concluded that Britain would be unable to provide loans for China in the postwar
period. 21 Despite these conclusions, the United States, overestimating Britain's strength
in 1945, presumed that the British would re-establish their pre-war status in China.
Many British businesses within China hoped that they also could pursue their old
commercial activities. The eight year-long Sino-Japanese war, however, had swept away
foreign business interests, while witnessing increased Chinese government ownership.
Chiang Kai-shek, for example, launched an ambitious programme for industrialisation
backed by a series of laws that aimed to control foreign economic activities and remove
old tax privileges. British commercial hopes for a return to the pre-1937 state of
industrial and fmancial affairs had been seriously diminished.'
Echoing the sentiments of a British Cabinet paper produced in December 1945, the
Chungking representative for Swire and Sons, one of Britain's leading companies in
China, described how the Americans could impress the Chinese with talk of firm finance
and early large scale delivery. They also seemed to possess an unlimited supply of
20 Cavendish Bentinck, minute, 13 March 1945, F1331/409/10, FO 371/46232.
21 Treasury brief for Dalton by Young, 8 September 1945, F6864/13/1O, FO 371/46146.
22 This, the Americans thought, would include a Yangtze River Patrol and a China Squadron
based on Hong Kong. 'British Intentions in China', Chief of Naval Operations memorandum,
JCS 1502/1, 10-(11) September 1945, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 152, KCL.
23 Aron Shai, Bniain and China, 194147: Imperial Momentum (London, 1984), pp.95-105 and Xiang,
Rscastin the Imperial FarEast, pp.23, 60.
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technicians and planners to put at China's disposaL As Britain's traditional role in
China appeared to be waning, plans by the Joint Planning Staff to send British ships into
Chinese ports with the United States Navy, met with strong disapproval from both
America and Nationalist China. 25 Chiang Kai-shek flatly told Truman that the British
fleet was not welcome in China.26
 The United States responded to this request by
removing all British ships from under their command in China.27 With the British Pacific
fleet detached from the American Seventh fleet, the Chinese Foreign Ministry argued
that there was no longer any justification for it remaining in Chinese waters, especially as
it could arouse strong national feeling and provoke inddents. The attitude of the
British towards China in the Asian-Pacific war perhaps contributed to these lukewarm
relations. Furthermore, the British renunciation of extra-territoriality and the American
presence in China, had buoyed the Nationalists to take a firmer line with the British
government in late 1945 and early 1946. The Nationalists refused to return British
properties, failed to renew a 3-year R.AF contract for a training mission at Chengtu, and
reduced to a period of three months air staging posts for the British in Canton and
Shanghai, which served the Commonwealth occupation of Japan. The British Embassy at
Chungking and the China Department at the Foreign Office, noted that the Chinese
Nationalists had become increasingly 'chauvinistic'.
24 In the spring of 1945, a G5 Section which was created in Wedemeyer's headquarters, assumed
wide responsibilities in steering the Chinese domestic economy. See ibid., pp.29-30, 95.
25 
'British Representation at Main Chinese Ports', JP(45)220(Final), 11 September 1945, CAB
79/39 and Cunningham, minute, COS(45)222, 13 September 1945, CAB 79/39.
26 flurley to Secretary of State, 1 September 1945, FRUS, 1945, VoL VII p.545.
27 See COS minutes in COS(45)240, 3 October 1945, CAB 79/40.
28 A Sino-British agreement in October 1945 provided for the loan of British ships to apply
temporarily on the Yangtze to carry relief supplies but the Chinese also went back on this
understanding. 'China: Some Current Trends and Recent Developments', Kitson memorandum,
23 May 1946, F7701/25/1O, FO 371/53564.
29 WaJlir to Bevin, telegram no.1248, 11 December 1945, F67/25/10, FO 371/53561; 'China:
Some Current Trends and Recent Developments', Kitson memorandum, 23 May 1946,
F7701/25/10, FO 371/53564 and Lamb to Kitson, letter, 12 December 1945, F33/33/10, FO
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The British government found it difficult to challenge the Nationalists at a time when
it had begun to scale down its commitments in China. As soon as Japan surrendered, all
British military organisations in China were removed other than the normal military
attaches and their staffs. 3° Meanwhile, Washington ignored Britain's requests to transport
British Consular officers across China. By November 1945, the British remained
dreadfully short-handed in China, lacked people with Chinese experience, and could not
reopen many British posts, apart from those at Shanghai, Nanking, Tientsin and
Canton.31 The American position contrasted sharply with Britain's status. Backed by
Wedemeyer's troops, the Americans moved quickly to re-establish American diplomatic
outposts throughout China. 32 John Vincent at the State Department felt that the United
States was: 'moving towards establishment of a relationship with China which has some
of the characteristics of a defacto protectorate with a semi-colonial Chinese Army under
our direction'. 33 United States ships were allowed the free use of Shanghai and other
harbours while British ships had been given clearly to understand that they were not
wanted there.
C. HONG KONG
Despite several drawbacks, Britain was not about to withdraw politically and
economically from the mainland and Hong Kong, particularly as the British government
371/53573.
'Future of British Troops in China', JP(45)256(Final), 2 October 1945, CAB 79/40 and COS
approval in COS minutes, COS(45)241, 4 October 1945, CAB 79/40.
31 Seymour to Sterndale Bennett, letter, 1 November 1945, F10179/186/10, FO 371/4621 5.
32 Xiang, Rtczctrng the ImpenalFarEact, pp.58-59.
The American Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed a military advisory group approximating
1,000 Army officers, 2,600 enlisted men and 300-700 naval personneL See Vincent memorandum
for Byrnes, 12 November 1945, FRUS, 1945, VoL VII, pp.6l4-6l7.
China. Some Current Trends and Recent Developments', Kitson memorandum, 23 May 1946,
F7701/25/10, FO 371/53564.
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wished to rehabilitate its imperial and world power status. 35 Hong Kong, for example,
represented a valuable commercial and industrial centre for the British and contributed
to its prestige as a symbol of imperial strength in Asia. American claims for bases in the
Pacific and the projected Sino-Soviet joint administration of the ports of Dairen and
Port Arthur encouraged the British to stand firm on the retention of Hong Kong.36
When Japan surrendered, the British government considered it was of 'paramount
political importance' that they should send a force at once to Hong Kong even though it
lay within China's operational area.37 To the annoyance of Chiang, Wedemeyer and
MacArthur, a Royal Navy Task Force duly arrived on 29 August 1945, in order to
pre-empt any possibility of the Americans or Chinese Nationalists taking the colony's
surrender. Regarded by the Chiefs of Staff as defenceless in any future war, a British
military presence was maintained in Hong Kong to maintain law and order and as a
deterrent against the activities of local bandits or of a possible Chinese war lord. 39
 The
Hurley to Secretary of State, 14 April 1945, FRUS, 1945, VoLT/Il, p.331. The Colonial Office
even wanted an extension of the 99 year lease. See 'British Colonial Economic Interests in
China', note by Colonial Office, FE(E)(45)20, 28 February 1945, F1373/1147/10, FO
371/46251. The Foreign Office did not think these plans were realistic. See Scott, minute, 8
March 1945, ibid.
36 Kitson, minute, 5 September 1945, P6859/1147/10, FO 371/46254; Cadogan, minute, 6
September 1945, F6859/1147/10, FO 371/46254. Bevin, minute, DO(45)5, 7 September 1945,
CAB 69/7 and The Future Status of Hong Kong', State Department Interim Research and
Intelligence Service: Research and Analysis Branch memorandum, 5 October 1945, RJCS:
1946-1953, MF5IO, KCL
' 'Action in the Event of an Early Japanese Surrender', British COS representatives
memorandum, CCS.901/1, 11 August 1945, F5495/1147/10, FO 371/46252. See COS minutes
in COS(45)198, 14 August 1945, F5552/1 147/10, FO 371/46252.
38 See COS minutes in COS(45)198, 14 August 1945, F5714/1147/10, FO 371/46253;
'Summary of Impressions Received at Manila', Penney memorandum, 23 August 1945, 5/13,
Penney papers, KCL and Xiang, Recasting the Impenal Far East, p.22. Chiang could no more get to
Hong Kong to take the Japanese surrender than he could reach north China and Manchuria
without aid from the United States. See Truman, Memoirs, VoLI, pp.446-450.
'Organisation for the Support of the Fleet in All Parts of the World', Plans Division
memorandum, 28 September 1945, ADM 205/50 and COS minutes in COS(46)24, 13 February
1946, CAB 79/44. The Chiefs of Staff sent the 150th Indian Brigade to complete its
concentration by December 1945. The Chiefs of Staff informed the Colonial Office that while
they realised the difficulties with which Harcourt was faced, further British reinforcements were
impracticable at the present moment. Simpson, minute, COS(45)289, 27 December 1945, CAB
79/42.
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British Consul-General in Canton, Ronald Hall, for example, had warned the Embassy in
China that the Nationalist Press was flooded with arguments regarding the Chinese daim
to Hong Kong and expected local disturbances.4°
Indeed, the Chinese Nationalists consistently attempted to make political capital out
of the position of Hong Kong. By early 1946, the Nationalist Army had begun to treat
Hong Kong as a 'right of way' for the movement of their troops through the south coast
of China and the repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war. 41 The Chiefs of Staff
consequently aimed to fix a time limit to these operations, considering that there were
other ports on the Chinese Pacific coast capable of handling troop movements. 42 The
Foreign and Colonial Office, aware of Chinese sensitivities about Hong Kong, disagreed
withAChiefs of Staff.43 George Kitson, at the China Department in the Foreign Office,
had even contended that Britain ought to return sovereignty but, recognising the
colony's economic importance, wanted to retain some kind of special position there by
agreement with the Chinese government. Sterndale Bennett and Geoffrey Wallinger,
were not convinced, as British traders had been led to understand in a public statement
by Attlee that Britain intended to hold on to Hong Kong. 45 Internal events within China
eased Nationalist pressure on Hong Kong by mid-1946. The Chinese government halted
troop movements through Kowloon, while Harcourt convinced the Nationalists that
Hall to Seymour, letter, 9 November 1945, F10574/186/1O, FO 371/46215.
'' Cunningham, minute, COS(46)20, 6 February 1946, CAB 79/44.
42 Cunningham, minute, COS(46)33, 1 March 1946 and Hollis to Foreign Office, letter, 1 March
1946, CAB 79/45.
See COS minutes in COS(46)42, 18 March 1946, CAB 79/46; Alanbrooke, minute and COS
minutes in COS(46)42, 18 March 1946, CAB 79/46 and COS minutes in COS(46)53, 3 April
1946, CAB 79/46.
Seymour to Sargent, letter, 11 June 1946, F10372/113/1O, FO 371/53635; Kitson, minute, no
date, ibid. and The Future of Hong Kong', China Department memorandum, 18 July 1946,
F10572/113/10, FO 371/53635.
' Waflinger, minute, 5 April 1946, F5107/113/10, FO 371/53633 and Sterndale Bennett,
minute for Kitson, 29 January 1946, F3604/113/10, FO 371/53632.
46 See COS minutes in COS(46)43, 20 March 1946, CAB 79/46 and Cunningham, minute,
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his object in Hong Kong was to use its facilities to aid China, as well as Britain. 47 Soong
had also visited Hong Kong and appeared most friendly, helping the British with some
of the local problems. By 1947, Hong Kong became a source of considerable dollar
credit and the only stable port in China, increasing its commercial and economic
importance.49 A principal reason for the more accommodating nature of the Nationalists
was their fear of, and preoccupation with, Soviet policies in northern China and the
latter's relations with the Chinese communists.50
III. Britain, the United States and Sino-Somet Relations
A major question that divided many British officials during 1945 was how to identify the
scale and nature of Chinese communism and its possible affiliation to the Soviet Union.
Evidence indicates that Stalin's relationship with the CCP leader, Mao Tse-tung, was far
from clear. In the niscl492Os, Stalin persuaded Mao to form a 'United Front' with Chiang
Kai-shek, a policy, which by the mid-I 930s, had witnessed the near extermination of the
CCP. Henceforth, Mao began to view his Party's policies as primary and was not
prepared to subordinate its interests to the Soviet Union. For example, Mao, fearing
disaster, rejected Stalin's requests, after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, to
attack the Japanese along the borders of Mongolia in June 1941. Fearful of an attack on
the Soviet East Asian front, Stalin wanted all Chinese to unite under Chiang, in order to
pin down Japan's Expeditionary Force in China. Consequently, during the war against
COS(46)43, 20 March 1946, CAB 79/46.
47 Harcourt to Alexander, letter, 7 November 1945, AVAR 5/10/70(c), Alexander papers, CAC.
See COS minutes in COS(46), 16 January 1946, CAB 79/44 and McGrigor, minute,
COS(46)113, 18 July 1946, CAB 79/50.
'Policy for a Permanent Military Garrison in Hong Kong', copy of a minute, 21 May 1947,
from Cs-in-C Committee, Southeast Asia to secretary of COS Committee, COS(47)122(0), 9 June
1947, DEFE 5/4.
5° Hall to Nanking, despatch no.120, 13 May 1946, P9376/51/10, FO 371/53598.
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Japan, Stalin did not allow CCP guerrillas to retreat across the borders of Soviet
Northeast Asia and recruited the indigenous Chinese population into the Soviet
Communist Party. There is also little evidence of any direct material support for the
Chinese communists from Moscow.51
The ambiguous nature of Mao's relationship with Stalin, tended to sow doubt among
British and American officials about the true nature of the CCP. Attempting to establish
a ea4obtik partnership with the Western allies, Stalin supported Chiang and went Out of
his way to downplay ideological connections between the Soviets and the CCP. 52 In
conversation with Harriman, Stalin referred to the CCP as 'margarine communists'.53
Molotov similarly told Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador to Moscow, that
Stalin would not support Mao against Chiang. Molotov remained adamant that the CCP
were in no sense communists. Clark Kerr agreed and wrote 'they are not'. Nevertheless,
it has been recently documented that Clark Kerr's downplaying of the CCP threat was
due more to his desire not to undermine the Nationalist government. Privately, Clark
Kerr thought that Mao would eventually become the master of China but like others, he
misunderstood the nature of the CCP and underestimated the speed with which they
51 Mao's battle for the party leadership in the mid-1930s against Wang Ming, who had
connections with the Comintern, did not endear Mao to Stalin either. See John Garver, 'The
Origins of the Second United Front The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party', China
Quateny, No.113 (March 1988), pp.29-S9; Michael Hunt, The Genesic of Chinese Communist Forngn
Polig(New York, 1996), pp.136-138. 142-145 and Westad, Cold EVar & Revolution, pp.61-63.
Michael Sheng has claimed that relations between the Soviet Union and the CCP were much
closer during this period. See Michael Sheng, 'Mao, Stalin and the Formation of the
Anti-Japanese United Front 1935-1937', China Quarterly, No.129 (March 1992), pp.149-170 and
idem, The Triumph of Internationalisnt CCP-Moscow Relations before 1949', Dplomatic Histo!y,
VoL21 No.1 (Winter 1997), pp.95-100;
52 Zuk and Pleshakov, inside the K,,nhn's Cold [Var, p.56.
Westad, Cold War & Revolution, pp.13-l4; Harriman to Hull, 26 June 1944,FRUS, 1944,
VoLVI, p.799; Harriman to Roosevelt, 11 June 1944, ibid, p.97 and Harriman and Abel,Special
Envoj, pp.370-371.
Clark Kerr to Foreign Office, telegram no.2327, 3 September 1944, F4114/3913/10, FO
371/41685 and Kennan to Secretary of State, 17 April 1945, FRUS, 1945, VoL VII, p.338.
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could achieve power. 55 The Counsellor of the British Embassy in Chungking, John
Keswick, even felt that the CCP would not interfere with the private ownership of
property. Yet, during 1939 and 1940, Mao had stated in The Chinese Rnolution and the
Chinese Communist Party and On New Democray, that the CCP must overthrow the rule of
the bureaucratic-capitalist class and eliminate all foreign influence. 57
 This led Geoffrey
Hudson, an Oxford-educated China expert at the Foreign Office's Research Department,
to claim that the CCP were devoted to the interests of the Soviet Union because it was
an essential part of their political faith. 58 General Adrian Carton de Wiart, Churchill's
personal representative in China, on meeting Mao at a dinner engagement in 1945,
considered him a 'fanatic Moscow-trained' and recalled being treated to a discourse of
praise on the qualities of communist organisation.59
Any f)ovid
	
li imn tr t1ii CCP in t m ted by 'ton de Wiart and Hudson,
1ed 51iti to believe that Washington could dispense with Soviet participation in the war
against Japan. To solve this dilemma, Stalin aupported efforts to build a CCP Nationalist
coalition that would allow him to legitimately utilise Mao's forces when the Red Army
attacked the Japanese. Roosevelt endorsed such a coalition but wted to develop an
integrated Chinese Army that could defeat Japan in north China without Soviet
Lo	 6) oáMege 4	 /ce14(, Clisna,
mtcrfcrcncc.6° Rooseveli, remained unconvinced that the CCP was governed from
Donald Gillies, Radical Thplomat: The Lj[e of Archibald Clark Kerr, Lord Invercbape 1882-1951
(London, 1999), pp.117-118.
'The Situation in China: November 1944', Keswick memorandum, 30 November 1944,
F6140/34/10, FO 371/41583. See also Gunther Stein, 'Behind the Blockade in China:
Communists set up new democracy', News Chronic/i, 2 January 1945 for similar views.
Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean Wa The Making of the Sino-Amencan Confrontation (New
York, 1994), p.14.
58 Hudson, minute, 15 March 1944, F975/159/10, FO 371/41611. Hudson, minute, 13 April
1944, F1546/159/10, FO 371/41612 and Scott, minute, 10 September 1944, F4114/3913/10,
FO 371/41 685.
Adrian Carton de Wiart, Happy Oq'yssy: The Memoirs of Iieutenant..General Sir Adnan Carton de
[Viart (London, 1950), pp.269-270.
Harrumn explained that Stalin, with a CCP Nationalist settlement, could use Mao's forces in
137
BRITAIN AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR
Moscow and endorsed the sending of the American Dixie mission in 1944 to visit Mao
at Yenan, in order to investigate the possibilities of aiding the CCP. 61 Patrick Hurley, the
new United States Ambassador to Chungking, was also sent to China in late 1944 to help
bring the CCP and Nationalists together. 62 The British were doubtful about the success
of such a policy, especially as Hurley was reckless and utterly ignorant of China.63
Attempts to mediate in the Nationalist-CCP crisis were immediately ruled out by the
Foreign Offlce.M Keswick warned the State Department that trying to achieve a
Nationalist-CCP truce was extremely 'unrealistic' and presumed that a loosely federated
system was more likely to arise in China. Vincent took these views as an indication of
British policy on the matter.65
Keswick, undoubtedly envisaging spheres of influence in China, was backed by Sir
Horace Seymour, who felt that any agreement negotiated under American pressure
would be purely temporary because the CCP were geographically well placed in north
China to occupy cities if the Japanese suddenly evacuated. British and American
policymakers tended to link this analysis with the Soviet interest in north China,
questioning whether Stalin would hand any cities back to the Nationalists in this region,
if the Red Army advanced upon Manchuria, Peking and Tientsin. 67 Fearful of this
his offevcive agnct Japan to protect his right flank Harriman and Abel, SpsdalEnvojy, p.371.
61 The mission was struck by the lack of corruption, factionalism and inflation that was prevalent
in Nationalist China. The CCP also appeared to be fighting the Japanese, a policy from which,
together with land reform, Mao derived much of his support. Dreyex, China at War, p.29l and
Westad, Cold War Revolution, pp.13-14.
62 eyer, China at Waç p.298.
63 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation.' Mj Yea,:c in the State Department (London, 1967), p.133.
'British Policy Towards China', Sterndale Bennett memorandum, 2 March 1945,
F1331/44)9/10, FO 371/46232; Prideaux-Brune, minute, 13 June 1945, F3065/36/10,
F0371/46170 and Sterndale Bennett, minute, 16 February 1945, F804/186/10, F0371/46209.
65 Memorandum of conversation by Vincent, 25 January 1945, ibid, pp.35-36 and Winant to
Secretary of State, 2 March 1945, ibid, p.258.
Seymour to Sterndale Bennett, letter, 13 December 1944, F261/35/10, FO 371/46164 and
Prideaux-Brune, minute, 9 February 1945, F804/186/10, FO 371/46209.
67 Hudson, minute, 22 January 1945, F261/35/10, FO 371/46164 and 'Outline of Current
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possibility, when Hurley halted talks on military co-operation with the CCP in late
I 944, the Foreign Office concluded with approval that: 'supplies to the communists,
unless with Chiang's prior agreement, might cause the latter to throw in his hand and
lead to chaos in China'.69 For the British, civil war could destroy all hope of merchants
re-establishing their economic interests, while a China without Chiang might witness the
loss of imperial influence on the Chinese mainland. 70 Stalin, wanting to consolidate his
gains at Yalta, also realised that civil war could make Chiang unwilling to sign a treaty
with him due to fears that the Soviets would support the CCP. Stalin needed to legitimise
Yalta, guard against future Japanese aggression and check a preponderance of American
power in China.71
However, deepening tensions between the Grand Alliance over Eastern Europe and
Hurley's openly announced support for the Nationalists in April 1945, saw Chiang
become far more obstinate in coalition negotiations with Mao. Consequently, the latter
attempted to define a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. 72 Mao now prepared
plans for an infiltration of Manchuria, hoping he could create a CCP-Soviet bloc in the
north as a bulwark against growing American-Nationalist strength in south and central
Chinese Situation',Chase memorandum, 1 March 1945, FRUS, 1945, VoLT/Il, pp.59-60.
Roosevelt asked Harriman in November 1944: 'If the Russian go in, will they ever go out?'
Harriman and Abel, Special Eiwqy, p370.
Westad, Cold IVar & Revolution, pp.66-67.
69 Scott, minute, 6 January 1945, F102/35/1O, FO 371/46164.
70 Hudson felt that it was extremely unlikely that a communist China would be any more
pro-American than Tito's Yugoslavia pro-British. Xiang, Recasting the Imperial Far East, p.49.
71 Westad, Cold War & Revolution, pp.8-IO, 61-63.
72 See Yang Kuisong, The Soviet Factor and the CCP's Policy Toward the United States in the
1940s',Cbinese Histonans, No.1 VoL5 (Spring 1992), p.22; Michael Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese
Communist Foreign Poliy, p.l47 and James Reardon-Anderson, Yenan and the Great Powec: The
On gins of Chinese Communist Foreign Poliy, 1944-1946 (New York, 1980), pp.68-101. Transcript of
Press and Radio News Conference by Hurley, 2 April 1945,FRUS, 1945, VoLT/TI, pp.317-322
and ibid, pp.74-79. Hurley's statement brought forth a wave of vitriolic CCP attacks on Chiang
and the United States. Chase memorandum, 16 July 1945, FRUS, 1945, VoLT/Il, p.433 and
Atcheson to Secretary of State, 9 April 1945, ibid, p.327; Russell Buhite, Patrick J.Hurkj and
American Forn,gn Polity (Ithaca, 1973), pp.220-22l; Dreyer, China at War, p.298 and Sheng, 'The
Triumph of Internationalism', p.99.
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China.73 British and American planners were aware of this possibility and M16 confirmed
that the CCP were showing a very anti-British and anti-American attitude right up to the
Soviet entry into the war against Japan.74 Mao had even feared that the success of
Britain's Burma offensive might put them in a position to launch their own south China
operations. The British had no such plans and Mao himself was still reluctant to rule out
the possibility of utilising American aid, 75 especially as the CCP leadership despondently
admitted in the summer of 1945, that: 'we do not know what the Soviet Union will do'.76
Throughout 1945, there was a marked reluctance on the part of the United States to
consult with Britain over its China policy. Hurley had visited London in March 1945 and
showed no inclination to talk about Chinese affairs with the British. Similarly, Truman
afforded Britain no prior consultation on the Harry Hopkins presidential mission to
Moscow in the summer of 1945, which aimed to discuss China and other issues! 7 This
attitude was probably bolstered by Stalin's assertion to Harriman in June 1945, that
America must play the largest part in helping China recover, as his country would be
focused on internal reconstruction and the British 'occupied elsewhere'. Stalin disclaimed
any effort to interfere with Nationalist sovereignty over Manchuria and stated he would
deal with Chiang and not Mao. 78 Nevertheless, during his discussions with the
Nationalists for a treaty in the summer of 1945, Stalin moved to acquire his concessions
73 Westad, Cold War & Revolution, pp.74-75.
'Chirix A Report from Kukong', M16 Polticial Report No.62, 17 August 1945, WO 208/4399.
Hudson claimed that both the Nationalists and the CCP were more interested in acquiring
strategic advantages within China, than driving out the Japanese. Hudson, minute, 20 July 1945,
F4207/ 186/10, F0371 /46211. See Dreyer, China at War, pp.292-297 that confirms Hudson's
analysis. See also 'Chinese Communist Expectations in Regard to Soviet Participation in Far
Eastern War',Service memorandum, 14 March 1945, FRUS, 1945, VoL VII, pp.279-283.
Mads principal reasoning was that the United States would become increasingly disenchanted
by the Nationalists. Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foregn Poliy, p.156
76 Westad Cold War & Revolution, pp.74-75.
Xiang, R#castiig the Impeiial Far East, pp.15-18, 20,49-50..
78 flarriman and Abel, SpecialEnviy, pp.472-473.
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at Yalta from Soong. 79 Clark Kerr found Soong 'in a gloomy mood' and 'sore' about the
terms of the Yalta accords but, as Harriman recalled later, Soong was delighted when
Stalin recognised Nationalist sovereignty over Manchuria. Soong appeared less
concerned about whether Nationalist or Soviet troops would guard the railroad or who
would be the Port Master at Dairen. Harriman saw Soong almost every day and urged
him to be firm.8°
After the atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima, Stalin worried that if the
Japanese capitulated before the Soviets entered the conflict, the British and Americans
would 'renege' on the Yalta agreement. The secret Bulletin of the Central Committee
Information Bureau reported in July 1945 that reactionary circles in Britain wanted a
compromise peace with Japan in order to prevent the Soviets from strengthening their
influence in East Asia.81 Although there is no evidence to substantiate such an
accusation, Byrnes had certainly been urging Soong to stall his negotiations with Stalin in
order to receive the Japanese acceptance of Potsdam before Soviet forces attacked north
China. However, a day after the Red Army had launched its attack on the Japanese,
Stalin warned Soong that unless he quickly agreed to Moscow's terms, the CCP would
get 'into Manchuria'. This veiled threat alarmed Nationalist and American planners
because Soviet domination of Manchuria was a key economic aone for China and could
give Stalin a potential lever over the future of the entire region. 82
 Chiang therefore signed
79 See Goncharov, Xue and Litai,Uneen'ain Partners, pp.4-6. Chiang had been indirectly informed
of the Yalta terms by Soviet and American sources just weeks after the summit closed. This
accounts for Chiang's calm manner when Hurley officially told him on 15 June 1945. See
Westad, Cold War & Rniolution, p.32 and Harriman and Abel,SpecialEnvoj', p.399,482-483.
Clark Kerr, minute for Eden, 18 July 1945, F8854/-/61, F0371/54073.
David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Sosiet Union and Atomic Eneej, 1939-1956 (London,
1994), p.125 and Zubok and Pleshakov, Incide the Kremlin's Cold War, p.41.
82 Harriman and Abel, Special Em'oj, pp.495-497 and Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan,
p.14. Harriman grew so concerned that he urged Truman to order pre-emptive landings in
Northeast Asia. Although military planners considered landings in Manchuria impracticable, they
improvised plans for an American occupation of Korea below the 38th parallel. Harriman to
Truman, 8 August 1945, FRUS, 1945, VoLT/Il, pp.533-SSS; Harriman to Truman, 9 August
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a Sino-Soviet treaty on 15 August 1945, fearing that if he did not acquiesce to Stalin's
pressure, there would be outright collaboration between the CCP and the Soviet Union.
In return, Stalin promised that he would only support the Nationalists.83
Stalin's deal with Chiang was motivated by his belief that the CCP had little possibility
of taking power, while viewing a Soviet presence in Manchuria as a card to play in his
dealings over Eastern Europe. Mao, stunned by the absence of any reference to the
settlement of China's domestic dispute, immediately prepared for civil war.M Continuing
as Attlee's personal representative in China, General Adrian Carton de Wiart shared
Mao's view and did not see how outright civil war could be avoided in China. 85 Unsure
of Stalin's assurances about withholding aid to the CCP and his commitment to Yalta,
Truman despatched 50,000 Marines to north China, instructed the Japanese to surrender
to Nationalist forces only and helped transport Chiang's Army to key areas in China.
Wedemeyer explained that the Marines were deployed for the purpose of repatriating and
disarming the Japanese, though fears of a CCP-Soviet closed bloc in north China were a
major factor in American calculations. 87 Truman and his military advisers now offered
1945, ibid, pp.537-538; Westad, Cold War & Revolution, pp.50-Si; See Matray, 'Captive of the
Cold War', pp.145-I68.
83 The settlement was fairly acceptable to the United States. Truman had also secured an oral
commitment from Stalin to honour the 'Open Door' in Dairen. Truman to his wife, letter, 18
July 1945 in Ferrefl(ed.), Dear Bess, p.519 and Tang Tsou, Amenca 's Failure in China 1941-50, VoLI
(London, 1963), pp.282-283. The Chinese had to agree to a plebiscite in Outer Mongolia, the
leasing of Dairen and Port Arthur, combined ownership of the main Manchurian railroads.
Goncharov, Xue and Litai, Uncenain Parnwrs, pp.4-6 and Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's
Cold Wa,, p.S6.
84 Wes Cold War & Revolution, p.75.
85 Dc Wiart to Ismay, letter, 23 August 1945, PREM 8/485.
Wedemeyer to Marshall, 19 August 1945, FRUS, 1945, VoL VII, p.53l-534 and JCS to
Wedemeyct, 18 September 1945, ibid., p.565. Dreyer, China at War, p.3i3-3l4; Steven Levine,
Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution inMancbuna, 1945-1948 (New York, 1987), pp.37-41 and
Odd Arne Westad, 'Losses, Chances and Myths: The United States and the Creation of the
Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1950', Dplomatic History, Vol.21 No.1 (Winter 1997), pp.106-107.
87 The Red Army continued its Manchurian offensive for weeks after Japan had declared itself
willing to surrender. The War Department now thought that Stalin aimed to occupy areas outside
the northeast See Westad, p.102; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold [Var, p.11 and
Buhite, "'Major Interests", p.427. The Soviets held symmetrical views and felt that the
Americans could use Chiang's China as a 'springboard' to oppose the Soviet Union. Kuisong
142
BRITAIN AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR
Soong, who visited Washington in late August 1945, general military assistance in an
ana
effort to build a friendlyAunited China and preclude a Chia.n.g-Stalin deal at the expense of
the United States.
To complement this approach, the United States hoped a new attempt to build a
settlement between the CCP and the Nationalists could be reached. Hurley suggested to
Chiang the advisability of inviting Mao to Chungking and it appears that Stalin pressured
Mao to accept the offer. 89
 It gave the latter a respite to prepare for further revolutionary
action and repair his damaged relations with Moscow. 9° At this stage, the United States,
Britain and even the Soviets held out little hope that Mao and his forces could be
victorious in a civil war. 91 Seymour was convinced that: 'if a settlement is reached it will
rather be because Mao realised indirectly he can have little chance if it comes to fighting
than because of any real agreement'. 92 Despite this assessment, the British did not hold
out high hopes for the American policy. Meanwhile, General Carton de Wiart informed
Mao at a private dinner party that he had no remit to interfere in CCP-Nationalist
negotiations. The General considered Mao to be 'quite a good type of man' but 'a fanatic'
and concluded that 'I am afraid that my meeting with Mao does not give me any more
'The Soviet Factor', p.26. Wedemeyer realised that these American actions would be construed as
a anti-CCP measure but wanted 'to preclude toss of advantages we now enjoy in the Far East'.
Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p.85.
88 ibid., p.85 and Westad, Cold [Var c Revolution, p.101 and 'Military Equipment and Advice for
China', Acheson memorandum for Truman, 13 September 1945, .FRUS, 1945, VoL VII,
Hurley to Byrnes, 16 August 1945, ibid., p.446. See Goncharov, Xue and Litai, Uncenain
Partners, p.7-8 and Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Polify, pp.162-163.
Westad, 'Losses, Chances and Myths', p.107.
91 Yang, The Soviet Factor ',p.25.
92 Seymour to Indian government, telegram no.379, 10 September 1945, WO 208/3116. Some
intelligence sources were now reporting that CCP forces observed were poorly clothed and
equipped, and about half were wearing captured Japanese uniforms. Others wore farmers
clothing. 'China: Communist Activities', M12(b) Report, 22 September 1945, WO 208/4399 and
'China - Communist Activities', M12(c) 2nd District Report No.878,30 November 1945, ibid.
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confidence in a settlement than I had before'. 93
 Hurley's rigid policy and style also
concerned the State Department. Under Hurley's direction, the Embassy had lost many
of its experienced China service personnel who did not agree with his inflexible
pro-Chiang position, while informal contact with the CCP had been severed.94
Officials at SEAC now felt that the prospect of local engagements in China seemed
inevitable after the occupation by the CCP of Japanese-evacuated agricultural areas
between the main centres before Nationalist forces could take over.95
 British intelligence
claimed that Mao's forces had already received Japanese arms from the Soviets and were
in contact with the Red Army north of Kalgan. CCP troops were reported to be moving
towards the Peking-Tientsin area with the object of forestalling occupation by the
NationalistsY6
 The American Embassy in China had been receiving similar information
but in all cases the information was difficult to verify. 97
 The problem of confirming these
suspicions was that although the Red Army had been instructed to protect CCP units as
they moved into the northeast, they were not, in any circumstances, allowed to operate
openly under the pennant of Mao's forces. 98
 When a small OSS team was sent into
Mukden to retrieve prisoners of war in August, the Red Army had been anxious to have
93 Xiang Recasting the Impenal Far East, p.41.
Ibid, p.52
SACSEA to War Office, telegram no.SAC 19478,24 August 1945, WO 208/3116.
The Situation in China', M12(b) memorandum, 20 August 1945, WO 208/3116. Other British
intelligence claimed that the Soviets had delivered 200,000 rifles to the CCP at Shanhaikuan and
that there were now 60,000 Communists in Mukden area armed with Japanese tanks and
machine guns. 'China: Communications: Communist Activities', M12(b) Report, 19-20
September 1945, WO 208/4403; 'China: Communist Order of Battle: Communications', M12(b),
2nd District Report No.816, 22 September 1945, WO 208/439 and 'China: Communist Troops',
M12(c) District Report No.837, 14 October 1945, ibid.
The American Military Attaché reported that CCP units were receiving Japanese arms but
there was no open fraternisation with Soviet forces. Robertson to Secretary of State, 29
September 1945,FRUS, 1945, VoL I/Il, pp.572-573. The American chargé in China also had
information that suggested Soviet staff officers were working in an advisory capacity in the
Chinese communist headquarters at Kalgan. Robertson to Bymes, 9 October 1945, ibid,
pp.579-580.
98 See Goncharov, Xue and Litai, Uncertain Partners, pp.9-12.
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all Americans leave Soviet-occupied territory, especially as they were reporting large scale
lootingY A British Colonel, Jacobs Larkcom, who had just returned from Mukden,
confirmed OSS intelligence, observing that the CCP were in complete control of the area
with the approval of the Soviets while the latter was removing machinery from Mukden
'wholesale'.'°°
British military planners began to assess the fragments of information they were
receiving on China in the autumn of 1945. SEAC argued that the Soviets had deliberately
infringed the spirit of the Sino-Soviet treaty and aimed to communise Manchuria through
the CCP.'°' The JIC adopted a more guarded approach, recognising the fact that they
had no firm evidence of a Soviet violation of the treaty. The JIC believed that the Soviets
were encouraging the establishment of a chain of nominally independent states across
northern China but doubted Stalin saw in the CCP the best means of detaching
Manchuria from the Nationalist government.' 02 The JIC analysis did not see any
potential co-ordinated communist threat to Britain's major imperial interests in Shanghai
and Hong Kong. Indeed, the evidence indicates that the degree of co-operation between
the Soviets and the CCP differed from one city to another. Soviet commanders, for
example, refused the Nationalists access to three ports, Hulutao, Talien and Yingkou, in
the northeast, which helped Mao control Jehol and Chahar. 103 However, Mao's forces
Peter Clemens, 'Operational 'Cardinal': The OSS in Manchuria, August 1945', Intel4gence and
National Securify, VoL13 No.4 (Winter 1998), pp.71-100.
'°° Seymour to Foreign Office, telegram no.1158,22 September 1945, WO 208/206.
101 SACSEA to Cabinet Offices, telegram no.SAC 25335, 15 October 1945, WO 208/206 and
Seymour to Bevin, telegram no.1098, 25 October 1945, F1204/186/10, FO 371/46216. The
Soviet Union's war with Germany had also seen them transfer their industry and agriculture from
the Ukraine to the Urals and to Siberia. Roberts to Bevin, telegram no.659, 5 September 1946,
F12910/12653/23, FO 371/54335.
102 Cabinet Offices to SACSEA, telegram no.6315, 19 October 1945, WO 208/206 and 'Internal
Situation in China', JIC(45)314(Final), 10 November 1945, F10436/186/10, FO 371/46215.
103 As it turned out Mao had already asked the Soviet to delay their withdrawal for exactly the
same purpose. See Goncharov, Xue and Litai, Uncertain Partners, p.11-12; Dreyer,Cbina at War,
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were not allowed to disembark at Dairen and Port Arthur and were placed under Soviet
orders when they arrived at Mukden in September 1945. In Mukden and other areas of
the northeast, looting and violence made it difficult for the CCP to associate itself with
the Red Army. 1°4 The delivery of arms to the CCP, while substantial in August, appeared
to cease from mid-September, as many Soviet commanders hoarded Japanese equipment
and denied it to the CCP.'°5
Soviet intervention did open up the northeast to CCP activity and kept the
Nationalists out of Manchuria, at least temporarily. However, the Sino-Soviet treaty
isolated Mao internationally and gave rise to CCP fears of Soviet-American support for
Chiang in a civil war. These fears were reinforced when Stalin told Chiang in November
that he would assist the Nationalists in taking over cities. Soviet gains at Yalta depended
on Nationalist rule enduring and Stalin instructed the CCP to evacuate the major cities of
the northeast, pushing Mao's forces into the region's poorer areas. 106
 The Soviet leader
still maintained low-level contact with the CCP but also, at Chiang's request, avoided
withdrawing from Manchuria while American forces remained in the north. 107
 Although
American logistical support saw the Nationalists penetrate deep into the northeast, 108 the
Nationalist return to north China was not popular. The prospect of civil war, rising
inflation, corruption and the incorporation of former 'puppet' troops into the National
Westad, Cold War & Revolution pp.83-87. The Soviets also allowed the CCP to build a
clandestine munitions complex in the Soviet controlled city of Dairen and to recruit an additional
300,000 servicemen from Dairen and its suburbs. See Goncharov, Xue and Litai,Uncertain
Partners, pp.9-12.
105 Dreyer, China at lVvp.324; Westad, Cold War & Revolution, pp.89,91-92. Clemens, 'Operation
"Cardinal", pp.98-99.
106 On 13 November the Soviets informed the Nationalists that the Chinese Air Force could use
the Cbangchun airport to bring in troops. However, some CCP cadres were allowed to secretly
stay behind in and around major Soviet-occupied cities. Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Commumst
Forngn Polity, p.l64.
107 Westad, Cold War & Revolution, pp.122-123,138.
1 The CCP had managed by November to get only 30,000 of its own troops into the area and
they were arriving fatigued. Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Fore:gn Polity, pp.161-162.
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Army, led to large scale anti-government rallies in several major cities.'°9 As Chiang
continued to push his forces into Manchuria, Nationalist-CCP negotiations broke down
and Hurley resigned on 27 November 1945, claiming publicly that his subordinates were
communist sympathisers. 11° The British were not enthralled when Hurley also blamed:
'the imperialist servants of Britain in Asia', but hoped his resignation might lead to better
Anglo-American relations in China. London had disagreed with Hurley's all-out support
for Chiang but did not foresee that current developments in China would harm British
imperial interests."
IV. Bntain and the Failu, g of the Marshall Mission
A THE MARSHALL MJSSIONANL) THE MOSCOW' CONFERENCE
In the fall of 1945, Sterndale Bennett, explained to American Ambassador Winant in
London, that although Foreign Office information was 'fragmentary and confused', it did
look as if China was drifting inevitably into a large-scale civil war. 112 Wedemeyer's
outlook was also gloomy. He did not feel that the Chiang had sufficient forces to retain
control of north China at least for many months if not years. The area was vast,
communications limited and the loyalty of the population doubtfuL Wedemeyer
predicted that CCP guerrillas could harass Nationalist troop movements to such a degree
that an extended costly campaign would result." 3 When Madame Chiang Kai-shek
109 The CCP had been laying the organisational groundwork for some of these demonstrations,
but in most cases the participation went far beyond CCP sympathies. Westad,Co/d War c'
Revolution, pp.112, 138-139 and Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: The Political Strip,gle,
1945-1949 (Berkeley, 1978), pp.9-16.
110 Mao had tried to secure specific concessions, chiefly Nationalist recognition of CCP rule in
some, but not all, of their 'liberated areas' and control of 20 out of 120 divisions of the
reorganised army. For Hurley these were irritating 'details' to be solved after a political settlement
had been reached, and the negotiations failed. Dreyer, China at War, p.315 and Acheson, Present at
the Creation, p.l34.
"Xiang, Recasting the ImpenalFarEact, pp.52-54.
112 Wnt to Byrnes, 14 November 1945, FRUS, 1945, VoLT/Il, pp.485-486.
Wedemeyer to Eisenhower, 20 November 1945, ibid., p.6S3.
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approached General Carton de Wiart to obtain greater support for the Nationalists,
Bevin instructed the British Embassy in China to avoid all references of co-operation
with the Nationalists, especially as it might be construed as an effort to profit from the
uncertainty of American policy in the wake of the Hurley affair." 4 In an attempt to stop
the outbreak of full-scale civil war, Truman despatched General George Marshall to
China to stabilise China and fulfil America's wartime objective of building up the country
as a major power in Asia. Marshall's remit was to arrange a truce, ensure Nationalist
domination over all Manchuria and to remove Soviet troops from the region." 5 That
Britain was no longer playing a major role in East Asian affairs was highlighted by the
fact that London remained in the dark about Marshall's appointment. Marshall,
according to the British Embassy in Chungking, was greeted by the Nationalists with
reserve. 116 The Nationalists feared that continued American economic aid might now be
dependent upon Chiang yielding more in any bargain struck with the CCP." 7 Despite
such concern, Marshall's mission was compromised from the outset. The Americans still
transported and supplied Chiang's troops bound for Manchuria while Byrnes indicated
that if CCP intransigence thwarted chances of a political settlement, Marshall was to back
Chiang. 118 Both Sir Horace Seymour and the Foreign Office presumed that such a biased
approach to the negotiations was unlikely to promote a genuine settlement."9
' Xiang, Rtcasling the Imperial Far East, p.54. The flux in American policy had also been picked
up by Wallinger who had received confidential approaches at the highest Chinese levels
emphasising the necessity of closer Sino-British co-operation. Wallinger to government of India,
telegram no.493,26 November 1945, WO 208/4399.
" Nancy Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the United States, 1945-1992 (New York, 1994), p.1 6;
Levine,Anvilof Victory, pp.74-75 and Westad, Cold [Var & Revolution, p.145.
116 Wallinger to Bevin, telegram no.1325, 27 December 1945, F518/515/10, FO 371/53678.
117 Xiang, Recasting the Imperial Far East, p.54.
Memorandum of conversation by Hull, FRUS, 1945, VoLVII, pp.76l-763; JCS to
Wedemeyer, 19 December 1945, ibid, pp.698-699 and Acheson, Present at the Creation,
pp.139-140. 142-143. Simultaneously, the Truman administration moved ahead with plans to
train postwar Chinese Air Forces, provide military advisers and military assistance and relieve
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A major concern for many officials in the Truman administration was a belief that
CCP advances in Manchuria and north China would witness the consequent expansion
of Soviet power in East Asia. 12° However, the relationship between the CCP and the
Soviets remained ambiguous in the fall of 1945. Chiang admitted he was glad that Soviet
troops had stayed in Manchuria, as a Red Army withdrawal could have left the region
open to CCP occupation.' 21 Information coming into Washington confirmed that the
Soviets were collaborating with the Nationalists.' By December 1945, the CCP feared
strong Nationalist assaults on their base areas and the probability that Mao would have to
accept harsh peace terms. Nevertheless, a communiqué from Moscow in the same
month, did intimate that the Soviets would at least seek to check a preponderance of
American power in the northeast, even if they did not directly aid the CCP.'
Consequently, at Moscow in December 1945, both Stalin and Molotov pressed Byrnes
for the removal of 50,000 Marines from north China. Stalin worried that if war broke
Chinese shipping problems. See Byrnes to Robertson, 19 November 1945, ibid, pp.638, 634-644
and Byrnes to Land, 30 November 1945, ibid, pp.689-690; Steven Levine, 'A New Look at
American Mediation in the Chinese Civil Wac The Marshall Mission and Manchuria', Dip h,matic
History, VoL3 No.4 (Fall 1979), p.353; Westad, Cold War & Ret,L'wtion, p.l33; Truman
memorandum, November 1945 in Ferrell(ed.), Off the Record, p.74 and Buhite, "'Major Interests",
p.430.
119 Butler, minute, 6 May 1946, F6165/25/10, FO 371/53563 and Xiang, Rscasting the Imperial Far
East, pp.56-S7.
120 LefflerA Preponderance of Power, p.87.
121 Minutes of meeting held at Nanking, 21 December 1945,FRUS, 1945, VoL VII, pp.795-797
and Jesperson, Amencan Images of China, p.l45.
The Sovieuhad informed Chiang that he could send forces to Mukden and Changchun while
guaranteeing their safe landing at airfields there. Smyth to Bymes, 1 December 1945, ibid,
pp.lO46-iO47; Vincent memorandum, 1 December 1945, ibid, p.lO48; Byrnes memorandum, 24
November 1945, ibid, pp.666-667; Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp.202-203; Levine, Anvil of
Victorj, pp.49-51 and Reardon-Anderson, Yenan and the Great Powers, pp.1l9-13l. Stalin also told
Harriman that he had poor contacts with the CCP, having recalled his three representatives from
Yenan. Harriman and Abel, Special Envoj, p.532. Once again it appeared that Stalin was distancing
himself from Mao. See Clark Kerr to Foreign Office, telegram no.176, 10 December 1945, WO
208/206 and Harriman and Abel, SpecialEnmy, p.527.
123 H, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foregn Polify, p.1 65.
124 Byrnes claimed that the Marines were helping repatriate 325,000 Japanese soldiers. Stalin
wondered why the Nationalist Army could not accomplish this task themselves. Minutes of the
First Formal Session of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, 16 December 1945,
FRUS, 1945, VoL 1711, pp.83S-839; Levine, Anvil of Victoy, pp.56-58 and Harriman and Abel,
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out, the United States, from its position in north China, might attempt to cut the
Trans-Siberian Railway and break up Soviet influence in Northeast Asia.' 25 There were
no war plans to support this fear but Stalin's attempts to consolidate spheres of influence
in Eastern Europe and Iran, meant that Harriman, Forrestal and Patterson pushed
Truman not to withdraw American Marines in order to prevent similar Soviet efforts in
East Asia.'
Troop withdrawal therefore went unresolved at Moscow but the British, led by Bevin,
did pressure the Soviets and Americans to agree to a policy of non-interference in
Chinese domestic affairs. Bevin's purpose, enshrined in the Moscow declaration, aimed
to thwart the American desire to legitimise its unilateral mediation efforts. The Marshall
Mission had undoubtedly diminished Britain's world power status. This fact was
reinforced when Molotov and Byrnes appeared ambivalent to Bevin's actions and, like
their dealings over Korea, attempted to solve Chinese issues without Britain.' 27 The
Marshall Mission and the Moscow declaration pleased Mao, as it appeared to confirm the
failure of Hurley's pro-Chiang policy.' However, the Western powers' response to the
Moscow declaration was less than clear. After unrelenting pressure from Chiang to make
good a naval loan agreed in October 1944, Attlee decided to send several British
warships to China in early 1946. The excuse that the naval loan, by bolstering the
Chinese fleet, would cement British maritime interests in East Asia was rather lame and
only managed to further alienate the CCP.' 29 Not to be usurped by Britain, the United
SpecialEnvojy, p.527
125 ffler,A Preponderance of Power, pp.87-88 and Levine,Anvil of Victory, p.34
126 The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that if war did break out, the United States, lacking allies in
East Asia, could not prevent the Red Army overrunning Manchuria, north China and Korea.
Ross, Amencan War Plans, p.9; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p.88 and Westad, Cold War &
Revolution, pp.115-l17.
127 See Chapter II, pp.19,22 and Xiang, Recactuz the Imperial Far East, p.57.
128 Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Fore ign Poliy, p.166.
129 Malcolm Murfett, 'Old Habits Die Hard: The Return of British Warships to Chinese Waters
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States continued to show its prominence in East Asian affairs, leasing Chiang 271 surplus
warships and despatching a military advisory group to China.'30
Despite the ambiguous neutral stance by the Soviet Union, Britain and America,
Marshall's efforts to conclude a truce between the warring factions, appeared promising
at first and Seymour incorrectly thought that: '[aJ settlement must not now long be
delayed'.' 31
 Marshall achieved a cease-fire in Manchuria on 10 Jan uary 1946 and the
CCP's agreement to participate in the Political Consultative Conference, an all-party
assembly preliminary to the formal drafting of a constitution. Mao was delighted with
achieving an all-party assembly but in return had to open CCP base areas to political
competition and integrate his Army with the Nationalists.' 32
 Chiang remained reluctant
to endorse Marshall's efforts, convinced that Stalin, under the umbrella of the CCP,
would seek to extend his influence over north China. By February 1946, disregarding
Harriman's advice to pursue reforms in China and the latter's belief that Stalin would tell
Mao to make an agreement work,' 33
 Chiang made the decision to push for immediate
Soviet withdrawal, even if this meant a hard fight for control of the northeast.' Events
after the Second World War' in John Hattendorf and Malcolm Murfett(eds.), The Limitations of
Powe, Essajspresentedto PrvfessorNoeman
	 on his egbtieth bi,tbdy (London, 1990), pp.204-205.
° Xiang, Rscasting the Imperial Far East, p.84. The American military advisory group contained
750 personneL Wedemeyer to Eisenhower, 21 January 1946, FRUS, VoLX: The Far East: China,
1946 (Washington, 1972), pp.811-816.
'' Seymour to Foreign Office, telegram no.24, 6 January 1946, WO 208/4399. Chou En-Iai, the
chief CCP representative in Chungking, told Seymour that Marshall's presence gave hope for a
settlement. Chou wanted the cessation of hostilities and the acceptance of CCP forces being able
to take Japanese surrenders. Seymour to Bevin, telegram no.25, 7 January 1946, F1364/384/1O,
FO 371/53670.
132 In February 1946, he secured Nationalist and CCP assent to the reduction of the Chinese
Army to 60 divisions of which 10 would be CCP. Dreyer,Cbina at War, p.316 and Hunt, The
Genesis of Chinese Communist Forqgn Poliy, p.167. Marshall, for example, had proposed that out of
108 Chinese Divisions only 18 would be up from Communist forces. See 'Basis for Military
Reorganisation and for the Integration of the Communist Forces into the Nationalist Army',
Marshall to Byrnes, 14 March 1946, FRUS, VoLIX: The Far East: China, 1946 (Washington,
1972), pp.29S-300. This was unacceptable to CCP leaders. See Kuisong,'The Soviet Factor', p.26.
'33 llarriman and Abel, SpecialEmv,j, pp.539-540.
134 Field to War Office, telegram no.MA 3, 3 January 1946, WO 208/3116.
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in northern Iran also indicated to Chiang that Truman was prepared to take a harder line
with Stalin.135 American and British planners shared Chiang's fears to some extent and
suspected that if the CCP controlled Manchuria, it would be linked to a powerful Soviet
closed bloc in Northeast Asia.' There was little panic, though, in Whitehall about the
possible repercussions this could have on Britain's imperial position in China. This was
no doubt reinforced by the fact that the United States continued to help Chiang's forces
move into Manchuria while granting China just under $84Omillion in postwar lend-lease
funds, a figure that exceeded America's wartime total.137
B. THE GREAT P0 WERS AND MANCHURIA
On 11 February 1946, London and Washington decided to publish the contents of the
secret Yalta accords which produced a wave of anti-Soviet protests across China. The
publication came at a time when the United States was expressing its opposition to
Soviet-Nationalist negotiations on economic co-operation in Manchuria.' Marshal
Rodion Malinovsky, Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Forces in Asia, was threatening to
135 Chapter II and Westad, Cold [Var & Ra'obdion, pp.151-152. By the middle of January 1946,
heavy fighting broke out as the Nationalists began advancing on Kalgan, Shantung and
Manchuria. Seymour to Bevin, telegram no.39, l2January 1946, F1736/325/10, FO 371/53561.
136 'Soviet Intentions and Capabilities in the Far East', Tarver memorandum, 9 April 1946, WO
208/4716; 'The Position in Manchuria', Foulds memorandum, 23 February 1946,
F2436/757/10, FO 371/53684; 'The Manchurian Issue', Foreign Office memorandum, 28
March 1946, F4883/757/l0, FO 371/53686; Stuart to Byrnes, 31 October 1946, FRUS, 1946,
VoLX, pp.453-457; Westad, Cold War & R,vo/i,tion, p.l63 and Levine, Anvil of Victoy, pp.54-56
137 Royal! to Forrestal and Truman, 14 January 1946, FRUS, 1946, VoLX, pp.724-725 and
Patterson to Byrnes, 18 February 1946, ibid, pp.728-73S.
' Byrnes to Kennan, 9 February 1946, FRUS, 1946, VoLX, pp.11O4-11O5. See also Yang, 'The
Soviet Factor', p.26. In late January 1946, it transpired that Byrnes and Acheson, had not seen the
secret Yalta protocols. Byrnes could hardly believe that Roosevelt had departed from the
customary practice and agreed handing over the Kuriles for the Soviet Union, without some
qualifying phrase to safeguard himself us-a-v,:c the constitutional rights of the Senate. Halifax to
Foreign Office, telegram no.622, 28 January 1946, F1535/406/23, FO 371/54283. Sterndale
Bennett found the confusion in the State Department about it 'quite incredible'. Sterndale
Bennett, minute, 30 January 1946, F1535/406/23, FO 371/54283. But it appeared the Chiefs of
Staff were also to some extent in the dark about Yalta. In February 1946, Alanbrooke claimed
that Britain would never have condoned the ceding of the Kuriles to the Soviet Union.
Alanbrooke, minute, COS(46)18, 1 February 1946, F1991/406/23, FO 371/54283.
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carry off whole industrial plants from Manchuria. After a long talk with Chiang,
I-Iarriman reported to Washington that Malinovsky would leave this equipment provided
the Soviets received a 51 per cent interest in heavy industries and a 49 per cent interest in
light industries. Chiang told Harriman that under no circumstances would he let the
Soviets have 51 per cent but appeared willing to offer Malinovsky 'a substantial interest'
in many of the Manchurian industries rather than risk their outright removal to the
Soviet Union, which would destroy the economic life of the region.' 39 Marshall, alarmed
by Soviet demands and the contingency that an agreement had to be reached before the
Red Army withdrew, pressed Truman to take action.' 4° The State Department
accordingly addressed notes to the Soviet and Chinese governments, stating that the
'OpenDoor' principle must be sustained and that the disposal of Japanese assets in
Manchuria discussed between all interested allies.' 4' At the Far Eastern Department of
the Foreign Office, Linton Foulds now wondered whether the British should intervene,
especially as Britain was a party to Yalta and needed to protect the export of soya beans
and rice to Southeast Asia' 42 The Americans had not suested that Britain should take
any supporting action but Foulds wondered if it was wise, by remaining silent, to convey
the impression that Britain remained indifferent.'43
Foulds found support for his concern from the head of the Northern Department at
the Foreign Office, Christopher Warner. Warner claimed that the Soviets would move
fast and establish a political stranglehold over Manchuria by harnessing it economically
139 Harriman and Abel, Specia1Emy, pp.538-540 and Levine,Anvil of Viaoy, pp.68-72.
Marshall to Truman, 9 February 1946, FRUS, 1946, VokiX, pp.'425-429.
Halifax to Foreign Office, telegram no.913, 13 February 1946, F2436/757/10, FO
371/53684.
142 The British bad so far just confined themselves to receiving reports from the British
Ambassador in China on the situation in Manchuria. See dThe Position in Manchuria', Foulds
memorandum, 23 February 1946, F2954/757/10, FO 371/53684.
Both the Americans and the British had failed to open consular posts in Manchuria because
of Soviet obstructionism. Foulds, minute, 16 February 1946, F2436/757/ 10, FO 371/53684.
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to the Soviet Union. Warner wanted to force the Americans hand by suesting to the
State Department that the British proposed to make searching enquiries of the Soviet
authorities and give them publicity. Warner felt that the Americans might then react
more strongly to prevent Britain from taking the lead.' Unwilling to play a major role in
East Asian affairs, the heads of the Far Eastern and North American Departments were
not convinced. Paul Mason, supported by Sterndale Bennett, declared that: 'This is a
hand which the Americans must in any event play...even though we are right to claim
association with it'. 5 The paucity of Anglo-American collaboration in East Asia was
highlighted by the fact that Britain was relying primarily on newspaper articles to glean
information on the Nationalist-Soviet economic negofiations. 1 Mason concluded that
this was America's business and added: 'it will do them good to stand up to the Russians
for once and I don't see why we should deprive them of that privilege'.' 47 Foulds was
also forced to confess to the State Department that Britain was unable, by itself, to
influence events in East Asia. 1 Even Chiang told Marshall that 'the outcome of the
Manchurian question now depended on the strength of the American stand towards
Russia on this subject and that of Iran; that any weakness would mean virtual
emasculation of Manchuria as a part of the Chinese nation'.149
Chiang's talk with Marshall, tensions in Iran and Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech,
saw the State Department demand an explanation for the presence of Soviet troops in
L Warner, minute, 26 February 1946, F2954/757/1O, FO 371/53684.
Mason, minute, 26 February 1946, F2954/757/10, FO 371/53684 and Sterndale Bennett,
minute, 26 February 1946, ibid.
This indicated Britain's lack of first hand knowledge on the ground in China. The British
referred to A.Steele, 'Reds to Leave Mukden', New York Herald T,ibune, 10 March 1946; idem,
'Mukden Street Battles Reported in Wake of Russian Withdrawal; Chinese Factions Race for
City', New York Herald Tnbune, 12 March 1946 and 'Mukden under siege by Communists', Dai'y
Telegrapb, 20 March 1946.
147 Mason, minute, 26 February 1946, F2954/757/10, FO 371/53684.
148 Wnt to Secretary of State, 9 April 1946, FRUS, 1946, VoZX, p.1122.
Memorandum of conversation by MarShall, 10 March 1946, FRUS, 1946, VoLIX, pp.529-530.
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Manchuria.' 50 The British also made representations to Moscow about the removal of
Japanese assets from Manchuria.' 51 Stalin's failure to gain economic concessions from
Chiang, coupled with Chinese patriotic feeling and Anglo-American anger against the
continued presence of the Red Army, led the Soviets to announce their withdrawal from
Manchuria on 11 March 1946.152 This announcement immediately saw the CCP attempt
to reinforce Jehol and Manchuria.' 53 A newly formed China Department at the Foreign
Office, under the direction of George Kitson, was convinced that the Soviets would
encourage the infiltration of the CCP into the areas from which the Red Army had
vacated to make Chiang's tenure of cities taken over virtually impossible. To ensure
Soviet military dominance of Manchuria, the Foreign Office argued that Stalin would
provide strong military garrisons in the Port Arthur-Dairen area and along the Siberian
and Outer Mongolian borders.IM The deductions made by the Foreign Office were
borne out by events. In April 1946, it appeared that the Soviets ignored Nationalist
requests to prevent CCP encroachments into Manchuria.' 55 Other evidence has shown
that the Soviets provided limited military support, including weapons and military
advisers, while telling CCP leaders that their troops must attempt to control all large and
'° Chapter II, pp.24-25 and Levine,Am'il of Victory, p.78.
151 Bevin, minute, CM(46)23, 11 March 1946, CAB 128/5. The Soviets had attempted to term
Japanese assets in Manchuria as 'war booty' and this the American Secretary of State could not
accept See Kennan to Byrnes, 5 March 1946, FRUS, 1946, VoLX, pp.11l2-11l3 and Byrnes to
Kennan, 5 March 1946, ibid, pp.1113-1114. Kitson was aware that the British were helpless in
this matter but the Americans he felt, could offer to replace lost machinery. Kitson, minute, 2
April 1946, F4954/757/10, FO 371/53686.
152 ibid., pp.77-79; Westad, Cold [Var & Revolution, p.162 and idem, 'Losses, Chances and Myths',
p.108.
153 Field to War Office, telegram no.MA 150, 15 March 1946, WO 208/3116.
1'he Manchurian Issue', Foreign Office memorandum, 28 March 1946, F4883/757/10, FO
371/53686.
Seymour to Foreign Office, telegram no.501, 6 April 1946, WO 208/4403.
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middle-size cities, reassuring them that they would not allow Nationalist troops to
occupy the entire northeast of China.
C. THE FAILURE OF THE MARSHALL MISSION AND TUE OUTBREAK OF
CIVIL WAR
Chiang now hoped that his alliance with the United States would hold, even if he used
force against the CCP.' 57 In April 1946, bolstered in this belief by an American offer to
help transport two additional armies to Manchuria, Chiang ordered his armies to start
attacking CCP-held areas around Siping in an effort to cut through Changchun.
Nationalist troops captured Changchun on 23 May, but seriously over-extended their
forces, leaving supply lines vulnerable to CCP harassment and interdiction.' Marshall
was forced to admit that the outlook for a Nationalist-CCP truce was not promising and
warned Chiang that if he did not terminate the fighting, his mission would become
untenable. 159 Seymour held the same concerns but these problems all appeared to
validate Britain's reluctance to back the Marshall Mission.' 6° Famine, inefficiency and
corruption dogged the Nationalists' liberated areas, leading to economic and
administrative chaos in many places. 16 ' The prospect of unrest and disorders in the cities,
The CCP had been initially reluctant to follow this advice as negotiations with the
Nationalists for peace in the northeast had just started and that the October 1945
Nationalist-CCP agreement had allowed Chiang's forces to take over Soviet occupation zones
after Russian withdrawaL But they quickly changed their minds largely because the Soviets
intimated that they could not allow the Nationalists to have complete control in the northeast.
Kuisong, 'The Soviet Factor', p.27; Westad, Cold War & Revolution, p.l58; idem, 'Losses, Chances
and Myths', p.108 and Scott, minute, 10 April 1946, F5393/5393/10, FO 371/53735.
157 Westaci, Cold War & Rvohition, pp.151-152 and Seymour to Bevin, telegram no.39, l2January
1946, Fl 736/325/10, FO 371/53561.
Jesperson, Amencan Images of China, p.l45 and Dreyer,Cbina at War, pp.31 7,324.
159 Marshall to Truman, 6 May 1946, FRUS, 1946, VoLIX, pp.81S-8l8 and Marshall to Soong, 29
May 1946, ibid, p.9l2.
° Seymour to Bevin, telegram no.565, 15 May 1946, F9359/25/10, FO 371/53565.
161 See Kitson, minute, 21 May 1946, F7467/757/10, FO 371/53687 and 'China Today I:
Invoked Economic Conditions and Obscure Tax Laws', Finanaal Times, 10 July 1946.
156
BRITAIN AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR
led Kitson to request keeping Britain's warships at Shanghai.' 62 By mid-1946, British
military planners did not rule out the prospect of a China partitioned into a communist
state north of the Yellow River, and a Nationalist area in the remainder of south and
central China. Indeed, British intelligence had already pointed towards Soviet infiltration
into Sinkiang and separatist tendencies in Inner Mongolia, which were strongly
encouraged by the CCP and the Soviet Union. The Anglo-American powers could do
little to prevent these incursions apart from issuing verbal remonstrations. 163 Still, there is
no evidence to suggest that the British saw these developments as a threat to their major
economic and commercial interests in China nor were they seen as materially altering the
balance of power in the emerging Cold War.IM This perhaps sprung from Britain's
historical experience in China. During this time the country had remained weak and
divided and there was little belief in Whitehall that this state of affairs would change.
Indeed, in June 1946, amidst this chaos, the China Department at the Foreign Office
prepared a complete reappraisal on Britain's position in China that took little account of
growing Cold War fears. Even though Britain was not in a position to give economic and
financial assistance, the Department deemed that China was a potentially important
market in which Britain must preserve its footing and restore all its property. 165 But,
value of currency had declined and the cost of Chinese labour was now some 5 or 6
times its pre-war cost in 'real' money, making the price of exports manufactured by
162 Kitson, minute, 13 June 1946, F7998/757/10, FO 371/53687.
163 
'Russian Intentions in Sinkiang and Mongolia', M12 Report, 16 August 1946, WO 208/285A.
See also Stevenson to Bevin, telegram no.1063, 3 September 1946, F13592/25/10, FO
371/53568.
'Possible Future Direction of Events in China', DM1 memorandum, no date, WO 208/3763.
165 Unfortunately, a large proportion of British-owned warehouses, wharves and ships had not all
been recovered because of Chinese military occupation or customs controL The reason for this
given by the Chinese authorities were that they housed Japanese cargo or were being used as
Japanese repatriation camps. The position was particularly difficult as regards shore and floating
premises of British shipping firms. 'British Policy towards China', China Department
memorandum, 18 October 1946, Fl 5359/384/10, FO 371/53672.
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Chinese labour prohibitive in terms of foreign currency, consequently stifling China's
formerly flourishing export trade. The British also had a shortage of Consuls and of the
twenty Consular posts open in China before the war, the Foreign Office could only open
eleven. All remained inadequately staffed. These depressing facts led the China
Department to conclude that it had to wait for Britain's economic recovery and an end to
China's internal political turmoil, to restore its position on the East Asian mainland. The
British, therefore, limited themselves to sending a trade mission, appointing shipping and
labour attaches to give advice to Chinese authorities and negotiating a commercial treaty.
Yet, the China Department hoped to strengthen its Consular representation, provide
more adequate transportation facilities for British merchants, while showing greater
determination to protect British rights.166
It was unfortunate that this memorandum was produced at a time when full-scale civil
war broke out in China which tended to undermine many of the goals set by the China
Department. 167 By June 1946, the Nationalists had taken Szup'ing and pushed north
across the Sungari. Only another cease-fire on 6 June, agreed to as a result of great
pressure by Marshall and later described by Chiang as his 'most grievous mistake', saved
the CCP and permitted the central Manchurian front to stabilise for the remainder of
1946.166 Marshall's irritation with Chiang mounted during the spring and summer of
1946. He resisted political, institutional and administrative reforms that Marshall deemed
critical for the maintenance of order, the dilution of communist influence and the
exclusion of Soviet power. 169 Exasperated by Chiang's determination to defeat the CCP
166 Consular posts such as Mukden, Dairen and Harbin, for example, had to remain closed due
to the political conditions, while others, such as Foochow and Ichang, were of doubtful
importance to current British interests. 'China Policy', Kitson memorandum, 17 June 1946,
F8984/25/10, FO 371/53565.
to Bevin, telegram no.773, 8 July 1946, F10956/384/10, FO 371/53671.
Dreyer, China at [Var, pp.324-325; Acheson, Present at the Creation, p.204 and Hunt, The Genesis
of Chinese Communist Forqgn Polify, pp.169-170.
169 Vincent memorandum, 9 September 1946, FRUS, 1946, VoLX, pp.l63-l65. Chiang was
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militarily, Marshall recommended that the United States withhold military equipment
from the Nationalists. Dismissing any Cold War implications, Truman and the British
supported Marshall's stand, while the latter, in particular, did not believe Chiang could be
an effective ally for the United States in its confrontation with Moscow. 17° Chiang was so
confident in final victory that he insisted the Nationalists would not need any foreign
assistance for at least two years.'7'
Although the Americans wanted to contain communism in China, its policy
fluctuated due to the inherent corruptness of Chiang's regime. 172 The Soviets, for
example, thought that United States policy in China appeared vague, inexplicit and so
easy to attack and the British could not disagree. 173 In conversation with Lord
Inverchapel, the new British Ambassador to Washington, John Vincent contended that
there were two stark options available to the United States. The Americans could either
provide full support for Chiang to crush the CCP or withdraw all their forces from China
completely. Both were presently unacceptable which directed the Americans to a policy
of 'holding the ring' and persuading Chiang and Mao that the fight was draining both
sides.' 74 Yet, an air of American impartiality was still difficult to observe and the CCP
convinced that the CCP never intended to co-operate with the Nationalists and that they were
acting under Soviet influence. See notes on meeting between Chiang and Marshall, Nanking, 1
December 1946, ibid, pp.57 S-578.
'70 Westad, Cold [Var & Rivolution, p.164.
171 Indeed, the Chinese Ministry of Defence continued rearming its second-line troops,
something it presumably could not have done had it not had the equipment for its front-line
troops. Jesperson, Amencan Images of China, p.14.6. However, the British Military Attaché to China
was concerned that if Chiang did not fulfil his objectives, once ammunition ran and all
expendable stores ran out for the 39 American and 2 British-equipped divisions, it could amount
to a virtual disarmament of the Nationalist Army. 'Report by the Military Attaché on the Chinese
Army in 1946', Stevenson to Bevin, letter, 14 March 1947, P4490/4490/10, FO 371/63439.
172 The State Department's estimate of world-wide Soviet aims and expansion can be found in
Carter to Marshall, 14 August 1946, FRUS, 1946, VoLX, pp.27-28.
'Soviet Diplomatic Intentions in China', M12 Report,July 1946,WO 208/4392.
Inverchapel to Foreign Office, telegram no.5482, 4 September 1946, F12949/515/10, FO
371/53678; Marshall to Acheson, 25 September 1946, FRUS, 1946, VoLX, pp.875-876 and
Roberts to Bevin, telegram no.659, 5 September 46, F12910/12653/23, FO 371/54335.
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bitterly resented the presence of Marines in north China that were protecting Nationalist
supply routes and communications.'75 The Foreign Office maintained that Britain should
remain on the sidelines. Still, they were encouraged that American Marines intended to
stay in China and hoped their presence would indirectly protect British imperial interests
by preventing chaos spreading to principal Chinese ports which could threaten British
communities and trade.176
The Nationalists, riding high on lend-lease procured during the war, supposedly for
use against Japan, continued their advance. In October 1946, the Nationalist occupation
of Kalgan in north China proved the last straw for Marshall and he recommended to
Washington that he be recalled.' 77 Bevin subsequently discussed the matter with Byrnes
in Paris. The latter dejectedly stated that the American government was in very great
difficulties in China. Byrnes thought that Chiang had been exploiting them and
consequently Marshall had been authorised to return whenever he felt he ought. After
further Nationalist advances into Manchuria, Byrnes told Bevin that the United States
government were now considering withdrawing all Marines from China. Bevin was
adamant that the British should: 'keep completely clear of the whole business'.' 78 Bevin's
175 He Di, Fhe Evolution of the Chinese Communist Party's Policy Toward the United States,
1944-1949' in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming(eds.), Sino-Ame,jcan Relations 1945-1955: A Joint
Reac.cessment of a Cntical Decade (Wilmington, 1989), pp.163-165.
176 Kitson, minute, 9 September 1946, F12949/515/10, FO 371/53678. But the British did want
to avoid the impression that they were looking to the United States to pull British chestnuts out
of the fire. Foreign Office to Washington, telegram no.8501, 29 August 1946, F11597/25/10,
FO 371/53566.
177 Dreyer,Cbina at [Var, p.3l9 and Acheson, Present at the Creation, p.208.
178 Foreign Office to Nanking, telegram no.910, 16 October 1946, F13859/119/10, FO
371/53652. The Cabinet endorsed Bevin's analysis. See Cabinet minutes, CM(46)86, 14 October
1946, CAB 128/8. Vincent now did not believe that the withdrawal of the American Marines
would jeopardise the Nationalist government. In addition to Kalgan, they had taken strategic
points in Jehol province and were rapidly consolidating their position in southern Manchuria.
Vincent to Acheson, 5 November 1946, FRUS, 1946, VoLX, pp.879-892. Marshall and Admiral
Charles Cooke, Commander of the Seventh fleet, agreed with Vincent and wanted to remove the
Marines before they became entangled in a full-blown civil war. Acheson, Present at the Creation,
p.209.
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remark dismissed any serious consideration of the possible long term consequences that
such a withdrawal could have on Britain's imperial position in China, let alone its effect
on the Cold War. Although the Foreign Office recognised that communist domination
could threaten Britain's position in Southeast Asia, there was no contingency planning
for such a scenario, reflecting a widespread belief in Whitehall that the communist threat
in China was not immediate.' 79 Similarly, in the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
argued that if Manchuria was lost through stalemate, China would be denied its richest
mineral, industrial and agricultural area, circumventing an ability to defend itself. This
would result, according to the Joint Chiefs, in a Soviet desire to expand their control
through China, Korea, Malaysia and India.' 80 However, Marshall quickly dismissed the
Joint Chiefs of Staff's concerns as unrealistic, 18 ' and returned to America, convinced that
his mission had failed, blaming Chiang for the breakdown in negotiations.'82
Dean Acheson,John Vincent and Walton Butterworth, the Minister Counsellor at the
United States Embassy in China, now ranged behind Marshall in his efforts to suspend
all-out support to Chiang. They argued that American military aid was encouraging
Chiang to pursue military solutions while pushing the CCP closer to the Soviet Union. If
this assistance were suspended, on the other hand, Chiang would have to remove
reactionary elements from his governing party and undertake reforms that could win the
support of the Chinese masses. Such a policy, it was hoped, would preclude the Soviet
Union from intervening in Chinese domestic affairs.'83 All these plans grossly
179 
'British Policy towards China', China Department memorandum, 18 October 1946,
Fl 5359/384/10, FO 371/53672.
180 cUmted States Policy Towards China', JSP memorandum, JCS 1721/4, 17 October 1946,
RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 44, KCL.
181	 the I#periaIFar East, p.I20.
182 Dreyer China at War, pp.319-320.
183 Vincent to Acheson, 5 November 1946, FRUS, 1946, VoLX, pp.879-892 and Butterworth
memorandum, 6 September 1946, ibid, pp.148-150.
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underestimated the ability of the CCP and were based on the assumption that the
Western powers had time to deal with the crisis in China. At this stage, most
Anglo-American policymakers were reluctant to view the situation as grave. 1M Truman,
ignorant of Chinese affairs, relied implicitly on Marshall and in December 1946
confirmed that the United States should not become involved in the Chinese civil war.'85
Despite a reluctance to view Chinese affairs in Cold War terms, the communist problem
in Greece and the beginnings of the Cold War in Europe, coupled with the election in
1946 of a Republican majority in Congress looking for a political issue, made it hard for
Truman to ignore the communist problem in China.'86
V. British Polüy Towards North China
The uncertainty surrounding American policy left the British reluctant to follow an
American lead in north China. Everett Drumright at the American Embassy in London,
told the British that the State Department had issued instructions to the American
Ambassadors at Nanking and Moscow to urge the respective governments to reach
agreement for Dairen's restoration to Nationalist control and reopen it to international
shipping, as provided for by the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945. The Ambassadors were also
instructed to press for the resumption of traffic on the Chinese-Changchun Railway. The
Americans did not consult Britain beforehand and Kitson presumed that this was
probably to avoid the appearance of a pre-arranged 'united front' against the Soviets.
Stevenson to Bevin, telegram no.1063, 3 September 1946, F13592/25/10, FO 371/53568.
The Foreign Office also could not work out why the CCP failed to come to terms with Chiang
and were happy to hold on to precarious footholds in Yenan and Manchuria. Stevenson to
Bevin, telegram no.741, 16 November 1946, F16592/25/10, FO 371/53570 and Kitson, minute,
19 November 1947, ibid. The American Ambassador to China also felt that Chiang's regime,
despite an economic crisis, would staer on for some time. See Stevenson to Foreign Office,
telegram no.143, 10 February 1947, F1870/37/10, FO 371/63302. The China Department
agreed. Kitson, minute, 13 February 1947, ibid.
Carter to Handy, 7 November 1946, ibid, pp.148-1 50.
Butterworth memorandum, 6 September 1946, FRUS, 1946, VoLX, pp.148-150 and Dreyer,
China at War, pp.3 I9-320.
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Nevertheless, Kitson recommended that Britain should also make representations,
especially as there were reports of substantial amounts of rice and beans wasting away in
Manchuria for want of shipment facilities out of Dairen. 187 Once again, Bevin did not
want to see Britain playing a prominent role in Chinese affairs and did not endorse
Kitson's suggestion. Along with Dening, he had been struck by America's reluctance to
take a firm grip of East Asian issues. Bevin, clearly worried about America's declining
influence in East Asia, feared that if the Americans got 'cold feet', Britain could be left in
a position of having to sustain an attitude without their support.'
Indeed, by February 1947, Chiang's persistence in solving his internal crisis through
military means saw Marshall return home, take up his new appointment as Secretary of
State and advocate disengagement from China on the grounds that further involvement
in its civil war would be a waste of American resources. 189 At the Moscow conference in
early 1947, Bevin had a chance to talk to Marshall and the latter told him that it was only
a matter of time before the CCP would be in a position to take over all of China north of
the Yangtze Valley. Marshall declined to outline what future American policy would be if
such an event took place. 19° Vincent reiterated this view to InverchapeL When the British
Ambassador to Washington asked whether Vincent agreed with the thesis that a financial
collapse would entail the downfall of Chiang's régime, he replied that: 'you could not
knock down a plank that was already lying on the ground, but it might rot'. In Vincent's
opinion, it was out of the question for the United States government to help Chiang
mobilise Chinese assets in America. There remained, noted Inverchapel, a firm belief that
187 Kitson, minute, 4 January 1947, F371/86/1O, FO 371/63332.
' Dening, minute, 4 January 1947, F371/86/1O, FO 371/63332. Sargent agreed with Dening's
analysis and didn't think it was even necessary to seek confirmation from Washington. Sargent,
minute, 6 January 1947, F371/86/1O, FO 371/63332.
189 
'Memorandum for Use in Presenting to the President the Problem of Military Assistance to
the Chinese National Armies, Vincent memorandum, 27 June 1947, FRUS, VoL VII: The Far
East China, 1947 (Washington, 1972), p849-854 and Christensen, UsefulAdversanes, p.59.
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the crisis was still not serious, while Vincent claimed that the present crisis scarcely
affected the majority of Chinese people.191
The new British Ambassador to China, Sir Ralph Stevenson, could not reconcile
himself with Vincent's last remark. Stevenson felt that the scarcity of essential
commodities, the disruption of communications, currency inflation and military activity
by both sides, did affect the majority of the peasant population. Moreover, the CCP's
land reform policy appealed to the cupidity of many millions of peasants. However,
instead of going on to address the possible implications of these facts on the emerging
Cold War, Stevenson slid back into analysing their effect on how they could uphold
Britain's traditional imperial role in China. The British Ambassador stated that it would
not be to Britain's advantage to have the Nationalists hold undisputed sway over China.
Stevenson argued that the Nationalists were just as hostile to foreign interests as the
CCP. 192 These pronouncements would have no doubt fuelled age-old American
suspicions that Britain wanted a weak and divided China to safeguard its imperial
position. In fact, Ashley Scott at the China Department was extremely unsure about
these suggestions. Regarding the hostility of the Nationalists, Scott argued that: 'we can
still "speak the same language" as them and the Chinese government they control'. Scott
contended that the latter were sensitive to foreign criticism but they allowed a far greater
latitude to foreign interests for participation in Chinese reconstruction and trade than did
the CCP.' 93 Indeed, Mao had stated during 1947, in a report on domestic and
191 Inverchapel to Foreign Office, telegram no.1160, 22 February 1947, F2459/37/10, FO
371/63302 and 'Memorandum for Use in Presenting to the President the Problem of Military
Assistance to the Chinese National Armies', Vincent memorandum, 27 June 1947, FRUS, 1947,
VoL VII, p.854.
192 Stevenson to Dening, letter, 7 March 1947, F4120/76/10, FO 371/63321. In fact, rumours
had been circulating in the State Department that the British were encouraging a 'Southern
Separatists Movement', allegedly led by General Li Chi-shen, a former military leader in southe
China and rival to Chiang. The General was residing in Hong Kong but there was no truth tcj
allegations. See Xiang, Rtcasting the Imperial Far East, p.116.
193 Scott, minute, 27 March 1947, F4120/76/10, FO 371/63321.
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international relations, that he saw the Soviet Union as the leader of the anti-imperialist
camp, of which China should become a member.'
By 1947, despite the various views and perceptions raised above, the Foreign Office
concluded that that there was little Britain could do to change the situation other than to
keep a commercial foothold in China until better days. The British government would
merely continue to support American efforts to persuade the Chinese government to
introduce democratic ways and methods and generally to preserve an attitude of
non-interference.' 95 There was little debate about a possible communist domination of
China. The negative attitude of the Foreign Office towards Chinese affairs, was
questioned in April 1947 by Gerald Samson at the Manchester Guardian. He argued that
there was an urgent need for a more imaginative and objective British approach to the
Chinese people. Samson pointed out that China was anxiously seeking advice and
technical assistance, and claimed that in both these fields Britain could surely make a
generous response. Samson also pointed out that the Consulate in Shanghai was at half
its pre-war strength, yet the work had doubled. Samson had heard numerous complaints
from British nationals regarding the ineffectiveness of some of its Consular officials. It
was felt that they should be replaced by men more attuned to the changed conditions
throughout this area.' On the heels of Samson's complaints, during a Parliamentary
debate on 22 April, Sir Ralph Glyn, a Conservative MP, asked Bevin whether or not the
See Jian, China's Road to the Korean War, pp.19-20 and Hunt, The Gentsis of Chinese Commumsi
Fore:gn PoIiy, pp.171-172.
Scott, minute, 27 March 1947, F4120/76/10, FO 371/63321. A British estimate by
J.Hutchi.sor , the Commercial Counsellor at Nanking, said that for the first seven months of
1946, 53.63 per cent of China's total imports caine from the United States and only 4.85 per cent
from Britain. Xiang, Rtcachng the Imp erial Far East, pp.128,130-131.
1% Gerald Samson, 'British Policy in China: The Need for Better Representation', Manchester
Guardian, 8 April 1947. The Foreign Office was well aware that they were 'thin on the ground' in
China. The chief difficulty had been the shortage of trained China officers and this was
compounded by the Fact that there had been a recent cut of 10 per cent in manpower. Even so,
Nanking and Shanghai, claimed the Foreign Office, were sufficiently staffed. Kennedy, minute,
19 May 1947, F4903/28/10, FO 371/63285.
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government intended to assist China, when conditions improved, in carrying out civil
economic reconstruction and reform in China to promote commercial relations.
Christopher Mayhew, parliamentary under-secretary, replied positively but stated that any
projects had to be considered in relation to Britain's fmancial and economic situation. In
other words, for the foreseeable future, Britain would not play a major role in
reconstructing internal China.197
In the summer of 1947, after the announcement of the Truman Doctrine and
Marshall Plan, the United States Navy Department became increasingly concerned about
a premature withdrawal from China and warned that the Soviets might attempt to
facilitate a permanent occupation or domination of selected positions in Korea,
Manchuria and other provinces of China, such as Tientsin, Shanghai and Tsingtao.198
Gradually, during the spring of 1947, Marshall resumed limited military assistance to
Chiang.' Both British and American policymakers did not think that Chiang's recent
military successes in Shantung were sufficient to outweigh his difficulties in Manchuria
and Shensi.20° The civil war was becoming more unpopular not only with the people but
also with the troops, leading to a decline in the morale of the Army. Recent political
demonstrations led the American Ambassador to China, John Stuart, to send a personal
message to Chiang urging him to make a public declaration that he was aware of the
people's longing for peace while appealing to the CCP to join him in stopping the
fighting and reopen negotiations. Stuart's British colleague, Stevenson, worried that the
197 Xiang, R€casting the Imperial Far East, pp.134-l35.
198 Forrestal to Marshall, 2OJune 1947, FRUS, 1947, VoL VII, pp.968-970.
Marshall decided that 7,000 tons of American ammunition should be left at depots near
Tientsin and Tsingtao, while also enclosing the transfer of 137 naval craft and ordering the rapid
completion of the portion of the assistance programme for the Chinese Air Force. See Minutes
of Conference Concerning China, 20 February 1947, ibid, pp.946-95O; Acheson to Patterson, 28
March 1947, ibid, p.8I1; Stuart to Marshall, 3 April 1947, ibid, pp.815-816; Ringwalt to Vincent,
5 May 1947, ibid, pp.831-833 and Forrestal to Marshall, 26 May 1947, pp.966-968.
200 AtheSOn to Marshall, 2 April 1947, ibid, pp.814-815 and Dreyer, China at Way; pp.330-331.
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CCP could detect such an approach as a sign of weakness and could step up their terms
accordingly.20'
In fact, the Foreign Office did not like the Marshall-Vincent policy, which was
regarded as a policy of drift and indecision. Kitson argued in July 1947 that 'large scale
American military aid and economic assistance is now the only hope of pulling
Nationalist China together and enabling her to resist effectively the tide of communist
infiltration'.202
 But there was little prospect of such an outcome and the British could
offer no alternative ideas. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognised, the problem was that
the corrupt Chiang was the only opposition to Soviet expansionist aims in Asia.
However, even if Nationalist China collapsed, both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
British JIC(Far East), presumed that the collapse of Nationalist China would only witness
the Soviet domination of north China down to the Yellow River-Yangtse watershed. 203
 A
complete communist domination of China was still seen as a distant possibility. For the
moment, Britain's imperial position in China seemed secure. Furthermore, as the tide
began to turn against Chiang, the State Department advised Marshall to lift the arms
embargo and aid the Nationalists so long as it was recognised that the aim was to prevent
a collapse in China. The State Department still considered that a Nationalist success in
unifying China depended upon economic and political reforms. 204 Marshall agreed but
201 Stevenson to Foreign Office, telegram no.541, 28 May 1947, F7181/76/1O, FO 371/63323
and Field to Howman, letter, DO no.46,20 December 1946, WO 208/4922 and Dreyer,Cbina at
Wa,, p.325.
202 Xiang, Ricasting the Imbeiia1 Far East, p.12l and Kitson, minute, 29 May 1947, F7181/76/10,
FO 371/63323. Ashley Scott minuted that British opinion on the government of China, like the
present government of Greece, may not be all that it should be but it is at least preferable to a
Communist government. Scott, minute, 11 November 1947. F14773/76/10, FO 371/63328.
203 
'United States Policy Towards China', JSSC memorandum for the JCS, JCS 1721/4, 21 May
1947, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 44, KCL. This memorandum was approved by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on the 9 June 1947. See 'United States Policy Toward China, JCS memorandum for
SWNCC, 9 June 1947, FRUS, 1947, VoL VII, pp.838-848 and 'Reports by the Joint Intelligence
Committee(Far East), JIC(47)50(0)Final., 15 September 1947, CAB 158/1. See also Ross,
American W"ar Plans, pp.44-46.
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argued that China was not as important as Western Europe and the Eastern
Mediterranean in the Cold War. Too much assistance, he explained, could push the CCP
towards Moscow and prompt the latter to actively intervene in China. 205 In addition, the
Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, under George Kennan, was reluctant to
believe that the CCP had the capabilities to assume effective control all over China.206
Nevertheless, as in Korea, Marshall did not want to completely abandon the Northeast
Asian periphery and, after consulting with Truman, sent Wedemeyer back to China to
assess Nationalist requirements and prospects. The appointment sought to satisfy
influential Congressional opinion that questioned why the United States was sending aid
to Western Europe, Greece and Turkey to fight communism but not China.207
The Foreign Office thought the American removal of the embargo was too little too
late to bolster the Chiang's régime and avert the disintegration which could threaten
China.208 The British now considered whether they would follow the American stance
and lift their arms embargo. Scott argued that Britain should lift the embargo, although it
was likely to become the subject of criticism in Parliament because of Britain's adherence
to a policy of non-interference in China. 209 Scott's reservation worried Kitson and the
latter did not want to get 'draed on the coat-tails' of an indecisive American policy
which could lead to another Spanish civil war, with America and the Soviet Union as the
background protagonists in a duel for control of China. Britain's embargo was not
205 Marshall to Forrestal, 23 July 1947, ibid, pp.970-971 and Marshall to Lovett, 2 July 1947, ibid,
pp.635-636.
206 See Christensen, UsefidAdvercanes, p.61
207 See William Stueck, The lVedemyer Mission: Amencan Politics and Forrin Poliy Dunng the Cold
War (Athens, GA, 1984). According to one participant in America's China policy, Marshall used
Wedemeyer to send secret instructions to the American Consulate in Mukden to begin building
co-operative bridges with the CCP. See Christensen, UsefulAdverstrnes, pp.6l-62, 65.
208 Foreign Office to Washington, telegram no.5324, 1 June 1947, F7185/13/1O, FO
371/63272.
209 Scott, minute, 29 May 1947, F7185/13/1O, FO 371/63272.
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holding up a great flood of arms shipments to China. There were, however, certain
items, such as aircraft and aviation equipment, radar equipment, and machine tools that
could be used for armament manufacture, which Britain was in a favourable position to
supply, and the sale of which was likely to have long term benefits for Britain's export
trade to China. Therefore, applications for such equipment, Kitson suggested, should be
re-examined.210
During the summer of 1947, the Chinese Director of Military Intelligence told the
British Assistant Military Attaché at Nanking, Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett, that the arms
embargo had forced the Nationalists to change American-equipped divisions to Japanese
and Chinese specifications. Furthermore, the Korean Communist Army was also
operating with the CCP. The Chinese Director of Military Intelligence was convinced
that the CCP intended to capture the whole of Manchuria and form a communist state
therein.21 ' Suspicions of co-ordinated communist activity in East Asia, led American
military, intelligence and political planners to predict the possible creation of
communist-dominated Manchuria, coupled to Korea and the Soviet Union's Northeast
Asian provinces, that would form a powerful military and economic East Asian bloc.212
Such fears must have been reinforced after a reliable British source had just returned
from Yenan after a year's stay and reported that Mao was absolutely confident of
winning the war in no more than two years. The CCP would continue the current
210 Kitson, minute, 30 May 1947, P7185/13/10, FO 371/63272.
211 Fawcett to Howman, letter DO no.80, 9 June 1947, WO 208/4922. A British military
intelligence source suggested that over 100,000 Korean troops were fighting with 500,000 CCP
troops in China. All were in possession of captured war material from the Japanese made over to
the CCP by the Soviets. 'Manchuria: Russian Assistance to Chinese Communists', M12(b) CX
Report, 10 June 1947, WO 208/4753 and Hamilton, minute, 28 July 1947, WO 208/4753.
212 
'Present Situation in China',Sprouse memorandum, 19 September 1947, FRUS, 1947,
VoL VII, pp.741-759; 'Sino-Soviet Relations', Melby memorandum, no date, ibid, pp.678-682 and
John Gaddis, The Strategic Perspective: The Rise and Fall of the "Defensive Perimeter'
Concept, 1947-1951' in Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs(eds.), Unee,ain Years:
Chinese-American Relations, 1947-1950 (New York, 1980), pp.70-73.
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'whirlwind strategy', cutting swathes through Nationalist-held territory. Furthermore, the
source stated that the Yen an communist area was in constant radio communication with
Moscow. But doubts still remained about Mads relationship with Stalin. The British
source had no evidence of any other forms of liaison, nor did he see the supply of arms
and equipment by the Soviets, though many troops were equipped with Bren and Sten
guns213
As the gravity of the situation seemed to be deteriorating, the British showed no signs
of panic and the Admiralty merely agreed to send one cruiser and two destroyers from
the British Pacific fleet to Shanghai should 1-us Majesty's Consul there call upon them214
It was not until late 1947 that the British began to contemplate the wider implications of
a CCP victory in Manchuria. When reviewing the present situation in Manchuria, Leo
Lamb at the British Embassy in China argued that full account had to be made of the
enormous amount of indoctrination to which the population of the north-eastern
provinces had by this time been exposed. Lamb stated that: 'it may well be that the
majority of the common people now regard themselves as a communist first and a
Manchunan afterwards'. More importantly, Lamb sounded a note of warning. He
regarded the suestion that the CCP would handle foreign capitalists gently, could well
only apply to the brief initial period during which they could be made use of. Lamb
claimed that British business, missions, and residents would then be: 'bled white,
exploited, reviled, and/or squeezed out under a communist regime. 215
 Lamb's analysis of
repression was supported by a former reliable British employee of the Peking Syndicate.
He recounted that the CCP had systematically shot 800 men who tried to escape into
213 
'China: Political/Military' Communist N.W.Border Area: General Situation', CX Report, 29
September 1947, WO 208/4742. To support this claim see Sheng, The Triumph of
Internationalism', pp.98-l04.
214 
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Nationalist territory, in order to enforce the point that the people were expected to stay
on their land and welcome the CCP.216 Another British source reported that everywhere
one went inside communist territory, the walls were plastered with anti-American and
anti-foreign posters.217
Despite CCP tactics, the alternative for the ordinaryCI q.zwi. was not enticing either.
During July and August 1947, when Wedemeyer carried out his mission he was appalled
by Nationalist incompetence, corruption and unpopularity. Additional aid, he argued had
to be contingent on further reform.218
 Wedemeyer did not find any evidence of Soviet
involvement in north China but still hoped to remove communist power from
Manchuria. The State Department did not support Wedemeyer and they believed that
Manchuria had to be abandoned. The latter now attempted to focus on saving central
and south China which they deemed more important to United States interests.219
 The
Foreign Office correctly observed that because a Soviet-American clash might be
difficult to avoid, coupled with the fact that Chiang's armies were 'a doubtful horse to
back', America would: 'shrink from trying to underwrite China's recovery of Manchuria
and will seek instead to try and stop Soviet infiltration at the Great Wall'.° It was a
strategy that the British accepted, especially as its major imperial interests were in the
central and southern half of China. An alteration in the Cold War balance of power was
216 
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218 Stueck, The IVedemyerMirnon, pp.77, 86-92.
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not envisaged. In fact, the only drawback that Kitson worried about, underlining the ever
present Anglo-American rivalry in the region, was that this policy could witness
Sino-American collusion to exclude British trade from China, undermining its
commercial activites, Hong Kong.1
Indeed, there was little Anglo-American collaboration in China. Dening complained
in November 1947: 'Where does the US stand in relation to China? We do not know,
and I do not know whether the Americans know themselves. Their present tendency to
let Far Eastern affairs drift is likely to have the most deplorable consequences'? In the
Truman administration's defence, the British had no concrete plans to confront a
possible communist threat in East Asia either which, compared to the Middle East and
Europe, was not seen as immediate. The dilemma for the United States in late 1947 was
neatly summed up by Marshall when he declared that everyone in the Truman
administration was now in agreement that they wished to prevent Soviet domination of
China but there was no unanimity on the way in which assistance could be rendered?
Signs that the British were beginning to realise that the Chinese civil war could have
long term implications for their imperial position in China appeared at the end of the
year, when the question of the sale of British arms to China re-emerged. The Chinese
government, through their agent in Canada, had asked the British to supply 1000
I-Iispano-Suiza guns as armament for Mosquito aircraft which were being sold to them
by the Canadian government Sargent now thought that the time had come to reconsider
the policy of complete embargo in the light of the situation in China and the present
attitude of the American and Canadian governments to supply war material. Sargent
recommend that this particular request of the Chinese government, for the supply of
221 Xiang, Rzct the Imperial Far East, p.132.
222 Dening, minute, 17 November 1947, F14773/76/1O, FO 371/63328.
223 Minutes of the meeting of the Committee of Two, 3 November 1947, ibid, pp.908-9l2.
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Hispano-Suiza guns, be met. Sargent concluded that the lifting of the embargo was in
British interests as the only visible alternative to Chiang was a communist and ultimately
Soviet-dominated China. 4 Although the Anglo-American powers began to shift their
policy to one of more overt support for Chiang by the end of the year, the future for
Nationalist was bleak. Mukden, while not actually captured, had been virtually isolated
by the cutting of the Tientsin-Mukden railway. CCP forces had furthermore succeeded in
breaking across the Peiping-Hankow railway and the overall picture showed the
Nationalists in control of less territory than at the same time in 1946fl6 The British
Military Attaché to China, Brigadier Field, remarked that while he was in Peking, Chiang
was issuing the customary sheaf of orders on every conceivable subject simihir to Hitler
in the latter days of the war. Field noted that his orders bore little relation to the facts of
life as did Fiitlers?V
 Field now thought it possible that Chiang could lose the civil
war.
In conclusion, economic problems at home, the renunciation of extraterritoriality,
wartime strategy, increased American power and the Chinese civil war served to damage
Britain's postwar return to China. But the British successfully rehabilitated Hong Kong
and still attempted to uphold its commercial and economic interests in China.
Meanwhile, Stalin's ambiguous relationship with Mao led British officials, more often
than not, to dismiss the possibility of a CCP-dominated China. Along with the severe
disillusionment and distrust of Chiang, British and American planners were reluctant to
224 Sargent, minute for Attlee, 1 January 1948, F16504/13/10, FO 371/63273 and Foreign
Office to Washington, telegram no.265, F16504/13/10, FO 371/63273.
225 Field to Howman, letter, 5 August 1947, WO 208/4922.
226 Stevenson to Foreign Office, telegram no.18,9 January 1948, F1764/35/10, FO 371/69552.
227 Field to Tarver, letter, 2 December 1947, WO 208/4922.
228 But Field still guarded against suggesting an imminent defeat. Field to Tarver, letter, 16
December 1947, WO 208/4922.
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devise policies in Cold War terms for China. Britain monitored events in north China as
best it could but relied on the United States to maintain a China orientated towards the
West that could protect British commercial interests. However, age-old American
suspicions of British imperial designs on China prevented active collaboration in China
during 1945-1947. Furthermore, the failure of the Marshall Mission, which the British
Foreign Office predicted, saw most officials in the State Department de-prioritise China
in strategic terms. Yet, developments in Europe, such as the Truman Doctrine and
Marshall Plan, made it difficult for the Truman administration to pull away from Chiang
in the context of the Cold War. A policy of drift therefore ensued and although the
British complained about the American attitude, there was little likelihood of the Foreign
Office attempting to tackle the China situation unilaterally at this stage, especially as they
assessed that there were no immediate threats to Britain's more important imperial
interests in central and south China.
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BRITAIN AND THE 'REVERSE' OCCUPATION POLICY IN JAPAN
MAP NINE: JAPAN, 1945-1949
Source: S.Woodburn Kirby,Tbe lVarAgainst Japan, 1/oL V. The Swrender ofJapan(London, 1969).
Reproduced by kind permission of the Historical and Records Section at the Cabinet Office.
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Iv
THE 'REVERSE COURSE' IN JA PA N,
1 948-1 949
I. Introduction
Although Japan had formally surrendered in September 1945, the war had destroyed the
infrastructure of the Japanese nation-state, leaving the economy in ruins and millions
facing the prospect of homelessness and hunger. Emerging as a victorious power after
1945, a British role in the occupation of Japan was legitimate. However, it soon became
apparent that the occupation would be fundamentally controlled by the Americans.
Unable to play a major role in East Asian affairs, the British were not too displeased to
see the United States assume the burden of reconstructing Japan. But as control bodies
for the occupation proved ineffective, a danger arose that British interests could be cut
out altogether, affecting Britain's Southeast Asian colonies, its domestic economy and
overall world power status. In an attempt to rectify this situation, the British dispatched a
liaison mission to Tokyo to keep a careful watch on the direction of American policy
towards Japan. A major interest for Britain and its Commonwealth partners in the
Asia-Pacific was to prevent Japan from becoming a threat to world peace. By 1948,
increasing Cold War tensions and turmoil in China, saw the United States begin to build
up Japan as a bulwark against further communist penetration into East Asia. Pushing
Cold War concerns in East Asia to one side, the Foreign Office at once worried about
the implications upon Asian security and predicted increased competition for British
exporters as the Japanese economy tried to expand. While Britain supported an early
peace treaty with Japan, it was perhaps more sceptical than the United States about
177
BRITAIN AND THE 'REVERSE' OCCUPATION POLICY IN JAPAN
Japan's ability to convert its society to democracy. British concern was somewhat diluted
when the United States warned the Foreign Office, in what was tantamount to blackmail,
that an unfavourable attitude towards its proposals could influence Congressional
appropriations for European recovery. Yet, throughout 1948-1949, the United States
clearly failed to keep the British informed of its policies for Japan. Consequently, British
Commonwealth and American aims diverged on issues such as reparations, economic
policy and security. This divergence was not helped by infighting between the Pentagon
and the State Department over the timing of a peace treaty. By late 1949, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff wanted to maintain its military occupation in order to prevent another Pearl
Harbor and preserve Japan as an anti-communist stronghold. The State Department, no
less anti-communist, also did not want to see the American position in East Asia
weakened further but felt a prolonged occupation would cause restlessness amongst the
Japanese and drive them into the arms of the communist system. The British
sympathised with the State Department's view as the very real prospect of a
communist-dominated China in 1949 saw the British begin to devise their policies for
East Asia much more in terms of a Cold War framework. Nevertheless, the internal
American dispute went unresolved until after the outbreak of the Korean War and only
served to fuel a prevalent conviction in the Foreign Office that the United States lacked a
clear cut strategy for East Asia.
II. The Control ofJapan
To this day, the war against Japan has evoked many emotions throughout the United
Kingdom. The maltreatment of prisoners of war by Japan's Imperial Army has led
British veterans to fight a losing battle for compensation against a Japanese nation which
finds it hard to apologise for its part in the Asian-Pacific war. t Japan's inability to come
See Robert Whymant and Michael Evans, 'Tokyo judges reject POWs' claim for
compensation', The Times, 27 November 1998. Eric Lomax, 'Led out of our torment by the
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to terms with its recent history was in part due to the American occupation which
introduced press controls and forbade debate on the war at either the popular or
academic level.2 In fact, it soon became apparent after the Japanese surrender that the
occupation of Japan, while in theory represented as a joint allied enterprise, was to be
fundamentally controlled by the United States. The late entry of the Red Army into the
war against Japan precluded the possibility of a strong Soviet role in the occupation,
China was wracked by internal disorder and little interest was shown by the Americans
regarding British views on the occupation. 3 The display of American power at the formal
proceedings of the Japanese surrender on 2 September 1945, for example, dwarfed the
British military contingent in Tokyo Bay.4
Initially, the Americans believed that Britain would be content to leave the United
States to control Japan, while the British embarked upon the difficult job of
re-establishing its imperial position in Southeast Asia. The task confronting the
listening lady', The Sundqy Times, 27 December 1998.
2 See Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, p.231. The Japanese government is still
reluctant to formally sign an apology with regard to China and issues such as the Rape of
Naniting' continue to dampen relations between the two countries. See Iris Chang, The Rape of
Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (London, 1997); David Watts, Japan avoids China
kowtow', The Times 27 November 1998 and George Hicks, Japan's War Memories: Amnesia or
Concea/tisent? (Aldershot, 1997), pp.7-8.
See Roger Buckley, 'A Particularly Vita! Issue? Harry Truman and Japan, 1945-1952' in T.Fraser
and Peter Lowe(eds.), Conflict and Amity in East Aia. Es&Tjs in Honour of Ian Nish (London, 1992),
pp.110-124 and Gordon Daniels, 'Britain's view of postwar Japan, 1945-9', in Ian Nish(ed.),
Anglo-JapaneseAlienation, pp.257-277. It was not until 1982 that the first British book appeared on
the occupation in the form of Buckley's, Occupation Dblomaiy. Other works include Peter Bates,
Japan and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, 1946-1952 (London, 1993); Ian Nish(ed.),
Aspects of the Allied Occupation of Japan (London, LSE, 1986); idem(ed.), The Occupation of Japan
1945-52(London, LSE, 1991) and Roger Buckley, 'Competitor and A11y British Perceptions of
Occupied Japan' in Proceedings of MacArthur Foundation Sjimposium on Ocaation of Japan. The
International Context (Norfolk, 1984). On MacArthur's rejection of a multilateral force see Gaddis,
We Now Know, p.57. The Soviets had already asked for the northern island of Hokkaido to be
made a Soviet zone of occupation. See John Dower, Japan in War and Peace: Essqys on I-Iistoy,
Culture and Race (London, 1996), p.164.
' One British observer wrote in his diary that: 'The British contingent is quite a small one, just
Duke of York, KGV, Neufound/and, Gambia, Napier, Niam [two or four] main destroyers screening
the Duke of York. The United States Third fleet on the other hand has been reinforced by the
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diary, May 1944-December 1946, Mulleneux papers, KCL See also John Dower, Embrasing
Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World [Var H (London, 1999), p.43.
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Americans in Japan was also a daunting prospect. George Atcheson, head of the office
of the political advisor, Diplomatic Section, SCAP, wrote to Lady Seymour, the wife of
the British Ambassador to China, in November 1945, describing Tokyo as 'a gloomy
pl2ce...perhaps 7Ø% destroyed as compared to Yokohama's 90%...The people look
drab...and not very well fed.S The first British political representative to return to Japan,
Dermot MacDermot, made similar observations and thought that: 'a tremendous effort
will be required to get this country into any sort of productive shape again'. 6
 On the day
of Japan's surrender, 9 million were homeless, factories lay idle and over one and half
million soldiers had died. 7 The devastation heaped upon Japan by the ravages of war
meant that the Foreign Office was only too pleased to see America bear the financial
brunt of rehabilitating Japan. The Foreign Office also recognised that America's
predominance would help to avoid the experience of the German occupation.8
However, General Douglas MacArthur, as SCAP, sought to harness total control over
the occupation. In Washington, this led Sir George Sansom to remark that he could
glean little information from the State Department on Japanese affairs. 9 According to
Atcheson, this was due to the fact that on all matters of substance: 'General MacArthur
or his Chief of Staff and other members of the Bataan Club who act as his Privy Council
or genvo wish if possible to keep the State Department out'.'° Surrounding himself with a
devoted wartime staff, MacArthur, who sought the Republican presidential nomination
in 1948, attempted to use Japan as a political stage. 11 MacArthur had been one of
5 Atcheson to Seymour, letter, 10 November 1945, SEYR 3/4, Seymour papers, CAC.
6 MacDermot to Foreign Office, telegram no.19, 8 October 1945, F8319/4/23, FO 371/46429
and MacDermot to Far Eastern Department, telegram no.26, 1 November 1945, F10352/4/23,
FO 371/46430.
Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation (Oxford, 1997), p.8
and Dower, Embracing Defeat, p.47.
Foulds, minute, 23 August 1945, F5559/584/61, FO 371/46347 and Hudson, minute for
Stemdale Bennett, 1 September 1945, F6312/584/61, FO 371/46347.
Sansom to Sterndale Bennett, letter, 11 September 1945, F7150/630/23, FO 371 /46459.
10 Atcheson to Acheson, letter, 7 November 1945, FRUS, 1945, VoL VI, pp.838-841.
The most powerful groups within SCAP were an intelligence section that monitored both
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America's most experienced soldiers. He had fought in the Great War, commanded West
Point, served as the Chief of Staff to the United States Army and had conducted a series
of successful campaigns in the Southwest Pacific from 1942-1945. General Gairdner,
who had been appointed to SCAP, serving as Atflee's personal representative in Japan,
admired MacArthur but admitted that the General was too impatient of criticism, too
dictatorial and too sensitive to the press. 12 Truman also considered MacArthur to be an
excessive egotist but while both agreed that there should be minimal outside interference
in the occupation, MacArthur attempted to exclude Washington as well.'3
MacArthur set up his headquarters at the Dai Ichi insurance building in central Tokyo
and issued some 550 directives between September 1945 and January 1946. Washington
had issued MacArthur with a lengthy set of directives on how to conduct the occupation,
yet the intent was more to clarify his powers than to recommend specific policies.
MacArthur implemented programmes that oversaw the abolition of militarism, the
disarmament of Japan, land reform, the remodelling of public education along Western
lines and attempts to foster trade unions. A new constitution was formed during
1946-1947 based upon American lines which also disavowed the use of war. Emperor
Hirohito renounced divinity in 1946 and many prominent Japanese wartime figures were
put on trial during 1946-1948, in which Britain took part, for war crimes at an
international military tribunal. Finally, the occupation aimed to reduce the power of the
aibatsu, a group of big companies that formed a powerful industrial bloc headed by
Japan and South Korea, a Government Section that oversaw political reform, and an Economic
and Scientific Section which carried out economic policy. The respective heads of these sections,
Generals Charles Willoughby, Courtney Whitney and William Marquat, were all members of the
'Bataan gang', whose loyalty to MacArthur stretched back to prewar Manila. See Schaller, Altered
States, pp.7,10 and Leffler,A Preponderance oJPower, pS)l
12 Gairdner to Foreign Office, telegram no.422, 20 April 1946, F5985/2/23, FO 371/54092. On
MacArthur's appointment see Schaller, Dougks MacArthur, idem, The Ameñcan Occbation ofJapan,
pp.20-28 and idem, Altered States, p.8.
13 Diary entry for 17 June 1945 in Ferrell(ed.), Off the Record, p.47. SCAP censors discouraged
Japanese newspapers, for example, from reporting the actions of Truman and his administration.
See Schaller, Altered States, p.9.
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Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Yasuda, Sumitomo and Okura.' 4 MacArthur never toured Japan to see
things himself, choosing to live in virtual proconsular remoteness 'above the clouds'. The
Japanese Conservative no doubt related to this aloof stance while the fact that SCAP was
a military organisation must have reinforced a belief that the soldier still counted for
more than the civilian. By early 1946, assessing the impact of MacArthur's reforms,
Sansom felt that most of Japan's political elite were numb, bewildered and a little
frightened too in some cases.'5
Although the British government was reconciled to the fact that it would not play a
major role in Japanese affairs, it was not prepared to give the United States an unlimited
power of attorney to act on its behalf in all matters relating to Japan. In September 1945,
the Foreign Office claimed that if Britain had no voice in Japan, it would be unable to
exert its full influence on the Japanese settlement in such matters as reparations, where a
purely American settlement seemed likely to favour China.'6 The Foreign Office felt that
the British acceptance of MacArthur did not imply acquiescence over United States
policy.'7 Yet, in September 1945, at a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers,
Byrnes pressured the British into rejecting Molotov's request regarding discussion about
a Japanese control commission. Byrnes even launched a veiled threat towards the British,
suesting that the successful conclusion of an American loan could be jeopardised if
Britain did not comply. 18 As the United States tightened their grip on the direction of
14 
'United States Administrative Control in Japan',Gascoigne to Bevin, despatch no.193, 27
October 1949, F16112/1021/23, FO 371/76213. See also Roger Buckley, US-Japan ALliana
Dp1omacjy, 1945-1990 (Cambridge, 1992), pp.12-13, 19; D.Clayton James, The Yea,c of MacA n!bur,
VoL Ifi: Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964 (Boston, 1985), chp.4; Schaller, The American OccpaJion of
Japan, chp.2; John Dower, 'Occupied Japan and the cold war in Asia' in Lacey(ed.), The Tnmean
Ptsideny, pp.375-384.
See Richard Storry, A History of Modern Japan (London, 1982), pp.240-241 and Sansom's diary
of his visit to Japan in January 1946,9 March 1946, F3595/2/23, FO 371/54086.
16 
'Control of Japan', Foreign Office memorandum, 10 September 1945, F6699/364/23, FO
371/46449.
17 Sterndale Bennett, minute, 11 September 1945, F6699/364/23, FO 371/46449.
18 Kent,Bntish Imperial Strategy, p.84.
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Japanese affairs, Britain and the Soviet Union vainly tried to wrest from the Americans
an effective allied control commission in Japan.' 9 Both the Anglo-Soviet powers saw this
contentious issue as a challenge to their world power status. In Moscow, Averell
Harriman and Frank Roberts reported that Japan remained high on the 'hidden agenda'
of Soviet concerns. Stalin was apprehensive about a revival of Japanese militarism and
worried that the United States intended to use Japan against them. 2° For Britain, policies
drawn up solely by the United States in Japan would not only affect its Southeast Asian
colonies but the British domestic economy as well, particularly in the shipbuilding and
textile industries. The damage that a unilateral American hold over Japan could inflict
upon British imperial prestige in Asia, especially after the sacrifices made by the
Commonwealth, was very real. The Attlee government could also not ignore its
responsibility for the defence of British territories in the Asia-Pacific region against
future Japanese aression.2'
Dismissing the sensitivities of their former wartime allies, Truman, Byrnes, Leahy
and MacArthur all strenuously objected to the idea of a control commission, fearing a
reduction in SCAP's power and the introduction of zones in Japan similar to that of the
German modeL Despite complaints from Stalin and the Foreign Office suspicion that
the United States was hiding behind the smokescreen of Soviet manoeuvring to keep the
British out, both realised they had little ability to influence the course of American
policy.' One reason why Stalin did not pursue this matter vigorously stemmed from the
As matters stood in September 1945, the United States government proposed that Britain
should participate in the control of Japan on the same footing as the Philippines within a Far
Eastern Advisory Commission based in Washington. This Advisory Commission would possess
little power and could only make recommendations on Japanese post-surrender policy. Cadogan,
minute, 11 September 1945, F6699/364/23, FO 371/46449.
20 Roberts to Foreign Office, telegram no.4640, 21 October 1945, F8717/1665/61, FO
371/46362 and Schaller, The American Occupation offapan, pp.59-60.
21 See 'Far Eastern Commission', Sterndale Bennett memorandum, 29 September 1945,
F7613/364/23, FO 371/46449 and Dominions Office to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and
South Africa, telegram no.1988, 24 October 1945, F8518/364/23, FO 371/46449.
22 Bevin to Byrnes, letter, 12 September 1945, F6699/364/23, FO 371/46449. Dixon, minute
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fact that he hoped by acknowledging an American sphere of interest in Japan, the United
States would similarly acknowledge the Soviet Union's position in Eastern Europe,
China and North Korea. Truman was reluctant to accept such a quid pro quo but at the
Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1945, Byrnes struck a deal with the Soviet
Union over the question of Japan. The United States would abandon its stance on
refusing to recognise the Soviet satellite regimes in the Balkans for Molotov's acceptance
of an eleven-nation Far Eastern Commission and a four-power Allied Council in Japan.
The Allied Council would have to vote unanimously on Far Eastern Commission
proposals. In the event, both bodies degenerated into no more than mere talking
shops.2 ' British interest in the workings of these bodies waned considerably when, after
several unsuccessful attempts to get both Australia and Britain Onto the Allied Council,
Bevin reported to the Cabinet that Australia would become the sole Commonwealth
member.
for Sterndale Bennett, 16 September 1945, F7090/364/23, FO 371/46449; Stetndale Bennett,
minute, 16 September 1945, F7090/364/23, FO 371/46449; Bevin, minute, CM(45)35, 25th
September 1945, CAB 128/1; MacDermot to Far Eastern Department, letter, 25th September
1945, F8207/6311/23, FO 371/46503; Foulds, minute, 24 September 1945, F7331/364/23, FO
371/46449 and Buckley, Occupation DpLomafy, chps.3 and 5. Australia was also not enamoured
with the American attitude. Addison, minute, CM(45)35, 25th September 1945, CAB 128/1. For
Stalin's complaints and Soviet insistence on a veto over SCAP policy see Schaller, The American
Occupation of Japan, p.60 and Clayton James, The Years of MacA,ihur, VoL1II, pp.28-30. On
American objections to a Control Commission see Gailman to Bevin, letter, 11 October 1945,
F8183/364/23, FO 371/46449; Sterndale Bennett, minute, 24 October 1945, F8855/364/23,
FO 371/46449; Gaddis, EVe Now Know, p.57 and Buckley, 'A Particularly Vital Issue?', p.1 13.
23 Schaller, The American OCcupation ofJapan, p.61 and DowerJapan in War and Peace, p.164.
24 The Foreign Office considered that MacArthur had scant regard for the Far Eastern
Commission and the Allied Council. Cheke, minute, 11 June 1946, F8264/95/23, FO
371/54146 and De Ia Mare, minute, 28 May 1946, F7753/95/23, FO 371/54144; Buckley,
US-Japan Alliance Dplomag, pp.11-12 and idem, Occupation Dpkmag, chp.5; Dc la Mare, minute,
23 July 1946, F10649/857/23, FO 371/54288; Dening, minute, 15 August 1946,
F11591/857/23, FO 371/54288 and Graves to Foulds, letter, 6 August 1946, F11714/857/23,
FO 371/54288.
25 See Bevin, minute, CM(46)1, 1 January 1946, CAB 128/5. The Australian appointee to the
Allied Council was also a disappointment for the British. MacMahon Ball, the head of the
Political Science Department at Melbourne University, had little experience in international
negotiations. Foulds, minute, 24 January 1946, Fl 324/2/23, FO 371/54080. However, wary of
Australian sensitivities, Atflee refused to convey his doubts about MacMahon Ball to Australia.
See Attlee to Chifley, telegram no.68, 20 February 1946, PREM 8/190. It was not long before
the British officials had serious reservations about Australian representation on the Allied
Council injapan. Bevin, minute, 13 June 1946, F8997/2/23, FO 371/54097.
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IlL The British Commonwealth, Strategic Requirements and the Origins of
the 'Reverse' Occupation Policy
A. BRITAJNAND THE COMMONWFiALTH
Besieged by a host of commitments in the postwar world, the British government
welcomed the chance to draw on Australian support for the administrative and military
responsibilities inside Japan. But, the Australian government, moving from its original
position of sending an independent force, had told the British that it would only include
its forces in a British Commonwealth Occupational Force (BCOF) if it retained overall
command. To preserve Commonwealth unity, both Attlee and the Chiefs of Staff
relented. This decision and the resultant size, composition and role of the BCOF
undoubtedly dealt a blow to British imperial power in the region. During early 1946,
approximately 36,000 British Commonwealth military personnel arrived in Japan under
the command of the Australian Lieutenant-General, John Northcott, setting up
headquarters at Kure and then Okayama. 27 MacArthur was particularly anxious that there
should be no question of the BCOF being allotted a zone of its own, since such an
arrangement would make it very difficult for him to resist a similar request by the
Chinese and the Soviets. Under American jurisdiction, the BCOF's independence was
consequently compromised.28
26 
'Occupational Forces for Japan and Korea', JP(45)217(Final), 28 August 1945, F6624/630/23,
FO 371/46458.
27 For the original proposal of including Commonwealth forces under British command see
Attlee to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, telegram nos. 170,290,203 and 65,
13 August 1945, PREM 8/27. See also COS minutes in COS(45)210, 30 August 1945, CAB
79/38 and 1-bus, minute for Attlee, COS(45)221, 12 September 1945, CAB 79/39. the
Dominions Office had been extremely doubtful whether the Australians, in 'their present
somewhat truculent mood', would accept British control of the BCOF. Stephenson, minute,
COS(45)210, 30 August 1945, CAB 79/38 and Australian government to Attlee, 17 August 1945,
PREM 8/192. The Australian government eventually accepted control of the BCOF subject to
certain conditions, the main one being the establishment of a Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia.
See COS minutes in COS(45)232, 24 September 1945, CAB 79/39.
28 Gairdner, minute, COS(45)249,12 October 1945, CAB 79/40 and COS minutes in
COS(45)249, 12 October 1945, CAB 79/40.
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The British were not unprepared for such a disappointing outcome in the control
mechanisms for Japan and had been focusing on other ways of safeguarding British
interests, especially as MacArthur had pronounced that the occupation might last as long
as five years. The answer now seemed to lay in building up a closer Anglo-American
relationship. In October 1945, General Gairdner reported to the Chiefs of Staff that he
felt the 'time was ripe' for the establishment of a British liaison mission in Tokyo. As the
United States had already established a large organisation in Tokyo, Gairdner considered
that a liaison mission could help further British interests in Japan.3° MacArthur saw no
objection to such a proposal and a United Kingdom Liaison Mission (UKLM) was
quickly approved by the Attlee government to add political, financial and other technical
experts to the existing British staff section under Gairdner.3' The first civil head of
UKLM, Sir Alvary Gascoigne, would see MacArthur with considerable frequency from
1946 while enjoying an amicable relationship with him before the Korean War.
Gascoigne had served in China during the 1920s and in Japan from 1931-1 934. A former
head of the Far Eastern Department at the Foreign Office between 1934 and 1936,
Gascoigne was 'bluff and reasonably direct', no intellectual but a man of 'shrewdness and
common sense'. Until the late I 940s, Gascoigne's link with MacArthur was essential,
especially as the British government considered the General as central to the functioning
of the occupation.32
29 See Buckley, Occupation Dplomay, p.72.
Gairdner, minute, COS(45)250, 15 October 1945, CAB 79/40.
31 Foreign Office to Washington Embassy, telegram no.11726, 22 November 1945,
F11569/8564/23, FO 371/46526 and Sterndale Bennett, minute for Scott, 4 December 1945,
ibid.
32 Gascoigne to Dening, letter, 11 September 1946, F14696/198/23, FO 371/54248. Next to
William Sebald, the senior State Department representative in SCAP, Gascoigne was the person
who had the most office appointments with MacArthur between 1946 and 1951. See Hoare,
Embassies in the East, p.l59; Peter Lowe, 'Great Britain, Japan and the Future: The End of the
Allied Occupation, 1948-52' in Aldrich and Hopkins(eds.), Intdkgence, Defence and Dp1omag,
pp.180-182 and Clayton James, The Years ofMacArthur, I/oL III, pp.363, 693.
186
BRITAIN ANI) THE 'REVERSE' OCCUPATION POLICY IN JAPAN
Despite later protests from Northcott's successor as Australian commander of BCOF,
General Horace Robertson, who considered that his position had been undermined, the
Foreign Office later reflected that it was right to set up UKLM as virtually an Embassy.
The Foreign Office explained to the Commonwealth Relations Office that with Britain's
past history and prestige in Japan, it was inevitable and proper that Britain should take
the lead.33 The former British Ambassador to Japan, Sir Robert Craigie, for example,
argued that opportunities for trade in East Asia necessitated a British presence in Japan.
Britain, Craigie pointed out, forced by the very magnitude of its war effort to double
pre-war exports, could not afford to be short-sighted in such a matter.M To help offset
any inter-Commonwealth antagonisms, the Foreign Office assured the Pacific
Dominions that American primacy did not mean Britain would be deterred from
supporting the recovery of Commonwealth interests. Indeed, the Foreign Office kept a
careful eye on American attempts to bring Japanese trade within the dollar area while
major problems still revolved around the distribution of reparations. 35 Apart from the
struggle to re-open the Japanese market to private traders, which the British finally
secured in August 1947, it appeared that UKLM and the Foreign Office were not too
displeased with the course of MacArthur's occupation policies during this period, despite
their unilateral implementation. At this time, Britain's relations with the Japanese
remained minimal as the British avoided fraternisation. This was compounded by the fact
that MacArthur had ruled that contacts with the Japanese government must first be
approved by SCAP.
Scarlett to Cumming-Bruce, letter, 11 June 1949, F5568/1891/23, FO 371/76255.
Robert Craigie, 'Looking Eastwards', The Sundqy Times, 17 March 1946.
Policy Towards Japan', notes for Bevin at the meeting of Dominion Prime Ministers by the
Japan and Pacific Department, 18 April 1946, F7671/2/23, FO 371/54095.
36 Gairdner, minute, COS(47)32, 26 February 1947, DEFE 4/2; Gascoigne to Dening, letter, 2
December 1946, F18192/12653/23, FO 371/54335 and Buckley, Occupation Dplomay, chp.8.
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By mid to late 1946, Britain's low profile in the military occupation of Japan brought
forth complaints of boredom from British Army personnel and demands that its badily
needed manpower be relocated. 37 The Foreign Office, never a firm advocate of the
BCOF, also thought that Britain's contingent was serving no useful purpose and
damaging British imperial prestige, particularly amongst the people of Japan, as it took
no part in the military administration. In September 1946, the War Office told the
Chiefs of Staff that the Army was at present stretched to the limit to fulfil its military
commitments, and one month later, the Defence Committee took the decision to pull
British troops out of Japan. 39 According to the Joint Planning Staff, Britain's primary
strategic interest was that Japan should not threaten world peace or be allowed to fall
under domination of a potentially hostile power. As this was a close concern of the
United States, the Joint Planners thought that the British need not worry about this
aspect. 4° The Foreign Office, MacArthur and the Australians had already stressed that
they would not object to a reduction in British forces. Meanwhile, the new Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, wanted to encourage
Australia to take a larger share in the defence of its own strategic zone. 4' The Chiefs of
Staff were disappointed that they could not maintain a larger military share in
Asian-Pacific defence with the Commonwealth and the United States but, by late 1947,
See Lachie MacDonald, 'Cinderella Role for British in Japan: Army Protests', Daiv Mai4 3
August 1946.
38 Buckley, Occupation DbLomag, p.101.
Montgomery, minute, COS(46)146, 27 September 1946, CAB 79/52. Bevin also wanted to
withdraw forces from Venezia Giulia, Italy and Greece. Furthermore, the British government
needed to make good a short term deficiency of 69,000 men. See Buckley, Occupation DpLomacjr,
pp.98-100.
° 'BCOF in Japan - Implications of Withdrawal', JP(47)24(Final), 20 March 1947, DEFE 4/3.
The COS approved this report. See COS(47)46, 28 March 1947, DEFE 4/3. See also Peace
Treaty with Japan - Military Requirements', JP(47)61(Final), 29 May 1947, DEFE 4/4. Approved
by the Chiefs of Staff in COS(47)120(0), 7June 1947, DEFE 5/4.
41 Draft memorandum by MacDermot, no date, F14501/2/23, FO 371/54106; Sugden, minute,
COS(46)173, 29 November 1946, CAB 79/54; Tedder to COS, telegram no.1425, 1 December
1946, F17292/2/23, FO 371/54113; 'Co-operation in British Commonwealth Defence:
Australian Views', JP(47)82(Final), 16 June 1947, DEFE 4/5 and 'Co-operation in British
Commonwealth Defence', COS(47)203(0), 6 October 1947, DEFE 5/6.
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manpower constraints forced the Chiefs to reduce the British Army component in Japan
to only staff and administrative units.42
B. THE COLD WAR AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 'RE VERSE COURSE'
In the early months of 1947, just as the British military commitment to Japan faded,
MacArthur began to lobby for the occupation to be terminated. MacArthur informed
Gascoigne that he had demulitarised Japan and almost achieved its 'democratisation'. But
MacArthur complained bitterly that Truman and his advisers championed their own
successes in Europe at the expense of his achievements in Japan. 43 During July,
MacArthur reiterated his thesis to Gascoigne but added that Australia, the Philippines
and China aimed to ruin Japan economically by the imposition of heavy reparations and
trade controls. MacArthur angrily stated that the United States would not foot the bill for
keeping the Japanese economy viable and proposed that once a peace treaty had been
signed, the supervision of Japan would be exercised through a UN Commission."
Although the Japanese government welcomed the prospect of a peace treaty and
suggested that the United States retain Okinawa asmajor military base, 45 Gascoigne was
not at all convinced that they had accepted democracy. He felt the Japanese were
doubtless attracted by freedom from regimentation and police inquisition but argued that
42 In February 1947, the Cabinet chose to axe half its force. The V infantry brigade was to be
sent from Japan to Malaya. But, there were suspicions at the Foreign Office that Montgomery
was engineering the shortfall in manpower to obtain additional forces. See Withdrawal of U.K.
Army Component from British Commonwealth Forces in Japan', JP(47)122(Final), 3 September
1947, DEFE 4/7. For a good overview of the British military contribution to the BCOF see
Bates, Japan and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force and Buckley, Occupation Dplomay, chp.6.
Schaller, The Ame,ican Occupation in Japan, pp.95-96.
Gascoigne to Foreign Office, telegram no.935, 2 July 1947, F9054/1382/23, FO 371/63771.
The Japanese, through an Inter-Ministerial Committee for Co-ordination, declared that Japan
could re-establish itself to some extent in the islands of Habomai and Shikotan while the Kuriles
would come under a UN mandate. Islands such as Okinawa and the Bonins could be retained by
the allies, the Japanese argued, as long as they were compensated. The 'Second Ashida
Memorandum' even envisaged ruggct.d that if the UN could not protect Japan the United
States would be permitted to send forces to Japan. See Lowe, The Ongins of the Korcan [Var, p.98
and Dower, 'Occupied Japan and the cold war in Asia', pp.385-386 and idem, Japan in War and
Peace, pp.170-Ill.
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many years had to lapse before they could be termed as 'democrats' on the Western
modeL
In addition, MacArthur's actions, undoubtedly motivated by the announcement of the
Truman Doctrine and impending presidential primary elections, coincided with a crisis in
the Japanese economy. Faltering economic policy, such as SCAP's vacillation over
dissolving the aibatsu, contributed to falling production, rising unemployment, high
inflation and a huge trade deficit. To preclude an economic collapse the United States
government needed to provide annual assistance of $400 million. America's dramatic
postwar economic expansion had seen both an impoverished Europe and Japan unable
to compete with the United States in global markets. By 1947, inadequate production and
export earnings meant that Europe and Japan would soon run out of dollars to buy food
and raw materials. 47 American policymakers, such as Acheson, Forrestal, Kennan and
Army under-secretary William Draper, now insisted that in order to rectify the 'dollar
gap' and contain the Soviets, the economic 'workshops' of Germany and Japan had to be
rehabilitated to regain the Cold Wax balance of power in Europe and Asia.' Washington,
in direct opposition to MacArthur, argued that a termination of the occupation could
bring about the swift political and economic collapse of Japan. 49 Furthermore, the
crumbling position of Nationalist China, the traditional centrepiece of Washington's
grand design for postwar Asia, focused American planners on utilising Japan in the
emerging Cold War. 5° This policy discrepancy between Truman's advisers and
MacArthur concerned the Foreign Office. It did not want to be seen siding with
Gascoigne to Bevin, telegram no.177, 7 August 1946, F13031/2/23, FO 371/54105.
Schaller,AlieredStates, pp.12-13.
Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp.227-229; Schaller, Altered States, pp.12-13 and Dower, Jan
in War and Peace, p.173.
49 Schaller, The American Occupation ofJapan, p.97
See John Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance Sylem: A Studj in
the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Polify (London, 1988), p.27 and William Borden, The
Pacific Alliance: United States Fomgn Economic Poliy and Japanese Trade Recowe 1947-1955 (London,
1984), chp.1.
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MacArthur, especially if his views differed from the State Department. The Foreign
Office recognised that Britain would have to rely very largely on the goodwill of the State
Department in Japanese peace treaty negotiations to achieve its main objectives for the
common interest and the Commonwealth.5'
Unsure of who spoke for the United States, the British decided to postpone the
question of a peace treaty when the State Department, under public pressure, reluctantly
sent out invitations in July 1947 to the eleven nations of the Far Eastern Commission to
discuss the matter. 52 The invitation also clashed with a forthcoming Commonwealth
conference in Canberra that placed Japanese issues high on the agenda. The British
wished first to discuss Japan with the Commonwealth and therefore suggested that the
Anglo-American powers begin private talks some time in the near future. The Soviet
Union similarly objected, demanding that the peace treaty be considered initially by the
'Big Four' and then a multinational forum.M Both the United States and Britain opposed
this idea after their experience of impasse in recent Council of Foreign Ministers
meetings. Britain could not conceivably exclude the Dominions from such talks. 55
 The
irony for British policymakers was that they dreaded both Japan's economic collapse and
complete recovery. The former could divert American aid from Western Europe and
destabilise Britain's imperial position in Southeast Asia which provided important dollar
Dening to Gascoigne, letter, 8 May 1947, F6171/1382/G, FO 371/63768 and Buckley,
Occupalion DpIomag, p.l35.
52 See Kennan,Memoir.c, p.375.
See Cabinet minutes, CM(47)49, 22 May 1947, CAB 128/9 and Bevin, minute, CM(47)54, 17
June 1947, CAB 128/10. For a full analysis of the Commonwealth conference see Buckley,
Oca4ation DpIomacj, chp.9.
Smith to Secretary of State, 3 January 1948, FRUS,VoL VI: The Far East and Austraaci, 1948
(Washington, 1974), pp.647-648. The Chinese tabled a similar idea with the four main powers
retaining the right of veto but all the Far Eastern Commission powers would be invited to the
conference. The Chinese government wanted a veto because they feared the British
Commonwealth would vote as a bloc. See Stuart to Marshall, 18 February 1948, ibid., p.663. See
also Dower,Jr4an in (Var and Peace, pp.17O-l7l.
Bevin, minute, CM(47)92, 2 December 1947, CAB 128/10 and Japanese Peace Settlement',
Foreign Office memorandum, 16 December 1947, F16907/1382/G, FO 371/63784.
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earnings for the British, such as Malaya's rubber and tin. The latter outcome bred fear
amongst Australia and New Zealand of a Japanese military resurgence, while the Chiefs
of Staff and Cabinet worried that America would augment Japanese economic
encroachment into Britain's Southeast Asian colonies to compensate for lost markets in
Manchuria and Korea.
Lingering mistrust of Japan meant that few American officials were ready to
champion the full restoration of Japan as a Cold War ally. 57
 However, American military
planners and the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, for example, were aghast
upon reading a draft treaty being prepared by the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
which took little account of Cold War concerns and emphasised disarmament,
detnocratisation and international supervision. Consequently, in August 1947, Kennan
thought it would be highly dangerous for the United States to enter into discussions on
peace terms until America knew precisely what it was they were trying to achieve. 59
 The
Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained that bases at Okinawa were essential in order to project
American power across Northeast Asia. American planners warned that in the event of
an American withdrawal from Japan, the Soviets would intervene more actively in
Japan's affairs, with the hope of dominating the country by means of a subservient
Japanese government. 60
 To prevent this, Washington argued that Japan had to be
stabilised so a post-occupation Japanese government could stifle internal subversion,
Schaller, The American Occupation ofJapan, pp.100-101.
Dower, 'Occupied Japan and the cold war in Asia', p.387
See Dower, Japan in IVar and Peace, p.l64. American naval planners doubted the wisdom of
demilitarising Japan and wanted the United States to retain forces in some form within Japan.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff also reaffirmed the importance of retaining a strategic trusteeship over
the Ryukyu Islands. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p.25 5.
Kennan memorandum for Lovett, 12 August 1947, FRUS, 1947, VoL VI, pp.486-487. See also
Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, pp.28-30.
Leffler,A Preponderance of Power, p.255.
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preserve domestic order and resist inducement to join the communist orbit. 61 The British
JIC did not disagree that the Soviets would attempt to undermine the American
authorities in Japan, especially as they had already been indoctrinating returned Japanese
surrendered personnel. But the JIC dismissed any immediate Soviet threat to Japan and
correctly presumed that Stalin first wanted to consolidate his position in north China,
Korea and the Northeast Asian maritime provinces.62
As this communist consolidation continued, the American position in China and
South Korea looked increasingly precarious. Even in Japan, where the Far Eastern
kth
Commission had set Japanese industrial levels to no more than the 1930-1934, the
Japanese economy has reached hardly more than half-way towards that goal by early
1948.63
 Henceforth, American officials informed the Far Eastern Commission of
Washington's desire to rehabilitate the Japanese economy and make it self-supporting.TM
The implications of such a policy shift, the Foreign Office realised, would result in a
smaller reparation pool for the members of the Far Eastern Commission and higher
levels of Japanese industry than had hitherto been envisaged. 65 The British had regarded
as necessary fairly drastic reductions on all war and war supporting industries. The
Foreign Office, now worried how a policy of 'viability at all costs' and a Japanese revival
61 Schaller, The American Occupation ofJapan, p.l06 and Dower, 'Occupied Japan and the cold war
in Asia', p.387-388.
62 
'Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities', JIC(47)7/ 1. Final., 6 August 1947, CAB 158/1
and 'Reports by the Joint Intelligence Committee(Far East)', JIC(47)50(0)Final., 15 September
1947, CAB 158/1. See Ch.pter V for a discussion on Stalin's policy of consolidation.
63 Scott, minute, 23 January 1948, F1187/4/23, FO 371/69802 and Cheke, minute, 8 January
1948, F207/4/23, FO 371/69802
64 See Lowe, 'Great Britain, Japan and the Future', p.l81; H.Schonberger, 'The Japan Lobby m
American Diplomacy, 1947-1952', Pacific Historical Review, Vol.46, No.3 (August 1977),
pp.327-3S9 and Inverchapel to Foreign Office, telegram no.322, 21 January 1948, F1187/4/23,
FO 371/69802.
65 The British had maintained that reparations should include industrial assets, shipping and
shipbuilding capacity beyond Japan's peacetime requirements. Gold deposits and external assets
should also be made available. See Lowe, Containing the Cold War in East Asia, p.15 and idem, The
Origins of the Kot?an War p.84
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would affect Asian-Pacific security. These arguments provide little evidence to suest
that Britain saw Japan as an important asset in the Cold War. Gascoigne, for example,
had been unimpressed with postwar Japanese Prime Ministers such as Yoshida, Ashida
and Katayama, and felt more menacing figures were perhaps biding their time, waiting
for the end of the occupation. 67 MacArthur, like many of his colleagues in Washington,
although still distrustful of the Japanese, focused more on a possible Soviet threat to
Japan. At the end of January 1948, MacArthur stressed to Lord Killearn that any Soviet
incursion would be prevented immediately by a United States defensive perimeter
stretching through the Mariana, Ryukyu, and Bonin Islands. Dismissing the impact of
the Japanese Communist Party inside Japan, 69 the head of the Japan and Pacific
Department at the Foreign Office, Dermot MacDermot, concluded that the new
direction of United States thinking towards Japan: 'was perhaps an attractive short term
policy in the context of a general panic about Russia. But it has disquieting long term
strategic and political implications'. 7° In the context of the Cold War, the Foreign Office,
like the JIC, dismissed as unlikely an imminent Soviet threat to Japan either in political or
military terms.7t
As in China, an air of Anglo-American rivalry also persisted over economic concerns.
The Foreign Office feared that in building up the Japanese economy, the United States
Cheke, minute, 23 January 1948, F1187/4/23, FO 371/69802.
67 Gascoigne to Bevin, despatch no.36, 13 February 1948, F3508/44/23, FO 371/69819. See
also Lowe, 'Great Britain,Japan and the Future', p.186.
Gascoigne to Foreign Office, telegram no.1, 25 January 1948, F2023/2023/23, FO
371/69912.
69 It seemed to UKLM that, up to now, the effect of communist activity on political opinion in
Japan had been negligible. Japanese Communist Party membership numbered some 16,000 with
about 100,000 Japanese 'interested' in communism. Japanese communist progress was extremely
slow and UKLM was confident it consisted mostly of a consolidation of the Communist Party.
Gascoigne to Warner, letter, 14 February 1948, F3838/44/23, FO 371/69819.
MacDermot, minute, 24January 1948, F1187/4/23, FO 371/69802.
71 Dening, minute, 28 January 1948, F1187/4/23, FO 371/69802.
194
BRITAIN AND THE 'REVERSE' OCCUPATION POLICY IN JAPAN
government would 'rig things' to the advantage of American business interests. 72
 By
1948, disruption in China and Korea led UKLM to predict that Japan might be a more
promising terminal for East Asian trade. UKLM had considered Japan's present artificial
link to the dollar would gradually be replaced by import and export trade on a sterling or
at least non-dollar basis, so long as there were no discriminatory laws or practices which
excluded British shipping from Japan. 73 However, a prolonged period of American
dominance in Japan looked increasingly likely in 1948. The Truman Doctrine and the
Marshall Plan combined with the Soviet coup in Czechoslovakia during February 1948
and increasing turmoil in China, saw Japan begin to assume more importance in
American global strategic thinking.74 The Defence Department felt at this stage that a
peace treaty would be premature and remained determined to keep Japan within the
American sphere of influence. Forrestal, Royall and Draper even argued for a limited
degree of Japanese rearmament once the occupation ended to preserve order against the
threat of communism. But, they realised this would put a strain on the Japanese
economy, undermine the Japanese constitution and bring forth outrage from most
Asian-Pacific nations.75
In an attempt to clarify American policy, Kennan and Draper visited Tokyo in March
1948 to discuss the future of Japan. Kennan saw MacArthur virtually as a law unto
himself and wanted Washington to have more direct control over policymaking.
72 Cheke, minute, 23 January 1948, F1187/4/23, FO 371/69802.
' American cotton producers, for example, had given Japanese spinners a $3.5 million credit to
buy cotton from them. But as the market for Japanese cotton goods was in Asia, Japan would
ultimately have to buy its cotton from India, and would not be able to repay the American credit.
Allen to Ministry of Transport, letter, 23 February 1948, F6499/21 34/23, FO 371/69913.
See Dockrill, B,itisb Defence since 1945, p.32; Mastny,Tbe Cold War, p.58; Reynolds, Britannia
Ovemded p.l76 and Young, Britain and the World, p.148.
' See Allison memorandum for Hamilton, 30 April 1948, FRUS, VoL VI: The Far East and
Austra/asia, 1948, pp.742-743 and conversation between MacArthur and under-secretary of Army
Draper, and Kennan, 21 March 1948, ibid, pp.706-709. See also Schaller, The American Occiq)ation
ofJapan, p.l24; Drifte, Seam!, Factor, pp.73-76, 79; Dower, Jan in War and Peace, p.174 and idem,
'Occupied Japan and the cold war in Asia', pp.390-391.
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MacArthur defended his occupation policies, especially the anti-aibatsu measures, and
derided any notion of linking Japan to a regional containment programme. Kennan
remained unimpressed, arguing that to avoid economic disaster in Japan, the aibatsu had
to be revived and the power of labour unions curtailed.76 Kennan vaguely relayed some
of his discussions with MacArthur back to Gascoigne. As Kennan saw it, the prospects
for an early peace treaty were not encouraging. Henceforth, in a period that would 'mark
time', Kennan thought it might be desirable, while maintaining the present regime of
occupation, to encourage the Japanese to develop an independent responsibility for the
future. Gascoigne detected from his conversation with Kennan that the United States
government had not yet formulated a long term policy towards Japan and were in a
considerable quandary over it. This, according to Gascoigne, explained America's
reluctance to consult the British on Japanese issues. 77 The Foreign Office also correctly
guessed that a willingness to 'mark time' was based on a belief in Washington that there
were positive advantages in continuing the occupation of Japan as a safeguard against
Soviet designs. Reluctant to embrace a Cold War policy for East Asia, the Foreign Office
concluded that as long as the occupation continued, 'the Japanese will rely on the
Americans for support and will not really get down to the job of preparing for their own
future'.78
IV. B,jtain the United States and the Economic Reconstruction ofJapan
Upon his return from Japan in the spring of 1948, Kennan, through the Policy Planning
Staff, laid out his recommendations before the State Department Kennan envisaged that
76 See Kennan, Memoirs, pp.369-372, 39 1-392; Schaller, ALtered Stales, p.l6 and idem, The American
Occupalion ofJapan, chp.7.
Gascoigne to Foreign Office, telegram no.248, 11 March 1948, F4043/662/23, FO
37 1/69885. For a full analysis of Kennan's views see memorandum of conversation, prepared in
the Canadian Department for External Affairs, 3 June 1948, FRUS, 1948, VoLT/I, pp.801-807.
78 Tomlinson, minute, 17 March 1948, F4043/662/23, FO 371/69885.
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SCAP's scope of operations should be progressively reduced to a point where its mission
would largely observe the activities of the Japanese government. Economic recovery
would be made the primary objective, with Japan 'amenable to American leadership' and
'industrially revived' to prevent Soviet penetration. Although the Planning Staff doubted
the Soviets would attack Japan, it feared that communist control over Manchuria, China
and Korea would provide a 'lever for Soviet political pressure'. Kennan, therefore,
proposed that the United States should retain tactical forces in Japan, pending the
conclusion of a peace treaty. The peace treaty itself, should be brief, general and
non-punitive. In one point of agreement with MacArthur, Kennan stressed the utility of
an off-shore security perimeter, embracing the Aleutians, the Ryukyu, the former
Japanese mandates and Guam. Okinawa was seen as pivotal for the projection of air
power and the prevention of an amphibious assault on Japan.79
 Kennan's overall
proposals won widespread support in Washington's military and political circles.80
However, in the presence of MacArthur, Gascoigne lambasted the Americans for failing
to fully divulge their thoughts to Britain. MacArthur explained that 'inertia' had reigned
in Washington because certain influential officials now wanted to prolong the occupation
and implant Japan firmly in the American orbit.8'
Gascoigne's complaints to MacArthur appeared to produce some positive results. Just
days after his complaint, the United States Embassy in London revealed to the Foreign
Office that the Truman administration was considering a relaxation of economic barriers,
See 'Recommendations With Respect to U.S. Policy Toward Japan', Kennan memorandum,
PPS 28, 25 March 1948, FRUS, 1948, VoLVI, pp.691-719; Conversation between MacArthur
and Kennan, 5 March 1948, ibid., pp.699-703; Kennan, Memoirs, pp.39l-392; Schaller, Altered
States, pp.15-16 and Gaddis, The Long Peace, pp.72-1O3.
80 Cargo memorandum for Gerig, 5 April 1948, FRUS, 1948, VoL Vi, 1948, pp.722-724; Thorp
memorandum for Butterworth, 6 April 1948, ibid., pp.964-966 and Sahzman memorandum for
Butterworth, 9 April 1948, ibid., pp.727-736. Kennan's proposal for a strategic trusteeship over
Okinawa and commercial facilities for the Navy at Yokosuka met the minimum demands of the
military services. Gaddis, The Long Peace, p.74.
' Gascoigne to Bevin, despatch no.87, 10 April 1948, F6048/662/23, FO 371/69886.
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travel by Japanese businessmen abroad who might secure credits and some limited form
of diplomatic recognition. 82
 Draper had already escorted a business delegation to Japan
led by Chemical Bank chairman, Percy Johnston, which met with aibatsu
representatives. 83
 When Draper released the Johnston report on 26 April 1948, British
concern over its imperial interests in East and Southeast Asia mounted. The report stated
that Japanese production would be accelerated by the relaxation of anti-aibatcw measures,
curtailing organised labour, controlling inflation, fixing the yen's foreign exchange value
and increasing exports at the expense of domestic consumption. TM
 More alarmingly and
contrary to British policy, Johnston recommended the cancellation of reparations and
Japanese penetration into Asian import markets, to help Japan achieve a nine-fold
increase in exports. 85
 UKLM pointed out that the dollars necessary to solve SCAP's
dollar shortage could only come from the United States, either in payment for goods and
services supplied for Japan or in respect to any shortfall, as a free gift, or later by
long-term investment when Japan was able to service foreign loans. 86
 This analysis
reflected Britain's wider conviction that the dollar-gap was a world-wide problem and
not rectifiable, as the Americans believed, through a British-led tariff-free United States
of Europe. As sterling was still a vehicle for half the world's trade, the Treasury argued
82 Foreign Office to Tokyo, telegram no.520, 17 April 1948, F5236/662/23, FO 371/69886.
Schaler,Alterrd States, p.l6 and idem, TheAmerican Occupation ofJapan, chp.7.
Schaller, The American Occupation ofJapan, p,l29 and Lowe, The Origins of the Koean Wa p.84.
85 The suggestion that external assets were to accrue to the country in which they were located,
cut right across British policy. See 'Comments on the Reparation Section of the Johnston
Report', Shearer, minute, ad., F8309/4/23, FO 371/69809; Schaller, A1te,d States, p.16 and
idem, Tbe Ame,ican Occupation ofJapan, chyj. Kennan felt reparations would hamper a Japanese
revival and noted that masses of upment lay rotting on the docks at Shanghai and other
Asian ports. Kennan, Memoirs, p.389.
Pinancial Adviser's Comments on the Johnston Report', Thomas, minute, n.d., F8309/4/23,
FO 371/69809.
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that Britain's trade and currency network constituted the principal 'bridge between the
Western and Eastern hemisphere'.87
Throughout the spring of 1948, Draper and the State Department pressed Congress
to inject almost $500 million into Japan for the fiscal year 1949, in order to revive its
economy and preclude civil disorder. Even MacArthur, after his stunning defeat in the
presidential primary elections, now began to devise his industrial deconcentration
policies for the requirements of Japanese recovery. The course that the United States
government aimed to pursue was bound to run into opposition from Britain, Australasia,
India, China and the Soviet Union. Foremost, concern developed over the resurgence of
Japan as a military and economic power. Within Britain, the textile and shipbuilding
industries were also determined that strict limitations should be imposed upon a Japanese
revival.89
 At this stage, the British still did not see Japan as a viable asset in the Cold War.
But, Dening pointed out that Britain could not now remain indifferent to United States
policy in Japan. The solution for Dening was to travel to America and propose
five-power talks on the subject of East Asia that would include Britain, the United States,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand° Bevin agreed, arguing that without these talks, it
was impossible to determine Britain's Asian policy, particularly as Americans appeared to
be taking unilateral decisions on Japan. Bevin proposed that Dening should first visit
Canada, Australia and New Zealand for oral talks, intimating Britain's intentions but
stressing the need for secrecy, before he travelled to America.9'
87 Reynolds, Bntannia Overruled, pp.179-l80.
Sebald to Marshall, 13 August 1948,FRUS, 1948, VoL VI, pp.837-839; Sebald to Marshall, 9
December 1948, ibid., pp.91 6-921 and Dower, Japan in War and Peace, pp.1 71-172.
89 Buckley, Occiqiojion Dqilomacj, pp.168-169.
'Far Eastern Policy', Dening, minute, 24 March 1948, F8770/ /23, FO 371/69927.
Bevin, minute for Attlee, 3 April 1948, PREM 8/736.
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The British move for five-power talks reflected a concerted attempt to influence
American policy before it crystallised. British military reports, for example, were
indicating a marked increase in American defensive measures throughout Japan, 92
 but
Gascoigne sensed from his conversations with MacArthur that the United States had not
reached a definite consensus on long-term policy for Japan. Indeed, apart from Kennan,
many officials in the State Department could not agree with the Army Department's
position that Japan's level of industry had to reach the considerably high quotas laid out
by the Johnston report. The State Department feared the recommendations might
alienate 'allies' in the Far Eastern Commission. 93 MacArthur admitted to Gascoigne that
there was a good deal of jealous rivalry and bitterness between individuals serving in the
Army and State Departments. Lovett, for example, was not on speaking terms with
Draper, and there were other high officials in the said Departments who were at
loggerheads with one another for personal reasons. Yet, MacArthur was determined to
stress that no senior American official had ever schemed to use Japan as an "aggressive"
instrument. The final aim of all American officials was to put Japan back on its feet so
that it could no longer be a burden on the American taxpayer. 94 Throughout 1948-1949,
MacArthur also championed his own views, often related to Gascoigne, that dismissed
92	 ,Brigadier £Ferguson, UKLM s military adviser, noted that a number of air bases had been
improved and extended far beyond the maximum necessary for mere occupation purposes. Some
runways had been constructed which allegedly took B36 bombers. Japanese Army and Navy
ammunition storage facilities in certain places, notably at Sasebo and Yokosuka, had also been
improved. Furthermore, it was known that Japanese underground oil storage facilities had not yet
been destroyed and had even been, to a limited extent, put into a usable condition. But Ferguson
was in no doubt that these moves were purely precautionary and defensive. Ferguson, minute for
Gascoigne, 22 May 1948, F7999/662/23, FO 371/69887.
See memorandum of conversation, prepared in the Canadian Department for External Affairs,
3 June 1948, FRUS, 1948, 1/oL VI, pp.8Ol-8O7; Throp memorandum for Butterworth, 6 April
1948, ibid., pp.964-966; Saltzman memorandum for Butterworth, 9 April 1948, ibid., pp.727-736;
and Marshall to Royall, 26 August 1948, ibid, pp.996-1011.
' Gascoigne to Bevin, letter no.124, 21 May 1948, F7999/662/23, FO 371/69887. Newspaper
articles such as 'American Policy on Japan Disagreement Seen Between State and War
Departments', Nippon Times, 21 May 1948, had been fuelling debate that internal disputes existed
over American long-term policy towards Japan.
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Japanese rearmament and envisioned Japan as the 'Switzerland of the Far East', a unique
symbol of peace in the modern world. 95
 What resulted was a plethora of conflicting
American opinions for the British to dissect.
Amidst these conflicting opinions, British hopes for five-power talks that could help
to construct a co-ordinated 'allied' policy for Japan, were dealt several blows in the
summer of 1948. Upon visiting Australia, Dening found the Australian External Affairs
Department unenthusiastic about the proposals. Australian leaders, resenting America's
unilateral decision-making towards East Asian affairs, saw the revival of Japanese
aggression as a far greater problem than global communist expansion.96
 Dening was
dismayed by a suggestion from the latter that an approach about a Japanese peace treaty
should first be made to the Soviet Union. If Stalin agreed to a conference, the External
Affairs Department then suggested putting the United States 'on the spot'. Dening,
openly shocked, derided this provocative attitude and concluded that Australia, in its
existing frame of mind, would not keep the talks secret if they were held. 97 Further
disappointment arose when Dening finally reached Washington in late May 1948.
Accompanied by Hubert Graves, the British Embassy's Asia expert, Dening held a series
of conversations with senior State Department officials. Dening was forced to admit that
the Chiefs of Staff had 'not given detailed consideration' to a Cold War situation in East
Asia but he felt it could be safely assumed that the British Commonwealth would not
wish to see America's strategic position in the Asia-Pacific weakened. He added that due
to the Yalta provisions, it was an inescapable fact that the Soviet Union held a dominant
Dower, Japan in War and Peace, pp.17l-l72 and Lowe, 'Great Britain, Japan and the Future',
p.182.
96 Lowe, Containsn the Cold Warm East Asia, pp.22-23.
Dening to Machtig, letter, 7 May 1948, PREM 8/736. In January 1948, the CIA had also
reported on Australian security leaks from a series of intercepted Soviet communications
code-named Venona by GCHQ. See Christopher Andrew, The Growth of the Australian
Intelligence Community and the Anglo-American Connection', Inisl4gence and National Secuny,
VoL4 No.2 (Summer 1989), pp.226-229.
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position in East Asia. Ignoring any wider Cold War implications that this dominant
Soviet position could have on East Asia and its surrounding regions, Dening argued that
the United States should resign itself to this situation and 'get on' with negotiations for a
Japanese peace treaty. Butterworth and Kennan dismissed Dening's assumption that the
Japanese were anxious to have a peace treaty. The Japanese, they suggested, were more
alarmed by the prospect of being left unarmed against a Soviet-dominated Northeast
Asia. This fact, according to the State Department, required another phase of the
occupation in order to strengthen Japan and rehabilitate its economy.98
Despite an apparent divergence on policy, the Foreign Office welcomed these talks
but declared that Britain needed to know much more about American plans before it
could formulate a responseY9
 Evidence shows that in 1948, the British continued to be
completely ambivalent towards any positive Cold War advantages Japan could provide.
Hector McNeil, the Minister of State, saw the United States presenting Britain with a
'nasty political mess' through their apparent inability to understand Australian fears about
the re-emergence of Japanese aggression. McNeil worried that the apparent
determination on the part of America to treat the Japanese leniently from an industrial
point of view would also land the Attlee government in trouble with its Lancashire textile
community. McNeil hoped that Bevin might impress upon Marshall that Britain could
not agree to either delaying indefinitely a Japanese peace treaty or adopt an indifferent
attitude over the new policy for Japan. 10° Yet, by early June 1948, Dening was reluctantly
prepared to face realities and accept the reorientation of American policy. This was not
because he now saw Japan as important piece in the Cold War balance of power but
98 Memorandum of conversation by Green, 28 May 1948, FRUS, 1948, VoL VI, pp.788-794;
Franks to Foreign Office, telegram no.2546, 31 May 1948, F7845/6139/23, FO 371/69926 and
Franks to Foreign Office, telegram no.21 8, 4 June 1948, F8097/ /23, FO 371/69926.
Tomlinson, minute, 3 June 1948, F7845/6139/23, FO 371/69926.
McNeil, minute for Bevin, 3 June 1948, F8332/6139/23, FO 371/69927.
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more to do with the recognition that the United States would proceed to implement
policy initiatives without Britain if the latter showed a blank refusal to co-operate. It was
therefore better to be working from within than without. Dening had, for example,
detected 'the light of temptation' in Butterworth's eye when he mentioned the
'dissolution' of the Far Eastern Commission, though the latter hastily assured him that
there were no such plans. Realising that Soviet propaganda could attack another phase of
the occupation as American subjugation, Dening declared that: 'the American thinks that
the United States is the sole power which can ensure security in the East, to which the
other powers should be satisfied with any measures they think appropriate'. 101
 This
American exciusivist attitude was ultimately undermining Britain's world power status
and imperial strength in the Asia-Pacific.
Just as Dening was complaining about the American attitude towards Japan, Kennan's
recommendations evolved into NSC 13 and, under the Economic Recovery in Occupied
Areas programme, Congress appropriated $108 million, that, for the first time, could be
used specifically for economic recovery in occupied Japan.102
 Britain, the Soviet Union,
China, Australia, New Zealand and Canada all remained unconvinced that American
policy was heading in the right direction. 103 Gascoigne informed MacArthur in July 1948,
101 Memorandum of conversation by Green, 28 May 1948, FRUS, 1948, VoLT/I, pp.788-794 and
Dening to Wright, letter, 1 June 1948, F8091/6139/23, FO 371/69926.
102 Dower, Japan in IVar and Peace, p.174.
103 UK High Commissioner in Canada to CR0, telegram no.663, 26 July 1948, F10555/4/23,
FO 371/69813; New Zealand government to CR0, telegram no.147, 29 July 1948,
F10555/4/23, FO 371/69813; Acting UK High Commissioner in the Commonwealth of
Australia to CR0, telegram no.477, 27 July 1948, F10555/4/23, FO 371/69813. The Nationalist
Chinese also wanted the prevention of any repetition of Japanese aggression and the
rehabilitation of Japan to dangerous levels. See 'Conversation Between the Secretary of State and
the Chinese Foreign Minister: Foreign Affairs', Bevin to Lamb, telegram no.343, 29 October
1948, F15285/361/G, FO 371/69608 and record by MacDonald on conversation with Soong, 9
June 1948, 22/2/47, MJM, Durham University Library(DUL). The Soviets suggested that the
Americans were encouraging inflation and completing the economic ruin of the country, so
Japan could be built up as jumping-off point for their aggressive designs against the Soviet
Union. Pink to Bevin, letter, 21 July 1948, F10731/662/23, FO 371/69887.
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that the Japanese appeared to be more sulky and arrogant.'°4 The British Press were
concerned that although Japan had been demilitarised in the material sense, there had
been no mental disarmament. 105
 The Japan and Pacific Department at the Foreign Office
concurred, noting that: 'The real danger is that the more likely they [the Japanese] are to
revert rapidly to extreme nationalism as soon as the restraints are removed'. 106 At a
Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting, the Australian delegation argued that the
recent war trials suggested there had been little real change of heart on part of the
Japanese. 107
 Fearing for the future, the Australian Prime Minister, Ben Chifley, thought
that the United States had become obsessed about the Soviet menace and were
conducting a policy that would defeat itself by building Japan up to such an extent to
make it once again a threat to international security. 108
 According to UKLM, the tone of
SCAP and its local English-language newspapers in Japan confirmed this hysteria about
the threat of communist penetration, to the exclusion of any concern about Japanese
militarism.'09
104 Gascoigne told MacArthur that he had received a serious report from the head of the
Purchasing and Selling Section of UKLM, whereby the latter had received great discourtesy at
the hands of officials of the Japanese Board of Trade with whom he wished to discuss disabilities
under which foreign firms in Japan were now operating. Gascoigne to Foreign Office, telegram
no.631, 1 July 1948, F9266/1956/23, FO 371/69911 and note on meeting held in Dening's
room on 15 July 1948, MacDermot, minute, 15 July 1948, F9980/8598/23, FO 371/69930.
Richard Hughes, japan: the enemy has become ally', Sundqy Chronicle, 15 August 1948 and
Hessell Tiltman, gaps win the peace', Daily Herald, 16 August 1948.
106 Lowe, 'Great Britain, Japan and the Future', pp.182-183.
107 Evatt, minute, PMM(48)3 at Downing Street, 12 October 1948, CAB 133/88.
'°8 Acg UK High Commissioner in the Commonwealth of Australia to CR0, telegram no.477,
27 July 1948, F10555/4/23, FO 371/69813.
109 The local English language daily, the Nppon Times, and the Stars and Stnbes, which catered for
the American occupation forces, had recently carried a steadily increasing volume of
anti-communist material. Figures released by GHQ in Tokyo estimated that the actual
membership of the Japanese Communist Party was 15,200 and for fellow travellers,
approximately 70,000. UKLM considered that this figure, for a country with a population of 80
million, was remarkably smalL Pink to Bevin, letter, 26 August 1948, F12413/44/23, FO
371/69823.
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These views had been reinforced by the British Commonwealth's strong objection to
SCAP pressure on the Japanese government to outlaw strikes and labour agitation in July
1948. When Britain and Australia protested, MacArthur boomed that the British
Commonwealth was lining up with the Soviet Union. The episode epitomised America's
determination to pursue its new Cold War economic policy for Japan."° Japan, with its
skilled manpower and industrial war making potential, constituted a critical basis of
power in Asia that the United States could not allow the Soviet Union to controL
Consequently, although Asia ranked behind Europe and the Middle East in American
political-strategic priorities, Japan could not be written off and formed part of a strategic
defensive in the East. The British JIC did not quarrel over the strategic significance of
the Japanese Islands and considered that under Soviet control, they could play a most
useful part in the defence of the latter's Northeast Asian provinces. But a strategic threat
to Japan was still not anticipated at this stage and the British remained uncomfortable
with the idea of a prolonged occupation, especially over the degree to which Japan
should be economically built-up."2
These concerns apart, MacNeil's earlier protestations that the British should flatly
oppose delaying a peace treaty were not politically expedient, in view of Britain's need
for American economic help and defence co-operation against possible Soviet aggression
in Europe. To achieve their goals in Japan, the United States had strong political levers
with which to persuade their allies. Marshall, in conversation with the new British
Ambassador to Washington, Oliver Franks, felt that an understanding of what the
110 Schaller, The American Occa1ion oj'Japan, pp.135-136 and Cheke to Wakely, letter, 1 October
1948, F13656/44/23, FO 371/69824. MacArthur complained to Gascoigne that Britain always
seemed to be 'led by the nose' by Australia. MacArthur felt Australia was too obsessed with its
part of world and did not have a global outlook. Gascoigne to Dening, 30 June 1948,
F9701/6724/23, FO 371/69928.
Dower, 'Occupied Japan and the cold war in Asia', pp.391-393. See also chp.V.
112 
'Russian Interests, Intentions and Capabilities', JIC(48)9(0)Final, 23 July 1948, DEFE 4/15.
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United States were seeking to do in Japan, was important not only for America's broad
East Asian interests but also in relation to the European Recovery Programme (ERP).
Marshall warned Franks that what could begin as an issue of spending fewer dollars in
Japan might over the coming months be broadened out by a chain reaction into a less
favourable attitude in America to the ERP. 113
 In China, the Nationalists were similarly in
a difficult position to protest strongly against America's Japanese policy. The
maximisation of its share of reparations undoubtedly had a higher priority in most
Nationalist minds than any longer term considerations of economic stability in Asia. But
the Chinese could not afford an open break with the United States as they needed
American aid to stem the engulfing waters of Chinese communism.114
Despite Marshall's veiled threats, by the late summer of 1948, the Attlee government
faced continuous demands from the British textile industry to curb Japan's textile trade.
Bevin tried to impress upon the Board of Trade and Raymond Streat, the chairman of
the British Cotton Board, that the proposal to prevent the Japanese textile trade from
developing was a very difficult one. The United States was paying £400m a year to
support Japan and it was unlikely that Congress would absorb this sum much longer.
Bevin also pointed Out that the world was starved of textiles and once Southeast Asia had
settled politically, its demands would be enormous. Bevin concluded that: 'be would feel
uneasy in argument with other countries about restricting Japan when the markets were
already there for our asking and the British could not go all out to fill them'. 115
 In
Lancashire, the heart of the British textile industry, the view remained that it could not
withstand competition from the Japanese which employed extremely cheap labour. As a
compromise, the Board of Trade suggested that the British ask the United States to
h13 Franks to Foreign Office, telegram no.3474, 15 July 1948, F9870/662/23, FO 371/69887.
114 See 'China's Attitude Towards Japan' Thomas, minute, 12 March 1948, F5407/4/23, FO
371/69086 and chapter VI.
115 Bevin, minute, 18 August 1948, F10929/60/23, FO 371/69814.
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sanction a combined Anglo-American textile industry mission to Japan for talks on a
non-governmental basis with SCAP and Japanese textile experts. 6 Concern still reigned
in the Foreign Office that a mission consisting of producers would lead to very
one-sided recommendations. The Foreign Office were doubtful that it would be possible
to obtain restrictions on textiles and this was borne out in 1950 when MacArthur
appeared reluctant to receive an industry mission. 117
 Proponents of heavy restrictions on
the Japanese economy were dealt a further blow, after the British had successfully
conducted complex financial negotiations for a widening of sterling-area trade with
SCAP. In 1948 and 1949, Britain reached agreement on the sum of $112 million for the
period July 1948 to June 1949 and £143 million from July 1949 to June 1950.118 The
British dilemma remained focused between avoiding a Japanese collapse, that could have
a knock-on effect upon its imperial position in Southeast Asia and force the Americans
to divert aid from the ERP, and thwarting a complete Japanese recovery, that raised
questions of security and economic competition.
V. The Politics of the Peace Treaty with Japan
A BRJTAINAND A NEW POLiTICAL DAWN FORJA PAN
As 1948 drew to a close, the election of Yoshida Shigeru in October, marked a new era
of continuity in Japanese politics. Yoshida had been Japanese Ambassador to London
during the I 930s and his objection to the continuation of the war in 1945, led to his
arrest by the military but saw the Americans exempt him from the postwar purge.
Yoshida, although opposed to militarism, aimed to preserve Conservative forces in
116 The Board of Trade presumed that India would also be interested in the mission. Meeting at
the Foreign Office, 4 October 1948, F13779/60/23, FO 371/69815B.
117 Cheke, minute, 4 October 1948, F13779/60/23, EQ 371/69815B and Lowe, The Ongins of the
Korean War pp.85-86.
118 For a full discussion on the implementation of these agreements see Buckley, OcciØation
Dplomacjy, pp.166-170.
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postwar Japan. His shrewd tactics and sometimes recalcitrant conduct, at first led
MacArthur and UKLM to see him as lacking in application. MacArthur also considered
him lazy and politically inept although the relationship remained courteous. 119 It was part
of Yoshida's panache to assume a rather English air, suggested by his choice of clothes
and his attachment to a well-loved Rolls Royce. This was a mild, calculated irritation to
the dominant Americans.° Gascoigne regarded Yoshida as 'likeable enough' but saw
him as an intriguer and trouble-maker who aimed to split Britain and American apart
while complicating British inter-Commonwealth relations. 121 On the question of policy,
Yoshida desired an early peace treaty that would enable the United States to retain their
strategic advantages th-â-th the Soviet Union. Yoshida stressed that unless Japan was
allowed to have a much stronger police force or army, he would welcome the presence
of American troops to defeat communist fifth column methods inside the country.
Yoshida's aim was to make Japan less of a burden to the American taxpayer, foster
democracy, strengthen the economy and restore Japan's stature in the world.
As Yoshida tried to accommodate the Americans in their strategic policies towards
Japan, Bevin realised that for the Commonwealth, security in the Pacific, whether the
potential aggressor was Japan or the Soviet Union, also depended to a major extent on
the United States. Realising that Britain could not play a major role in East Asian affairs,
119 Gascoigne to Foreign Office, telegram no.1211, 22 October 1948, F14829/44/23, FO
371/69825. Yoshida has often been underestimated but proved to be a wily operator and stayed
in power until 1954. See also John Dower, Enbire and Aftermath: Yosbida Sb:geru and the Japanese
Expe,ience, 1878-1954 (London, 1979), chp.9 and Schaller4herd States, p.7.
120 Storry,A History oJModern Japan, p.254.
121 Gascoigne to Foreign Office, telegram no.1211, 22 October 1948, F14829/44/23, FO
371/69825. Gascoigne's 'intriguer' remarks stemmed from an inquiry by Yoshida as to whether
he could employ as an adviser A. Edwardes, a former member of the Chinese Maritime Customs
Service and a past adviser to the Japanese Embassy in London before 1941. Gascoigne replied
that it would be impossible to employ Edwardes because of the latter's pre-war activities and
because employment of a British national in a sensitive post would not be acceptable to SCAP.
See Lowe, 'Great Britain,Japan and the Future', p.l87.
122 Gascoigne to Foreign Office, telegram no.1211, 22 October 1948, F14829/44/23, FO
371/69825; Dower, Japan in War and Peace, pp.208-241 and Lowe, 'Great Britain, Japan and the
Future', pp.l86-187.
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there was a case for having to accept American policies and a recognition that Japan
should have a viable economy. Although Bevin did not wish to see levels rise beyond
Japan's 1930-1934 standard of living, if the Americans set them higher, he was prepared
to consider them. 1 Still, British anxiety over a prolonged occupation had not been
ignored by the United States. In late 1948, Butterworth briefly outlined to Graves the
recent trends in American thinking towards Japan. He told Graves that Dening's remarks
concerning the psychological effects of maintaining the occupation, focused the United
States on cushioning this impact by changing the character of the occupation. The
Japanese would be given greater political freedom while SCAP would become little more
than an important political counsellor. Occupation forces would also begin to
concentrate on the vital zones only. Intimating the reduction of outside interference even
further, Butterworth thought the Far Eastern Commission had done all it could. It could
no longer settle the issue of reparations which led Butterworth to presume that the
Commission would lapse into a state of 'innocuous desuetude'.''
Graves correctly estimated that an early peace treaty was still not contemplated by the
Truman administration because it would give the Soviets an opportunity to press for the
withdrawal of American troops, thereby leaving a dangerous vacuum inside Japan.
Lovett, for example, worried that communist control of Manchuria, northern China and
perhaps all of Korea, could enable the Soviets to tie Japan economically to its Northeast
Asian provinces. 1
 After much debate, the State Department finally accepted the Army's
position on Japan.127
 Henceforth, in October 1948, the NSC concluded that the question
123 Discussion of Japanese Problems with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers', Bevin
memorandum, n.d., F13872/662/23, FO 371/69887.
124 
'United States Policy towards Japan', summary of interview with Butterworth, 4 October
1948, F14331/662/23, FO 371 /69887.
125 
'Estimate of United States Intentions Regarding Japan', Graves memorandum, 4 October
1948, F14331/662/23, FO 371/69887.
126 Lovett to Marshall, 7 October 1948, FRUS, 1948, VoL VI, pp.862-865.
127 Saltzman to Marshall, 15 September 1948, ibid, pp.10l5-l0l6 and Lovett to Royall, 28
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of Japanese security should only be formulated in the light of the prevailing international
situation and degree of internal stability in Japan. It recommended retaining American
forces and advised the United States government not to press for an early peace treaty.
Rearmament was considered impractical and, contrary to British Commonwealth
suspicions, distrust of Japan remained a feature of United States planning.' Following
his election triumph in November 1948, Truman committed his full authority to the
so-called 'reverse course'. On 10 December, he issued an economic directive that
consolidated the themes of NSC 13/2, the Johnston report and measures to build up
Japanese industry. He named a special emissary, Detroit banker Joseph Dodge, to
oversee SCAP and implement a stabilisation programme.1
MacArthur remonstrated to Washington that the success of a stabilisation plan
depended upon a United States aid package for Asia of $165 million, no international
trade discrimination and the ability of Japan to conduct freely its own foreign commerce
and merchant shipping. The problem was that any programme depended on Japan
gaining access to East and Southeast Asian markets. Critical areas of Southeast Asia were
wracked with instability and at the same time, large parts of Northeast Asia had fallen
under communist controL' 3° Despite these problems, there was little prospect of any
joint Anglo-American plans for the Asian region. By the end of 1948, Dening fumed to
Graves that: 'unless there is a concerted Far Eastern policy soon, the future can only
develop to our common detriment'. Dening charged that American policy would fail in
October 1948, ibid, pp.1038-104.0.
128 
'Recommendations with respect to United States Policy Toward Japan',NSC 13/2, 7 October
1948, ibid, pp.858-862. MacArthur had vociferously opposed Japanese rearmament. Dower, J4an
in W/ar and Peace, p.175.
129 Schaller, Altered Stales, p.17. Dodge, former President of American Bankers Association, was
to crack down on government spending, constrain wages and cut domestic consumption, all of
which were essential to boost Japanese production, stabilise the yen and attract capital and
promote exports. See Borden, The Pacific Alliance, pp.88-94.
130 Draper to Lovett, 14 December 1948, FRUS, 1948, VoLVI, pp.1062-1063 and chapters V
and VI.
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China, Korea and Japan because they did not understand the intransigent nature of those
countries. Still angry, Dening wondered how long it would be before the United States
abandoned East Asia. He rectified this last sentence later by suggesting that he was just
'letting off steam'. 131
 The British, for their part, had appeared reluctant to devise policies
towards East Asia in Cold War terms and seemed more concerned about maintaining
economic advantages to consolidate imperial and world power status. These facts, as well
as differences of opinion inside the Truman administration over Japanese policy, explain
why the United States did not feel able to consult with the British in Japan.
By early 1949 communist control over North Korea, northern China and anticipated
communist advances into Southeast Asia and Formosa, brought new impetus to the
American focus on Japan's economic recovery. The Japanese government had already
discouragingly announced that its economy could not reach 1930-1934 levels of
production by 1953. A self-sustaining economy envisioned by the United States would
now require increasing exports from $600 million in 1949 to $1.5 billion in 1953. Such an
increase would disturb Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines, who feared a revival
of Japan's military power. These countries were also still reluctant to grant most-favoured
nation treatment to Japanese goods. The situation was made worse by disruptive
nationalist uprisings in Southeast Asia, which damaged the flow of trade, increased food
shortages and, more importantly, reinforced Japan's dependence on American
supplies.' 32
 In the opinion of the Foreign Office and UKLM, these depressing indicators
spelt disaster for Japan, even more so as Yoshida did: 'not give the impression of being
particularly well qualified to cope with the intricate political and economic situation'.133
131 Dening to Graves, letter, 29 December 1948, F18545/33/10, FO 371/69550.
132 Acheson to certain Diplomatic Offices, 8 May 1949, FRUS, VoL VII: The Far East and
Ausira/asia (Pa,i II), 1949(Washington, 1976), pp.736-737. Australian emotions were deemed by
the Americans to continue to override the logic of the situation. Interim Directive by JCS to
MacArthur, 12 May 1949, ibid., p.744 See also Leffler,A Preponderance of Power, p.299.
133 Lowe, 'Great Britain, Japan and the Future', pp.187-188.
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However, the arrival of Dodge in Japan during February 1949, ushered in new policies
that revitalised the aibatsu, restricted inflation, promoted exports, decreased workers
living standards and, along with help from Yoshida, limited the rights of unions to
bargain and strike. By implementing these measures, Dodge hoped to contain
communism and encourage Japan to align itself, commercially and ideologically, with the
West.1M
As Dodge attempted to reinvigorate the Japanese economy, the implications for the
British were not encouraging. In February 1949, Sir William Strang, during a tour of Asia,
visited Tokyo. Strang reported that there was little margin for increased home production
and Japanese exports would therefore have to be increased by five or six times the
present amount. This, Strang noted, was bound to mean increased competition with
British exporters. United States pressure to relax restrictions on the Japanese economy
and merchant shipping, left Strang in little doubt that the Japanese would once again
attempt to attain economic predominance over those areas which they sthed between
1941 and 1942.135 Yet, by early 1949, Britain's ability to gauge any clear indication of
United States policy in Japan was still hampered by a lack of consultation with the State
Department and a policy of drift in Washington. Royall attempted to rectify this aura of
drift in 1949, when he announced to the Press that in the event of war against the Soviet
Union, the United States was under no obligation to defend Japan and American troops
would withdraw. Royall's comments, quickly denied by Acheson, confused the British,
shocked Yoshida and infuriated MacArthur.
See Schaller, Altered Slates, p.l7.
135 
'Sir William Strang's Tour in South-East Asia and the Far East, Strang report for Bevin, 27
February 1949, F4447/1051/61, FO 371/76208.
136 MacArthur reaffirmed that America was determined to keep the Soviets out from the island
line Japan-Okinawa-Formosa. See Gascoigne to Foreign Office, telegram no.145, 10 February
1949, F2223/10345/23, FO 371/76215; Gascoigne to Foreign Office, telegram no.172, 13
February 1949, F2328/10345/23, FO 371/76215 and Franks to Foreign Office, telegram
no.957, 16 February 1949, F2487/10345/23, FO 371/76215. Tomlinson minuted that. 'as long
as he remains in the government the possibility that they will gain ground cannot be excluded'.
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Although Royall knew full well that the United States would not, as MacArthur
claimed, 'scuttle the Pacific', his outburst aimed to move the Truman administration,
MacArthur and the Japanese into thinking about requirements for a post-occupied
Japan. 137
 Its immediate effect was to cause alarm amongst America's allies concerned
with Asia. Dening told the British Embassy in Washington that Royall's comments
instilled doubts which would not be easy to eradicate, least of all in Australia and New
Zealand.' When Butterworth, in an attempt to reassure the British, told Franks that no
changes were contemplated in American strategy, the latter wryly lamented that if Britain
knew more about the details of United States policy this would have been a helpful
remark but without the precise knowledge it did not assist Britain to any great extent.139
Since Dening's meeting with the State Department in the summer of 1948, the British
had rarely been informed of United States policy on Japan. In March 1949, Dening
complained to Bevin that he had no notion as to how American ideas were developing
on the subject, or indeed whether they had any ideas at alL Both Dening and UKLM
were particularly worried about whether the Japanese would co-operate with the West
once the occupation was over. UKLM was unprepared to indulge in any extravagant
expressions of good-will for the new Japan, common among a certain section of the
Americans, if only because many British officials did not believe that the new Japan was
all that new. But the British did not regard the Japanese with the blank hatred sometimes
encountered amongst the Australians.140
Tornlinson, minute, 14 February 1949, F2268/10345/23, FO 371/76215.
137 Memorandum of conversation by Bishop, 16 February 1949, FRUS, 1949 (Pail II), VoL VII,
pp.65 5-658. Royal! did eventually backtrack stating that the garrison would stay at Okinawa. See
Gascoigne to Foreign Office, telegram no.172, 13 February 1949, F2328/10345/23, FO
371/76215 and Schaller, Tbe American Occbation ofJapan, pp.164-165.
' Dening to Graves, letter, 14 February 1949, F2384/10345/23, FO 371/76215.
139 Franks to Foreign Office, telegram no.955, 16 February 1949, F2485/0345/23, FO
371/76215.
140 See Pink to Scarlett, letter, 2SJune 1949, F9901/4/23, FO 371/76216 and 'China andJapan',
Dening, minute for Bevin, 23 March 1949, F4488/1023/61, FO 371/76023.
213
BRITAIN AND THE 'REVERSE' OCCUPATION POLICY IN JAPAN
B. BUILDING A COLD WAR STRATEGY FORJAPAN
When the United States began to move on NSC 13/2, its unilateral implementation irked
the British. In May 1949, NSC 13/3 recommended that the United States government
should advise the Far Eastern Commission that all industrial facilities, including so-called
'primary war facilities', presently designated for reparations would be utilised as
necessary. Furthermore, there would be no limitations on Japan's production for
peaceful purposes or on levels of Japanese productive capacity in industries devoted to
peaceful purposes. 14' These measures were not discussed with the British but simply
announced before a meeting of the Far Eastern Commission. This action, undoubtedly
dealt a blow to Britain's world power status and Franks explained that a reason for this
attitude lay in the lack of any serious American conviction that other countries had a
definite right to be consulted. But the British Ambassador felt that a failure on the part
of the United States to consult effectively with Britain threatened to create a growing
divergence of views on policy.' 42
 The Foreign Office observed that the United States
were heading towards a position which would make it positively dangerous for them to
countenance a peace treaty, since a peace conference would have the right to reverse any
of the unilateral decisions which they were now taking.'43
Such an assessment by the Foreign Office took on more significance in June 1949,
when shortly after the American Secretary of Defence, Louis Johnson, had called for a
co-ordinated policy 'to contain communism' in Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a
controversial paper on United States security needs. The paper declared that America
had to maintain strategic control of an 'offshore island chain' in Asia, with Japan playing
141 
'Recommendations with Respect to United States Policy Toward Japan', Report by NSC,
NSC 13/3, 6 May 1949 in 'Recommendations with Respect to United States Policy Toward
Japan',Note by Lalor and Ives,JCS 1380/62, 9 May 1949, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 47, KCL
142 Franks to Bevin, despatch no.399, 23 May 1949, F7919/10115/23, FO 371/76210.
143 Tomlinson, minute, 1 June 1949, F7919/10115/23, FO 371/76210.
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a pivotal role as a forward staging area from which United States military power could be
launched. The Japanese Islands, claimed the Joint Chiefs, were of high strategic
importance to United States security interests in East Asia because of their geographic
location with respect to trade routes of North Pacific, the exits and entrances of the Sea
of Japan, the East China and Yellow Seas. Under Soviet control these could be used as a
base for aressive action directly against American bases in the Western Pacific. The
Joint Chiefs argued that Japan's strategic importance was increased by its skilled
manpower and industrial potential which could be exploited by the Soviets, especially as
the latter was in control of Japan's wartime industrial provinces in Northeast Asia. The
Joint Chiefs also endorsed the creation of a Japanese Army in time of war which could
tie down the Soviet Union on its Asiatic front, upsetting their concentration against
Europe and the Middle East. Although MacArthur and the State Department felt that
Japanese rearmament was inadvisable during peacetime, there were no objections to
considering the idea in secret, if war between the Soviet Union and the United States
broke out.145
In 1949, British military planners agreed that Japan and the Ryukyu Islands could
provide valuable air bases within strategic bomber range of industrial areas of the Soviet
Union. Japan had become the one remaining relatively secure non-communist area in
East Asia. British planners wanted to prevent any country from exploiting Japan's
manpower and industrial potential in a direction antagonistic to Commonwealth
'Current Strategic Evaluation of U.S. Security Needs in Japan', JSSC Report to JCOS, JCS
1380/65, 1 June 1949, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF47, KCL; 'Strategic Evaluation of United States
Security Needs in Japan', Report byJCS, 9 June 1949, FRUS, 1949 (Part II), VoLVII, pp.744-777
and 'United States Policy Toward Asia', Johnson memorandum for the NSC, JCS 1992/2, 19
June 1949, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF56, KCL In May 1949, the CIA had also stated that the
Japanese industrial machine was more important to the Soviet Union due to its effective control
of northern China, Manchuria and North Korea, whose natural resources Japanese industry
could utilise most efficiently. See Dower, 'Occupied Japan and the cold war in Asia', p.393
' Bishop memorandum to Butterworth, 1 April 1949, FRUS, 1949 (Part II), VoLT/Il,
pp.694-696. For MacArthur's views see memorandum of conversation by Bishop, 16 February
1949, ibid, pp.655-658.
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mterests.' The Joint Planning Staff maintained that the United States had to negotiate a
treaty and a bilateral defence agreement, whereby America undertook the naval and air
defence of Japan in return for bases and facilities in Japanese territory. Japan would be
permitted to build up an army, armed and equipped by the United States, to defend itself
against an external aggressor. These measures, the Planning Staff argued, ensured that the
Japanese themselves did not have balanced forces capable of aggression, or the need for
a large arms industry. There was no question of Britain accepting Soviet or Chinese
communist participation in the control measures for Japan. The Joint Planners
concluded that if the United States agreed upon a bilateral defence treaty, the revival oç
Japanese shipbuilding industry would not represent a threat to Britain's security.' 47 The
Chiefs of Staff concurred and recognised that the most immediate threat lay in Japan
joining an unfriendly Asiatic or communist bloc. Consequently, the Chiefs of Staff
recommended that adequate provisions for Japan's external defence and internal security
had to be made.1
These assessments vividly indicated an appreciation of the strategic importance of
Japan in the global struggle against communism, to the degree that British military
planners were even prepared to accept limited Japanese military rearmament. However,
in 1949, the only dear views the British received on the future of the occupation
continued to come from MacArthur. The latter had told Admiral Sir Patrick Brind,
Commander-in-Chief Far East Station, that he wanted Japan to remain strictly neutral
and emphasised that he personally had no intention of converting the Japanese, whom
he still distrusted, into allies against the Soviet Union. To secure Japan against Soviet
'The Implications of a Communist Success in China', JIC(49)48(Final), 30 September 1949,
CAB 158/7 and Acheson memorandum for Franks, 24 December 1949, FRUS, 1949 (Part II),
VoL J/JJ, pp.927-929.
"fl' Japanese Peace Treaty - Defence Aspects', JP(49)163(Final), 20 December 1949, DEFE
4/27.
japanese Peace Treaty - Defence Aspects', COS(49)453, 23 December 1949, DEFE 5/15.
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attack, MacArthur preferred using bases in the Pacific Islands, especially Okinawa,
Manila, Guam and, in the north, the Aluetian and Alaskan bases. To Brind's suggestion
that an atomic bomb might wipe out bases on Okinawa, MacArthur produced the rather
lame reply that if the Soviets had such bombs they would use them on more important
targs.' MacArthur's views were very different from those in the Pentagon and by
1949, MacArthur's grip on the formulation of United States policy was dexiini n
slipping from his grasp and his pronouncements could not be relied upon as a true guide
to the thinking of the Truman administration.'50
Kennan, on a visit to London, confessed to Dening that, although the United States
were now seriously considering a Japanese peace treaty, the defence aspects of a possible
treaty still remained a major problem. Kennan stressed that the United States did not
want Japan for offensive operations but did want to deny it to a potential enemy and
were looking at the possibilities of a bilateral agreement with the Japanese. Dening
pointed out that the bilateral idea had long been in British thinking. The Foreign Office
believed that a peace treaty which would allow the Japanese to re-enter the comity of
nations would be a sufficient inducement for them to voluntarily concede bases for
American security and ensure Japan's friendship. Kennan's dilemma focused on the
Soviet Union and a communist China. He felt no agreement could be reached with them
present at the peace table but, conversely, if excluded, they might make their own treaty
with Japan which was more favourable.15'
149 Brind had also suggested to MacArthur that Okinawa might itself be vulnerable since airfields
there were concentrated in a small area. MacArthur agreed but suggested that it would be
possible to arrange for radar cover and attacking aircraft would have to come from so far afield
that they should receive adequate warning of their approach. Pink to Foreign Office, telegram
no.750, 13 July 1949, F10130/10115/23, FO 371/76210.
t50 Schaller,AlteredStates, chp.1
Record of conversation with Kennan and Dening, 26 July 1949, W4528/2/500, FO
371/76383 and brief for Council of Foreign Ministers: Japan, Scarlett to Bevin, 19 May 1949,
F9014/1021/23, FO 371/7621 1.
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Although British thinking towards East Asia had begun to move gradually into a Cold
War framework, there still remained several contentious issues between the
Anglo-American powers. The Foreign Office disagreed with American attempts to allow
Japan the ability to participate in international affairs before the conclusion of a peace
treaty and objected to their reparations and economic policy. 152 The Foreign Office still
argued that if Britain permitted Japan unrestricted production, after a few years of
full-scale industrial rehabilitation, Japan could be free to exploit its increased capacity or
fall under influence of the Soviet Union with this considerable industrial power.' 53 As a
serious divergence of policies appeared to be emerging, officials from the Foreign Office,
including Bevin, travelled to the United States in September 1949 to discuss East Asian
issues. Preliminary discussions between Butterworth and Dening, saw the latter press for
an early peace treaty, a bilateral defence agreement and a conference that could proceed
without communist China and the Soviet Union. Butterworth did not object to Dening's
suggestions, so long as the United States had an assurance that the British
Commonwealth, France and the Netherlands would embrace the key clauses of a
generous treaty. Butterworth remained sceptical on this point and argued that the
Philippines, Australia and Malaya were not prepared for the intimate contacts with the
Japanese which would be implicit in a treaty. Although Dening admitted that Britain also
favoured restrictions on iron and steel, oil refining and ship building industries, he
152 For example, SCAP had allowed the Japanese government to accede to an International
Telecommunications Union and at recent meetings of that Union in Geneva and Paris the
propriety of this action was questioned by delegates. In Geneva, the Japanese delegation
withdrew and in Paris after debate, an American proposal that 'the present conference authorise
Japan to take part in the debates of the conference as a full member' was defeated. Japanese
Participation in International Affairs', Foreign Office brief, 2 September 1949, F13321/1056/23,
FO 371/76216. The provisions in the Public Corporation Labour Restrictions Law, which made
strikes illegal, was applied not only to civil servants but to all employed in public utilities and
government enterprises. The Foreign Office regarded these policies as wrong in principle and
unwise as a method of combating communism. 'Labour', Foreign Office brief, 2 September
1949, F13321/1056/23, FO 371/76216.
153 
'Reparations and Level of Industry', Foreign Office brief, 2 September 1949,
F13321/1056/23, FO 371/76216.
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concluded that if the British Commonwealth was tactfully approached by the United
States, it would willingly consider American proposals for a treaty.' TM
 Four days later, the
Secretary of State, Acheson, explained to Bevin that the United States government could
not allow other powers to dictate the main principles of a treaty. Acheson favoured
securing agreement with the British Commonwealth first, to avoid any procedural
difficulties. It would not matter very much if the Soviets and Chinese refused to
participate. But if the United States and British governments could not reach agreement
on the basic principles, Acheson felt it would be preferable not to go forward with the
idea of a treaty at all. Bevin thought the best way to make progress now would be for
Britain to have further talks with the Commonwealth and obtain an agreed policy that
would preclude the necessity of the United States needing a veto. Encouragingly,
Acheson told Bevin that the United States government had now reached the conclusion
that it was important to get on with a Peace Treaty for Japan and would let the Foreign
Office know what its requirements were.155
A smooth move towards a peace treaty for Japan soon hit trouble. The Australians
objected to their exclusion from the talks between Britain and the United States and sent
a formal protest to both the Truman and Attlee administrations. Attlee, infuriated, told
Chifley that Bevin had been trying hard for the last two years to establish confidence
between the American-Australian powers and this move had not helped.' 56
 Meanwhile,
MacArthur poured scorn on Acheson's promise regarding an early peace treaty and
doubted whether Washington meant business. He told Gascoigne that, in his opinion, it
154 Japan', conversation between Dening and Butterworth on 9 September 1949,
F14256/1072/61, FO 371/76032.
155 Japan', record of a meeting held at the State Department, Washington, 13 September 1949,
F14108/1021/23, FO 371/76212 and Peace Treaty for Japan', record of a meeting at the State
Department, Washington, 17 September 1949, F14555/1021/23, FO 371/76212.
Atdee to Chifley, letter, 26 September 1949, PREM 8/966.
219
BRITAIN AND THE 'REVERSE' OCCUPATION POLICY IN JAPAN
was no more than a 'smoke screen' to satisfy allied concerns. 157
 There is no evidence to
suest that Acheson's remarks were other than genuine but MacArthur's comments
undoubtedly sowed apprehension in Whitehall. Still, at the Foreign Office, even Dening
wondered whether it would be possible to ascertain a consensus from the
Commonwealth, as well as France and the Netherlands, on what the United States
considered the essential requirements of a treaty. With the CCP in power throughout
China by late 1949, the British also found it difficult to accept American demands for a
Chinese Nationalist delegation to attend a Japanese peace con ference.
All these difficulties were overshadowed by a larger debate between the Pentagon and
the State Department regarding the timing of a peace treaty that would not be resolved
until September 1950. Although both sides were in general agreement before then on the
necessity of Japanese rearmament and long-term American military air bases in Japan,
they differed on how to maintain Japan firmly within the Western orbit. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff argued that a peace treaty would be premature, as they could not be sure that the
Japanese would remain democratic or fully committed to the anti-communist cause.159
Acheson was prepared to retain American forces in Japan, 16° but in deference to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, he argued that post-occupation security would be assured by
maintaining economic recovery, creating a central police force and possibly retaining a
leased naval base at Yokusuka. Acheson warned that unless Japan was given its
'' Gascoigne to Dening, letter, 19 September 1949, P14735/1021/23, FO 371/76213.
158 Dening to MacDonald, letter, 1 October 1949, F14256/1072/61, FO 371/76032.
159 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff',General Omar Bradley, said Japan must be denied
to the Soviet Union and its orientation maintained towards the West. The terms of the peace
treaty should not preclude bilateral negotiations for base rights. Bradley memorandum for
Vorhees, 12 October 1949, FRUS, 1949 (Pait II), Vol Vf.4 pp.885-886 and memorandum by JCS
to Johnson, 22 December 1949, ibid, pp.922-923; Dower, Japan in Peace and War, p.181 and idem,
'Occupied Japan and the cold war in Asia', p.397.
160 Achen approved appropriation funds for base development at Okinawa and a naval facility
at Yokosuka. He supported the resurfacing of Japanese airfields to make them suitable for jet
fighters that were coming off American assembly lines. See Acheson to Marshall, 9 September
1949, FRUS, 1949 (Part II), Vol I/Il, pp.85O-852; Blum, Drawing the Line, p.2O3 and Leffler, A
Preponderana of Power, p.336.
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sovereignty and encouraged to trade with neighbours, it might prefer an accommodation
with the communist system in Asia. 16 ' Given the strong anti-communist Yoshida and his
moves to undermine the left in Japan, these views, which the Foreign Office shared,
seemed rather over-exaggerated.
Acheson told Franks privately in his home about his distress at not being able to
deliver American requirements for a peace treaty to Bevin as promised in September.
Acheson said he could not get clearance to tell Franks the exact nature of the roadblock.
But Franks correctly guessed that the real trouble on the security clauses sprang from a
dispute between Acheson and the military authorities in Washington.' 62
 Acheson
explained to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they were destroying attempts to obtain British
Commonwealth support for a unified policy. Acheson had promised Bevin that the
United States would submit treaty terms that could be discussed at the Colombo
conference at Ceylon due to take place in January 1950. Acheson complained he now
had to break his pledge and could be charged with misleading vital allies.' 63 Truman was
inclined to agree with Acheson, and entrusted the latter implicitly with foreign policy, but
Johnson had been a stalwart supporter of the President even when most people had
written him off to retain a second term of the presidency. Truman was the only person
who could resolve the dispute over the Japanese peace treaty but was unwilling to do so
until the dust had settled over the issue of recognising communist China.'64 Henceforth,
by the end of 1949, British policy was effectively marooned, unable to influence
American strategy for Japan and in no position to consult with the Commonwealth
because it lacked precise information on the direction of United States planning.
161 State Department comments on NSC 49 (June 15, 1949), 30 September 1949, FRUS, 1949
(Pa1 II), Vol I'll, pp.87l-873 and Schaller, The American Occupation ofJapan, pp. 166-167.
162 Franks to Foreign Office, telegram no.5740, 9 December 1949, F18486/1021/23, FO
371/76214.
163 Schaller, The American Occupation ofJapan, pp.l 74-177.
Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp.135-138 and Lowe, The Origins of the Korean Wa p.97.
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In conclusion, during the first four years of the occupation, the British did not play a
major role in reconstructing Japan. American primacy meant that British policymakers
had to secure their interests through Anglo-American contacts. The re-opening of trade
to private traders and sterling area agreements were two such areas where this was
achieved. Despite doubts on both sides of the Atlantic, it is evident that the United
States was more willing to embrace Japan as an asset in the Cold War than Britain. The
British only moved in this direction during 1949 and still challenged the fact that the
Japanese had embraced democracy. This no doubt reflected, in part, the fears of the
Pacific Dominions, who along with the British, deeply resented America's unilateral
policy initiatives towards Japan. Meanwhile, the 'reverse course' policy proved to be a
double-edged sword for the British. The British could not wholeheartedly endorse
stifling restrictions on the Japanese economy for fear of precipitating a Japanese collapse.
This could destabilise its imperial position in Southeast Asia and divert much needed
American assistance from Europe to Japan. However, a prosperous Japan brought forth
security concerns and the prospect of increased competition for British exporters. The
British had to maintain a fine balance between the two extremes but found it difficult to
influence American policy. Indeed, this struggle reflected Britain's diminished world
power status and its dependency on the United States for economic help which the
British were not prepared to jeopardise in arguments over Japan.
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V
THE EMERGENCE OF TWO KOREAS,
1948-1949
I. Introduction
Deprived of access to northern electric power, coal and minerals and with the economies
of Japan and China in turmoil, South Korea could barely survive. Inflation, black markets
and limited American aid also stifled economic reconstruction. In North Korea, the
removal of assets as 'Japanese reparations' and looting by Red Army troops had left the
region in economic distress as well. 1
 Britain, however, seemed unwilling to grasp the
global consequences if Korea turned communist, especially at Foreign Office middle
echelon leveL Top officials and major decision-making bodies, such as Chiefs of Staff,
were preoccupied in Berlin, Malaya and Hong Kong. The British had aimed to relieve the
strain on its resources by encouraging Commonwealth defence co-operation in Asia and
placing confidence in an American lead for the region. Indeed, in the event of war, the
British aimed to pull the majority of its forces out of Asia while concentrating on
building up the Middle East as a strategic base. The British, without administrative or
defensive responsibilities in Korea, left American officials in little doubt that Britain
would be unable to help them in Korea and consultation remained minimal. Yet, both
British and American analysts were agreed that the communist position in North Korea
was strong and held out small hope for the continued existence of the South. That this
imbalance could have wider implications for the Cold War, bolstering the CCP and
thereby threatening Britain's imperial position in Southeast Asia, was rarely discussed by
The New Government in South Korea: Its Form and Chances for Survival',State Department
memorandum, 17 August 1948, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 515, KCL
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the British. The United States was more alert to possible Cold War repercussions but the
Joint Chiefs of Staff were particularly reluctant to involve themselves in another
disastrous Asian continental commitment after China. With pressing commitments
elsewhere, the United States had already declared Korea's position untenable but they
could not 'scuttle and run' without loss of prestige in Asia. The State Department
attempted to solve the dilemma by referring Korea to the UN and sending military
advisory groups and diplomatic missions to the South. But internal communist uprisings
and border disputes in 1949 exposed South Korea's weakness. Despite the State
Department's valiant attempt to retain troops in Korea, the Army remained determined
to pull its forces out. As late as 1949, the British remained convinced that North Korea
could overcome the South with little difficulty and British and American war plans
continued to call for the immediate withdrawal of American forces from the province.
With the 'loss' of China, the United States, unlike the British, were not prepared to
completely write off Korea and worried that a Soviet absorption of Korea would
strategically enhance its Cold War position s-à-th Japan, degrading American and UN
prestige. Consequently, the United States attempted to build up the South Korean
economy and its Army. However, America's indecisive approach to Korea was finally
called into question in June 1950.
II. Korea, Britith Hot War Planning and the Defence ofEastern Asia
In January 1948, Bevin penned a depressing review of Soviet policy for his Cabinet
colleagues. He explained that the Soviet Union had ruthlessly consolidated its position in
Eastern Europe and still threatened to dominate Western Europe, North Africa, British
oil reserves in the Persian Gulf and much of East Asia. 2 The evidence suggests that
Britain was determined to halt communist expansion in Europe and the Middle East, in
2 
'Review of Soviet policy', Bevin memorandum, CP(48)7, 5 January 1948, CAB 129/23.
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both political and military terms, though a defence commitment to Europe would only
appear in I 9493 The British Cold and Hot War commitment to East Asia, despite
Bevin's concern, was less than clear. If war broke out during 1948, both British and
American planners bleakly concluded that they would evacuate Western Europe, China,
Korea, launch an atomic air offensive against the Soviets from the Middle East and build
up forces for a new Overlord-type invasion of Europe. 4
 Bevin's anxieties and the
inadequacy of Western military defences were heightened when, during February 1948,
the communists usurped power by emergency measures in Czechoslovakia. 5 At the same
time, the Soviets, worried about a revived Germany allied to the West, blockaded the
three Western-held sectors of Berlin in the summer of 1948.6 These actions wrongly
convinced British and American policymakers that Stalin actively sought to extend his
hold over the whole Eurasian land mass. 7
 It led many within Britain and the United
Kent,Britisb Imperial Strategy, chp.6.
In the long-term, the United States desired holding air bases in Europe and the Japanese
Islands rather than the Middle East. For the moment, the onset of the Berlin crisis focused
British and American planners once more upon Egypt as a forward base. 'United States: Weekly
Political Summary No.7: The Strategic Aspects of American Foreign Policy', Inverchapel to
Foreign Office, telegram no.192, 21 May 1948, AN2076/6/45, FO 371/68014; Dockrill, British
Defence since 1945, p.32; Ross, Ameiican War Plans, p.8O; Danchev, "'In the back room", pp.223,
225; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p.225; Aldrich and Zametica, The rise and decline of a
strategic concept', pp.254-255; Kent,Bn'tisb I,.vperial Strategy, pp.165, 169 and Bullock, Ernest Bevin,
p.524.
See Karel Kaplan, The Shopi Manh: The Communist Takeover in Czjcboslovakia 1945-8 (London,
1987); Martin Myant, Socialism and Democracj in Czjcboslovakia (Cambridge, 1981); Dockrill, Bntisb
Defence since 1945, p.32; Mastny, The Cold Wa p.58; Reynolds, Britannia Ovemdsd, p.176 and
Young, Britain and the World, p.l48. For Britain's attitude to the crisis see Rundall, minute, 24
February 1948, AN667/6/45, FO 371/68013B; Peter Hennessy, Never Again: Britain, 1945-51
(London, 1992), p.252 and Bullock, Ernest Bevin, pp.552-556. Stalin's action in Czechoslovakia
was plausibly, if wrongly, regarded abroad as the first part of a programmed westward expansion
of his empire rather than the last act of its Sovietisation. See Mastny,The Cold IVar, p.43.
6 The dispute over Berlin resulted in British and American moves to develop a West German
state after the failure of the meeting of Foreign Ministers at the end of 1947 and the Soviet
refusal to accommodate a new currency. For a good study of the Berlin blockade see Avi Shlaim,
The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949: A Stut/y in Cnsis Decision-Making ( London,
1983), pp.33-34, 83. See also Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War, pp.52-53.
'The Threat to Western Civilisation', Bevin memorandum, CP(48)72, 3 March 1948, CAB
129/25. For Stalin's motivations in Berlin see Leffler, A Prponderana of Power, p.204 and Gaddis,
EVe Now Know, p.46.
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States to finally confirm their wartime ally as a potential military enemy, while removing
the last Congressional objections to the Marshall Plan and forcing the Anglo-American
powers to reconsider the defence of Western Europe.8
In the Asia-Pacific, British planning revolved around maintaining its imperial position
through upholding the integrity of Malaya, as it had done during the inter-war period.
Faced with increasing communist terrorism throughout Malaya, the British dedared a
state of emergency in June 1948, promptly despatching troop reinforcements. Malaya
was a valuable asset for Britain, producing net dollar earnings in 1948 of $170 million
while providing over half of America's imports of rubber and nearly all its imports of
tin.9
 The Czechoslovakian, Berlin and Matayan crises compelled Bevin to argue, in the
face of objections from Attlee and the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford
Cripps, that immediate measures were needed to divert resources to the British military.
Bevin pointed out, and the Defence Committee agreed, that if through military weakness,
Britain was forced to give way in Germany or Malaya, the resulting economic loss would
be far greater than the cost of bringing the armed forces up to an effective state.10
Although British planning had hitherto been based on the premise that war before
1951-1952 could be discounted, examination showed that Britain was not in a position to
8 ibid pp.47-48; Reynolds, Briiannia Ovcrruled p.176; Young, Britain and the Worl4 p.148; Rundall,
minute, 24 February 1948, AN667/6/45, FO 371/68013B; Hennessy, Never Again, p.252 and
Bullock, Ernest Beven, pp.552-556. In February 1948, an Information Research Department was
established as 'a dedicated unit to prepare briefing material on communist policy, tactics and
propaganda', for internal and external consumption in the struggle for 'men's minds'. See 'Future
Foreign Publicity Policy', Bevin memorandum, CP(48)8, 4 January 1948, CAB 129/23. See also
Paul Lashniar and James Oliver, Britain's Secret Propaganda War (Stroud, 1998); Hugh Wilford,
Fhe Information Research Department Britain's Secret Cold War Weapon Revealed', R,v,ew of
International Studies, VoL24 No.3 (July 1993), pp.353-369; W.Scott Lucas and C.Morris, "'A Very
British Crusade": The Information Research Department and the Beginning of the Cold War' in
Aldrich(ed.), Strategy, InteI4gene. and the Co/il War, pp.85-110 and Wesley Wark, 'Coming in from
the Cold: British Propaganda and the Red Army Defectors, 1945-52', The International History
Review, Vol.9, No.1(February 1987), pp.48-72.
9 Reynolds, Bntannia Overruled, p.188.
10 Bevin, minute, DO(48)16, 13 August 1948, CAB 131/5 and Bullock,Ernest Bevin, p.523. See
also DO minutes, DO(48)16, 13 August 1948, CAB 131/5 and Montgomery, minute, DO(48)16,
13 August 1948, CAB 131/5.
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fight with what it had got." Korea was not discussed at Defence Committee meetings
indicating the low priority it held within British governmental circles. Despite the turmoil
inside Korea and the growing strength of communism in Northeast Asia, the omission
suests that the British believed the region could have little impact on the present Cold
War and was strategically redundant in any Hot War.
The Defence Committee, dismissing an immediate Soviet military threat, had ordered
the armed services to reduce their requirements to £600 million and 650,000 personnel
per year by 1949 which would substantially curtail long term military plans to build up
British forces.' 2
 These shortfalls suested to Anglo-American planners that if war did
break out, they would still have to concede Western Europe, the Persian Gulf and
withdraw all forces from Korea, China and Southeast Asia, except Malaya. In response,
the United States would launch an atomic bomb offensive from protected bases in the
America, Britain, Okinawa and the Suez area while defending Japan by guarding the
Bering Sea-Japan-Yellow Sea line.' 3
 Confident in maintaining the American atomic
monopoly at least until 1954, ' the Chiefs of Staff, the JIG, American policymakers and
intelligence analysts all agreed that although Soviet armies had the capability to overrun
much of Western Europe, Stalin would want to avoid a military clash with the West
They highlighted the Kremlin's economic weakness, transportation bottlenecks,
The British government also continued to accept proposals that reduced Britain's armed
strength from 937,000 men to 713,00 by 31 March 1949. The British Ambassador in Washington
noted that cuts in the Royal Navy had caused the Americans to reflect on Britain's standing. See
'United States: Weekly Political Summary No.7: The Strategic Aspects of American Foreign
Policy', Inverchapel to Foreign Office, telegram no.192, 21 May 1948, AN2076/6/45, FO
371/68014; Alexander, minute, CM(48)1, 6 January 1948, CAB 128/12; Cabinet minutes,
CM(48)1, 6 Januray 1948, ibid. Tedder, minute, DO(48)16, 13 August 1948, CAB 131/5 and
'The Defence Position', Alexander memorandum, DO(48)46, July 1948, CAB 131/6.
12 These long-term plans would amount to well over £1,200 million per year, a figure that the
British economy could not support ibid, p.162.
13 Aldrich and Zametica, 'The rise and decline of a strategic concept', p.254 and Ross, American
War Plans, pp.86-87, 92.
This was the British JIC estimate. See 'Soviet Intentions and Capabilities 1949 and 1956/57',
JIC(48)104(Final), 8 November 1948, CAB 158/4.
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vulnerable petroleum industry and unreliable allies.' 5
 These facts led British planners to
believe that the Soviets were unlikely to embrace an aggressive communist operation in
Korea. According to the Foreign Office, local sources of fuel, food and munitions which
had to be imported from west of Lake Baikal, would not permit prolonged warfare on
the Soviet East Asian Front. 16
 Indeed, Stalin had no intention of starting a war over the
crisis in Berlin which forced him to concede defeat in 1949, when the West successftilly
implemented an airlift.17
 Of course, the West had shown a concerted resolve in Europe
and the Middle East to block communist expansion. The same could not be said about
the British and Americans in China and Korea. But a British analysis of a possible
communist attack in an area where the Western Powers were at their weakest was not
drawn up.
Anglo-American Hot War planning for East Asia was often seen in defensive terms,
an adjunct to the more important areas of Europe and the Middle East. If war broke out,
the British hoped that the Pacific Dominions would form an integral part of
Commonwealth defence co-operation. In May 1948, the Australians suggested taking
responsibility for an area stretching from Malaya to the Pacific waters surrounding New
Zealand. Although the Chiefs of Staff considered a major military threat to the
Commonwealth in Asia to be remote,' 8
 the British had hoped that the Australasian
powers, by undertaking matters relating to regional security in the Pacific, would also
On the whole British intelligence on Soviet capabilities remained inadequate. For example,
details on the strength and ability of the Soviet Air Force were uncovered mainly from German
rather than Soviet sources. 'Soviet Intentions and Capabilities 1949 and 1956/57',
JIC(48)104(Final), 8 November 1948, CAB 158/4; Montgomery, minute, confidential annex to
COS(48)94, 7 July 1948, DEFE 4/14; Defence Review', COS memorandum, DO(48)61, 14
September 1948, CAB 131/6; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p.210 and Ross4meiican War
Pla,zc, p.151.
16 
'Communism in Korea', Milward memorandum, 7 June 1948, F12188/511/81, FO
371/69945.
17 Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War, p.52.
Defence Review', COS memorandum, DO(48)61, 14 September 1948, CAB 131/6.
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commit resources to the Middle East. 19
 The possibility that instability in Korea could
ignite a major war does not appear in any British military thinking. The Australians were
slightly more cautious, recounting their experiences of 1942-1943, and stated that its
main contribution would be directed towards either the Middle East or the Asia-Pacific.
Attlee had already informed Chifley, that if British forces were engaged elsewhere, there
was little likelihood of a large British contribution to Asia. 2° In an effort to cajole the
Australians to send troops to the Middle East, the Chiefs of Staff pointed out that, in
war, the Pacific would be an American area of responsibility and that any campaign was
likely to be directed by the United States from bases in Japan and the Ryukyus
Encouraged by the Australian initiative, the Commissioner-General in Southeast Asia,
Malcolm MacDonald, thought that the British could employ Australian troops in the
Malayan jungle to combat the communist guerrillas. The employment of Australian
troops in Malaya was a controversial decision, but the Chiefs of Staff eventually felt that
it was necessary to allocate strategic responsibility for Malaya, the Netherlands East
Indies and Borneo to Australia. British military officials argued that in a future war,
Britain would be unable to send sufficient troops to Asia to safeguard its interests. Even
circumstances short of world war might give rise to a situation in which Britain would
19 See Chifley to Attlee, letter, 24 May 1948 in 'Australia: Defence Co-operation', COS(48)126(0),
l4June 1948, DEFE 5/11 and Hack, 'Southeast Asia and British Strategy, 1944-51', p.315.
20 
'The Strategical Position of Australia', Australian COS appreciation, September 1947 in
'Australia: Defence Co-operation', COS(48)126(0), 14 June 1948, DEFE 5/11. See also 'Australia
- Defence Co-operation', JP(48)79(Final), 7 July 1948, DEFE 4/4. The Australians had also been
willing to provide technicians for Malaya. See COS minutes, COS(48)1 15, 18 August 1948. See
also Ovendale, The EngIish-Steakin,gA/&znee, pp.l19-l21
21 The Chiefs of Staff also thought that the United States might want to use Hong Kong and
bases in the southern half of the Pacific or the Philippines. 'Comments by British Chiefs of Staff
of the Military Aspects of Mr.Chifley's Letter', Annex II to 'Australian Defence Co-operation',
JP(48)81(Final), 11 September 1948, DEFE 4/16.
22 BDCC, Far East, special meeting, 20 August 1948, 25/9/20, Malcolm MacDonald papers,
DUL
23 Eddleston, minute, COS(48)150, 22 October 1948, DEFE 4/17; Parker, minute, COS(48)150,
22 October 1948, DEFE 4/17 and 'Australian Defence Co-operation', JP(48)114(Final), 3
November 1948, DEFE 4/17.
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welcome the assistance of Australian forces. The British command in Southeast Asia
would be retained in peace and war for the local defence of territories. 24 Colonial and
Foreign Office officials were unable to accept many of these suggestions, realising the
implications for Britain's imperial position in Asia. Dening could not contemplate
allotting areas of strategic responsibility to Australia without seeking the consent of the
territories concerned. He was sure that neither the Dutch nor New Zealanders would
concur in the allotment of prime responsibility for the areas proposed by the Chiefs of
Staff to Australia. If it was known that in a future war Britain would surrender its
position to Australia, Dening declared that British imperial influence would finally be
extinguished in Asia. Dening concluded the discussion by recognising the fact that
British resources were limited in the event of war but in the immediate future he asserted
that the threat to Asia was mainly politicaL
Ultimately, the Chiefs of Staff argued that Australia's security depended on
Anglo-American containment Yet, as the British struggled to maintain their imperial
presence in Malaya and the Americans appeared to be retreating in China and Korea, the
Australians hedged, particularly as the ability of the Anglo-American powers to execute
their war plans were frustrated by continued defence budgeting. Truman's 1949 decision
to put a $15 billion ceiling on defence spending for the fiscal year 1950, led defence
officials to complain that America could not retain troops in Korea, meet emergencies in
Greece and Italy, and provide forces for the Middle East or carry on the Berlin airlift27
24 Templer, minute, COS(48)150, 22 October 1948, DEFE 4/17; Fraser, minute, DO(48)22, 24
November 1948, CAB 131/5 and 'Australian Defence Co-operation', JP(48)114(Final), 3
November 1948, DEFE 4/17.
25 Paskin, minute, COS(48)150, 22 October 1948, DEFE 4/17. The Colonial Office also worried
about the commitments the British had made to the Malay rulers. See 'Australian Defence
Co-operation',JP(48)114(Final), 3 November 1948, DEFE 4/17.
26 Dening, minute, COS(48)150, 22 October 1948, DEFE 4/17 and Murfett, In Jeo/)ardj,
pp.76-79.
27 ffler A Preponderance of Power, p.263.
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The Middle East, along with the defence of the United Kingdom and sea
communications, formed a vital pillar of British strategy. Although the United States Air
Force and Navy were interested in using the Middle East as an offensive base, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff would tell the British in I 9'f9 that they could expect no assistance in this
region until at least two years after the outbreak of global war. These strategic and
financial constraints, drove American planners to increase their reliance upon atomic
weapons?
Despite close collaboration in the field of intelligence, in an air of uncertainty about
American intentions and increasing Soviet-Western hostility, even the British Cabinet
considered that defence estimates for 1949-1950 should total 760 million although
Cripps had been unwilling to make more than VoOm available.30 Furthermore, the
reduction in military personnel would only gradually be reduced from 793,000 in 1949 to
750,000 in 1950. The reintroduction of conscription in 1946 eased the burden on
Britain's heavy overseas responsibilities somewhat but was not popular while men lacked
the skills necessary for highly technical arms. 3 ' What all this meant for East Asia was that
the Anglo-American powers would concentrate on its strategic defence. Evacuating
China and Korea, American forces would require over 4 divisions, 9 anti-aircraft
battalions, and 5 fighter groups to defend Japan, the Ryukyu, Okinawa, the Philippines
and Formosa.32
 The British aimed to pull most of its forces out of Asia. At the outbreak
28 DoiII, British Defence since 1945, p.31 and Kent, B,itisb Imperial Strategy, chp.6.
29 Ross, Amencan lVar Plans, p.108. The British JIC also felt confident in America's atomic
superiority. See Possibility of War Before the End of 1956'JIC(48)121(Revised Final), 27
January 1949, DEFE 4/19.
See Cabinet minutes, CM(49)6, 24January 1949, CAB 128/15.
31 Dockrill, British Defence srnce 1945, pSi. 'Statement on Defence 1949', Alexander Note,
CP(49)21, 8 February 1949, CAB 129/32, Part II. The Cabinet approved the draft White Paper
on the above lines annexed to CP(49)51. See Cabinet minutes, CM(49) 11, 10 February 1949,
CABI28/15 and Defence Estimates, 1949-50', Alexander memorandum, CP(49)16, 20 January
1949, CAB 129/32 Part I.
32 Ross,Ame,ican War Plans, pp.114, 126, 129.
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of war, it was planned to leave a Ghurka division in Malaya but the British Far Eastern
fleet would withdraw and the British brigade group would move to the Middle East
between D+3 to D+6 months. The Joint Planning Staff were happy to let an American
Supreme Commander conduct the war in the Pacific. The British Defence Co-ordinating
Committee, Far East, (BDCC, Far East) would conduct the defence of British territories
in Southeast Asia from Singapore, at least in the early stages of war. 33
 Such a retreat was
justified by the Chiefs of Staff because they argued that as long as the United States
retained the control of sea communications in the Pacific, there could be no direct threat
to the main support areas of Australasia, Malaya and the East Indies. The Chiefs of
Staff did not consider the possibility of war breaking out in East Asia first and the other
fronts remaining stable. Once again the importance of China and Korea, even in a Hot
War, was dismissed.
East Asia would remain a tertiary theatre with the formation of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO) in April 1949, which witnessed a gradual reorientation of
British strategy away from the Middle East as the centre of all war planning. Despite
initial British objections, planning now focused on the United States concept of holding
a foothold in Europe to avoid another Overlord-type operation. 35
 NATO and the Berlin
blockade had demonstrated that military deterrence made sense when dealing with the
Soviet Union. By the autumn of 1949, with British resources stretched to the limit, the
devaluation of the pound and the successful testing of a Soviet atomic bomb, the United
'Guidance to Commanders-in-Chief Committee, Far East', JP(48)125(Final), 5 January 1949,
DEFE 4/19. Even in peacetime, the Royal Navy was only operating with one submarine in the
Asia-Pacific region. See Murfett, In Jeopardj, p.73.
'General Strategic Implications of the Situation in China as Foreshadowed in the Foreign
Office Appreciation', COS memorandum, COS(49)29, 20 January 1949, DEFE 5/13. See also
Hack, 'Southeast Asia and British Strategy, 1944-51', p.316; Aldrich, "The Value of Residual
Empire", p.231 and Ovendale, The Eng/isb-SpeakinA1/iance, pp.121-122.
Dockrill, British Defence since 1945, p.33; Young,Britain and the Work!, p.156; Acheson, Prrsent at
the Creation, pp.276-284; Kent, British Imperial Strategy, pp.204-205; Gaddis, The Lg Peace, p.63
and Bullock, Ernest Bevin, pp.614-625, 632-633, 642-646, 655-682.
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States redoubled its focus on Western Europe. The development of American aircraft
with longer range, permitted the strategic air offensive to operate from bases in Britain,
Alaska and Okinawa rather than the vulnerable Middle East. There was still no
evidence, however, that Stalin was preparing immediate plans for war. 37
 Both the British
and the Americans, therefore, sought ways to reduce spending. The Chiefs of Staff
commissioned a report by an inter-service working party, under the chairmanship of a
civil servant, Sir Edmund Harwood, on the size and shape of the armed forces that
would limit expenditure to no more than VOOm annually. 39
 This limit, argued the report,
meant a greater reliance on the United States military and more responsibility for
Commonwealth countries in global defence. The report asserted that in peace and war,
Commonwealth forces should assume naval responsibility for the Indian Ocean and
South Pacific areas with the appointment of an Australian naval commander-in-chief at
Singapore. To maintain imperial interests, a small component of the Royal Navy would
stay in Chinese waters under British command at Hong Kong. The British would
abandon the Trincomalee naval base along with the Smgapor, except for such facilities
as the Australian Navy might need.4°
36 Aldrich and Zametica, 'The rise and decline of a strategic concept', pp.259, 262-263; Hack,
c utheast
 Asia and British Strategy, 1944-51', p.3I6; Murfett, In Jeopardj, pp.96-97; Ritchie
Ovendale, Engi.th 3peakingAliance, pp.119-121; Reynolds, Britanma Ovemded, p.179 and Acheson,
Present at the Creation, pp.322-329.
According to Mastny, the Soviet military response to NATO was moderate rather than
alarmist. A 20 per cent increase in defence spending, mainly calculated for public effect and a
bolstering of the troops in eastern Germany. Soviet spies also provided accurate information on
the defensive nature of Anglo-American war plans. See Mastny,The Cold JVa,; p.74 and Leffler, A
Preponderance of Power, pp.306-7,327
38 As late as October 1949, the NSC determined that the Defence Department could, under a
$13 billion ceiling, main substantially the same degree of military strength, readiness and posture
during fiscal 1951, as in fiscal 1950. Pollard, 'The national security state reconsidered', p.218.
For a fuller analysis of the so-called Harwood report see, for example, Barnett, The Lost Victory,
pp.88-97 and Murfett, In Jeopardj, pp.86-90.
"° 'Responsibility of Commonwealth Countries in the Far East', JP(49)36(0)(T of R), 7 April
1949, DEFE 6/8. The report proposed retaining a presence in Chinese and Japanese waters 2
cruisers and 4 minesweepers based at Hong Kong. This was probably designed to 'show the flag'
along the China coast and help in the occupation of Japan. See Murfett, InJeopardj, pp.87-88.
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The Joint Planning Staff, in conjunction with the Colonial and Foreign Office,
analysed these considerations with care. In the event of war, Soviet naval forces in Asia
and the Pacific, the Joint Planners argued, would mainly operate in waters which were a
United States responsibility. Indeed, the British did create an area of responsibility,
comprising Malaya, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, the Southeast Indian Ocean and
the Southwest Pacific, known as the ANZAM Area. Planning would be carried out
through the Australian Chiefs of Staff in conjunction with the representatives from
Britain and New Zealand Chiefs of Staff.41
 Australia's main task included the protection
of sea communications while the control of planning for the defence of Malaya would
remain a British responsibility. 42
 However, the Joint Planners pointed out that the
political difficulties in peacetime for the working party's reductions would prove harder
to overcome. Britain had special responsibilities towards its Asian colonial territories,
which it could hardly surrender to any other power, even if it was a fellow member of the
Commonwealth.43
 Britain was not about to relinquish its imperial position in Asia.
Consequently, the Chiefs of Staff and Attlee told Chifley, in response to the latter's
proposal for an Australian zone of strategic responsibility, that they had no intention of
handing over to Australia, military control or influence in any territory for which the
'Allied High Command in War - ANZAM Area', JP(49)101(Final), 7 September 1949, DEFE
4/27. See also Proposals for the Setting up of Joint Australian, New Zealand and United
Kingdom Service Planning Machinery for Co-ordinating the Defence of Australia, New Zealand
and the Territories in Southeast Asia where the United Kingdom has Responsibilities',
JP(49)159(Final), 22 December 1949, DEFE 4/28 and 'Allied High Command in War - Anzani
Area', JP(49)160(Final), 22 December 1949, DEFE 4/28.
42 Cole, minute, COS(49)139, 21 September 1949, DEFE 4/24; COS minutes to COS(49)139,
21 September 1949, DEFE 4/24 and 'Anzam Area Boundaries', JP(49)102(Final), 8 September
1949, DEFE 4/24. Indeed, the Cs-in-C, Far East, the Chiefs of Staff and the Colonial Office all
agreed that the defence of Malaya should be treated in the same manner as that of home
territories and that it should remain a British responsibility but with Australian and New Zealand
representation at Singapore. See COS minutes to COS(49)183, 9 December 1949, DEFE 4/27.
The Americans also agreed to the ANZAM boundary on a planning leveL See COS minutes to
Confidential Annex to COS(49)160, 28 October 1949, DEFE 4/25.
u 'Responsibility of Commonwealth Countries in the Far East', JP(49)36(0)(Final), 13 May 1949,
DEFE 6/8. See also 'Report of the Inter-Service Working Party on Shape and Size of the Armed
Forces', COS(49)113, 30 March 1949, DEFE 5/13.
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British were responsib1e.'' Although the British were showing a determination to
maintain their imperial interest in Southeast Asia, even in the face of economic
difficulties, their ability to assess a communist threat to their position from East Asia was
rather less formidable.
IlL A Cold War Concern? The Anglo-American Appraisal of Korea
It was clear that in a global Hot War both British and American planners did not see
Korea as defensible. During the Cold War, the American position in East Asia also
remained precarious. The Truman administration had expended some $1.5 billion on
China and had little to show for it45 By the opening months of 1948, a major question
for the American Far Eastern Sub-Commitee of the State-Army-Air Force Co-ordinatmg
Committee (SANACC) was whether a South Korean state could politically, economically
and militarily sustain itself in the face of a strongly supported Soviet northern state.
South Korea was basically an agricultural area and did not have the overall economic
resources to sustain its economy without external assistance. It had an estimated annual
trade deficit of $100 million and there was no prospect of balancing trade without
unification. There had not been sufficient imports of rehabilitation items to enable South
Korea's industry to function at more than 20 per cent of capacity. SANACC
recommended that the United States should establish a strong economy in order to
foster political and economic stability by furnishing minimum requirements of food,
fertiliser, petroleum and other supplies. SANACC made it clear, however, that no
commitments would be made concerning the extension of American economic aid after
Attlee to Chifley, letter, 29 December 1949, CAB 21/2537. See also 'Responsibility of
Commonwealth Countries in the Far East', JP(49)36(0)(Final), 13 May 1949, DEFE 6/8. See also
'Report of the Inter-Service Working Party on Shape and Size of the Armed Forces',
COS(49)113, 30 March 1949, DEFE 5/13.
'United States: Weekly Political Summary No.7: The Strategic Aspects of American Foreign
Policy',Jnverchapel to Foreign Office, telegram no.192, 21 May 1948, AN2076/6/45, FO
371/68014. See also chp.III and VI.
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December 1948. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed that Korea possessed
little strategic interest for America and would divert sorely needed manpower from other
areas.47
In Cold War terms, although the Truman administration declared that America's
position in Korea was untenable, they recognised that they could not "scuttle and run"
without considerable loss of prestige and political standing in Japan, Asia and the world
at large. SWNCC, therefore, desperately tried to find a solution to the mess which it
found itself in that would enable the United States to withdraw from Korea as soon as
possible with the minimum of bad effects. As chapter two has shown, the answer to this
quandary lay in forwarding the Korean question to the UN. Despite the setting up of
UNTCOK, SANACC anticipated that American policy would be confronted with a
number of difficulties. The overriding problem was the likelihood that the Soviet Union
would not agree to the holding of elections in its zone of occupation. If this happened
SANACC hoped UNTCOK would proceed with zonal elections in the South only.
Predictably, the Soviet Union and its allies voiced their categorical opposition to the
setting up of the functions of UNTCOK49
From early 1948, British Cold War planning still envisaged Asia as a secondary front.
British assessments were consistent in stressing that Soviet Russia would absorb Korea
for the purpose of extending its own Pacific seaboard. The British considered that unless
America greatly increased its military strength in South Korea, or trained and equipped
" 'United States Policy in Korea', note by Secretaries to JCS, JCS 1483/49, 15 January 1948,
RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 51, KCL.
'United States Policy in Korea', report by the JSSC to the JCS, JCS 1483/50, 30 January 1948,
ibid.
'United States Policy in Korea', note by Secretaries to JCS,JCS 1483/49, 15 January 1948, ibid.
For a lucid analysis of the UN, see Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations, VoLI: Tbe Years
of W'esten', Domination, 1945-1955 (London, 1982), pp.232-236. See also Leon Gordenker, The
United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Kornr The Politics of Field Operations, 1 947-1950 (Hague,
1957).
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the South, which was unlikely, the Soviets would force their puppets into power.5°
Kermode warned his colleagues at the Foreign Office in 1948, that it was not in
Moscow's character to be content with a humble 'third of the loaf when it could within a
very brief time 'grab and swallow the whole'. Kermode gloomy concluded that:
I believe that there is no sadder man in Korea today than General Hodge. When first he
arrived he had high hopes of creating a free Korea that would stand as a bulwark
between the red destroyer and MacArthur's Japan. Little by little his hopes have faded
till now he is left with nothing but the knowledge that Korea is doomed to return to
captivity and that the new captivity will be worse than any that she has previously
endured.51
British intelligence bolstered Kermode's grim analysis by illuminating the strength from
which North Korea was operating. A military intelligence report explained that unlike
China, Soviet military aid was direct and this established North Korea as a thorough
communist area from which communist agents, inspired by the Soviets, penetrated
almost at will into South Korea. The penetrations were in addition to the activities of
communist cells in South Korea, and were so organised as to be training tests for Soviet
agents. This training provided skilled agents for future infiltration into Japan and China.52
Despite these assessments, there was no mention of the fact that a communist
absorption of Korea could provoke a major conflict. There was also little discussion
about the impact of such an outcome on the Cold War. It appeared that the British had
effectively written-off Korea and were prepared to accept it. A reluctance to discuss the
50 Political Developments in Korea: Period 15th August, 1945, to 15th March, 1948', Kermode
to Bevin, despatch no.33, 16 March 1948, F990/511/81, FO 371/69940.
Kermode to Bevin, despatch no.27, 12 February 1948, F3983/511/81, FO 371/69940. The
Soviets had stipulated that North and South Korea should be represented in equal proportions
and not in the proportion suested by "an appropriate number of seats" being left vacant
Nevertheless, given their general hostility, the Soviets were scarcely likely to encourage North
Korean participation as a minority in a national government, and still less so, if the latter were
efficient. See Scott, minute, 13 February 1948, F2280/511/81, FO 371/69937.
52 See ¶M12(b) Contribution to Monthly Summary of Communist Activities, January 1948', M12
Report, no date, WO 208/4829.
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long-term implications of a communist-dominated Korea upon Asia was unfortunate,
considering the disturbing intelligence material the British received. During the spring of
1948 the British obtained an illuminating intelligence report on North Korea from a
Chinese source which the Directorate of Military Intelligence considered very usefuL
The report argued that Soviet assistance to the CCP in the Northeastern Provinces had
been conclusively proven through the revelation of the Sino-Soviet-Korean Joint Military
Council now existing in the North Korean capital, Pyongyang. More positive than any
other communist liaison body ever formed, the Joint Military Council was in charge of
co-ordinating the activities of the three commands, including the transfer of troops and
logistic support. An estimated 30-40,000 Korean troops had been sent into the
Northeastern Provinces at the behest of the Joint Military Council. CCP troops wounded
in battles in the northeast were known to have been brought into northern Korea for
hospitalisation. The report claimed that the Soviet-trained 'People's Army' in North
Korea was not only capable of defending the communist state in the North but also
strong enough to undertake an invasion of South Korea, if American forces left without
arming South Korea. The best estimate placed the total armed strength of North Korea
at no less than 250,000 men which included the troops sent to China. The 'People's
Army' was sufficiently equipped to fight an offensive battle with the backbone of the
senior staff composed of seasoned and experienced officers who had seen years of
combat with the CCP and the Red Army.TM
An official at the Directorate of Military Intelligence wrote that 'This report is a most useful
one. If it was complete and one was more certain of the source it would be of considerable value.
For a report of Chinese origin...this seems to be unusually objective and lacks the customary
exaggeration'. Hamilton, minute, 11 May 1948, WO 208/4753.
'Soviet Assistance to Communist Forces in Manchuria and North Korea: China/Korea,
Military', M12 Report, 1 April 1948, WO 208/4753. Cumings states that British intelligence
showed a good awareness of the realities of Northeast Asian power relationships in the late
1940s and a reasonably full knowledge of the Korean contribution to the Chinese civil war. See
also Cuimngs, The Orzgizc of the Korean War, VoLI1, pp.355-369.
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This material appears to have been incorporated into a Foreign Office paper
produced in the summer of 1948 on Stalin's aims in Korea. That this information might
indicate a threat to Britain's position in Southeast Asia, through the apparent
strengthening of the communist position in East Asia, was not discussed. The paper
proclaimed that the ulterior aims of the Soviet government in Korea appeared to be
several. The addition of another state to the Soviet hegemony was in itself probably one
of the least of these. Of more importance, argued the Foreign Office, was the provision
of a safe rear-area for CCP troop movements, with inviolable lines of communication for
troops and supplies. The establishment of a Korean bastion, politically and militarily
impregnable, would guard the flank of a communist advance through China. The
Foreign Office suggested that Korea might, at a later date, serve as a base for a further
attack against Japan, co-ordinated with thrusts from Sakhalin and the Kuriles. 55
 In the
short term, according to Whitehall, Britain's imperial position in Southeast Asia appeared
to be safe.
The evidence indicates that Stalin aimed to secure his Northeast Asian periphery
flrst As an integral part of these pians, Kim 11-sung had been nurtured during the war
as an almost legendary guerrilla hero. After the war he materialised as a hard-headed
communist General, chairman of the Central People's Committee and dictator of a
revolutionary but repressive state.57 Kim was an intense nationalist with a strong desire
to reunify his country and was often envisaged in the West as one of Stalin's puppets.
'Communism in Korea', Milward memorandum, 7 June 1948, F12188/511/81, FO
371/69945. For a good discussion about the Korean communists who had operated as guerrillas
against the Japanese from Chinese and Soviet bases see RScalapino and Chong-sik Lee,
Communism in Korea (Berkeley, 1972) and Dae-sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement,
1918-1948 (Princeton, 1967).
Youngho Kim, 'The Origins of the Korean Wat Civil War or Stalin's Rollback?, Db1omay &
Statecraft, VoL 10 No.1 (March 1999), pp.188, 192-193.
Kim's early career was not notable but its is accepted that he took part in guerrilla operations
against the Japanese in the 1930s. For an interesting biography on Kim see Dae-sook Suh, Kim Ii
Sung: The Non!b Korean Leader (New York, 1988).
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The Foreign Office and the British Press, for example, believed that Stalin, when he
withdrew his forces m September 1948, was seemingly trusting North Korea to rule the
land in the interests of the Soviet Union without direct Soviet interference. United
States officials held substantially the same views, viewing Kim as 'completely subservient
and loyal to the Soviet Union'. 59
 It appears that these observations were over-
exaggerated and evidence over the last ten years has shown that Kim, like Rhee, used the
occupying superpower to fulfil his own personal ambitions for unification and waited for
the day when he could dispense with their services. Moreover, economic and military aid
from the Soviet Union was not as extensive as the West thought.°
In short, during 1948, the British continued to be far more prepared to write Korea
off than the United States. The former did not consider that Korea, whether in the
communist or Western democratic camp, would hold any obvious Cold War advantages.
British intelligence bodies, for example, were quick to point Out that Korea was doomed
arid dismissed the wider long term Cold War implications on Britain's imperial position
in Southeast Asia.61
 The American assessment of Korea was no less defeatist but they
realised that its Cold War position in East Asia was rapidly deteriorating. The dilemma
for the Truman administration was that it needed to avoid damaging its international
standing but was reluctant to get involved in another Asian civil war on the mainland.
The United States therefore set about trying to devise solutions to avoid suffering a
'defeat' at the hands of communism in East Asia.
'Communism in Korea', Milward memorandum, 7 June 1948, F12188/511/81, FO
371/69945; Scott, minute, 17 June 1948, F8292/511/81, FO 371/69942; The Threat to Western
Civilisation', Bevin memorandum, CP(48)72, 3 March 1948, CAB 129/25 and 'On Guard in
South Korea', The Times, 27 October 1948.
Drumright to Marshall, 16 February 1948, FRUS, 1948, VoL I/I, pp.1162-1163.
See Cumings, The On,ginc of the Konan War, VoL11, pp.365, 445-448 and Weathersby, 'Soviet
Ams'.
61 
'M12(b) Contribution to Summary of Communist Activities, June 1948', M12 Report, 1 July
1948, WO 208/4829 and 'Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities', JIC(48)9(0)Final, 23 July
1948, DEFE 4/5.
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IV. The Creation ofa South Korean State
A THE UNITED NATIONS IN KOREA
The most immediate problem for the United States was overseeing the success of
UNTCOK, which comprised members from India, Canada, Australia, France, China, El
Salvador, the Philippines and Syria. UNTCOK, chaired by the Indian diplomat, Kumara
Menon, faced an almost impossible task. The Soviet authorities refused UNTCOK entry
into the North, Korean leftists were antagonistic while the South Korean Labour Party
organised strikes in February-March 1948. The South Korean rightists wanted to create a
UN-sponsored state for themselves and the United States sought immediate extrication.
When the United States secured sanction in the UN, through the Interim Committee, for
elections in South Korea alone, many countries questioned the policy being pursued,
including the British Commonwealth countries of Australia, India and Canada. 62
 Upset
by these reactions, the United States political adviser in Korea, Joseph Jacobs,
complained that Australia, Canada and India had begun to form a 'British bloc' or
'anti-American bloc'. Jacobs considered that the Australian delegate, S.Jackson, was
definitely anti-American and had clearly come to Korea with the idea of 'showing us
up'.63
 Meanwhile, in early January 1948, the Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King,
professed an extreme distrust of American policy. King, noted Lester Pearson, the
Canadian under-secretary for Foreign Affairs, had just returned from Britain apparently
62 to Marshall, 2 February 1948,FRUS, 1948, VoL VI, pp.1089-1091. The leftists launched
a series of strikes in protest against UNTCOK's presence in Korea, involving violence and
sabotage. Its intention was to display the strength of popular opinion against UNTCOK and
frighten it into abandonment of its task. Its practical effect was to convince at least some of the
delegates that it would be naïve to expect that North Korean leaders would be allowed to
negotiate with the South on a reasonable basis. Political Developments in Korea: Period 15th
August, to 15th March 148', Kermode to Bevin, telegram no.33, 16 March 1948, F4990/511/81,
FO 371/69940; Luard, A History of the United Nations, VoLI, p.235; Farrar-Hockley, The Bntisb Part
in the Korean Wat VoLI, p.16 and Millett, 'Understanding Is Better Than Remembering'.
63 Jacobs felt that Jackson's attitude had derived from the small role given to Australia by
America in the occupation of Japan. Jacobs to Marshall, 12 February 1948, ibid., pp.1105-1109.
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greatly influenced by the gloomy description of the present situation which Bevin had
given him." The Canadian Prime Minister consequently told Truman that he was not
going to allow Canada to be used for enforcing one-sided American solutions 'merely to
be cuffed over the head by the Russians'. 65
 Only pressure from the Americans,
reinforced by an intense anti-Soviet atmosphere created by the Czechoslovakian crisis,
persuaded most to support the United States policy. 66
 This episode openly revealed that
the UN had become a tool in Cold War politics rather than an independent agency
dedicated to conflict resolution.67
At this stage, the Foreign Office took a somewhat calmer view of the heated
proceedings at the UN and of the events in Korea. 68
 Foreign Office officials felt that as
American and Soviet aims in Korea were irreconcilable and since the Soviet position in
Korea was by far the stronger, the Americans would sooner or later have to give way.
They argued that the reference of the Korean problem to the UN helped the Americans
in two ways. Firstly, the break was now likely to come over what were, on papec 'fair,
reasonable and workmanlike proposals'. Secondly, the activities of UNTCOK would
serve as a 'smoke screen', obscuring the main contestants and providing a cover for the
64 See 'Canada's Decision to Withdraw from UN Korean Commission', Lovett memorandum, 3
January 1948, ibid., pp.1O79-lO8I.
65 UK High Commissioner (Canada) to CR0, telegram no.45, 16 January 1948, Fl 373/1373/81,
FO 371/69954.
America's handling of Korea produced a Cabinet crisis in Canada and was only averted after
President Truman had made a direct appeal to the Canadian Cabinet See Truman to MacKenzie
King, 5 January 1948, FRUS, 1948, VoL VI, pp.108 1-1083. See also John Munro and Alex
Inglis(eds.), The Right Honourable Lester B.Pearsorn Memoirs 1948-1957, VoL [1: The International Years
(Toronto, 1973), pp.135-145. For Australian disagreement see Robert O'Neill, Australia in the
Korean War, VoLI: Strategy and Dplomag (Canberra, 1981), pp.7-8. See also Matray, The Rthatant
Crusade, pp.135-146 and Lowe, Containing the Cohi War in EastAsia, p.176.
67 See 'Withdrawal of U.S. Occupation Forces from Korea", Butterworth memorandum, 4
March 1948,FRUS, 1948, VoL VI, pp.1 137-1139. Nevertheless, a third of UN delegates abstained
in the Interim Committee, a body in which Soviet-bloc representatives refused to participate. See
Stueck, The Korean Wav, p.26 and Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Umfication of Korea,
chp.3.
Scott, minute, 16 January 1948, F594/511/81, FO 371/69937; Kermode to Bevin, despatch
no.20, 7 February 1948, F2918/511/81, FO 371/69939 and Kermode to Foreign Office,
telegram no.13, 10 February 1948, F2191/511/81, FO 371/69937.
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eventual American withdrawal. The Foreign Office concluded that: 'It may or may not
have been reprehensible for the Americans to use the UN for such purposes. But there is
a difference between using the UN machinery to cover up one's failures and using it to
"enforce" one's policies'. Yet, there could be no solution acceptable to both sides as long
as the domination of the whole Korean peninsula remained the objective of Soviet
policy, which British offici2ls believed to be the case.69
However, the Foreign Office was not about to whole-heartedly endorse American
policy. Member countries of the British Commonwealth who were taking part in
UNTCOK naturally influenced British decision-making, especially at a time when the
Commonwealth was in a process of evolution. 70
 The Foreign Office noted that: 'it is for
us to decide whether we should support the interests of the UN or of the United States',
and they noted that the views of Mackenzie King were not without relevance on this
point7' Indeed, although Jackson, the Australian representative in UNTCOK, had been
considered objectionable by American officials, Kermode found him able, steady and
responsible. According to Jackson, General MacArthur had told him to assist American
aims and not to be pushed into an early return to New York with an admission of
UNTCOK's failure. 72
 The UNTCOK representatives found nothing very appealing
about the Rhee regime, but they received absolutely no co-operation from North Korea
in the matter of general elections. 73
 Henceforth, the British remained reluctant to
69 Tomlinson, minute, 23 January 1948, F1373/1373/81, FO 371/69954. See also 'Korea',Japan
and Pacific Department memorandum, 22 May 1947, F7634/54/81, FO 371/63835 and 'Soviet
interests, Intentions and Capabilities', JIC(47)7/1. Final, 6 August 1947, CAB 158/1.
'Korea', MacDermot, minute, 18 February 1948, F2631/511/81, FO 371/69938.
Scott, minute, 11 February 1948, F2191/511/81, FO 371/69937. MacDermot also argued that
a South Korean government would soon be overwhelmed and wondered whether such a debacle
should be sponsored at birth by the UN. 'Korea', MacDermot, minute, 18 February 1948,
F2631/511/81, FO 371/69938.
72 See Jacobs to Marshall, 12 February 1948, FRUS, 1948, VL 1/1, pp.1105-1109 and Foreign
Office to New York, 13 February 1948, Lowe, Containing the CoW W/ar in EastAcia, pp.177-178.
73 Millett, 'Understanding Is Better Than Remembering'.
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proceed with their policy on Korea until they had heard recommendations from the
three Commonwealth members. 74
 But as the United States was playing the hand on
behalf of the democratic world in Korea and British policy remained one of steering
clear of a major involvement in East Asia, the Foreign Office demurred from suesting
that Britain should adopt an independent line.75
Nevertheless, the British still attempted to influence proceedings. The Foreign Office
held that the integrity of the UN must be preserved as it would be foolish for the United
States to treat the UN as a rubber stamp for decisions already taken in Washington.76
The British government maintained that while separate elections in the South might in
the event turn out to be the only practicable course, it was desirable, if only for the
record, that the Interim Committee should consider carefully and sympathetically any
possible suestions that UNTCOK made to unify the North and South77 Kermode had
expressed concern that: 'the prestige of the United Nations may suffer unless it can show
that the Russian attitude has made the Korean desire incapable of fulfi1mer'. He hoped
that recent communist demonstrations against UNTCOK, the announced draft
constitution on North Korean radio for a 'Democratic People's Republic of Korea' with
its capital in Pyongyang and the Soviet refusal to receive the Commission in the northern
zone, could help to establish this argument.78
'Korea', MacDermot, minute, 18 February 1948, F2631/511/81, FO 371/69938. The
Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, for example, meant that Britain could not dismiss
out of hand proposals tabled by Menon. See Lowe, C8ntaining the Cold [Var in EactAsia, p.177.
Tomlinson, minute, 11 February 1948,F2191/511/81, FO 371/69937 and Scott, minute, 13
February 1948, F2280/511/81, FO 371/69937.
76	 York to Foreign Office, 11 February 1948, Lowe,The Orgins of the Korean [Var, p.51.
'Korea', MacDermot, minute, 18 February 1948, F2631/511/81, FO 371/69938.
78 Kermode to Foreign Office, telegram no.13, 10 February 1948, F2191/511/81, FO
371/69937; Kermode to Bevin, despatch no.29, 19 February 1948, F3986/29/81, FO
371/69936; Political Developments in Korea: Period 15th August, 1945, to 15 March, 1948',
Kermode to Bevin, despatch no.33, 16 March 1948, F4990/511/81, FO 371/69940 and 'Korea',
MacDermot, minute, 18 February 1948, F2631/511/81, FO 371/69938.
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B. KOREAN POLITICS
Meanwhile, Korean political figures began to prepare for the elections due in May 1948.
The most prominent figure was Syngman Rhee, whose political background was
discussed in chapter two. The British Consul-General at Seoul explained that both the
Americans and the Korean police had built him intovirtual Korean St.George who had
come to 'slay the dragon of communism'. But, as Kermode pointed out to the Foreign
Office, Rhee could not resist the temptation to use power for purely personal ends. With
the police behind him, Rhee formed 'youth' organisations which joined the police in
intimidating the public into nominal support of Rhee. 79
 The Consul-General had stated
unequivocally that Rhee would attempt to establish his position as leader of Korea by
rigging the elections in the South and claiming the extension of its authority over the
whole of Korea. His plan was so transparent that Kermode thought that: 'people can be
forgiven for thinking him crazed'. Kermode believed that Rhee's meteoric rise had been
helped by a misguided American policy and concluded that 'It is certainly true that
General Hodge has poked his fingers, often imprudently, into the Korean political pie.
He talks much of democracy but he hates the left, regarding in common with many
Americans, anyone left of centre as a blood relation to the communists'. Hodge had
underestimated Rhee's ambitions but it took the American military government some
time to discover that Rhee was to play nobody's hand but his own. By the time Hodge
attempted to switch allegiance to the moderate Kim Kyu-Sik, it was too late.8°
Kermode to Bevin, despatch no.20, 7 February 1948, F2918/511/81, FO 371/69939 and
'Political Developments in Korea Period 15th August, 1945, to 15th March, 1948', Kermode to
Bevin, despacth no.33, 16 March 1948, F4990/511/81, FO 371/69940; Cumings, The Onins of
the Korean [Var, VoLII, pp.l85-236 and Millett, 'Understanding Is Better Than Remembering'.
Gaddis, We Now Know, p.71 and Kermode to Bevin, despatch no.14, 17 January 1948,
F2829/511/81, FO 371/69939. In fact, Hodge's relationship with Rhee became so strained that
his position became untenable by May 1948 and lodge formally resigned. "Replacement of
Lieutenant General Hodge', Butterworth memorandum, 11 May 1948, FRUS, 1948, VoL VI,
pp.1 192-1193.
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As the South Koreans moved towards elections, the British Consulate at Seoul
reported that considerable rightist pressure was supplied to reluctant voters to persuade
them to register. Registration was presented as being no less sacred a duty than air raid
precautions, and occasionally connected with the drawing of rations. The elections were
actively opposed only by a small majority, and this was no doubt, one reason why
right-wing pressure over voters registration did not prevent UNTCOK from declaring
the atmosphere 'free'. A second reason was perhaps that some members of UNTCOK,
being themselves citizens of Asia, were wisely aware of the degree of freedom it was
realistic to expect in an oriental country recently emerged from autocratic alien rule. The
third and most decisive reason was the violent and spectacular pressure over registration
exerted by the communist minority. North Korean radio called on communists in the
South to oppose the elections 'until death' and the latter attacked registration booths and
election officials, besides indulging in general rioting and sabotage, particularly in the
communist stronghold of Cheju Island. Already nearly 200 people had died from these
attacks.8'
Opposition to the elections was not confined to the communists. There were in
South Korea considerable numbers of people who followed Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-Sik
in arguing that the holding of elections and subsequent national government of South
Korea alone would provoke a similar action in the North and thus perpetuate the
arbitrary division of the country and ensure that it was eventually torn apart by civil war.
A British official at the Consulate-General office in Seoul wrote that:
On Cheju Island, always a hotbed of revolt, the communists started a guerrilla war in April
1948, hoping to capitalise on the popular resentment toward a repressive and corrupt governor
and the incompetence and indiscipline of the island's Korean national police. After six months
of vicious and inept rural warfare, neither side could claim much advantage. Crowiher to Bevin,
despatch no.43, 29 April 1948, F7341/511/81, FO 371/69941. See also Gordenker, The United
Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korni, chp.4 and Millett, 'Understanding Is Better Than
Remembering'.
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What is difficult to guess, in the light of one's knowledge of Soviet behaviour
throughout the world, is how the two Kims think that the fate of Korea can be altered.
Personally, I believe they are potential martyrs to reason which refuses to admit the
fantastic partition of an ancient and homogeneous country along a mere parallel of
latitude, and to patriotism which refuses to admit the callous use of one country, no
matter how weak and backward, as a mere plaything in the games of another (or rather
"others" as it seems to them); this is admirable but it is not realistic.
Henceforth, no broad-based 'united front' between the northern and southern political
groups emerged. Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-Sik had arrived in Pyongyang during April
1948 for the North-South Conference but there was no evidence to suest that the
Kims were a party to the resulting documents, which claimed all foreign troops should
withdraw, letting the Koreans fight for the realisation of a unified sovereign democratic
independent country. 83
 The Kims failure to participate in the South Korean elections,
enabled Rhee and his allies to win comfortably and the Republic of Korea was
established in July 1948 with Rhee at the helm.M With 90 per cent ofAelectorate in South
Korea voting for a 'democratic government', General Hodge told the first British
Minister in Seoul, Captain Vyvyan Holt, that the elections of 17 May 1948 had put the
Soviets 'right back on their heels'. The outcome was a national assembly, principally
conservative in character, ultra-nationalist and largely right-wing.85
82 Crowther to Bevin, despatch no.43,29 April 1948, P7341/511/81, FO 371/69941.
83 See Jacobs to Marshall, 29 March 1948, FPJJS, 1948, VoLVI, pp.l162-l163. For a balanced
analysis of the Pyongyang Conference see John Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War
(London, 1989), pp.70-72. The two Kims were also not favourably impressed with the régime in
the north. Crowther to Foreign Office, telegram no.40, 8 May 1948, F671 8/511/81, FO
371/69941.
Initially, Rhee's Rapid Realisation Society had even furnished 39 more candidates than there
were seats in the 200-seat assembly. For the relevant British despatches see Crowther to Bevin,
despatch no.43, 29 April 1948, P7341/511/81, FO 371/69941; Crowther to Foreign Office,
telegram no.40, 8 May 1948, F6718/511/81, FO 371/69941 and Scott, minute, 10 May 1948,
P6718/511/81, FO 371/69941. See also Cumings, The Ongins of tbe Korean Wai Vol II,
pp.379-407.
85 bit to Foreign Office, telegram no.46, 25 May 1948, F 7485/511/81, FO 371/69941.
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C. BRiTAiN, THE UNiTED STATES AND THE DIVISION OF KOREA
On the whole, the British remained in the dark about American policy objectives for
Korea, while British sources on the province were few and far between. 86
 A clearer
picture of American intentions finally began to emerge for the British in early June 1948.
The Foreign Office had received a telegram given 'diplomatic secret' distribution
covering draft State Department policy. It appeared that the United States would
recognise the Korean national government, established as a result of the South Korean
elections. A diplomatic mission and American advisers would also be attached to the
government. Finally, the head of the new Korean government would be advised to
request the United States authorities to withdraw their occupation troops at a slow rate in
order to give General Hodge time to train and equip a Korean gendarmerie of militia.
Upon reading these proposals, the Foreign Office considered them 'remarkably
unrealistic'. They deemed that the Soviets were in a far stronger position, with a
contiguous land frontier along their zone of occupation and the possession of a
formidable North Korean Army. The Foreign Office thought that leaving behind
sufficient hostages in the way of advisers and military missions to induce Soviet fears that
an overt act of encroachment on their part would be regarded as a casus beh, was surely
playing a risky game. They saw the present proposals as nothing more than part of a
face-saving process, and argued that the British and the Dominions needed to consider
what their attitude would be regarding American plans for recognition of the new state. 87
Despite this criticism, the British for their part did not produce any alternative proposals.
For example, Lieutenant-Colonel Grazebrook, the GSO(I) at General Headquarters, Far East
Land Forces, complained to the British Director of Military Intelligence, that his only
information on Korea came from Kermode which took weeks to reach Singapore. Apart from
Kermode, Grazebrook reluctantly admitted that he had to rely upon the Press for much of his
information. Grazebrook to Tarver, letter, 1 April 1948, WO 208/4833.
87 Tomlinson, minute, 3 June 1948, F7836/511/81, FO 371/69941 and MacDermot, minute, 4
June 1948, F7836/511/81, FO 371/69941. For the actual United States policy document see
'United States Policy in Korea', note by Schulgen, Lawrence, Field, Gardiner, SANACC 176/39,
22 March 1948, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 51, KCL. For Joint Chiefs of Staff approval see °The
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Instead, on 22 June 1948, the Foreign Office duly sent a concerned telegram to Sir
Oliver Franks at the British Embassy in Washington, disturbed to learn that the United
States was considering recognising the new South Korean government as the
government of all Korea. The Foreign Office considered that such a course of action
could not be justified either by the terms of the UN resolutions on Korea or by the
general principles that govern the recognition of new States. The terms of the Interim
Committee resolution of February 1948 contemplated the emergence of a government in
that part of Korea in which elections were possible. The Foreign Office stated that the
legitimacy of this government derived from the elections and it would be wrong to
recognise it as sovereign in territory where it could have no claim to be representative.
According to the Foreign Office, it also appeared unlikely that Australia, Canada and
India, who were represented on UNTCOK, would regard the government resulting from
the elections held in South Korea, as having any valid claim to sovereignty beyond that
area. The Foreign Office hoped that it would be possible to obtain a resolution in the
UN which might lead to recognition of a government that limited its claims to South
Korea. The Foreign Office recognised that any claim by the Seoul government to be
sovereign in all Korea would certainly be followed by a similar claim by the northern
administration and its recognition by the Slav bloc.
Two days later, the British Embassy at Washington expressed these concerns to
Walton Butterworth at the State Department. Butterworth stated that the Department's
plan had not been finally approved and he would, of course, consult Britain first before a
final decision was made. According to Franks, Butterworth made great play with the
point that the UN resolution specifically referred to the establishment of a national
Position of the United States with respect to Korea', note by secretaries to JCS, JCS 1483/54, 9
April 1948, ibid.
Foreign Office to Washington, telegram no.6718, 22 June 1948, F7836/511/81, FO
371/69941.
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government, that the people were encouraged to elect representatives to a national
assembly, and that two-thirds of the Korean people were able to take part in the
elections. In Butterworth's opinion, the new government needed, and needed badly, an
immediate mark of confidence. For the members of the UN not to give it support by
some measure of recognition seemed to him to be an evasion of parental responsibility.
The British Embassy had pressed Butterworth to say what kind of recognition he had in
mind since the administration could not possibly be, de facto, the government of all
Korea. Butterworth said that, whilst not admitting that it could be recognised as a defacto
national government, he would favour recognising it as the government that had come
into being in contemplation of the UN resolution. Aware that the Soviets were planning
similar moves in the North, Butterworth exclaimed that: We must get our shot in first'.89
The British did not need much convincing that early recognition of the Seoul
government 'in some form or another' would be correct and expedient. But the Foreign
Office still thought that an act of recognition that took no cognisance of the obvious fact
of the division of Korea would be both foolish and improper. 9° The Foreign Office was
still prepared, provided that the report of UNTCOK was satisfactory, to give recognition
to the Seoul government at the appropriate time, as long as it did not daim sovereignty
over the whole of Korea.91
 Australia and New Zealand had also expressed agreement
with the line Britain had takenY In fact, the Australians told the United States
government on 14 July 1949, that it would not recognise the South Korean government
as the government of the whole of Korea. 93
 These differences in attitude between the
89 Franks to Foreign Office, telegram no.3076,24 June 1948, F8868/511/81, FO 371/69942.
Tomlinson, minute, 28 June 1948, F8868/511/81, FO 371/69942.
' Foreign Office to Washington, telegram no.7215,3 July 1948, F8868/511/81, FO 371/69942.
92 Foreign Office to Washington, telegram no.7216, 3 July 1948, F8868/511/81, FO 371/69942.
See also memorandum handed to Dickover, Counsellor of United States Embassy, by the
Foreign Office, l4July 1948, F9509/511/81, FO 371/69942.
Nielson to Marshall, 14 July 1948, FRUS, 1948, VoL 1/7, pp.l241-1242.
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British Commonwealth and the United States were due to the fact that the former had no
administrative or defence responsibility for Korea. The Truman administration was
desperately trying to extricate itself from a corrupt and economically devastated South
Korea. However, in the context of the Cold War, the United States wanted to leave
South Korea without damaging its international standing, especially as the majority of the
South Korean people detested communism?4
Ignoring the concerns of the British Commonwealth, in July 1948, during his opening
speech to the national assembly, Rhee claimed that the assembly was the sole
representative body of the Korean people and that the government to which it would
give birth would be the sovereign independent government of the entire nation.
Referring to the United States, Rhee hoped that the Korean government would request
the Americans to let them retain some advisers and technicians. More importantly, Rhee
pressed the United States government to maintain American forces until national security
forces had been organised. 95
 In the same month, after a North Korean constitution had
been approved, Kim il-sung addressed a conference of the North Korean People's
Council, alleging that the South Korean state was phoney and full of traitors and
reactionary rightists. Kim deplored the division of Korea, which he claimed was
attributable to the machinations of the Americans. 96
 In response, Kim ordered a
'national' general election on 25 August 1948. Figures released from Pyongyang
suggested that 99.7% of the electorate had voted to elect 212 members to a People's
Assembly. There is no evidence to substantiate these figures and Kim's claim that the
'Korea: Annual Review for 1949', Holt to Bevin, telegram no.5, 30 January 1950, FK 1011/1,
FO 371/84053 and Farrar-J-Iockley, The British Part in the Korean War, VoLI, p.22.
'Opening Session of National Assembly of Korea', 1-Jolt to Bevin, letter, 6 July 1948,
F9317/511/81, FO 371/69942.
I-Jolt to MacDermot, letter, 15 July 1948, F10201/29/81, FO 371/69936. According to the
Foreign Office, the North Korean constitution revealed the incorporation of familiar features of
the Soviet constitution and there was also evidence of the Meiji constitution in Japan having
been consulted. See Lowe, Containing the Cold War in EastAcia, pp.178-l79.
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People's Assembly represented the whole of Korea was also debateable on a population
basis. The majority of the Korean people lived in the south, roughly 21 million as
compared to 9 million in the North. Moreover, refugee movement continued from the
north of Korea to the south.97
Amidst the further division of Korea into two separate entities, the United States
government told the British on 12 August 1948 that a statement was to be issued
decreeing that the Seoul government: 'is entitled to be regarded as the government of
Korea envisaged by the General Assembly resolutions'. In the British government's view,
this sentence could be interpreted as according de jure recognition to the Seoul
government and the Foreign Office refused to issue a similar statement. 98 Although the
Foreign Office expressed sympathy with the American position and supported their
decision to withdraw from Korea, the British wanted to wait for UN blessing on the
validity of the elections. With the American position in China rapidly deteriorating, it is
understandable, in the context of the Cold War, $ o why the United States wanted to
act quickly in South Korea. Political officials on the ground in Korea, for example,
encouraged the Truman administration: 'to stand firm everywhere on the Soviet
perimeter, including Korea'Y The British attitude over recognition of the South Korean
state suggests that it did not see the urgency in Cold War terms. 10° Indeed, as the United
States recognised the new government, it also arranged for the continuation of economic
aid, including electric power from specially equipped naval vessels.' 0' Despite continued
Army Department pressure for the withdrawal of United States troops, the State
Farrar-l-Iockley, The British Pa,i in the Korean Wae VoLI, p.2O.
98 Foreign Office to Washington, telegram no.626, 13 August 1948, F/511/81, FO 371/69944.
Jacobs to Marshall, 12 August 1948, ibid, p.1272
'°°Fanar-Hockley, The British Pa# in the Korean War, VoLI, p.22.
101 Marshall to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers Abroad, 10 July 1948, FRUS, 1948,
VoL VI, pp.1235-1237; Truman to Marshall, 25 August 1948, ibid., pp.1288-1289 and Saltzman to
raper, 24 April 1948, ibid, pp.1181-1182.
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Department wanted to slow the procedure, to help expedite its programme for the
training and equipping of South Korean security forces. They also had to have
equipment, arms and ammunition for at least two years of normal operations.
Accordingly, on 24 August, an interim agreement was signed. 102 Furthermore, the State
Department supported the most comprehensive of the economic assistance programmes
that had been drawn up by the Office of Occupation Affairs in conjunction with the
ECA.103
When the UN General Assembly met in Pans during September to December 1948,
the problem of recognition was finally addressed when the United States tabled a new
resolution for the future of Korea. The United States wished to have it officially
established that the new government was one to whom, in accordance with the original
Assembly resolution, they could legitimately hand over all authority. 104
 The British
government still hoped to dissuade the Americans from submitting a controversial
resolution of this kind but if the Americans pressed ahead, the Foreign Office proposed
to support it, although making it clear that in their opinion, the government in South
Korea was neither the deju nor defacto government of all Korea. 105
 In consequence, the
British had moved somewhat from bwroriginal position. The reason for this change of
attitude lay in the alteredinterpretation which the legal adviser considered permissible,
102 Withdrawal of US Occupation Forces from Korea',Allison memorandum, 5 March 1948,
ibid, pp.1139-1141; Marshall to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers Abroad, 10 July 1948,
ibid, pp.1235-1237; Butterworth memorandum, 17 August 1948, pp.1276-1279 and Marshall to
Royall, 17 September 1948, ibid, pp.1302-1303.
103 Marshall to Royall, 17 September 1948, ibid, pp.i302-l303; 'Future Economic Assistance to
Korea', Sakzman memorandum, 7 September 1948, ibid., pp.l292-l298 and Hoffman to
Marshall, 1 October 1948, ibid, pp.1312-1313.
Foreign Office to Washington, telegram no.9946, 4 September 1948, F12493/511/81, FO
371/69945.
105 CR0 to UK High Commissioner in Canada, Acting UK High Commissioner in
Commonwealth of Australia, UK High Commissioner in New Zealand, UK High Commissioner
in Union of South Africa, Acting UK High Commissioner in India, Acting UK High
Commissioner in Pakistan and UK High Commissioner in Ceylon, telegram nos.944, 578, 355,
346, 2733, 1633,463, 28 September 1948, F13376/511/81, FO 371/69946.
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keeci	 due to the second clause 'and that it function. The Foreign Office considered this was
si4 the OqLettk. .6	 acceptable, even though bothAstill differed in their attitude towards the South Korean
Ihe LAjkvJe" government's claim to sovereignty in the North.'° 6
 Under American pressure, the
tre
General Assembly of the UN did approve by 48 votes to 6 (the Soviet bloc) with 1
abstention, a resolution recognising South Korea which accepted the election results of
May as legitimate. 107
 The occupying powers would withdraw and a new group, the UN
Commission on Korea (UNCOK) would replace UNTCOK in order to improve the
prospects for unification.'° 8
 The resolution was unclear as to whether the South Korean
government was declared the government of the whole of Korea or not. The British
supported the idea of UNCOK because they felt that the UN should have a continuing
interest in the Korean situation.109
The government in Seoul had now, in the opinion of UN members, been validated.
The United States, which had already appointed a chargé d'affairs in Seoul, opened an
Embassy there. America's special representative to South Korea, John Muccio,
immediately endorsed Rhee's appeals for the retention of some American forces to help
maintain the new government in its initial stages. On 18 September 1948, the Soviet
Union had informed the United States that it was withdrawing all its troops from the
North, the removal to be completed by December 1948. Despite the Soviet withdrawal,
Cheke to Graves letter 28 September 1948, F12637/511/81 FO 371/69945. See i.sc
107 F	 -k),Th1Ibk/VtM .ekQeAWcVd	 )324-.See Draft Resolution on Korea for the tiN General Assembly, 8 November 1948, FRUS,
1948, l/oL 1/1, pp.1321 -1322. The former American political adviser to Korea, Jacobs, had
confided in Dening that he thought the Australians would vote against the American resolution.
Dening hinted that, if Dr. Evatt were allowed himself to move a resolution with which the
American agreed, this might be the best way of enlisting his support. 'Korea', Dening, minute, 9
November 1948, F15883/511/81, FO 371/69947. The Americans eventually adopted this
solution when an Australian-American draft resolution was tabled. Tomlinson, minute, 19
November 1948, F16750/511/81, FO 371/69948.
Luard,A History of the United Nationc, VoLI, pp.237-238.
109 The resolution deemed that the Republic of Korea as 'having effective control and
jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and
consult... and that this is the only such Government in Korea'. 'Korea', Dening, minute, 9
November 1948, F15883/511/81, FO 371/69947 and Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the
Korean War, VoLI, p.26.
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the State Department decided to agree to Rhee's requests and Marshall told the Chinese
Foreign Minister that America would not withdraw if an attack from the North seemed
likely. But, the United States had no formal commitment to defend Korea and the
Pentagon was willing to write the peninsula off as a strategic asset. The State Department
did appreciate this military logic but also recognised the potential Cold War implications
of a complete withdrawal from Korea. 11° By the end of 1948, the Asia experts in the
State Department were insisting that the South Korean state must survive. The latter
claimed that: 'Northeast Asia is one of four or five significant power centres in the
world'. If the United States did not 'face up to the problems in Korea', Japan might slip
into the Soviet orbit and the entire American position in the Pacific could be at risk.
There is no evidence to indicate that the British were drawing similar conclusions. British
thinking had come to accept the 'loss' of Korea and did not see any long term
detrimental effects. Still, the conflicting views of the State Department and the Pentagon
meant that the United States commitment was still less than clear.111
V. The Great Powers and Two Koreas
Within the creation of the Republic of Korea, Kermode's successor as Consul-General,
w& Captain Vyvyan Holt,was raised toAMinister. Holt had pursued his career through the
Army and Diplomatic Service. He possessed a wealth of Middle Eastern experience but
no knowledge of East Asia. A man of great charm but tinged with an air of eccentricity,
Holt was joined by Sydney Faithful, a career Foreign Service diplomat, who took up his
post as Consul to South Korea. 2
 In late October 1948, Holt reported that in Sunchon,
110 Muccio to Marshall, 12 November 1948, FRUS, 1948, VoLVI, pp.1325-i327; Saltzman to
Wedemeyer, 9 November 1948, ibid, p.1324; and Matray, The R,luctant Crusade, pp.151-174.
" Bishop to Butterworth, 17 December 1948,FRUS, 1948, VoL VI, pp.1337-1340 and Leffler,
A Prrponderance of Ponr, p.253. Both Jacobs and Hodge recommended that until the UN General
Assembly had considered the Korean problem, American troops should not withdraw. Hodge, in
particular, did not want the United States to jeopardise the early stages of South Korean
government. See Butterworth memorandum, 17 August 1948, FRUS, 1948, VoL VI,
pp.1321-1322.
112 1-bare, Embassies in the East, pp.197-198.
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north of Seoul, communist rebels, junior officers and non-commissioned officers, within
the XIV and XV regiment of constabulary, had butchered over 300 police and
non-communist civilians before South Korean forces eventually pressed the communist
guerrillas back to the Yosu peninsula. Everywhere the rebels went they put up the flag of
North Korea and displayed communist slogans. All the available evidence pointed to a
carefully planned communist uprising." 3
 The Yosu revolt, as the Foreign Office
correctly predicted, persuaded the Seoul government to retain American troops in
November 1948." But the result in its national assembly was not a foregone conclusion.
Only 103 of 198 members were present in the assembly, and of these, 16 abstained on
grounds of principle. As in 1945, most Koreans still wanted to be rid of foreign control
and influence, yet, it was the Seoul government which recognised the superiority in
numbers, training and weapons of the North Korean forces.115
Various attempts by Americans to strengthen Rhee's position in the South were often
deliberately misinterpreted by the latter for his own advantage. According to the local
Press, Rhee, on his return to Korea from Japan during October 1948, claimed General
MacArthur had said to him that: 'I will do anything I can to help the Korean peoples and
to protect them. I will protect them as I would protect the United States and California
against aggression'. Concerned, Sir Alvary Gascoigne asked MacArthur whether he had
in mind any new policy for Korea. MacArthur replied that he had authorised this
statement but that it should have been made in conjunction with a further explanation to
the effect that he would defend Korea in his present capacity as commander of United
States forces in the Pacific." 6
 MacArthur had already told General Gairdner that: 'if
h13 Flolt to Foreign Office, telegram no.83, 26 October 1948, F14961/511/81, FO 371/69947
and Millett, 'Understanding Is Better Than Remembering'.
114 Scott, minute, 27 October 1948, F14961/511/81, FO 371/69947.
115 Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korean [Var, VoLI, p.26.
116 Gascoigne to Foreign Office, telegram no.1249, 29 October 1948, F15227/511/81, FO
371/69947.
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Russia were to attack in Korea his pians were to get out General Hodge's army as quickly
as he could'. 117
 The Foreign Office regarded this as a private conversation between
soldiers and noted it as a much more authentic expression of MacArthur's real views.
The Foreign Office concluded that: 'If this new statement was intended to frighten the
Russians I doubt if it will have much effect'.118
From October 1948, George Blake and Norman Owen, members of SIS, began to
th
operate from Seoul. Blake was the head oSeou1 SIS station and had instructions to build
up an intelligence network inside the Soviet Northeast Asian Maritime Provinces, as
Seoul was the nearest diplomatic post to the area. It is interesting to note that Blake's
instructions were directed towards obtaining Soviet intelligence, not the collection of
material on communists in China or North Korea. This reflected once again Britain's
inability to identify emerging threats in East Asia. Still, Blake found his task impossible
and he rediverted his energies to cultivating Korean contacts should the communists
occupy the whole peninsula." 9
 The assessments that Blake was sending to Whitehall
must have been bleak. The JIC explained that it was only a matter of time before
communism absorbed the whole of Korea.'° The British were in no doubt that even a
South Korean Army, whatever its numbered strength, could not hold out against a
determined attack by the North Koreans, either by inspired risings in South Korea, or by
invasion over the border. British perception of the Korean situation, therefore, remained
Gascoigne to Foreign Office, telegram no.516, 27 May 1948, F7609/1956/23, FO
371/69911.
Tomlinson, minute, 2 November 1948, F15227/511/81, FO 371/69947 and Tomlinson,
minute, 31 May 1948, ibid.
119 Blake used the cover of a Vice-Consular post, developing links with various missionaries and
issuing visas to Koreans. Hoare, Embacies in the East, pp.197-198 and Richard Aldrich, Gary
Rawnsley and Ming-Yeh Rawnsley, 'Introduction The Clandestine Cold War in East Asia,
1945-65' in Special Issue: The Cindestine Cold War in Asia 1 945-65: Western Intel4gence, Propaganda and
Special Operations, Intelhenee and National Security, VoL 14 No.4 (Winter 1999), p.3.
120 
'Communist Influence in the Far East', JIC(48)1 13(Final), 17 December 1948, CAB 158/5.
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fundamentally unaltered in 1949.121 Despite this analysis, there was still no concern that
such an outcome might begin to erode the Anglo-American position in Asia. This
mind-set was bolstered by the Foreign Office belief, held since late 1947, that Korea had
already been written off in the highest of American strategic circles, and that the present
American assistance programme was part of a delaying action, devised for face-saving
purposes.' Due to the lack of serious Anglo-American consultation on East Asian
issues, it is not clear that the British were aware at this stage of the emerging resolve that
the State Department was beginning to show towards Korea.
For its part, American intelligence was still turning out bleak assessments for the
future of Korea. Intelligence estimated that North Korea's armed strength was capable of
victory in a civil war and this would be enhanced if the Korean units of CCP forces
returned home. An American Air Intelligence report also indicated that an air regiment
had been established in North Korea by early 1949. It was believed to be based at
Pyongyang and to comprise 800 personnel, 36 Soviet trainers and obsolete Japanese
planes. Koreans were sent across the border for training in the Soviet Union and this
force eventually comprised 36 Yak-9s and 1,500 personneL' 24
 In March 1949, Pyongyang
and Moscow concluded an arms pact in which the latter committed itself to supply
munitions to the North Korean Army.' 25
 The rapid collapse of the Nationalist Chinese
armies also meant that Korean troops fighting in China were more likely to return sooner
121 Scarlett to bit, letter, 28 February 1949, F3209/1015/81, FO 371/76258.
122 Scarlett to bolt, letter, 28 February 1949, bid.
123 Muccio to Marshall, 12 November 1948, FRUS, 1948, VoLVI, pp.1321-1322 and Gaddis, We
Now Know, p.71.
124 
'Review of North Korean Air Power and its Potentialities',Air Intelligence Information
Report, 28 February 1950, Lowe, The Oegins of the Korean Wai pp.61-62.
125 See Merrili,Kon!a, pp.14.3-144; Stueck, The Korean Wai, p.29; Cuniings, The Ongins of the Korean
War, VoLII, pp.325-349 and Weathersby, 'Soviet Aims in Korea, p.21.
259
BRITAIN AND THE EMERGENCE OF TWO KOREAS
than anticipated. Some units had already begun to return home in 1948 and were quickly
incorporated into the North Korean Army.' The military balance was clear by 1949.
Such information led the CIA to report in 1949 that American troop withdrawal
would probably result in a collapse of South Korea. The CIA, therefore, suggested that
the continued presence of a moderate number of American forces in the area would
discourage any invasion from the North while at the same time boosting morale in the
South. But MacArthur, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Johnson all advocated withdrawal,
due to pressing commitments elsewhere and the conviction that Korea would not
provide favourable terrain upon which to fight a war if war should come.lv Despite the
military disadvantages of maintaining a presence in Korea, the NSC realised that the
extension of a Soviet-backed unified Korean state would enhance the political and
strategic position of the Soviet Union in the Cold War with respect to Japan and
adversely affect the international position of the United States. Complete American
disengagement from the Korean peninsula, the NSC felt, could lead directly to that result
and would be seen as betrayal by the United States of its friends and allies in Asia,
possibly contributing to a fundamental realignment of forces in favour of the Soviet
Union throughout Asia.'
The solution for the NSC relied upon building up a 65,000 strong South Korean
Army and 35,000 man police force. This would ensure that such forces were capable of
serving effectively as a deterrent to external aggression and as a guarantor of internal
order in South Korea. When MacArthur stated in March 1949, that the establishment of
126 See Cummgs, The Ongrnr of the Ko?an lVai, I/eL TI, pp.350-376 and Millett, 'Understanding Is
Better Than Remembering'.
127 Gaddis, The Loeg Peace, pp.95-96.
128 Draft memorandum for the Secretary of Defence in The Position of the United States with
Respect to Korea', report by the JSSC to the JCS, JCS 1483/63, 18 March 1949, RJCS:
1946-1953, MF 51, KCL. American officials on the ground reiterated the fact that South Korea
could scarcely be made a viable economy unless determined efforts were made to rehabilitate key
industries such as coal, power, textiles and fisheries. See Muccio to Secretary of State, 27 January
1949, FRUS, VoL VIII: The Far East andAustralia, 1949 (Washington, 1976), pp.947-952.
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be
Korean security forces within the current programme had substantially comp1etthe
NSC agreed to withdraw American troops from Korea by the end of June 1949.129
Despite their desire to avoid direct military embroilment in South Korea, even American
a.
military officials would now endorse a State Department plan to prov1delong-term
programme of economic assistance to that country. They feared that total disengagement
from Korea could undermine American credibility in East Asia and lead to a realignment
in favour ofSoviet Union. Although they would not guarantee South Korean territory in
case of local and global conflict, American diplomats constantly reassured Rhee that
troop withdrawals reflected no lessening of their commitment. They were also firmly
convinced that America's Cold War credibility and interests depended on bolstering the
South Korean regime against its internal and external foes.13°
Despite troop withdrawal, the NSC's recommendations and the economic assistance
plan, had undoubtedly bolstered Muccio, assigned as the first Ambassador to South
Korea, and the latter assured Holt that the American government finnly intended to
continue giving substantial military and financial aid to the Seoul government. Holt
pointed out that the Americans were:
quite happy about the future, that discontent in the North is too strong for the
government there to be able to undertake a properly organised invasion of the south and
that the 100,000 armed troops and police in the south are well able to deal with any
probable threat of aggression from the north of the 38th parallel or of communist
uprisings in the south.
129 The Position of the United States with Respect to Korea', report by NSC, NSC 8/1, 16
March 1949 in 'The Position of the United States with Respect to Korea', report by the JSSC to
the JCS, JCS 1483/63, 18 March 1949, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 51, KCL. Draft memorandum for
the Secretary of Defence in The Position of the United States with Respect to Korea', report by
the JSSC to the JCS,JCS 1483/63, 18 March 1949, ibid.
130 Acheson, Rusk, Butterworth led efforts to elicit large-scale economic aid for Korea, totalling
$150 million for fiscal year 1950. Saltzman to Draper, 25 January 1949, FRUS, 1949 (Part II),
VoL VII, pp.944-945; Acheson to Johnson, 10 May 1949, ibid, p.1016; Acheson to Embassy in
Korea, 28 April 1949, ibid, pp.997-998; Gaddis, The Long Peace, p.96 and Matray, R,Lqctant Cnisade,
pp.175-199.
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Holt concluded that the Americans were evidently prepared to help on a very substantial
scale, and were confident that it would be adequate. 131
 The Foreign Office was still not
completely convinced and did not aim to modify its views, except to the extent of
agreeing that the weight of evidence indicated that in a purely Korean struggle the South
could now hold its own, proided the United States continues to supply a substantial
quantity of material help.'32
When, in the summer of 1949, the Americans withdrew all its forces from Korea,'33
Rhee's initial reaction to this American policy decision was one of deep concern and the
South Korean President pleaded for United States guarantees of defence and
independence.' Such guarantees seemed unlikely. Tentative plans by the United States
Army Department to introduce a military task force into Korea composed of American
units and UN personnel to restore law and order along the 38th parallel, were
immediately rejected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which the latter feared could easily lead
ammaaist
to a major military involvement.' 35
 13y mid-1949, Rhee faced a significant ruralpartisan
force in 5 of his 8 province. In contrast, North Korea appeared more stable than the
South. Kim's leadership was still under threat but factionalism within the government did
Holt to Scarlett, letter, 27 April 1949, F7288/1015/81, FO 371/76258. The Chargé of the
American Mission to Korea also reported that the Korean government was now settling down.
Economic conditions were improving. The inflationary spiral had slowed, prices remained stable
and currency circulation was declining while increased coal and power production was assured
during the next few months. The grain collection programme had failed but food stocks were
believed to be adequate for the immediate future. However, Drumright still pointed out that
there remained weaknesses such as corruption and inefficiency. See Drumright to Acheson, 28
March 1949, FRUS, 1949, VoL VIII, pp.979-980.
132 Tomlinson, minute, 23 May 1949, F7288/lO15/81, FO 371 /76258.
133 The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia', report by NSC, NSC 48/1, 23
December 1949 in 'The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia', note by Secretaries
toJCS,JCS 1992/6,27 December 1949, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 56, KCL.
134 Rhee had complained that as well as a standing army of 65,000 men, he wanted a reserve of
200,000 men fully equipped with American weapons. See Rhee to Muccio, 14 April 1949, FRUS,
1949, VoL VIII, pp.990-991; Butterworth to Acheson, 18 April 1949, ibid, pp.992-993 and
Muccio to Acheson, 6 May 1949, ibid, pp.1008-1009.
135 
'Implications of a Possible Full-Scale Invasion from North Korea Subsequent to Withdrawal
of United States Troops from South Korea', report by the JSSC to the JCS,JCS 1776/3, 13 June
1949, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 51, KCL
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not disrupt internal order. Rhee, on the other hand, was faced with economic crisis,
corruption amongst his ministers and found himself in disputes with the national
assembly. His autocratic rule and intractability, shown in his formation of a Cabinet that
failed to represent various groups within the assembly, further undermined his position.
Meanwhile, communist guerrilla attacks and unrest along the 38th parallel forced the UN
to adopt another American-sponsored resolution which called on UNCOK to carefully
monitor the border.'
All these developments began to grab the attention of both Evatt and Bevin. The
former now wanted American troops to remain in Korea and maintained this attitude
right up to their withdrawal in June 1949. Meanwhile, Bevm, addressing the ships'
company of 1-IMS Kenya on the problems of resisting aression, surprised them by
remarking that he was 'very worried about the precarious situation in Korea. . . If you ask
me where I think we might all be in for further trouble, I believe Korea is the place'.137
Bevin's remarks seem to be at odds with his Asia experts in the Foreign Office and go
back to his growing recognition of the global communist threat at the beginning of this
chapter. It reinforces the view that middle echelon Foreign Office officials were prone to
undersbsizte. the communist threat in East Asia. However, Bevin could divert little
attention to Korean affairs, preoccupied as he was with the Berlin crisis, the Middle East,
Malaya and the construction of NATO.
Unbeknown to the British, Kim had been pressing Stalin throughout 1949 for
permission to unify the country by force. Attempts to ignite a takeover in the South by
136 The localities of Ongjin, Kaesong and Chunchon were the worst sufferers but from time to
time therg were raids further east The attacks varied in strength from small skirmishes to planned
operations by as many as 2,000 men. 'Korea: Annual Review for 1949', Holt to Bevin, telegram
no.5, 30 January 1950, FK 1011/1, FO 371/84053. See also Joungwon Kim, Divided Korea. The
Politics of Development, 1945-1972 (Cambridge, MA, 1976); Farrar-Hockley, The British Pa,i in the
Konan War, Vail, p.30; Lowe, Containing the Cold War in East Aria, pp.179-180; Luard,A Histoy
of the United Nations, VoLI, pp.237-238; Stueck, The Korean War, pp.27-28 and Millett,
'Undertsanding Is Better Than Remembering'.
'37 Farrar-Hockley, The British Pati in the Korean War, Vail, p.29.
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guerrilla warfare had failed but Kim still hoped for a successful uprising once his troops
had broken through the defences of the South. He claimed that a swift victory would
ensue. Stalin, however, was concerned with the wider picture. As a communist victory in
China appeared imminent, Stalin told Kim that: 'the Americans will never agree to be
thrown out of [Korea and] lose their reputation as a great power'. Nevertheless, Stalin,
realising that the United States was in retreat in China and Korea, did not dismiss the
possibility and consulted Mao. The completion of American troop withdrawal from
South Korea in June 1949 and victory of the CCP in October 1949, provided Kim with
additional courage and a boost in morale.' Before Stalin would contemplate giving Kim
a green light to invade South Korea, the Soviet leader wanted first to secure an alliance
with Mao. This he hoped would result in a 'transnational network' embracing North
Korea, Manchuria and the Soviet Northeast Asian Provinces. It would later transpire that
the Sino-Soviet alliance of February 1950 made provisions that excluded Britain and the
United States from Manchuria and Sinkiang. Stalin was animated by the need to secure
an advantageous strategic environment before Kim embarked on an invasion o South.'39
Stalin's attitude is highlighted when Kim launched several border attacks on the
Ongjin peninsula, north of Seoul, in May and October 1949. Although Soviet advisers in
Korea were involved in these operations, Stalin feared they would start a general war
before his Northeast Asian consolidation had been completed. Stalin, therefore,
immediately sent instructions to Ambassador Shtikov in Pyongyang during October to
halt Kim's unauthorised attack.' 4° By the end of 1949, the War Office was firmly
convinced that the North Korean Army could advance into South Korea with little
138 Weiqun Gu, Conflicts of Divided Nations: The Cases of China and Korea (London, 1995), p.l36;
Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's CoW (Var; p.54 and Yahuda, The International Politics of/be
Asia-PacifIc, 1945-1995, p.167.
139 Kim, Fhe Origins of the Korean War', p.201.
140 ibid., pp.188, 192-193, 196-197 and Millett, 'Understanding Is Better Than Remembering'.
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difficulty. A North Korean invasion was, however, considered unlikely in the immediate
future. It was thought that the North Koreans would pursue: 'the well-tried tactics of
preparing the country within rather than resort to open aggression'. If an invasion did
occur, the War Office argued that the Americans were unlikely to become involved. The
War Office concluded that: 'the possession of South Korea is not essential for allied
strategic plans, and although it would be obviously desirable to deny it to the enemy, it
could not be of sufficient importance to make it the cause of World War Three'.141
In conclusion, the War Office's final assessment for Korea before the outbreak of war in
June 1950, seems, in retrospect, wildly inaccurate. What led the War Office to reach these
conclusions? On the whole, British officials devoted little time to analysing the situation
in Korea. The Chiefs of Staff, for example, absorbed in military matters for Europe, the
Middle East and Southeast Asia, did not discuss Korea at all during 1948-1949 and this
remained the case until the outbreak of the Korean War. There was also little that the
British could do to change the situation. However, this lack of attention was a major
reason behind Britain's inability to deal with the Korean situation. One could argue that
Britain was not far-sighted and vigilant enough to understand that Korea could pose a
serious threat to the Cold War balance of power. Indeed, it was not until Kim's invasion
of South Korea in June 1950 that the British finally recognised that its outcome would
affect imperial territories such as Hong Kong and Malaya, possessing wider implications
for the Cold War. 142
 In Britain's defence, since 1945, there were no indications from
American policymakers that the United States government treated Korea as a strategic
priority. Still, the United States, unlike the British, did recognise the Cold War
141 Ferguson-hines to Scott, letter, 30 December 1949, Lowe, CDntaining the Cold Ii7tn in East Asia,
p.181.
142 The situation in Korea', Minutes of a meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet held
in Attlee's Room at the House of Commons, 28 June 1950 in H.Yasamee and K.Haniilton(eds.),
DBPO, Series II, VoL fV Korea 1950-1951 (London, 1991), pp.7-10.
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repercussions for the Western powers if they completely withdrew from Korea. It started
a familiar pattern in Cold War politics where the sheer presence of one side meant that
the other side had to be there too. 143
143 GaddisjVe Now Know, p.71.
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VI
BRITAIN AND THE MOVE TOWARDS A
COMMUNIST CHINA, 1948-1949
I. Introduction
By 1948, the Chinese Nationalists had effectively lost control of Manchuria. The British,
however, still dismissed the possibility of a CCP-controlled China and a Cold War threat
to its imperial position in Southeast Asia. The British hoped that the United States would
continue to aid the Nationalists in order to stabilise central and southern China. But the
scale of aid needed to ensure this stability did not arrive. In 1948, the American military
had designated China as an extremely low priority while the State Department admitted it
could no longer influence events on the ground. The latter informed the British that the
diversion of resources to China could only be achieved at the expense of assistance to
Europe. The Foreign Office realised that if the United States could not help the
Nationalists, there was no one else who could. These facts, combined with the rapid
advance of Mao's forces in China, belatedly saw British planners become increasingly
concerned about communist infiltration into Hong Kong, Formosa and Southeast Asia.
By 1949, as the British began to view events in East Asia in a Cold War context, large
Chinese communities inside British territories and an American reluctance to defend
merely more than a perimeter around China, exacerbated fears that the whole allied
position on mainland Asia could turn 'red'. Inside China itself, the Cabinet, worried
about the impact of the advance on the British trading community, prepared planning
papers for a communist-dominated China. The British hoped that there would be an
initial period of CCP tolerance towards foreign trading interests, as it sought to
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reconstruct China. There was also optimism that the British could encourage a split
between Soviet and Chinese communism. Indeed, although Mao's world view moved
closer to Stalin's during the I 940s, the former was not prepared to subsume his interests
under the Soviet Union. But, equally, Mao feared Western attempts to undermine his
revolution and was anxious to remove foreign influence from China. In an effort to
maintain Britain's imperial interests in China and Hong Kong, the British government
aimed to keep 'a foot in the door', by recommending early recognition of the CCP, the
military reinforcement of Hong Kong, the abandonment of the Nationalist regime in
Formosa and a refusal to accept American attempts to place embargoes on a variety of
key goods to China.
IL Assessing the Prospect of a Chinese Communist Victory
Relations between Britain and the Chinese Nationalists reached a nadir by early 1948.
Protecting Britain's imperial interests, on 5 and 12 January 1948, the Hong Kong
government evicted squatters from the walled-city of Kowloon on the grounds that their
continued presence and growing numbers represented a menace to the security of the
colony. t
 In response, Chinese mobs destroyed British property at Canton on 16 January
1948 as a protest against the Kowloon City evictions. Attempting to make a major issue
of the incident, the Nationalists claimed jurisdiction over Kowloon in a populist effort to
curb British treaty rights. The matter remained a contentious one between the British and
Chinese until it faded amidst the rapid advance of CCP armies.2
 Nevertheless, southern
Grantham to Secretary of State for Colonies, telegram no.956, 20 October 1948,
F14784/154/10,FO 371/69583.
2 Under the 1898 Anglo-Chinese Convention, Chinese claims for jurisdiction over Kowloon City
were technically correct But after disturbances in 1899 by repeated attacks on British forces, the
latter occupied the city in 1899, and refused to recede on this position. 'Kowloon Walled City',
Scarlett, minute, 14 January 1949, F860/154/10, FO 371/69577. See 'Kowloon Walled City',
Scarlett, minute, 10 March 1948, F3602/154/10, FO 371/69580 and 'Arson of British Property
at Canton (Shameen Incident)', Hall to Stevenson, telegram no.IA, 22 January 1948,
F2019/361/10, FO 371/69605.
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China gained prominence in Nationalist politics during 1948. Soong, Chiang's
brother-in-law and former Foreign Minister, had been sent to Canton to try and hold the
south, as the Nationalists began to anticipate that northern and possibly central China
could be lost to the CCP. Sir Ronald Hall, the British Consul-General at Canton, thought
Soong's position was 'an entirely hopeless one' as he had no party following whatever in
Canton amongst the people that counted.3
Hall's assessment reflected just one aspect of a rapidly deteriorating situation for the
Chinese Nationalist government. During February 1948, Brigadier Field reported to his
superiors that the Nationalist armies were struIing to hold Manchuria. Reinforcements
of 'crack mechanised troops' had not, wrote Field, produced any appreciable effect.
Scathingly, Field pointed out that 'one has to remember that "crack" now means a
division which once had some American weapons, and which wasn't too badly
frightened in Burma; and "mechanised" means a division which still has a few jeeps that
work'. Field did not now doubt that the long range communist military plan would
encompass a jump across the Yangtze into China's central provinces. The only question
that remained was when such an operation would be launched.4
 Although the United
States Ambassador to China, John Stuart, argued that for American aid to be effective,
Chiang had to be assisted in maintaining a foothold in Manchuria,5
 Field concluded that:
'I consider it absolutely beyond the capacity of the government to restore the general
Manchurian situation, even to where it was eighteen months ago'.6
Destruction of British Property at Canton (Shameen Incident), Hall to Stevenson, telegram
no.2A, 22Januaq 1948, F1900/361/10, FO 371/69605.
to Tarver, letter DO 5/48,4 February 1948, WO 208/4922.
Dening, minute, 23 January 1948, F1120/33/10, FO 371/69527; Levine, 'A New Look at
American Mediation in the Chinese Civil War', pp.349-376 and Lowe, Containiig the Cold (Var in
EastAia, pp.85-86
6 Field to Tarver, letter DO 9/48, 3 March 1948, WO 208/4922 and Stevenson to Bevin, letter,
2 February 1948, F2535/33/10, FO 371/69527.
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However, at this point, Britain and the United States were not prepared to completely
abandon the Nationalist government. In early 1948, the Ministry of Fuel and Power told
the Foreign Office that the Shell Oil company had signed two contracts with Nationalist
China in 1947, to supply aviation spirit to the Chinese Air Force. Shell had still to deliver
43,000 barrels and the Ministry of Fuel and Power pointed out that two American
companies had been supplying aviation spirit as welL 7 The Foreign Office was aware that
the supply of aviation spirit did constitute assistance in the Chinese civil war,
contravening Britain's policy of non-intervention, but thought that the interests of
British oil companies would most probably suffer. From the political point of view, the
Foreign Office predicted that the Nationalists would 'take it hard' if it discouraged
British oil companies from renewing their contracts. The Foreign Office, therefore, saw
no political objection to supplies being continued. 8
 In March 1948, the Foreign Office
also allowed the export of indirect military assistance to China in the form of aircraft
engine parts and supporting technicians.9
What little assistance the British could render for Nationalist China was unlikely to
have any appreciable effects. By May 1948, Nationalist forces in north China were
effectively isolated. Inefficiency had doed the Nationalist Army. British intelligence
saw a Nationalist high command hamstrung by ineffective commanders who subjected
the Army to order, counter-order and disorder. 1° The main reason for this was that
' Farrell to Scott, letter, 4 February 1948, F2182/34/1O, FO 371/69551.
See Scott, minute, 10 February 1948, F2182/34/1O, FO 371/69551 and Scarlett, minute, 11
February 1948, F2182/34/10, FO 371/69551.
Engine parts would be sent to Dc Havilland, Canada, for fitting on aircraft destined for China.
15 Nene jet engines would be supplied to China by Rolls Royce Ltd, together with the despatch
of engineers to service Mosquito aircraft Finally, 40-50,000 sparking plugs would be supplied to
an American firm for use in connection with the aircraft for Dc Havilland. In none of these cases
was a direct export of arms and munitions of war to China involved. Scarlett, minute, 25 March
1948, F5192/34/10, FO 371/69551; Haynes to Scott, letter, 30 March 1948, F5192/34/10, FO
371/69551 and Dening, 5 April 1948, F5192/34/10, FO 371/69551.
10 
'Higher Direction of the Chinese Nationalist Army', DM1 memorandum, 8 April 1948, WO
208/4569.
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Chiang put his 'old friends' into places of high command who did not possess the
required standard and ability.' 1
 Although Nationalist forces were numerically superior to
those of the CCP, the latter continued to increase their supplies by the capture of
government stocks.' 2
 Despite Field's sombre assessments on the state of the Nationalist
Army and Hall's warning that China's southern regions were not stable, the JIC did not
envisage a complete CCP victory in China. The JIG doubted the ability of the CCP to
administer any large commercial or industrial area because they were experienced only in
living off the countryside. The JIG were prepared to write-off northern China but
remained confident that the communists would merely consolidate their position as far
south as the Yangtze. In the opinion of the JIC, to which many Foreign Officials
concurred, the CCP would not overrun southern China, threatening Hong Kong and
Britain's imperial interests in Asia, due to the hardening of resistance by the provincial
troops of the Nationalist government and United States aid.' 3
 Such an analysis dismissed
any change in the Cold War balance of power and would prove to be extremely wide of
the mark.
The JIC did not realise that by 1948 the American Joint Chiefs of Staff had begun to
list China as a very low and declining Cold War priority, compared to Europe, the
Middle East and, increasingly, Japan. The United States Army and Navy Departments
had also begun to question the sense of continuing aid to Nationalist China. A prevailing
Record by MacDonald on conversation with Soong, 9 June 1948, 22/2/45, MacDonald
papers, DUL 'Higher Direction of the Chinese Nationalist Army',DMI memorandum, 8 April
1948, WO 208/4569 and Dreyer,Cbina at Waç p.337.
12 The JIC estimated that Nationalist forces totalled 3.5 million effective troops while the CCP's
Army consisted of 1.25 million regulars. The JIC estimate of the Chinese Air Force was 465
aircraft. Of these 110 were unserviceable requiting spare parts and 145 non-combat types, mainly
transport. It was estimated that of the remaining 210, about 120 were unserviceable requiring
minor or major maintenance service. Only 90 combat aircraft could be considered fully
operational. This was not helped by general inefficiency and an almost complete lack of
co-ordinated direction to field commanders. 'China-Military Situation', JIC(48)30(0), 13 May
1948, DEFE 4/13.
13 lbici and Lowe, Containing the Cold WarinEastAcia, pp.86-87.
272
BRITAIN AND THE MOVE TOWARDS A COMMUNIST CHINA
view in the State Department suggested that even if the whole of China turned
communist, the Soviet Union would gain little benefit in terms of global power. Aside
from Manchuria and the northeast, the Policy Planning Staff, for example, felt that China
was a 'vast poor house', lacking strategic resources and requiring huge economic
assistance to recover from over a decade of war. 14
 Washington therefore hoped that the
'loss' of China would have little impact on the Cold War. The Truman administration did
yield to Congressional pressure for a limited programme of economic and military aid to
the Nationalists, but it did so more for the purpose of defeating opposition to the ERP
and buying time in East Asia, than from any conviction that aid to China might actually
be effective. 15
 The British JIG considered that the China Aid Bill of $338m for relief and
reconstruction, and $125m for military aid, would not prove effective in time to prevent
the collapse of northern China but vainly hoped that it might result in stabilisation
thereafter.16
The British JIC's confidence in the ability of Nationalist China to hold central and
southern China would be dealt several blows during the latter half of 1948. Field
reported that American military assistance, administered through its advisory group in
China, continued 'to get nowhere and achieve virtually no results'.' 7
 In June 1948, with
Berlin blockaded and entanglement in Palestine, General Bradley, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and General Wedemeyer, Director of Plans and Operations, displayed
14 Memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff, 7 September 1948, FRUS, VoLt/Ill: The Far East:
Cbina, 1948 (Washington, 1973), pp.146-165; Nancy Tucker, Patterns in the Duct: Chinese-American
Relations and the Recognition Contnwery, 1949-1950 (New York, 1983), p.i4; Leffler, A Preponderance
of Power, p.249 and Christensen, UsefidAdversaries, pp.60-61.
15 Gaddis, The Long Peace, p.75; Christensen, Useful Adversaries, chp.3; Lowe, Containing the Cold
War in EastAsia, p.11S; ltKoen, The China Lob& in American Politics (London, 1974) and Alistair
Cooke, 'Republicans Tip-Toe Away From an Avalanche: Mr.Marshall Reveals China to Them',
Manchester Guardian, 23 February 1948. For the United States debate over the grant of aid to
China see FRUS, 1948, VoL I/Ill, pp.442-685.
16 
'China-Military Situation',JIC(48)30(0), 13 May 1948, DEFE 4/13.
to Tarver, letter DO/MA/450(a), 24 . May 1948, WO 208/4922.
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even more reluctance than Marshall in placing advisers with Nationalist forces, while
Royall suggested the cessation of military supplies.' 8
 Butterworth dejectedly told Franks
that the United States government could no longer influence events in China and was at
pains to indicate that American sympathy for Chiang was on the wane. Franks concluded
that: 'it would appear that the Americans have no definite policy towards China'.19
Franks was right The State Department and NSC remained reluctant to withdraw aid
from the Nationalists completely, did not favour a rapprochement with the CCP and
pinned flimsy hopes on supporting regional opposition groups to the communists.20
Lacking any alternative suggestions, officials at the Foreign Office were sympathetic to
the American position in China, but realised that if the United States could not help the
Nationalist government, there was no one else who could.21
In a bid to stem the engulfing communist tide, the Nationalist government attempted
to introduce currency control measures to retard inflation but the Chinese Minister of
Finance clearly revealed to the British Ambassador in China, that he himself was
doubtful if the present reserves were adequate. The civil war with its effect on the
disruption of communications, continued to hamper local production and distribution,
while the shortage of foreign exchange, even allowing for the recent China Aid Bill,
remained. British officials at Shanghai gloomily noted that with wholesale prices tripling
in the month of June and retail prices similarly tripling during the month of July, there
18 Memorandum of conversation by Marshall, 11 June 1948, FRUS, 1948, VoL VIII, pp.90-99
and 'Possible Courses of Action for the U.S. with Respect to the Critical Situation in China',
NSC 22,26 July 1948, ibid., pp.118-122.
Franks to Foreign Office, telegram no.222, 5 June 1948, F8226/6319/23, FO 371/69927.
20 See Inverchapel to Foreign Office, telegram no.1069, 6 March 1948, F361 1/190/10, FO
371/69584; Possible Courses of Action for the United States with the Respect to the Critical
Situation in China',Report by the JSSC, JCS 1721/11, 31 July 1948, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 44,
KCL; draft report by NSC on United States Policy Toward China, 2 November 1948, FRUS,
1948, VoL VIII, pp.185-187 and Butterworth memorandum for Lovett, 3 November 1948, ibid.,
pp.187-189.
21 Scarlett, minute, 14 June 1948, F8226/6319/23, FO 371/69927 and Scott, minute, 26
February 1948, F3004/190/10, FO 371/69584.
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was a general feeling amongst the public that the situation had become untenable.
According to Stevenson, his American counterpart had now lost all faith in Chiang. By
the end of 1948, Chiang avoided implementing any social, political or economic changes
to alleviate the deplorable conditions facing the peasants. It contrasted sharply with the
CCP's integration of political, economic and military objectives, that made full use of the
peasant population and resources at its disposal. The speed with which the Nationalists
collapsed in 1949, reflected its poor relationship with the Chinese people. One British
official claimed that the Nationalists were so unpopular that they acted virtually as a fifth
column for the CCP.24
The turning point for Chiang was his doomed effort to win back Manchuria. During
the last four months of 1948, the Nationalists lost nearly one million men through death,
desertion or capture, along with an enormous quantity of military equipment When
Chiang started to bomb his own troops rather than permit their weapons and supplies to
fall into CCP hands, he made emphatically clear the failure of his resistance effort. Field
lamented the ease with which the communist armies were advancing and observed that:
'one feels they really ought to accept a handicap of some sort, like having the Ministry of
National Defence move over to their side en bloc. It would be too much, to ask them to
22 
'New Chinese Economic and Currency Measures', Mackenzie to Lamb, telegram no.422, 24
August 1948, F12232/39/1O, FO 371/69568.
23 Stevenson to Foreign Office, telegram no.567, 8 July 1948, F9585/33/10, FO 371/69536.
24 See 'Appreciation of North China Situation in the Event of Nationalist Collapse', Franklin
memorandum, 19 March 1948 in Burdett to Stevenson, despatch no.10, 19 March 1948,
F6117/33/10, FO 371/69531. In the villages, towns and cities of northern and central
Manchuria, a new communist structure of power was erected through a series of often violent
campaigns aimed particularly against landlords, rich peasants and their political agents in the
countryside. As the old elite was dispersed and destroyed, CCP cadres redistributed their land
and possessions. See Patricia Ebrey, The Cambridge Ilbistrated History of China (Cambridge, 1996),
pp.286, 290; Levine,Anvil of Victory, pp.124, 137 and Christopher Jesperson, American Images of
China, p.152
25 ibid., p.15l; Dreyer, China at War, pp.336-344) and Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the United
States, p.l9.
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accept the President and let him direct their strategy! 26
 On a more serious note, in late
1948, the British Directorate of Military Intelligence finally began to see dangerous Cold
War connotations to a possible collapse of Nationalist resistance. The capacity of the
Nationalist government to hold south China was of particular concern to Britain, with
regard to its imperial interests in I-long Kong and Southeast Asia. After the loss of
Manchuria, intelligence indicated that there were several CCP cells and a number of
bandit groups south of the Yangtze which the CCP were attempting to link. However,
like the JIG analysis before, the Directorate confidently hoped that if the central
government were strengthened by substantial external aid and its direction became more
democratic, south and west China could remain under Nationalist control. But, it was
recognised that Manchuria and most of China north of the Yangtze were unlikely to be
regained by the Nationalist government, even after a prolonged period of reconstruction
in the south with foreign aid.27
 The British continued to underestimate the strength and
potential of the CCP
In fact, no aid to the Nationalists was forthcoming and when Madame Chiang
Kai-shek made a direct and formal approach to Marshall in a last desperate appeal,
Washington rejected her advances. Marshall told Bevin when they met at the UN
General Assembly discussions in Paris during November 1948, that although the United
States would continue to supply the Nationalists with aid from existing contracts, his
26 Field to Tarver, letter D/O No.42/48, 5 October 1948, WO 208/4922.
27 
'The Military Situation in South China', DM1 memorandum, 3 November 1948, WO
208/4748.
28 Memorandum of conversation, by Secretary of State, 3 December 1948, FRUS, 1948,
VoL I/Ill, pp.299-301 and Stevenson to Foreign Office, telegram no.1071, 30 November 1948,
F16816/190/10, FO 371/69587. Lovett told Franks that it was difficult to see what more the
United States could do. If the State Department issued a statement that assisted Chiang, they
would be concealing the true facts from the American public and Congress. Yet, if the State
Department revealed the true facts, they would 'pull the rug from under Chiang Kai-shek's feet'.
Lovett felt, therefore, that it was best to say nothing. See Franks to Foreign Office, telegram no.
5437, 29 November 1948, F16909/190/10, FO 371/69587.
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government was at its 'wits end' over China. Referring to Chiang's disastrous campaign
in Manchuria, Marshall explained that Nationalist forces were providing more arms and
equipment for the Chinese communist armies in a week than the United States could
produce in twelve months. Importantly, Marshall pointed out to Bevin, that to dissipate
their men or material further in China could only be done at the expense of the Marshall
p 29 To add to the West's difficulties in China, there was minimal consultation
between the Foreign Office and the State Department. This state of affairs began to
witness signs of a divergence in Anglo-American policies towards China by late 1948.
During October, as the Nationalist position in Manchuria crumbled, official emergency
warnings were issued to American citizens in China, by Ambassador Stuart and John
Cabot, the Consul-General in Shanghai, recommending evacuation. This panic
contrasted sharply with British calmness inside China and officials on the ground
deemed it prudent for the British business community to stay put.3°
This decision, supported by the Foreign Office, sprung from the conviction that even
if the CCP were victorious, it would be impossible for Mao to rule China without outside
help that might include Britain. The British had already received reports noting the
presence of Soviet technical advisers in north China,3' and Bevin told the Cabinet in
December 1948, that after a communist victory, economic difficulties would possibly
force the CCP to be tolerant towards foreign trading interests. Nonetheless, Bevin
warned that: 'the present nationalist tendency towards foreign investments and capital
installations would thereafter be enhanced and that the intention to work rapidly towards
29 Bevin to Foreign Office, telegram no.109, 19 November 1948, F16331/190/10, FO
371/69586 and Scarlett, minute, 6 December 1948, F17445/33/10, FO 371/69546.
30 Xiang, Rscasting the Imperial FarEast, pp.150-151, 160-161.
31 A source from the British Kailan mining administration Staff in north China reported that on
2 December 1948, he saw scores of Russians arrive at Chinwangtao, wearing a kind of
semi-official uniform with no insignias or badges, who proceeded to examine all technical
installations. See His Majesty's Consul-General(Tientsin) to Nanking, despatch no.502, 14
December 1948, F969/1015/10, FO 371/75737.
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the exclusion of the foreigner would be strengthened'. Finally, Bevin felt that the Chinese
communists would subject foreign trade, both import and export, to close government
control, which did not altogether suit the types of trade British merchants were
accustomed to in China. Bevin's general conclusion was that, after a temporary
dislocation of perhaps several months, trade between the sterling area and China would
not cease under communist domination. Its maintenance would, however, present new
difficulties. If these could be overcome, a stable communist administration should be
able to do more than the present regime to provide commodities valuable to Britain in
payment for British exports'. 32
 A policy of keeping 'a foot in the door' was essential in
order to try and preserve British imperial and economic interests in the face of American
indecision. By not pulling out of China, the British also wanted to avoid appearing
hostile to the CCP, thereby hoping to undercut communist agitation in Southeast Asia.
III. Dealing with the Chinese Communist Thivat. Britain and the Defence
ofHong Kong Formosa and Southeast Asia
Throughout Southeast Asia, many territories, ravaged by the recent war, were dominated
by nationalist struggles against their European colonial rulers. In December 1947, Mao
called upon 'all anti-imperialist forces' to oppose colonialism and when a group of
international communists met at Calcutta during February-March 1948, to which a large
Soviet delegation was sent, revolts and violence broke out across Burma, Malaya and
Indonesia.33
 These events made the British more anxious to stabilise Southeast Asia.
32 
'Recent Developments in the Civil War in China', Bevin memorandum, CP(48)299, 9
December 1948, CAB 129/31 (Part I).
The Soviet Union had also for the first time obtained diplomatic representation in East and
Southeast Asia. See 'Communist Influence in the Far East', JIC(48)113(Fina), 17 December
1948, DEFE 4/19 and 'Communist Strategy in S.EAsia', Foreign Office memorandum, 12
November 1948, F15863/727/61, FO 371/69695. During 1948-1949, the CCP leadership began
to think in terms of a much broader anti-imperialist Asian and world revolution. They had come
to believe that their model of revolution transcended China and was the beginning of a new high
tide of revolutionary movements. See Chenjian, China's Road to the Korean War, p.21.
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However, British planners were not prepared to overestimate the influence of Soviet
designs on Southeast Asia in 1948. If, for example, communism did manage to expel the
European colonial powers from Southeast Asia, the extent to which the Soviet Union
could itself hope to fill the vacuum was not at present clear. The threat was more likely
to emerge from a Chinese communist-led revolution. But, as the last sub-section showed,
in 1948, the British still underestimated the ability of the CCP to rule China, let alone
lead a revolution in China. The Cabinet's Far Eastern Official Committee recognised
there was little Britain could do to halt communism inside China. The main task was to
build up resistance in the surrounding countries. The foundation with which this
resistance could be built up, rested upon United States support and the settling of
internal disputes in Indo-China and Indonesia. The next stage, according to the Foreign
Office and the Commanders-in-Chief, Far East (Cs-in-C, Far East), was the development
of local manpower and material, the promotion of economic and social welfare, a strong
intelligence apparatus backed by police powers, and political development with a view to
self-government. Maintaining stability in Malaya, argued the Cs-in-C, Far East, was the
key from which the influence of the British Commonwealth would radiate into India,
China, Burma, Siam, Indo-China and Indonesia.35
The outbreak of communist uprisings in Southeast Asia had moved the British to
start thinking about a Cold War policy for Asia. But, during the October 1948
Commonwealth conference, even though Bevin aired the idea of regional political and
economic co-operation, his proposals were only cautiously welcomed. India, Pakistan,
'Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities', JIC(48)9(0)Final, 23 July 1948, DEFE 4/5;
'Communist Strategy in S.E.Asia', Foreign Office memorandum, 12 November 1948,
F15863/727/61, FO 371/69695; Coates, minute, 30 December 1948, F17873/33/10, FO
371/69548 and Blackham, minute, 3 January 1949, ibid.
See 'The Strategic Position of Malaya', CIC(FE)(48)1(P), 6 February 1948, Annex to 'The
Strategic Position of Malaya', note by Stapleton, COS(49)43(0), 23 February 1948, DEFE 5/10;
'Communist Strategy in S.E.Asia', Foreign Office memorandum, 12 November 1948,
Fl 5863/727/61, FO 371/69695 and Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Cold IVar,
pp.270-27l.
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Australia and New Zealand, were all unwilling to do anything to support the European
imperial powers in Indo-China and Indonesia. Meanwhile, the State Department,
watching the United States position in China rapidly crumble, was also reluctant to
expend more dollars further south. As a Chinese communist crossing of the Yangzte
appeared increasingly likely in 1949, after Chiang's loss of Manchuria, Malcolm
MacDonald wrote a wealth of letters to London about the deteriorating situation and its
possible effects on Britain's imperial position. 37
 The Far Eastern Official Committee had
already warned the Cabinet that CCP control of China would present a 'grave danger to
Malaya', as the morale of the Malayan communistswould improve and more CCP agents
could be infiltrated. Siam and French Indo-China were seen as poor buffer states to
prevent the tide of communism.38
Consequently, MacDonald, hawkish and playing up the importance of Southeast Asia
in Britain's Cold War global strategy, hoped that the Attlee government would give him
something more than diplomacy to work with. Nevertheless, he realised that: 'In
London, the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak. In Washington, the flesh is strong, but
the spirit has so far been unwilling'.39
 Aware that the Americans were reluctant to spend
more dollars in Asia after 'burning their fingers in China',4° Hubert Graves, the
Asian-Pacific expert at the British Embassy in Washington, was left in no doubt by the
Foreign Office that he had 'to get the United States government to help us press the
36 Bk Ernest Bw,n, p.631 and Hack, 'Southeast Asia and British Strategy, 1944-51', p.323.
See, for example, MacDonald to Strang, letter, 3 April 1949, 22/8/88-90, MacDonald papers,
DUL.
38T, Britain SoutheastAcia and the Onset of the Cold (Var, p.271.
MacDonald to Killearn, letter, 26 February 1949, 22/6/80, MacDonald papers, DUL and
MacDonald to Bevin, letter, 23 March 1949, F4545/1073/61, FO 371/76033.
'China and Japan', Dening, minute for Bevin, 23 March 1949, F4408/1023/61, FO
371/76023; Dening to Syers, letter, 18 March 1949, F4486/1023/61, FO 371/76023; 'Southeast
Asia', Dening, minute for Strang, 23 March 1949, F4487/1023/61, FO 371/76023 and 'Brief on
South-East Asia', Bevin memorandum, 23 March 1949, ibid.
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Orientals to build up their own front against communism. If this has the convenient
sequel that America should become economically involved in Southeast Asia, so much
the better'. 4' In February 1949, Sir William Strang, after his recent journey through Asia,
felt that only through a combination of British experience and American resources could
the foundations of a positive policy be formed. 42
 Soon to take up his position as
permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office, Strang's hopes were ambitious and
unlikely to be realised, especially as the United States maintained its opposition to
imperialism. Britain, without a partner in Southeast Asia, had to turn to other methods to
prevent the spread of communism. As a world power Britain could not 'scuttle and run'
from its imperial responsibilities in Southeast Asia.
For their part, the Joint Planning Staff considered that in order to nullify communist
plans for political infiltration, Britain's main aims should be to restore law and order in
Malaya, give India all possible military assistance, encourage Australia and New Zealand
to take an active part in the theatre and continue with military support for the
governments of Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Siam.43 British garrisons in Southeast Asia,
argued the Joint Planning Staff, must give the necessary military backing to the political
and economic policy of the civil power. But, as the regular forces which the British could
afford to deploy in the theatre would be limited, both in peace and war, local forces,
suggested the Joint Planners, must be as strong as possible. Even these forces, the Joint
41 Graves to Dening, letter, 21 February 1949, F3215/1017/61, FO 371/76003. For an
indication of American reluctance to spend dollars in Southeast Asia see memorandum of
conversation by Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, 23 February 1949, FRUS,
VoL VII: The Far East am/Australia, 1949 (Washington, 1978), pp.1118-1119; Graves to Scarlett,
letter, 7 February 1949, F2415/1017/61, FO 371/76003 and Deiiing to Graves, letter, 14
February 1949, F2415/1017/61, FO 371/76003.
42 
'Sir William Strang's Tour in South-East Asia and the Far East', Strang report to Bevin, 27
February 1949, F4447/1051/61, FO 371/76028.
See 'Strategic Implications of the Situation in China', JP(48)124(Final), 12 January 1949,
DEFE 6/7 and 'General Strategic Implications of the Situation in China as Foreshadowed in the
Foreign Office Appreciation', COS memorandwn, COS(49)29, 20 January 1949, DEFE 5/13.
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Planners concluded, would be minimal and require the further support of an adequate
intelligence service, organised on a regional basis to ensure full co-operation between all
friendly countries in the area. However, British officials on the ground in Southeast
Asia were not satisfied with the results being achieved by the intelligence organisations.45
MacDonald now wanted a full time chairman appointed to the JIC, Far East, who could
co-ordinate all inteffigence activities across the theatre. This would relieve the existing
chairman, the deputy commissioner-general for Foreign Affairs, to concentrate fully on
his existing duties.' The Chiefs of Staff agreed to this and appointed a full time
chairman on a trial basis for two years.47
As a communist-dominated China became an increasingly real prospect, Whitehall
began to belatedly consider the Cold War implications. During early 1949, responding to
an appreciation by the Foreign Office, the Joint Planning Staff, in consultation with the
Colonial Office and the Cs-in-C, Far East, examined the consequences for British policy
in Asia, if Mao achieved victory. The Joint Planners argued that, in the event of a Hot
War, a communist China could be allied with the Soviet Union. Even in peace, the Joint
'Far East Strategy and Defence Policy',JP(48)1O1(Final Revise), 17 March 1949, DEFE 6/6.
MacDonald had been particularly unimpressed by the failure of the Malayan Security Service
to predict the internal threat to Malaya. See Andrew Defty, 'Organising Security and Intelligence
in the Far East Further Fruits of the Waldegrave Initiative: The Malcom MacDonald Papers,
The University of Durham', Stuij Group on Intü4gence: In the Arcbiv&c, Vol.22 No.16 (Winter
1997/1998), pp.2-5 and Karl Hack, 'British Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in the Era of
decolonisation The Example of Malaya', Intel4gence and National Security, Vol.14 No.2 (Summer,
1999), pp.124-i55. The chairman of the JIC had also been forced to admit that the Asian-Pacific
region had been accorded a low priority in intelligence. It had not even been given first or
second priority for intelligence purposes. The main problem which had to be faced was a
shortage of intelligence personneL Arrangements were therefore being made to allot the theatre
with a high proportion of the intelligence resources available. Hayter, minute, COS(49)92, 22
June 1949, DEFE 4/22.
46 BDCC, Far East, to COS, telegram no. SEACOS 888, 28 March 1949, 22/7/31, MacDonald
papers, DUL
MacDonald to Foreign Office, telegram no.294, 19 April 1949, 22/7/44, MacDonald papers,
DUL The function of the JIC, Far East, was to provide security intelligence, except military
intelligence which would remain the responsibility of the Cs-in-C, Far East. See 'Review of
Intelligence Organisation in the Far East', JIC(49)59(Final), 10 September 1949, DEFE 4/24 and
COS minutes to COS(49)138, 19 September 1949, DEFE 4/24.
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Planning Staff felt that a communist China might be available for the preparation of
bases and their use by Soviet forces in war. This could assist the Soviets in countering
the American strategic air offensive from Japan, forcing the allies to deploy larger static
air defences at the expense of European and Middle Eastern security. Still, the Joint
Planning Staff were confident that an allied retention of sea communications would
preclude direct threats to Australia and New Zealand. Similarly, while the allies controlled
the sea approaches, no serious invasion threat to Malaya or the East Indies could develop
owing to inadequate Chinese land communications. Yet, in a note of warning, the Joint
Planning Staff concluded that should the Soviets in war make use of bases in southern
China, the air threat to Southeast Asia would be increased. If unchecked, this would
result in the decreased production of rice, rubber, tin and oil, affecting the value of these
countries as minor support areas.
These military-strategic concerns prompted the Cs-in-C, Far East, to recommend
organising underground movements behind Chinese communist lines in an attempt to
hinder their advance while putting at least one brigade group on standby to reinforce
Hong Kong. Furthermore, The Cs-in-C, Far East, suggested that the integrity of
Formosa had to be upheld and immigration laws ruthlessly maintained in all of Britain's
imperial possessions. Formosa, according to the Cs-in-C, Far East, occupied an
important strategic position in relation to north French Indo-China and the coast of
China, between Hong Kong and the western Chinese frontier. 49
 Setting up a government
on the island in August 1949, after the Nationalist position on the mainland appeared
lost, Chiang would turn Formosa into a fortress and he hoped that the United States
48 
'Strategic Implications of the Situation in China', JP(48)124(Final), 12 January 1949, DEFE
6/7. See also 'Effects of Communist Successes in China'JIC(48)133(Revise), 6 January 1949,
CAB 158/5.
49 'Measures Required in View of the Communist Advance in China',CIC(FE)(48)8(P) in 'China',
Note by Price, COS(48)200, 10 December 1948, DEFE 5/19.
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would protect it. 50 During 1949, Anglo-American planners recognised that Formosa
could jeopardise lines of communications in relation to the defence of I-long Kong,
Japan and the Philippines. But, by the end of 1949, the State Department, disillusioned
with Chiang, persuaded the Joint Chiefs of Staff to disavow the use of overt military
force to protect the island, in favour of moderate economic and political help. 51 Stalin
also rejected giving military assistance to the CCP in their bid to recapture Formosa for
fear of provoking war between the United States and the Soviet Union.52
The State Department, the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff; all incorrectly held
out little hope that Chiang could defend Formosa beyond 1950, despite a successful
defence of the island by the Nationalists during the autumn of 1949. The Joint Chiefs,
ignoring MacArthur's requests, continued to discount a military occupation of the island,
in view ofit&.commitments to NATO and the likely adverse reaction it could provoke
amongst the Chinese people. In December 1949, the Joint Chiefs, under pressure from
lbint.Ch4e[s
Acheson,were forced to confess that Formosa posed no special threat to Japan,
Okinawa or the Philippines and that: 'there was little difference in terms of exposure of
Okinawa between hostile bases on the China mainland and on Formosa'. 53 The British
Allied policy toward Formosa was to treat it as occupied territory and return it China.
Churchill, Roosevelt, Chiang and Stalin accepted this recommendation during the end of 1943 at
Cairo and Teheran. But the Nationalistc1on their return, had systematically looted the island and
caused inflation, unemployment and a drop in production. Consequently in 1947, the Formosans
revolted but were ruthlessly suppressed by the Nationalists. See Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong and
the United States, pp.27-29; Gu, Conflicts of Divided Nations, p.37 and Chace, Atheson, p.217.
51 See 'The Military Situation in South China', DM1 memorandum, 3 November 1948, WO
208/4748; Gascoigne to Scarlett, letter, 20 January 1949, F1731/10345/23, FO 371/76215;
Lamb to Scarlett, letter, 21 February 1949, F3546/10127/10, FO 371/75801 and 'Recognition of
Chinese Communist Government',JP(49)140(Final), 28 November 1949, DEFE 6/11. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff; the State Department and MacArthur all considered that the loss of Formosa
could be detrimental to the security of the United States in the Pacific. See 'The Strategic
Importance of Formosa', NSC 37/3, 11 February 1949, FRUS, VoWC The FarEasi China, 1949
(Washington, 1974), pp.284-286; Gaddis, The Lang Peace, pp.80-83 and Chace, Acheson, p.221.
52 ov Lewis and Litai, Uncertain Partners, p.69.
See 'The Position of the United States with Respect to Formosa', report by JSSC, JCS
1966/17, 9 August 1949, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF45, KCL; 'Formosa', Conversation between
Dening, Butterworth and Livingston Merchant, 9 September 1949,F14256/1072/61, FO
371/76032; Dening to Elliott, letter, 18 October 1949, F15856/10127/10, P0 371/75804;
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had also protested to the Americans that continued military aid to the Nationalists on
Formosa could fall into the hands of the CCP and be turned on Hong Kong.
Consequently, the British JlC concluded that a Chinese communist occupation of
Formosa, would lift the present Nationalist blockade of Shanghai, improve possibilities
of trade with the CCP and reduce the likelihood of an attack on Hong Kong. TM
 These
proposals seemed more concerned with preserving Britain's imperial position in Asia.
Indeed, Hong Kong had developed into one of the world's great entrepots, with
commercial interests not just in China but throughout Asia. Throughout 1949, British
planners had been worried about threats to Hong Kong, particularly in the form of
internal unrest through communist-influenced trade unions, a large scale influx of
refugees or CCP-inspired external aression by guerrilla bands. To combat these
problems, the BDCC, Far East, requested that the 3 battalions on Hong Kong be
reinforced by a brigade group and the Chiefs of Staff agreed.55
'Measures which might be taken to prevent Formosa and its military assets coming under
Communist control',JIC(49)99(Final), 27 October 1949, DEFE 4/26 and Price to Scarlett, letter,
21 November 1949, F17490/10127/10, FO 371/75805. For the American stance see
memorandum of conversation by Sprouse, 6 December 1949, FRUS, 1949, VoLIX, pp.435-437;
memorandum of conversation by Acheson, 29 December 1949, ibid, pp.463-467 and 'The
Position of the United States with respect to Asia', NSC 48/1, 23 December 1949, RJCS:
1946-1953, MF 56, KCL. By November 1949, the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force
advocated that the CIA begin to plan for the destruction of Chiang's air force as soon as the fall
of Formosa appeared imminent. See Tucker, Taiwan Hong Ko, and the United States, p.30 and
Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, pp.209-211. CCP commanders, encouraged by easy
victories on the mainland, began to underestimate the Nationalists remaining strength. Without
air and naval support and other means of shipping, when Chinese communist armies landed at
Jinmen on 25 October 1949, Nationalist forces won control of the sea and air, destroyed all
transport vessels and in 3 days of fighting the CCP lost 9,000 troops. One week later the
communists lost another division. See He Di, "The Last Campaign to Unify China": The CCP's
Unxnaterialised Plan to Liberate Taiwan, 1949-1950',Cbinese Historians, VoL5 No.1 (Spring 1992),
p.6.
Butterworth memorandum for Acheson, 28 December 1948, FRUS, 1949, VoLJX,
pp.461-463; memorandum of conversation by Acheson, 29 December 1949, ibid., p.467 and
'Implications of the Defection of the Nationalist Forces on the Security of Hong Kong',
JIC(49)98(Final), 26 October 1949, CAB 158/8.
'Reinforcement of Hong Kong', Alexander memorandum, DO(49)32, 26 April 1949, CAB
131/6 and Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, p.23.
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MacDonald and the Chiefs of Staff felt that if Britain did not defend the colony, it
would have a disastrous effect on Britain's imperial position in Asia, particularly amongst
friendly countries such as Burma, Siam and French Indo-China. Bevin endorsed these
recommendations but opposed MacDonald's suggestion that Britain take a provocative
attitude by declaring that they would never leave Hong Kong in any circumstances. In
the opinion of Bevin and Attlee, British policy had to focus on resisting aggression.57
Bevin's argument was based on galvanising world-wide support for Britain's actions in
defending Hong Kong. The Canadians, for example, had already stated that they would
not help defend British colonial possessions. 58
 During the summer of 1949, despite its
useful position with regards to intelligence gathering, the United States also declared that
a commitment to help protect Hong Kong was out of the question. At a time when
NATO was under consideration by Congress, the latter could question the boundaries of
the Pact.59
 Notwithstanding a mixed response on the part of the Commonwealth to
provide material support, the British had their full moral support. 6° However, in June
1949, the British obtained intelligence that exposed the CCP's long-term economic plans
MacDonald, minute, COS(49)73, 18 May 1949, DEFE 4/21 and Alexander, minute,
COS(49)73, 18 May 1949, ibid.
See Bevin, minute, China and Southeast Asia Committee, SAC(49)5, 19 May 1949, CAB
134/669 and 'Hong Kong',Attlee memorandum, CP(49)119, 24 May 1949, C129/35. The
Cabinet supported Bevin's and Attlee's policy. See Cabinet conclusions, CM(49)38, 26 May 1949,
CAB 128/15.
58 United Kingdom High Commissioner (Canada) to CR0, telegram no.639, 28 May 1949,
F7962/1192/10, FO 371/75873.
'Implications of a Possible Chinese Communist Attack on Foreign Colonies in South China',
COS, United States Army memorandum, 10 June 1949, JCS 1330/51, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 56,
KCL See also Johannes Lombardo, 'A Mission of Espionage, Intelligence and Psychological
Operations: The American Consulate in Hong Kong, 1949-64', in Special Issue, Inlel4gence and
National Security, VoL14 No.4 (Winter 1999), pp.64-81.
60 New Zealand even made available three frigates and a transport flight of three Dakotas.
Australia and India doubted that a CCP attack on Hong Kong was likely. Australia had made
available some shipping and was considering to offer medical supplies and ammunition. But the
Joint Planners thought that Australia could be more forthcoming with material assistance if
Hong Kong was actually attacked. See 'Current United Kingdom policy in China and Hong
Kong', JP(49)97(Final), 14 September 1949, DEFE 6/10.
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for Kwangtung in southern China. The plans envisaged the continuation of the colonial
administration at Hong Kong. Other indicators helped to relieve the tension for the
British. The Hong Kong security authorities, for example, had not discovered any
evidence of preparations for an internal rising, while internal CCP propaganda made no
claims for Hong Kong.61
 By late 1949, the Joint Planning Staff and JIC still did not
possess any evidence for, or fear, an imminent Chinese communist attack on Hong
Kong. 62
The military reinforcement of Hong Kong appeared to vindicate the Cs-in-C, Far
East, assertion that, in Cold War, a 'half-hearted policy will achieve nothing since only
firm direction and the visible signs of power are likely to convince the oriental mind'.
Despite these strong words, the British had few military resources at hand and little
money to help sustain struggling countries in Southeast Asia and protect them from
communist insurgency. 63
 Meanwhile, policymakers in Washington remained reluctant to
commit resources to the Asian mainland and advocated that Japan and the Philippines
should form the main bulwark of a 'defensive perimeter' to safeguard American Cold
War interests.TM Kennan categorically told British officials that States in Southeast Asia
had to be capable of defending themselves. 65
 The Foreign Office questioned the validity
of the 'defensive perimeter' concept. It worried that if Burma, Siam and Indo-China
61 
'Situation in South China as at 28th June 1949', JIC(49)44/1O(Final), 24 June 1949, CAB
158/7.
62 
'Recognition of Chinese Communist Government', JP(49)140(Final), 28 November 1949,
DEFE 6/11 and 'A Review of the Threat to Hong Kong as at 4th October 1949',
JIC(49)44/11(Final), 5 October 1949, CAB 158/7.
63 Britain hatmited supplies to the Burmese as part of a policy of encouraging them to
accommodate the rebellious Karens, perceived as dependable anti-communists, and had little
money to offer even for the hard-pressed Malayan Government See 'Far East Strategy and
Defence Policy'JP(49)101(Final Revise), 17 March 1949, DEFE 6/6 and Hack, 'Southeast Asia
and British Strategy, 1944-51', p.323.
64 See Kennan, Memoirs, p.38l ; Blum, Drtra'ing The Line, chp.7 and Gaddis, The Lone Peace, p.80.
65 Hayter toJebb, letter, 20 May 1949, W3062/2/500, FO 371/76383. See also Franks to Bevin,
letter, 22 March 1949, F4595/1015/10, FO 371/75747 for further indications of a cautious
American attitude regarding commitments to Southeast Asia.
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turned communist, the foothold in the perimeter ring would become precarious. Britain's
imperial position in the South China Sea depended on the existence of bases at Malaya
and I-long Kong. If these bases were lost, the position of the perimeter countries, even if
bolstered by American aid would become militarily impossible. Recollections of
experiences in 1941-1942 were undoubtedly helping to shape the British reaction to the
crisis.
As leading media platforms, such as The Economist, stirred up emotions about the
implications of Chinese communism on the borders of Southeast Asia,67
 the British
continued to 'peg away' at the Americans, in order to highlight the seriousness of the
situation. In the intervening period, Bevin told Attlee that the British should, at the
forthcoming Commonwealth Foreign Ministers meeting, start to prepare the ground for
economic regional co-operation which could later develop into a security arrangement.69
To preserve Britain's imperial position and world power status, the BDCC, Far East,
agreed and urged the formation of a containing ring against further communist
penetration. The BDCC, Far East, hoped that this 'containing ring' would include India,
Burma, Siam, French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies. 70
 Evidence suests that
these British reactions to the situation in Asia were not misplaced. A prominent official
in the CCP leadership, flu Shao-ch'i, would visit Stalin in the summer of 1949, to hear
the latter surprisingly tell him that the CCP should advance the rising tide of world
revolution, especially in Asia. 71
 Yet, this conversation had implications that would also
Blackburn, minute, 8 March 1949, F3215/1017/61, FO 371/76003.
67 
'South-East Asia', The Economist, 28 May 1949. For similar arguments see also 'South-East
Asia', Manchester Guardian, 5 May 1949.
Scott, minute, 30 April 1949, F4595/1015/10, FO 371/75747; Bevin, minute, 30 April 1949,
ibid and Xiang, Raasiin the JmAbe,ia/ Far East, p.201.
69 Bevin, minute for Attlee, 21 April 1949, F8035/1072/61, FO 371/76031 and 'South Asia',
Bevin memorandum, 14 April 1949, ibid.
70 Alexander, minute, CM(49)33, 9 May 1949, CAB 128/15.
Liu remained cautious in acknowledging before Stalin that China would have sole control over
288
BRITAIN AND THE MOVE TOWARDS A COMMUNIST CHINA
help to serve the British in their effort to combat communism. The Malays, for example,
formed a bulwark against communism, seeing it as foreign and rooted in a Chinese
community they perceived as a political and economic threat.72
The threat remained but achieving a regional agreement similar to the North Atlantic
Pact would be harder to accomplish in Asia. Firstly, an American commitment was
lacking because of its disastrous policy towards China. Secondly, the imperial policies of
the French and Dutch were regarded with great suspicion by the Asiatic peoples and the
United States.73
 The cultural, political and historical complexities of the region, led the
New Zealanders, for example, to table ideas for a Pacific Pact in the summer of 1949,
that contained only 'peoples of European origin'. The Pact would exclude India, Japan,
Siam and, for political reasons, the French and Dutch as well. The idea was quite simply
to secure a United States military guarantee for Australia, New Zealand and British
territories in Southeast Asia.74
 When the Filipino President, Elpidio Quirino, proposed a
regional Pacific Pact he insisted that the United States provide money and leadership.
However, Quirino's idea won few friends once Chiang had managed to sign his name to
the Pact.75
 Both the Foreign and Commonwealth Relations Offices, for their part, saw
India as a crucial link in constructing a regional agreement but they realised that the
British could not surrender the initiative to India, that could affect Britain's world power
the direction of Asian revolution. Stalin may also not have been averse to encouraging a certain
amount of Chinese expansionism away from the Soviet Union as a way of embroiling Mao in
peripheral conflicts and ensuring that his state did not become too powerful. See Jian, China's
Road to the Ko,?an War, p.74 and Gaddis, We Now Know, pp.66-67.
72 
'Communist Influence in the Far East',JIC(49)33(Final), 29 April 1949, CAB 158/6 and Hack,
'British Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in the Era of Decolonisation', p.125.
'United States Policy Toward Southeast Asia',Policy Planning Staff paper, PPS 51, 29 March
1949,FRUS, 1949, I/oLI/II,pp1128-1133.
UK High Commissioner in New Zealand to CR0, telegram no.206, 20 May 1949, PREM
8/968 and Bevin to Makins, telegram no.36,24 May 1949, W3160/21/68, FO 371/76375.
75 MacDonald said he hoped Quirino-Chiang Pacific Pact would be 'stillborn'. Clark to Acheson,
4 August 1949, FRUS, 1949, VoLT/Ill, pp.471-472. Acheson also took a negative view of the
Pact. Acheson to Douglas, 20 July 1949, FRUS, 1949, VoLJX, pp.S0-52. See also Xiang, Recastin<g
the Imperial Far East, pp.20l-2O3.
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status, nor induce it to follow British imperial leadership. The former outcome could
lead, in the view of the Colonial Office, to an eclipse of British imperial power in
Southeast Asia and distrust among the smaller Asiatic powers. The latter would preclude
India's participation and rejection of what it would see as another 'power bloc'.76
As the British Permanent Under-Secretary's Committee (PUSC) noted, no final
regional system of collaboration could, in the long run, hope to exist without American
participation. But the PUSC pointed out that the American failure in China had left them
content to let Britain develop plans for regional co-operation, waiting to see if they
worked in practice before offering to assist or participate in them. It was clear that there
was no single Asiatic power capable of dominating the region nor any combination of
powers which, by its united strength, could successfully resist communist expansion.
Britain, through its links with the Commonwealth, was therefore in a unique position to
help. Before the war Britain had been the largest foreign investor and its holdings
remained substantial. Although the United States was now a bigger trader, the PUSC
claimed that historically and culturally, it did not enjoy the same presence as Britain. To
promote regional unity, the PUSC recommended that British policy should aim to
remove the stigma of imperialism and help to solve many of the disputes in the area,
such as Kashmir. Apart from Commonwealth solidarity and the continuing struggle for
American participation, the PUSC argued that the British should push through plans for
economic development with an emphasis on industrialisation. In pursuing this policy, the
PUSC recognised that Britain would be unable to satisfy Asian demands for large
76 Acheson also hoped that India could assume some form of leadership in Southeast Asia.
Acheson to Douglas, 20 July 1949, FRUS, 1949, VoLIX, pp.50-52 and Tarling, Bniain, Southeast
Asia and the Onset of the Ctthi Wa,, pp.329-340. Pandit Nehru, the Indian leader, had tried to
develop a 'united Asian front' but met with a somewhat lukewarm response throughout the
whole region. See Dening, minute for Strang, 29 March 1949, F2191/1072/61, FO 371/76031.
'Regional Co-operation in Southeast Asia and the Far East', PUSC(53)Final, 30 August 1949,
W4743/3/500, FO 371/76385. See also 'Brief on South-East', Bevin memorandum, 23 March
1949, F4487/1023/61, FO 371/76023.
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amounts of material assistance. Furthermore, corruption and inefficiency would not
vanish overnight.78
An Anglo-American working relationship, however, still proved difficult to achieve.
Washington, for example, viewed Britain's economic approach to Southeast Asia with
extreme suspicion. In September 1949, Acheson intimated to Franks that he considered
it as another effort to bolster the sterling bloc.79
 In an effort to dispel Acheson's fears,
Dening conveyed to the State Department that it was absolutely essential for both Britain
and the United States to keep out of the limelight in Southeast Asian affairs. This was
necessary because Anglo-American war plans focused on defending Europe, Japan and
the Middle East, a commitment so large that there would be little left over for Southeast
Asia.8° Yet, when Bevin discovered in the autumn of 1949 that the United States was not
contemplating further funds for the area, it focused the Attlee government even more on
efforts to try and organise Asian and Commonwealth countries in the region. In October
1949, the Cabinet endorsed a policy of working towards regional political and, if
necessary, military co-operation by first encouraging economic co-ordination, since
political problems in Indo-China, Kashmir and Indonesia, prevented a short-term
approach. These plans would be reinforced at the forthcoming Colombo conference
during January 1950, which brought all the major Commonwealth powers together.8'
78 The PUSC noted that within Southeast Asia, Britain was economically dependent upon
rubber, tea and jute. The dollar pool of the sterling area also derived very substantial earnings
from Malaya. The output of oil fields from Borneo and Sarawak was growing rapidly. More than
half the world's population lived in Asia and what the region had in labour, it lacked in skill. A
combination, argued the PUSC, of Western technology and Asian manpower could be welded
into a formidable partnership. cRegional Co-operation in Southeast Asia and the Far East',
PUSC(53)Final, 30 August 1949, W4743/3/500, FO 371/76385.
79 Xiang, Rscztint the Imperial Far Ea5t, pp.201-204.
80 Memorandum of conversation by Butterworth, 12 September 1949,FRUS, 1949, VoL VII,
pp1197-1204.
81 Hack, cSouth East Asia and British Strategy, 1944-51', p.324.
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When Mao announced the creation of the Peoples Republic of China on 1 October
1949, the consequent United States withdrawal and loss of access to Chinese markets,
forced the Americans to look more carefully at the situation in Southeast Asia in Cold
War terms, especially as the latter could help the revival of the Japanese economy. The
NSC now recommended that the United States could provide technical assistance,
maintain a liberal trade policy with Asia, and recognise non-communist governments.
The NSC also hoped, like the British, to be able to help resolve regional conflicts in
French Indo-China and Indonesia. The latter dispute, for example, had seen an increased
American involvement. But, the NSC's attitude remained cautious and, for the moment,
it still wanted India, Pakistan, the Philippines and Asian states to take the lead in the
region.82
 These NSC proposals were fairly similar to British plans for the region, except
the latter wanted the wholehearted commitment of the United States to the region. Yet,
suspicions of imperialism and the 'loss' of China, precluded a close working relationship
be
between Britain and the United States as decided to adopt a perimeter strategy around
the Asian mainland. Still, within the communist bloc, Stalin's relationship with Mao also
remained far from clear.
IV. The British Assessment ofStalin's Relationsh4 with Mao
By 1948-1949, Chiang Kai-shek's disastrous Manchurian campaign and continuing social,
economic and political chaos within Nationalist China, saw Stalin begin to envisage a
probable CCP success. Furthermore, unlike Greece, where Britain and the United States
were resolutely opposed to a communist victory, Stalin deduced that: 'China is a different
case, relations in the Far East are different'. It reflected Stalin's understanding of the
82 The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia', NSC memorandum, NSC 48/1, 23
December 1949 in The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia', note by Secretaries
to JCS, JCS 1992/6, 27 December 1949, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 56, KCL See also memorandum
of conversation by Butterworth, 12 September 1949, FRUS, 1949, VoL VII pp1197-1204. See
also Schaller,AhdSiates, p.19.
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importance that the United States attached to Europe and his awareness that the
Americans were according China a lower Cold War strategic priority by the late 1 940s.
Such conclusions led Stalin to cautiously respond to Mao's requests in May 1948 for
economic assistance, by despatching several hundred technical specialists to communist
areas in China.83
 The Foreign Office had noted the presence of Soviet technicians in
north China and this merely reinforced a widespread belief in Anglo-American official
circles belief that the CCP would be guided by Soviet advice.M However, although Mao
attempted to underscore the CCP's membership of the communist community during
the latter half of 1948,85
 one senior Soviet diplomat has stated that: 'Stalin advocated
assistance to the Chinese communists but also understood the limitations on Soviet
capabilities to shape the situation in China and to influence its policy. He often stated
that the Russian and Chinese revolutions were two different matters'. The implication is
that Stalin was neither willing nor able to treat Mao as a satellite leader.86
Indeed, Stalin and Mao had a major falling out at the beginning of 1949 when the
prospect of mediation in Chinese internal politics raised its head once more. After the
Stalin despatched a team of 300 specialists to help repair rail lines in the northeast, while also
providing locomotives, railway cars and repair facilities to transport the CCP for future
operations to the south. See Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Poliy, p.179; Westad,
'Losses Chances and Myths', p.110 and Goncharov, Lewis and Litai, Uncereain Partners, pp.24-25.
Tientsin to Nanking, despatch no.502, 14 December 1948, F969/1015/10, FO 371/75737.
The NSC saw the CCP as an effective instrument of Soviet policy and Truman decided toStaI1(.discontinue economicAin areas that became occupied by the CCP. See 'The Position of the
United States Regarding Short Term Assistance to China', JSSC Report, JCS 1721/8, 27 March
1948, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 44, KCL; Lapham to Hoffman, 26 November 1948, FRUS, 1948,
VoL VIII, pp.654-658; Butterworth memorandum, 30 December 1948, ibid., pp.667-668 and
Blum, Drawi the Line, pp.25-28. The British Ambassador to China also felt that the CCP would
eventually be subservient to Moscow. See Lowe, Cotuaining the CoM War in East Asia, p.86. The
Foreign Office agreed. See Scarlett, minute, 23 November 1948, F16258/33/10, FO 371/69542
and Scott, minute, 24 February 1948, F2535/33/10, FO 371/69527.
Mao sent public messages to the Italian and Japanese Communist Parties, offered condolences
on the death of prominent Soviet Politburo member, Andrei Zhdanov, sent congratulations on
the founding of the North Korea state, pointedly joined in celebrating the 31" anniversary of the
Russian Revolution and condemned Tito. See Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Polity,
pp.178-179.
Goncharov, Lewis and LItai, Uncertain Partners, pp.24-25.
293
BRITAIN AND THE MOVE TOWARDS A COMMUNIST CHINA
failure to control currency and the military debacles in north China, Chiang was urged by
prominent personalities within his ruling party, the Kuomintang, to bring the civil war to
an end. He had also been publicly counselled by a bold member of the Legislative Yuan
to 'take a rest'. 87
 In one last attempt to gain time for his crumbling Nationalist
government, Chiang had asked whether the governments of Britain, the United States,
the Soviet Union and France would be prepared to mediate between himself and his
communist adversaries in China. Bevin told the Cabinet that he had ascertained that the
United States government were proposing to decline this invitation. Underscoring
Britain's reluctance to play a major role in East Asian affairs, Bevin asserted that from his
own point of view, he would much prefer not to intervene and the Cabinet agreed.
Bevin supported the remarks made by Stevenson that: 'apart from the desire to gain time,
the Chinese government's approach is designed to put the blame upon others for the
situation which is likely to be created. If we are correct in assuming that mediation is
unlikely to change the course of events, then the blame is likely to be placed on us for
abandoning China to the communists'.89
Stalin thought that Chiang's move 'was inspired by the Americans' but ignored Mao's
pleas to reject the offer outright Stalin told Mao that this would give away an important
weapon, the 'banner of peace', and the United States an excuse for armed intervention in
87 
'China: Annual Review for 1948',Stevenson to Bevin, despatch no.62, 3 February 1949,
F3523/1011/1O, FO 371/75731.
88 Acting Secretary of State to Stuart, 12 January 1949, FRUS, 1949, VoL VIII, pp.41-42;
memorandum of conversation by Sprouse, 12 January 1949, ibid., pp
.4O-4l; Bevin, minute,
CM(49)2, 12 January 1949, CAB 128/15 and Cabinet minutes CM(49)2, 12 January 1949, CAB
128/15. The Foreign Office, on the whole, thought intervention would be a mistake. Firstly
because it was felt that such intervention would not materially alter the course of events, and
secondly because the failure of the Western powers to intervene successfully could only be
expected to react unfavourably upon their future relations with China. Foreign Office to
Washington, telegram no.391, 11 January 1949, F392/1015/10, FO 371/75735. See also Franks
to Foreign Office, telegram no.209, 11 January 1949, F548/1015/10, FO 371/75736.
89See Stevenson to Foreign Office, telegram no.36, 8 January 1949, F392/1015/10, FO
371/75735 and Foreign Office to Washington, telegram no.391, 11 January 1949,
F392/1015/10, FO 371/75735.
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which the Soviet Union could not help the CCP. 9° As a compromise, on 14 January
1949, Mao issued his eight conditions for negotiation which were all unacceptable to the
Nationalists and three days later, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrey Vyshinsky,
informed the Chinese Nationalist Ambassador to Moscow, that his government did 'not
regard it expedient to accept the mediation [plan]'. Although Stalin wanted to avoid a
final battle for southern China, in a bid to present the Soviet Union as moderate in
dealing with the Cbinese crisis, both Mao and the Soviet leader had been disturbed by
the other's behaviour. 91
 Mao had been particularly upset by Stalin's refusal to receive him
in Moscow. Stalin, instead, sent Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan on a secret mission,
to report on and evaluate the CCP. In January 1949, Stalin informed Mao it would be
improper for him to leave China as the civil war was at a crucial juncture. 92
 The British
JIC were aware of potential rifts between Stalin and Mao. The continued Soviet
occupation of Port Arthur and Dairen was one point of conflict. In early 1949, the JIG
correctly wondered: 'whether Chinese communists will remain loyal to Moscow when
Chinese national interests and the policy of the Kremlin are in conflict'.93
In the first months of 1949, Stalin remained unsure about the desirability of a CCP
victory over the whole of China. This was reflected in his continued refusal to sever ties
with the Nationalists and a reluctance to endorse a CCP crossing of the Yangtze. 94
 The
political map in China had also witnessed a dramatic change in early 1949. With Chiang's
See Sheng, 'The Triumph of Internationalism', pp.101-l03 and Gaddis, We Now Know, p.65.
Westad, 'Losses, Chances, and Myths', pp.111-112.
92j , China's Road to the Korean Wm-, pp .68-69 and Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foregn
Poliy, p.179.
Stalin had made it clear in early 1949, that if Mao crossed the Yangzte and it provoked an
American response, the Soviet Union would not be able to come to the CCP's assistance. See
Sheng, 'The Triumph of Internationalism', pp.101-103 and Gaddis, We Now Know, p.65.
See 'Effects of Communist Successes in China', JIC(48)133(Revise), 6 January 1949, CAB
158/5 and verbatim minutes of meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, 17 December
1948, FRUS, 1945-1950: Emergence of the Inte/4gence Establishment (Washington, 1996), doc no.356.
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attempts at mediation ending in failure, he 'retired' and the Nationalist government's
Acting President, Li Tsung-jen, assumed power. Both Chiang and Li had been rivals and
while the former attempted to retain control of Formosa, the latter sought good offices
to reach a compromise with the CCP and talked about ending the fighting. 95
 The British
JIC, Far East, still underestimating the power of the CCP, now felt that a more liberal
Nationalist government without Chiang would have a somewhat greater chance of
achieving popular support. The JIC, Far East, and the CIA presumed that the most
immediate course of action acceptable to Mao would be the formation of a coalition
government, allowing the latter to preserve the facade of co-operation and time to
consolidate their position down to the Yangtze. The JIC, Far East, estimated that the
complete domination of China by the CCP, could not be achieved in under six months.
If Mao did launch a campaign across the Yangtze, the major concern for the British was
a threat to its imperial and commercial interests. The JIC, Far East, also feared that the
former treaty ports could become battle areas.96
An indication of Mao's attitude toward foreign powers had been provided by the
CCP's occupation of Mukden in November 1948. Despite initial assurances from the
communist authorities that foreigners would be protected, the British, French and
American Consulates were suddenly cut off from the outside world. By the end of
January 1949, the British had heard nothing from their Consulate in Mukden since 18
November 1948 and when the CCP occupied Tientsin, the last contact had been on 22
Stevenson to Foreign Office, telegram no.50, 13 January 1949, F671/1015/10, FO
371/75736. In reality, Chiang still maintained his power through a network of loyalties to him
within the party and army. See Coates, minute, 14 January 1949, F671/1015/10, FO 371/75736;
Graves to Scarlett, letter, 18 January 1949, F1397/1015/10, FO 371/75738; Tomlinson, minute,
27 January 1949, ibid. and Stuart to Acheson, 28 March 1949, FRUS, 1949, VoL VIII, pp.207-208
and Rao Geping, 'The Kuomintang Government's Policy toward the United States, 1945-1949'
in Harding and Ming(eds.), Sino-Amencan R,latzons, pp.58-59. See Pepper,Civil War in Cbina,
pp.7-195 for the end of Nationalist rule.
See 'Effects of Communist Successes in China', JIC(48)133(Revise), 6 January 1949, CAB
158/5 and verbatim minutes of meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, 17 December
1948, FRUS,1945-1950: Emergence of the Intel4gence Establishment, doc no.356.
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January 1 949•97 The loss of diplomatic rights was a blatant attempt by Mao to gain some
form of recognition within China. Chou En-lai, the vice-chairman of the CCP Central
Committee, had already drafted a telegram to the Party's Northeast Bureau, arguing that
as the British, French and Americans had not recognised the CCP, the CCP should not
recognise their Consulates. Soviet representatives in the northeast had also expressed to
CCP members that their party must maintain a distance from Western countries.
Furthermore, the American Consulate possessed a radio transmitter which both the
Soviets and the CCP were aware could disclose CCP troop movements to the
Nationalists. When Angus Ward, the American Consul-General at Mukden, refused to
hand over this transmitter, CCP soldiers blockaded his Consulate and sparked off a
diplomatic crisis with the United States government that lasted well over a year.98
In February 1949, messages were eventually received from the British Consul General
at Tientsin. They indicated that the British community were 'in desperate straits' as a
result of the unhelpful attitude of the CCPY 9
 The Foreign Office, obviously referring to
arguments that Bevin had made to the Cabinet at the end of 1948, stated that: 'we [have]
overestimated the chances of the Chinese communists being, initially, desperately
anxious to trade with the outside world. Tientsin fell on the 15 January, and if they had
been desperately anxious to do trade they could easily have had visits from plenty of
British ships by now'. 10° In fact, Mao told the Seventh Central Committee on 5 March
Addis to Hetahcote-Smith, despatch no.1, 11 January 1949, F1533/1019/10, FO 371/75785.
See also Chen Jian, 'The Ward Case and the Emergence of Sino-Amencan Confrontation,
1948-1950', The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No.30(July 1993), p.151.
See ibid, pp.l53-155. Soviet representatives in the northeast also forced the CCP to dismiss
British attempts at establishing any sort of commercial contact with the British. See Kuisong,
'The Soviet Factor', pp.30-31 and Jian, China's Road to the Korean W'ai pp.36-38.
Stevenson to Foreign Office, telegram no.198, 17 February 1949, F2573/1015/1Q, FO
371/75741.
Coates, minute, 21 February 1949, F2573/1015/10, FO 371/75741. It was reported that at
Tientsin, the CCP had indulged in anti-imperialist slogans, but their attitude towards the foreign
communities was one of ignoring their existence rather than of active hostility, and there had
been no incidents. Economically, trade was at complete standstill. Employers could not dismiss
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1949, that bringing the remaining foreign presence under control, was the next concern
of CCP foreign policy. The CCP would not concede a privileged status to diplomats
accredited to the Nationalists, nor would it recognise objectionable treaties while foreign
trade would come under government controL'° 1
 After pressure from the China
Association and internal debate about according de facto recognition to the CCP, the
Foreign Office thought the latter question was a matter of timing. The Foreign Office
argued that the British should not give the impression that once its imperial economic
interests were at stake, they were prepared to swallow their principles. As the prospect of
a coalition government remained uncertain, the British were anxious to proceed only in
consultation with other powers.'°2
However, by March 1949, it was clear that a Nationalist mission recently sent to
Peking by the Acting Chinese President Li would not prove successful, especially as they
had failed to fix a date or place for future negotiations. No settlement which satisfied the
CCP could possibly be acceptable to the old guard of the Kuomintang, over whom
Chiang's influence seemed to remain unimpaired. The latter had recently arranged for the
lifting by air of 140,000 men in China from Sian to Chêngtu, in order to protect his
withdrawal into Formosa.'°3
 Stevenson thought that: 'it appears Chiang was trying to use
employees, even when they were unable to give the employees work to do. The CCP were at
least toying with the idea of encouraging calls by foreign vessels at Tientsin. Coates, minute, 7
March 1949, F3255/1015/1O, FO 371/75743.
101 Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Polify, p.174.
102 The Problem of Recognition', Scarlett, minute, 17 February 1949, F3305/1023/10, FO
371/75811; Sargent, minute, 18 February 1949, ibid and Stevenson to Foreign Office, telegram
no.614, 11 May 1949, F7450/1015/1O, FO 371/75756. As early as 1948, the China Association
had been lobbying for the appointment of a representative to the CCP. See Dening, minute, 19
March 1948, F4392/33/1O, FO 371/69529.
103 Stevenson to Foreign Office, telegram no.239, 2 March 1949, F3210/1015/1O, FO
371/757743 and Stevenson to Foreign Office, telegram no.183, 12 February 1949,
F2258/1015/10, FO 371/75740. The basis of Chiang's defence plan was to hold the west coast
line opposite Formosa, from Wenchow to Amoy. Chiang would then retire to Formosa to wait
out World War Three at which time, backed by American forces, he would hope to return to the
mainland in the role of the supreme liberator. Memorandum of conversation by Butterworth, 1
June 1949, FRUS, 1949, VoLIX, pp.701 -705.
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the "peace offensive" as a blind to gain time for renewal of the struggle and is ready to
disavow him [Li] when desirable'. The British Ambassador presumed that the CCP
leadership were also well are of this but Mao needed time to prepare for his assault south
ofYangtze.104
 Despite Stalin's concerns that a CCP advance into southern China might
provoke an armed American response, Mao ordered a crossing of the Yangtze in April
103
As the CCP began to overrun important centres such as Shanghai, by the summer of
1949, the Foreign Office pondered intensely over the strength of the bond between the
CCP and the Kremlin. Since the failure of the Marshall Mission, Mao had become
convinced that the United States was the main adversary to the success of the Chinese
revolution. In the late 1940s, Stalin realised that he had to tolerate the 'nationalism' of the
CCP in order to seize the strategic advantages that the alliance gave the Soviet Union in
terms of the Cold War, especially after the creation of NATO. Furthermore, continued
American support for the Nationalists and the CCP's ideological connections with
Moscow, saw Mao steadily encompass Stalin's world view of a dichotomy between the
socialist and imperialist camps.'° 6
 The Foreign Office, for example, could not reconcile
the fact that Mao, after deliberating on the preparation of an Atlantic Pact, had
announced in his 'lean-to-one-side' speech during June 1949, that the CCP would 'march
with the Soviet Union' at a time when the 'vital interest' was surely a period of external
peace after a prolonged civil war. The Foreign Office pointed out this was a quarrel that
104 Stevenson to Foreign Office, telegram no.183, 12 February 1949, F2258/1015/10, FO
371/75740 and Coates, minute, 21 February 1949, F2631/1013/1O, FO 371/75733
105 Whether Stalin's fear were genuine or aimed at restraining the CCP from driving out the
Nationalists is not clear. See Gaddis, We Now Know, pp
.
63-65; Goncharov, Lewis and Xue,
Unce,iain Patiners, pp.25-26 and Chen Jian, 1'he Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the
Korean War', Cold Wat Intmwtional Projec! Woodrow Wthon International Center for SchoLvc (1992),
p.5.
106 Gaddis, We Now Know, pp.63-64 and Westad, 'Losses, Chances, and Myths', pp.114-115.
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was in no sense Chinese but purely ideological, that is, in respect of a pact that did not
touch East Asia.107
Just days after Mao's speech, Liu Shao ch'i, the second ranking CCP leader, left for
Moscow. On his arrival in July, flu reiterated that the CCP would stand next to the
Soviet Union in the anti-imperialist camp. Nonetheless, flu also stated that a communist
China would try to expand foreign trade and conclude diplomatic relations, even with the
imperialists.' 08
 Soon after his 'lean-to-one-side' speech, Mao sent Chen Mingshu, 'a
fellow traveller of the communists', to explain his thinking to Ambassador Stuart. In
mid-July, Chen told Stuart that Mao's declaration was designed 'for his own Party'. The
CCP still hoped for diplomatic relations between the United States and the CCP.'°9 The
United States had received other approaches from CCP officials during the summer of
1949 regarding the prospect of trade. In June, Huang Hua, Chou En-lai's assistant, even
proposed a meeting between Stuart, Mao and Chou in Peking."° Another apparent
friendly CCP approach occurred during May and August 1949, when telegrams arrived at
both the State Department and the Foreign Office, the so-called 'Chou Demarche',
stressing China's need îor economic help while intimating that Chou was powerful
within the CCP and pushing Mao in a nationalist and potentially Titoist direction."
107 Scarlett to Coghill, letter, 21 June 1949, F8354/1015/10, FO 371/75759; Brimmell, minute, 5
July 1948, F9742/1015/10, FO 371/75761 and Coates, minute, 8 July 1948, ibid. See Chenjian,
The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War', p.l-3. See also Kuisong, The
Soviet Factor', p.30 who argues that this speech was aimed at making the CCPs' foreign policy
compatible with that of the Soviet Union. See also Gu, Coey'licts of Divided Nations, p.102.
108 On flu's departure in August 1949, Stalin promised to give the CCP technical assistance in
such areas as transportation and administration, help with educational reform, the immediate
despatch of 200 advisers, a $300 million loan and support in creating an air and naval force
essential for the occupation of Formosa. Stalin also agreed to shift Soviet air defence units from
Port Arthur to defend Shanghai against Nationalist air attacks. See Gaddis, We Now Know,
pp.66-67;Jian, Gbinds R,adto the Korean War, pp.64-77 and Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist
Forexgn Polity, pp.180-181.
109 Christensen, UsefulAdversaries, pp.91-92.
110 ibid, pp. 91-92; Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Po1iy, pp.l 77-178; Jian, China's
RDadto the Korea,, War, pp.50-57.
Christensen, UsefulAdversaries, pp.88-89. A message had been passed to the British Counsellor
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At the Foreign Office, the British spy-master Guy Burgess concluded that if the
'Chou Demarche' was genuine it did not seem to affect British policy, deducing that: 'the
possibility of [there] being real differences does seem to confirm us in our wish to keep a
foot in the door in China with the hope that ultimately the development of our
connections will be the best way of weakening Soviet ones'. 112
 Colleagues concurred with
Burgess and thought that this alleged dichotomy would go along way to explaining 'the
stiff and aloof attitude' of the Soviet government towards the CCP. 113 Moreover, in
agreement with Burgess, Dening did not see a requirement for a change in British policy.
Dening explained that: '[Britain's] only hope of exercising any influence on the future of
a communist-dominated China will be through our interests which are already there'. He
concluded that if these telegrams were truthful, there was a chance that China would
become Yugoslavia and that Britain should be able to exercise a healthy influence'. 114 It is
likely that through Burgess, Dening's conclusions would have reached Stalin. The
implication in terms of Cold War politics would have been for the Soviet leader to
promote a more accommodating attitude towards Mao to prevent the British achieving a
Sino-Soviet split. This is clearly evident with Liu's visit to Moscow in the summer of
1949. However, Bevin, unlike the Americans, dismissed the 'Chou Demarche' as a plant
and chose not to respond. 115
 Evidence from Chinese and Soviet sources has indicated
that there were indeed differing opinions concerning the direction of the CCP's domestic
by Michael Keon, an Australian journalist, who represented United Press in Peking. While in
Nanking during 1947 Keon came into contact with Chou and a number of other CCP officials
while subsequently visiting 'liberated' Shangtung. Chou did not want to use Consular channels
and in giving Keon the message he emphasised repeatedly that greatest care should be taken to
keep his name out. Grantham to Colonial Office, telegram no.824, 10 August 1949,
F12075/1015/10, FO 371/75766. See also Divided Counsels in Peking Relative Influence on
Russia and the West', The Times, 8 August 1949.
112 Burgess, minute, 15 August 1949, F12075/1015/10, FO 371/75766.
113 Tomlinson, minute, 15 August 1949, F12075/1015/10, FO 371/75766.
114 Dening, minute for Bevin, 16 August 1949, F12075/1015/10, FO 371/75766.
115 Edwin Martin, Divided Counsek The Angk-American Rz.ponse to Communist Victoy in China
(Kentucky, 1986), p.37.
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and foreign policies. Yet, these were between the pro-communist 'democratic parties'
and the CCP. Chou, for example, had sided with Mao in stating that these 'democratic'
parties' still had illusions that the new China would be able to maintain a middle path
between the two superpowers.116
Still, Mao was not prepared to subsume his interests under those of the Soviet Union.
Like the Nationalists before them, the JIC correctly asserted that the CCP wanted to
restore China's rightful place in the world and abolish Western extraterritoriality. Mao
would accept a close relationship with the Soviet Union in form as Chiang had with the
United States. For this reason he did not exclude attempts to establish limited relations
with the Western powers but these attempts had to fit in within the 'leaning-to-one side'
framework. 7
 It appeared that the United States was unable to accept this thesis,
especially as the State Department worried about the domestic political reaction to a
rapprochement with the CCP. On 1 July, Acheson had cabled Stuart not to attend the
proposed meeting with Chou and Mao. Meanwhile, before an accommodation could be
reached with the CCP, Truman wanted a stop to CCP anti-American propaganda and
their Consul-General released from Mukden. The United States also continued to
support Chiang, acquiesced in a Nationalist blockade of Chinese ports and showed few
signs of being willing to recognise the CCP. 118
 To maintain its imperial interests, the
British government, for their part, began to embark upon a different policy. Britain
wanted to disassociate itself from Chiang, disapproved of the Nationalist blockade and
began to show a desire to recognise the CCP as a way of protecting its interests in China.
116 Mao realised that the Chinese bourgeoisie and the intellectuals, including quite a number of
Party activists, viewed America as the epitome of modem development. See Goncharov, Lewis
and Xue, Uneertain Partnet:c, p.19; Westad, 'Lossess, Chances, and Myths', pp.114-115 and Jian,
The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War', p.2.
117 See The Implications of a Communist Success in China'JIC(49)48(Final), 30 September
1949, CAB 158/7 and Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, pp.36-51.
118 Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, pp.294-295.
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V. Keeping a 'Foot in the Door': Britain, the United States and the
Recognition ofthe People's Republic of China.
During the course of 1949, the British Cabinet became more actively involved in the
formulation of policy towards China due to the lack of American initiative in the region.
Although southern China could soon become a front line in the Cold War, the prospect
of this event did not provoke the same outcry as previous events in Czechoslovakia. Like
Britain's reaction to the war against Japan, for the proverbial 'man in the street' the
possible fall of China to the CCP was seen as a far off local event. 119
 However, British
economic interests in China remained considerable in 1949. The China Association
pointed out that British merchant houses transacted more then 50 per cent of the whole
export trade of China with the rest of the world. The Association argued that Britain's
commercial stake was an exceedingly valuable one which would bring substantial
dividends to Britain in the form of 'invisible' exports. 80 per cent of Britain's stake was
based at Shanghai but investments were also spread over many treaty ports such as
Tientsin and Hankow which contained shipping and oil interests. In all, the British
community numbered some 4-5,000 and despite the advance of the CCP, they remained
determined to stay in their jobs.12°
At this stage, both the British and the Americans carefully assessed their policy
towards China. Acheson, as well as Royall, Draper and Forrestal, an ardent supporter of
Chiang, admitted that the CCP advance dictated a reduction or suspension of military
equipment delivered to Nationalist China. Still, Truman decided against the formal
termination of aid, in order 'not to discourage continued resistance to communist
aggression'. But, in February, he had ordered that: 'no effort would be made to expedite
'Red Sky in the East', Sundqy Observer, 6 February 1949.
J20 
"British Interests in China', memorandum contained in Mitchell to Scarlett, 12 January 1949,
F723/1153/10, FO 371/75864 and 'Recent Developments in the Civil War in China', Bevin
memorandum, CP(48)299, 9 December 1948, CAB 129/31(Part 1).
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deliveries' to China, in effect ensuring few military supplies would reach the Nationalists
and, at the same time, whetting the domestic need to maintain a degree of
anti-communism in Chinese policy.' 2' Franks and the Foreign Office presumed that the
reluctance on the part of the United States government to create an anti-CCP bloc while
there was a pause in the Chinese communist advance, and the State Department's
determination to wait 'until the dust has settled' before formulating a China policy, made
it doubly clear that the United States had: 'no intention of doing anything about China'.
Indeed, the NSC admitted that their policy was 'not a happy one'. The NSC argued that
the vestiges of American 'intervention' were ineffectual, served the CCP as a
rationalisation for equating their interests with the Kremlin while solidifying the Chinese
people in support of the communists. A major concern for the British was that this
American attitude would cause them to adopt hasty and ad hoc measures to deal with the
CCP that could affect Britain's position in China.'
By 1949 both Truman and Acheson had become Atlanticist-first apologists, and as
Japan assumed more importance in American strategic thinking, they viewed China as an
unwelcome intrusion into American Cold War global policy. Nevertheless, while
Truman, the American military and the State Department were all anti-communist,
Acheson favoured exploring avenues that could prise the CCP away from the Soviet
Union. Sensitive to the complexities of Asian politics and with support from officials on
the ground in China, he felt that economic problems would engulf the CCP in urban and
industrial China. Then, finding out that the Soviets had nothing to offer them, the CCP
121 
'United States Policy Toward China',NSC 34/i, 11 January 1949,FRUS, 1949, VoLIX,
pp.474-475; Souers memorandum for NSC, 4 February 1949, ibid., pp.484485; Acheson
memorandum of a conversation with Truman, 7 February 1949, ibid., p.486; Souers
memorandum, 8 February 1949, ibid., pp.486-487. See also Blum, Drawing the Line, pp.28-30;
Christensen, Us dAdversa,ies, pp.77-78; Chace,Acheson, p.2l7; Schaller, The Ameñcan Occupation of
Japan, pp.184 and Leffler,A Preponderance of Power, p.292.
122 See Franks to Bevin, letter, 22 March 1949, F4595/1015/10, FO 371/75747; Coates, minute,
2 April 1949, ibid; 'U.S. Policy Toward China', NSC 34/2, 28 February 1949, FRUS, 1949,
VoLIX, pp
.49 l -49S; Tucker, Pauerns in the Dust, p.l3 and Chace, Acheson, p.217
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would turn to the West. 1
 Acheson's private views were more in line with British
thinking. On 4 March 1949, Bevin built on his earlier paper at the end of 1948,
reiterating his analysis that after a communist victory in China, there would be economic
chaos. Bevin expected the CCP to be unable to balance the budget, to suffer from
increasing taxation and to experience a lack of confidence in their currency. Without
Formosa, rice supplies would also be insufficient while industrialisation would require
foreign capital and technical assistance. Bevin doubted whether the Soviet Union and the
satellites could provide much of this. Mao had long realised this and in March 1949,
affirmed the CCP's previous commitment to trading with foreign countries on an equal
basis. China would be almost entirely dependent on non-communist sources for supplies
of rubber, oil, and fertilisers. Bevin concluded that the best hope for the British in China
seemed to lie in the presumed need for the continued functioning of British public
utilities, insurance, banking, industrial enterprises and commercial and shipping agencies
until the CCP were ready to take them over or had organised alternatives. Only when
British imperial interests in China were finally expropriated by the CCP would it be
necessary, argued Bevin, to persuade other powers to proceed at once to a policy of
economic warfare against the CCP.124
Yet, almost immediately, Bevin's policy began to conflict with the actions of the
United States. Stevenson told the Foreign Office that he had been approached by his
United States colleague, who gave him a paraphrase of a telegram to the State
Department agreeing to the use of American shipping and trade as a lever to induce the
123 Cabot to Acheson, 16 July 1949, FRUS, 1949, VoL VIII, pp.436-440 and Clark to Acheson,
27 July 1949, ibid., pp.459-461. See also Chace, Acheson, p.218; Acheson, Present at the Creation,
pp.302-344; Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, p.174 and Warren Cohen, 'Acheson, His Advisers, and
China, 1949-1950' in Borg and Heinrichs, Unce,iain Years, pp.13-52.
124 
'The Situation in China', Bevin memorandum, CP(49)39, 4 March 1949, CAB 129/32, Part II;
Bevin, minute, CM(49)18, 8 March 1949, CAB 128/15 and Cabinet approval in Cabinet minutes,
CM(49)18, 8 March 1949, CAB 128/15. For Mao's views see Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese
Comwunict Foivgn Policy, pp.177-178.
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CCP authorities to permit American Consulates to function. Stevenson pointed Out that
the United States government regarded the ignoring of their Consulates as derogatory
while Britain did not attach so much importance to it. The Americans were aiming to use
their commercial interests to strengthen the position of their Consulates while the British
considered the maintenance of its Consulates primarily to assist its trade interests.
Stevenson was convinced that Britain should not risk damage to its own imperial
interests by 'blindly' following an American lead in this matter. The Foreign Office
exclaimed that American policy was entirely opposed to Britain's but recognised that:
'The fact of the matter is, of course, that the interests of United States business in China
are so vastly smaller than ours that the United States government have far less cogent
reasons than we for acting slowly and with caution'. 126
 An NSC report confirmed the
China Department's analysis that the economic importance of China to the United States
was not great The NSC still desired continued trade between Japan and China and
hoped that this could produce friction between the CCP and the Kremlin. The NSC
therefore recommended a limited export control system that sought to embargo key
strategic goods destined for the Chinese economy. 127
In April 1949, Acheson urged Ambassador Douglas in London to secure formal
British co-operation in the control of exports to China. After several persistent
approaches to the Foreign Office, Douglas reported in despair that the British were
deliberately delaying a reply. The British had already categorically refused to put Hong
Kong under the NSC export-control system. Washington's attempt to galvanise a 'united
125 Stevenson to Foreign Office, telegram no. 342, 23 March 1949, F4314/ 1023/10, FO
371/75810 and Stevenson to Foreign Office, telegram no.467, 22 April 1949, F5708/1023/10,
FO 371/75811.
126 Coates, minute, 25 March 1949, F4314/1023/10, FO 371/75810 and Scarlett, minute, 28
March 1949, ibid.
127 ¶Jnited States Policy Regarding Trade with China', draft NSC report, NSC 41,28 February
1949, FRUS, 1949, VoLIX, pp.826-834.
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front' between Britain and the United States was beginning to look increasingly difficult
to achieve. 1
 In addition to Britain's determination to maintain its imperial interests in
China, another reason for the British attitude resulted from indications that the CCP
could be willing to trade with them. In March, at the first meeting of the Ministerial
Committee of China and Southeast Asia, chaired by Attlee, it was decided that the Hong
Kong and Shanghai Bank should accept a CCP invitation to act as a foreign exchange
agent in north China. This was a significant move, especially as the American banks had
not been invited to attend.'29
 The Foreign Office, therefore, duly sent a telegram to
Washington arguing that 'an attempt to bully [the CCP] now is unlikely to produce the
result desired and may well slam the door in our faces'. The British had learnt from the
Governor of Hong Kong that American attempts to send strongly worded denunciations
of CCP treatment of their Consulates through an intermediary in Hong Kong had met
with a strong rebuttal.' 3° Conditions for the British Consul-General at Mukden also
seemed to be improving, compared to his American counterpart, who continued to be
blockaded within his compound.' 3' The extent of the hostility between the CCP and the
United States during 1949, was highlighted by Mao's efforts to keep a close watch on
American activities along the coast for signs of intervention and his decision to designate
a reserve force to counter any landings. The Americans had no such plans but it
128 During a formal conference between Graves and Butterworth on 10 February 1949, the
Americans had officially raised the issue of putting Hong Kong trade under the NSC 41 control
system. Cabot to Butterworth, 11 May 1949, FRUS, 1949, VoL VIII, pp.307-3 10; Xiang, Rscathn
tbe Impenal Far East, pp.l75-l78; Tucker, Patterns in the Duct, p.24 and Martin, Divided Counse4
pp.19-20.
' 29 Xiang, Recasting the I#zpenal Far East, p.176.
130 See Foreign Office to Washington, telegram no. 3343, 25 March 1949, F4314/1023/10, FO
371/75810.
131 The British telephone line had been restored on 25 July 1949, the Consul's auto-licence was
due to be granted and plain clothes guards had been withdrawn. Jones to Acheson, 19 August
1949, FRUS, 1949, VoL VIII, p.974.
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epitomised Mao's inability to grasp that China might be only a peripheral Cold War
interest of the United States.132
Although Acheson had no love for the corrupt Nationalist regime and was intrigued
by a possible Stalinist-Mao split, he did not reach out to the CCP or offer a basis for an
eventual rapprochement) 33
 The problem for Acheson, in the era of the Truman
Doctrine, was that an abandonment of Chiang could be attacked by Republican critics as
a failure to tackle global communism. In March 1949, Acheson, therefore, told
Congressional representatives that limited aid would only continue to avoid the charges
of deserting the Nationalists.1M Such discrepancies in American policy saw the
Nationalists continue to seek more financial aid from the United States in an effort to
stem their ultimate collapse. At the end of March 1949, a strong appeal had been made to
Stuart by the Chinese Prime Minister, General Ho Ying-chin, for financial assistance. I-Jo
asserted that, failing a loan of $200-300 million, there would be a complete economic
collapse within China. Stevenson was at pains to tell his United States colleague that any
American financial assistance would be inevitably regarded on both sides as being
designed to prolong the war. He asserted that there was nothing that Acting President Li
could do which would possibly gain popular support for a continuation of the war. Ho's
inability to secure the services of the men he wanted for his Cabinet was proof that
Nationalist leaders were more concerned with their individual futures than the fate of the
country.' 35
 The Foreign Office remained in agreement with Stevenson and by May 1949,
the British were preventing arms reaching the Nationalist government via Hong Kong,
132 Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Fore:gn Poby, p.l73 and Gaddis, We Now Know,
pp.63-64.
133 Chace,Acbeson, p.211.
134 Christensen, UsefulAdversaties, pp.82-83.
Stevenson to Foreign Office, telegram no.344, 23 March 1949, F4290/1015/10, P0
371/75746. Many Nationalists now hoped that the prospect of World War Three would save
them. See 'China Shanghai/Nanking', CX report, 1-11 April 1949, WO 208/475.
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halting a Canadian consignment This was particularly important, as the British felt that
the arms, if delivered, would fall straight into the CCP's hands and be used against Hong
Kong. 136
Stevenson's discouraging remarks about the Nationalists prompted him to stay in
Nanking when it fell to the CCP in the spring and not move south to Canton with the
Nationalists. Indeed, British military intelligence did not feel confident that a Nationalist
attempts to set up a southern bloc would prove successful. 137
 Stevenson, supported by
the Foreign Office, argued that the reason for his decision was the fact that he did not
want to jeopardise Britain's chance of establishing satisfactory relations with a
CCP-dominated China or abandon Britain's commercial and imperial interests in the
areas already overrun. 138
 By the end of April 1949, Bevin hoped he could induce the
State Department to support a common front with other powers that encompassed
Britain's basic policy line towards China. But when Bevin was in Washington for the
signing of NATO, Asia was rarely discussed while Acheson was opposed to hasty
recognition, either de facto or de jure.139 The British had, however, reached the same
conclusion as the Americans about the withdrawal of warships from Whangpoo. Clashes
136 Coates, minute, 25 March 1949, F4290/1015/10, FO 371/75746 and Scarlett, minute, 16
May 1949, F8801/1194/10, FO 371/75880.
137 Intelligence showed that Fukien remained independently inclined; Kwangsi was the home of
Li and his henchman General Pai Ching-hsi while Hunnan's status remained unpredictable
because of the presence of Psi's troops. See 'Tour Notes of a Visit to Canton', GSO I (I)
memorandum, 9 March 1949, WO 208/4570. The Foreign Office agreed with these views. See
Scarlett, minute, 21 January 1949, F1126/10118/10, FO 371/75794. By this time, the British
military had also become favourably impressed with Chinese communist forces. The troops and
morale of the Army were described as excellent. See Field to FARELF, telegram no.
unnumbered, 28 April 1949, F6783/1015/10, FO 371/75753 and Field to FARELF, telegram
no.MA099, 28 April 1949, ibid. See also 'China: Conditions in Communist China and
Manchuria',M12 report, 31 March 1949, WO 208/4571.
' Foreign Office to Washington, telegram no.4053, 8 April 1949, F5057/10118/10, FO
371/75795. This move, however, left the British out of touch with both the Nationalists and the
CCP. See Scarlett, minute, n.d., F6541/1015/10, FO 371/75742.
Acheson to Stuart, 13 May 1949,FRUS, 1949, I/oLIX, pp.2l-23; memorandum of
conversation by Acheson, 16 June 1949, ibid., p.43 and Foreign Office to Washington, telegram
no.4670, 29 April 1949, F5786/10118/10, FO 371/75795.
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between warships and communists forces, concluded the Foreign Office, were likely to
have an adverse effect upon the position of Britain's representatives and communities.14°
A most serious incident had occurred in April 1949, when the British ship, HMS
Amet/yst, was caught in the middle of the CCP's advance across the Yangtze. After being
detained, the ship made a dramatic escape from a Chinese communist artillery
bombardment. When the ship's crew received an heroic welcome on their return home it
must have reinforced Mao's contempt for imperialism and a desire to remove it from
China..141
This tense confrontation with the CCP saw the Attlee government act with
considerable calm and restraint The Foreign Office, intimating the necessity of adopting
some form of recognition, noted that such an incident would never have happened if the
British had been in day-to-day contact with the CCP.' 42
 Yet, as Malcolm MacDonald
pointed out, the incident dealt a blow to Britain's world power status and vividly exposed
its weakness within China. 143
 It led the Director of Military Intelligence to suest that
the decision to remain in China was giving the CCP the initiative. He did not dispute
Bevin's policy analysis that the CCP would have a difficult task economically but was
convinced that the CCP would use Britain to help overcome these difficulties and then
'throw us overboard'. The Director argued, in a riposte to Britain's adopted policy, that:
'if we pull out now...communist economic difficulties may be so great as to cause a wave
of disillusion among the wavering Chinese'. The Soviet Union would then be forced to
'° Foreign Office to Washington, telegram no.4670, 29 April 1949, F5786/10118/10, FO
371/75795.
141 See Arthur Bryant, 'London's Welcome to the Ship's Company of HMS Amethyt, The
I&trated London News, 26 November 1949. See also Malcolm Murfeti, Hostage on the Yangte:
Bm'ain China and the Amethyt Crisis of 1949 (Annapolis, 1991); idem, 'Old Habits Die Hard',
pp.2O8-215 and Lowe, Containing the Cold IT/ar in East Acia, p.96.
'42 Mpi g dCou,,se p.13 and Xiang, Recasting the Imperial Far East, pp.l90-l91.
143 MacDonald to Creech Jones, telegram no. 385, 30 April 1949, F6195/1061/10, FO
371/75839.
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waste money on China as the British and Americans had done. This, the Director
concluded, would surely help the Western democracies' cause. Such an antagonistic line,
which dismissed the protection of British imperial interests, was not widely supported in
Whitehall and was probably written as a knee-jerk response to the worsening conditions
for the British inside China.1
An important event that affected the majority of the British community, had
occurred in May 1949 when the CCP occupied Shanghai) 45
 The CCP ignored British
Consular offices and had demanded the closure of American and British publicity
services in Shanghai. CCP troops remained well behaved but British merchants were
unable to make contact with responsible CCP officials to protest against unreasonable
sums of taxation. Consequently, the strain on British business had made Chinese labour
unruly. Meanwhile, a Nationalist blockade of Chinese ports and the wholesale Nationalist
removal of industrial assets at Shanghai had left trade at a standstilL 1 The China
Association estimated that the British commercial community was now drawing on
reserves at the rate of £375,000 a month.147
 To the annoyance of the British government,
Anglo-American differences in trade policies resurfaced with the Nationalist blockade of
the Chinese coast. The United States government would not join the British in an
attempt to negotiate the end of the blockade and protect Britain's commercial interests.
The Director of Military Intelligence recognised that some agents had to stay behind to tell
Britain what was happening but he recommended trained experts rather than normal commercial
methods. See 'Foreign Office Proposed Policy towards Communist China', DM1 memorandum,
25 August 1949, WO 208/4583.
145 Shanghai's economy had already been drained by the Nationalists. There were no markets, no
confidence and unemployment was rising. See Urqhart to Foreign Office, telegram no.315, 7
May 1949, F6541/1015/10, FO 371/75752.
146 Chiang was stripping Shanghai of whatever assets, including technical personnel, that could
be shipped out Butterworth memorandum for Webb, 17 May 1949, FRUS, 1949, VoLIX,
pp.325-327.
147 
'British Communities in China', Foreign Office memorandum, no date, F10964/1611/10,
FO 371/75942. Urqhart and the British community wanted to break the Nationalist blockade
and defeat 'the last vicious kicks of a dying mule'. Shanghai to Foreign Office, telegram no.526,4
July 1949, F9793/1261/10, FO 371/75901.
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Privately, Truman supported the blockade and it reinforced the economic pressure that
Acheson hoped to use on the CCP.'48
When the State Department did agree to joint action of sending 'relief ships' to
Shanghai, the Foreign Office was dismayed to discover that the American objective was
to withdraw its citizens from there.' 49
 Despite the protests of the British community,
there was no question of the Royal Navy attempting to break the Nationalist blockade of
Chinese ports.' 5° Acheson had already used the term 'stab in the back' in respect of
actions that could help undermine the resistance of the Nationalist government on
Formosa. The Foreign Office recognised that a forceful attempt to break the blockade
would be open to accusations of imperialism by the CCP and perfidy by the
Nationalists.' 5' The American decision to begin to evacuate nationals from Shanghai led
John Keswick, the head of the British commercial community in China, to refuse to be
swept away by American hysteria.' 52
 To the British, after the United States started to shut
down Consular posts, all evidence pointed to the fact that the United States were
148 Stuart to Acheson, 24June 1949, FRUS, 1949, VoLIX, pp.1105-1107.
' Xiang, Rteasting the Imperial Far East, pp.180-181 and Blum, Drawrng the Line, p.96.
Shanghai to Foreign Ofice, telegram no.977, 15 November 1949, F17090/1261/10, FO
371/75913.
151 The British were not prepared to respect the blockade, especially after the Nationalist
bombing of the British ship, Anchises. Buttwt,rth memorandum for Acheson, 27 June 1949,
FRUS, 1949, IJoLIX, pp.11 iO-lli2; 'British Shipping Interests and the China Blockade', Scarlett,
minute, 16 November 1949, F17322/1261/10, FO 371/75914 and Stevenson to Foreign Office,
telegram no.1083, 21 July 1949, F10820/1261/10, FO 371/75903. But one British official
thought the CCP would be only too happy to see the British embroiled with the Nationalists.
Franklin, minute, 7 December 1949, F19194/1261/10, FO 371/75917.
152 Cabot to Acheson, 16 July 1949, FRUS, 1949, VoL VIII, pp.436-440 and Urqhart to Foreign
Office, telegram no.657, 6 August 1949, F11657/1015/10, FO 371/75765. Dening, record of
conversation, no date, W4528/2/500, FO 371/76383. Urqhart and Keswick were both later
assured by the several Chinese communist officials, including the new MayoShanghai, that the
CCP did not intend to injure British subjects and that they wished to establish normal relations
with the business community. See Urqhart to Foreign, telegram no.727, 30 August 1949,
F12960/1015/10, FO 371/75768 and Shanghai to Foreign Office, telegram no.731, 30 August
1949, F12961/1015/10, FO 371/75768.
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perfectly willing to cut their losses in China and pull out, which appeared 'defeatist' to
Dening.'53
The chaos enveloping Shanghai, argued Robert Urqhart, the British Consul General
in the city, was due to the inefficiency of the 'simple-soldier men' of the CCP who did
not possess the administrative knowledge to cope with the problems of Shanghai. But
Urqhart also realised that the Moscow-type elements at present in control of Shanghai
were attempting to squeeze foreign firms out.1M Yet, when Urqhart presumed that
Peking would attempt to crack down on these extremist elements in Shanghai, Patrick
Coates at the Fr; Department in the Foreign Office wondered why the British should
expect Peking to be less extreme and he had no reason to believe that Mao was not a
Moscow-type poIitician. 55 An article in The Times had already pointed out that foreign
interests in Tientsin seemed fairly unanimous in their belief that the CCP were Out to
eliminate them as soon as practicable. The Times article concluded that foreign interests in
Shanghai had not yet 'felt the pinch' in the same way as Tientsin. 1
 Indeed, Mao had
worried in 1949, that without 'closing the door', or at least tightly controlling its access,
the Chinese communist revolution could lose its momentum, just as the CCP was
preparing to reorganise the cities.157
Meanwhile, in June, the Republicans increased their attacks on the Truman
administration's 'appeasement' of Chinese communism. Later in the month, 21 senators
sent a letter to Acheson demanding that the United States not recognise the CCP.158
153 Dening, minute, 4 August 1949, P11338/1261/10, FO 371/75904 and Martin, Divided
Counces chps.8 and 10.
Urqhart to Foreign Office, telegram no.576, 1 July 1949, F9684/1015/10, FO 371/75761.
155 Coates, minute, 6July 1949, F9684/1015/10, FO 371/75761.
'Frading Policy in China: Doubts of I-long Kong Merchants',Tbe Times, 5 July 1949.
157 Westad, 'Losses, Chances, and Myths', pp.114-115 and Jian, China's Road to the Korean War,
pp.40-41.
158 A coalition of politicians, journalists, scholars, businessmen, military leaders and missionaries
tried to keep China at the forefront of American policy. Dubbed the 'China Lobby' by the New
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Mao's ideology and the American reluctance to accommodate the CCP were now
preventing the chance of even limited contact 159
 The most strident members of the
Congressional China block seized on Truman asking Congress to approve the Mutual
Defence Assistance Act to provide funds for arms, defence production and other
activities in Europe and Asia. After signing the NATO treaty on 23 July 1949, Truman
formally proposed the creation of $1.5 billion to help buttress European allies. Senator
William Knowland, however, argued that $200 million be amended for use in East Asia.
From August through to September, Knowland and Senator H.Alexander Smith
continued to press for a diversion of aid while John Vorys and Walter Judd berated the
Truman administration's desertion of China.° The Economist had correctly worried that
any aid given to Nationalist China would be at the expense of support sufficient to
sustain the economic and military reinforcement of Europe.161
Matters were unintentionally made worse when, in August 1949, the Truman
administration produced a 1,100 page White Paper, entitled United Slates Relations with
China with Sjedal Reference to the Period 1944-1949, that hoped to place the facts about
Nationalist rule in China before the American public. In Acheson's letter of transmittal,
drafted by Philip Jessup, the State Department emphatically declared that the Nationalist
failure in China did not stem from the inadequacy of American aid. It also stated that the
CCP leaders 'have publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia'.
York Communist Party in 1949, this grouping was motivated by genuine support for Chiang to a
desire to produce an election issue with which to beat Truman. All feared the threat of a CCP
takeover because they would lose profits of trade and manufacturing enterprises or the
opportunity to make China a strategic bastion against Soviet Union. See Christensen, Usefid
Advercaries, pp.88-89; Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, chp.5 and idem, Taiwan, Hone Kong and tbe United
States, pp.21-22.
159 See Warren Cohen, 'Introduction: Was there a "Lost Chance" in China', Dqilomatic Histoy,
Vol.21 No.1 (Winter, 1997), pp.71-75 and Chen Jian, 'The Myth of America's "Lost Chance" in
China: A Chinese Perspective in Light of New Evidence', Dplomalic Hisey, ibid., pp.77-86.
160 Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, pp.196-200; Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, Chps.5, 8
and 9 and Christensen, UsefulAdversaries, pp.93-96.
161 
'Eleventh Hour in China', The Economist, 23 April 1949.
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This was a position that Acheson did not hold, according to John Melby, a key adviser
on China affairs for Marshall, who had written the draft of the White Paper. He
approved this language in order to appease the China bloc and because he thought it
would be little noted. In the end it made it difficult for the United States to pursue a
policy of recognition, even if Mao eventually conquered Formosa and eliminated all
domestic opposition. Republican senators assailed the White Paper as a whitewash and a
wishful 'do-nothing' policy which had succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of Soviet
conquest. 162
 Henceforth, as a compromise, during September, Acheson relented and
proposed that $75 million should be used on a confidential basis by Truman in 'the
general area of China'.163
These internal pressures on American policy had, in July, seen Acheson cable his
Ambassador in London to elicit a frank exchange of views with Bevin before either
government fmally crystallised its position. Acheson wanted to delay the British in
reaching an early decision to recognise the CCP which would run contrary to American
policy. Bovin appard reluctant, particularly as he was immersed in Neas and Middle
Eastern pioblems. A Gonfecence was taking place in London and Bevin was anxious te
maintain a workable balance between the Arabs and Israelis 164
 It was not until 13
September 1949, when a meeting was held at the State Department, that Acheson told
British officials he was determined to get the question of China removed from the field
of internal American politics. Bevin had already informed the British Cabinet that United
States policy seemed to have taken a sharp turn in the direction of retreat. While on the
one hand the State Department had issued a White Paper which sought to justify the past
162 Chace, Acheson, pp.219-220; Acheson, Present a! the Creation, pp.302-307; Blum, Drawing the
Line, pp.92-95 and chp.8 and Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, p.24.
(163 Acheson to Douglas, 20 July 1949, FRUS, 1949, VoIJX, pp.50-52; Douglas to Acheson, 22
July 1949, ibid., p.52; Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, p.24 and Bullock, Ernest Bevin, pp.712-7l4.
164 Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, pp.196-200 and Christensen, Useful Adversaries,
pp.93-96.
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policy of the United States in China and liberally castigated the Nationalists, on the other
they appeared to have decided that it was no longer desirable to keep 'a foot in the door'
and to be desirous of evacuating their nationals from China as soon as possible. Still, the
fact that the United States had asked the British to take charge of their Consulates and
American interests was interpreted by Bevin to mean that the United States did not
quarrel with Britain's decision to remain in China.165
Nevertheless, Acheson argued that the United States should avoid giving the
appearance of 'running after' the CCP. Acheson categorically stated that: 'this was not
the moment for conciliatory gestures to the communists, which would only be
represented as a sign of weakness, and in any case would be unacceptable to the
American public'. The aim, therefore, was to let the CCP learn by bitter experience that
the position of being a Soviet satellite had little to recommend it. Acheson recommended
that there should be no premature recognition of the CCP while all North Atlantic
powers must follow a concerted policy, especially regarding the prohibition of exporting
strategic raw materials to China. Although Bevin intimated that Britain was in no hurry to
recognise the CCP, he explained that the British found themselves in a rather different
position to the Americans in China, since their commercial interests were very much
greater. The British community had been advised to stay where they were and British
Consular officers remained at their posts. Bevin observed that the grant of recognition
would have to depend on how the communists behaved. It would certainly not be given
if they tried to use threats. At the same time Bevin thought there was a risk, if the
Western powers remained too obdurate, that the Chinese would be driven further into
165 The United States had decided to close their consulates at Canton, Kunming, Chungking and
Tihwa and drastically reduced their staffs at Nanking and Shanghai 'China', Bevin memorandum,
CP(49)180, 23 August 1949, CAB 129/36. Bevin thought the United States White Paper on
China was bold but pointed out to the American Ambassador in London that they had no
alternative to put in his place. See 'Conversation between Secretary of States and the United
States Ambassador: British and United States policy Towards China', Bevin to Franks, telegram
no.1243, 26 August 1949, F12843/1023/1O, FO 371/75814.
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the arms of Moscow. Acheson agreed that the objective must be to encourage a split
with Moscow and said he quite understood Britain's overall position in China. Acheson
concluded that 'as long as the objective of the two governments remained the same he
did not think it mattered greatly if there were some divergence on tactics'.
The British were encouraged by Acheson's remarks and indeed both the British and
the Americans were adopting a policy of embargo on the supply of war materials to the
whole of China, to prevent China becoming too strong. 167
 However, unlike the
Americans, the British did not wish to extend the ban to strategic goods of key
importance to the Chinese economy which could jeopardise the position of Hong Kong
and substantial British trade and investments in China. 1
 Not long after the
Bevin-Acheson meeting, the State Department were forced to accept that the CCP were
'here to stay for some time'. Diplomatic reports considered it futile to expect the CCP to
be overthrown by economic distress, scattered peasant revolts or the diminishing
resistance of the Nationalists. The State Department therefore decided that the prudent
course was to refrain from hostile acts and let the CCP witness that the Soviets had little
to offer. 169
 The British JIC agreed and doubted whether the Soviets had the sufficient
'China', record of a meeting held at the State Department, Washington, 13 September 1949,
F14109/1023/10, FO 371/75815.
167 See Dening to MacDonald, letter, 1 October 1949, F14256/1072/61, FO 371/76032 and
Conversation between Dening and Butterworth at the State Department, 9 September 1949,
F14194/1023/10, FO 371/75815. Acheson had also told the Portuguese Foreign Minister that if
Hong Kong was attacked would be seen as a violation of the UN Charter and the United States
would fulfil its obligation under that Charter. See 'Developments in China',Record of meeting at
State Department, 17 September 1949, F14440/1023/10, FO 371/75815.
168 Americans wanted to ban, for example, mining equipment, power generating equipment,
essential transport equipment, steel mill equipment and petroleum products. The British would
only agree to the banning of petroleum products but the rest were not considered a security
problem and rather merely asapolitical bargaining counter for the United States. See 'United
States policy Regarding Trade with China', report on NSC 41 from Acheson to Souers, letter, 4
November 1949 in 'United States Policy regarding Trade with China', note by Secretaries, JCS
1721/39, 8 November 1949, RJCS: 1946-1953, MF 56, KCL and 'China',conversation between
Dening and Butterworth at the State Department, 9 September 1949, F14256/1072/61, FO
371/76032.
169 See Jones to Acheson, 3 September 1949, FRUS, 1949, VoL III, pp.519-521; Tucker, Patterns in
the Duct, pp. l84; Blum, Drawing the Line, p.l07 and Leffler,A Preponderance of Power, p.297.
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technical manpower, specialist knowledge and political skill to exploit the opportunity
afforded by the CCP victory. The JIC also saw potential frictions between Stalin and
Mao over the status of Mongolia, Sinkiang and Manchuria.'70
With the domination of China by the CCP a near certainty, Stevenson argued that
British policy could be summed up in one word: 'trade'. He fully endorsed Bevin's
comments to Acheson and thought Britain had a good chance of retaining a 'foot in the
door'. To ensure this, Stevenson recommended that the question of recognising the CCP
had to be based on practical and not ideological grounds.' 7' Yet, Stevenson's theory, that
protests against CCP behaviour could be stepped up if the latter misbehaved, would not
work in practice. The CC? now believed that it was the turn of the Western imperialists
to defer to the Chinese.' 72
 The CCP leadership, anxious to establish themselves as
socialist revolutionaries, were quick to denounce British imperialism. But, the CCP were
also determined to show that they were China's new rulers and wanted to be recognised
by the British government according to established new international conventions.173
Despite American objections, the British recognised the Peoples Republic of China in
January 1950, hoping it would protect Britain's imperial position in Asia by reducing the
170 Sinkinag, for example, traded almost exclusively with the Soviets. It had deposits of tungsten
ore and oiL Manchuria was rich agriculturally and had abundant timber. The Soviet Union,
according to the JIC, wanted to maintain Manchuria as a source of foodtsuffs and raw materials.
The potential industrial power still existed and the basis laid by the Japanese was very extensive.
'The Implications of a Communist Success in China', JIC(49)48(Final), 30 September 1949, CAB
158/7.
Stevenson to Foreign office, telegram no.1391, 1 September 1949, F13102/1023/10, FO
371/75814. The British had reports that the CCP were making quite good attempts at solving
the most immediate economic problems but still felt that economics was the Achilles Heel of the
CCP. Coates, minute, 4 October 1949, F14533/1017/23, FO 371/76217.
172 Coates, minute, 3 September 1949, F13102/1023/10, FO 371/75814. Stevenson had argued
that Britain should ignore abuse after it had established relations with the CCP because the
British would then grounds for reacting and causing as much trouble as seemed desirable
Stevenson to Foreign office, telegram no.1391, 1 September 1949, F13102/1023/10, FO
371/75814.
Tuck-Hong, Bntain's Encounter with R,vohmona,j China; 1 949-54 (London, 1992), p.vii.
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threat to Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore, encouraging trade and undermining Soviet
influence over the CCP by maintaining contact with communist China.174
In conclusion, Britain's attitude towards China, despite or because of the pressures of the
Cold War, was bound to differ from the United States. In all cases concerning Britain's
China policy, the British wanted to protect their imperial and commercial interests in
Asia. This was essential in order to maintain Britain's world power status. Henceforth, a
determined effort to defend Hong Kong and a desire to maintain a 'foot in the door' had
their roots in imperial policy rather than primarily any Cold War policy. However, by
1949, the British began to think more in Cold War terms, especially in their commitment
to prevent Southeast Asia turning 'red'. The problem remained in finding a partner to
tackle the communist threat in Asia. For the United States, an involvement in Southeast
4sst
Adefence could also be seen as an effort protect Britain's imperial interests. Consequently,
after a hard fought war in the Pacific against Japan, the United States began to move
towards adopting more aggressive methods to thwart further communist incursions into
East Asia. Controls on exports to China were seen as a way to halt the growing strength
of the Chinese communist state while bases on Japan and the surrounding perimeter
could serve as a warning against further communist ambitions beyond China. In the end,
both Britain and the United States hoped to foment a Sino-Soviet split, the British from
within, the Americans from without.
174 Foreign Office to Washington, telegram no.11571, 16 December 1949, F19057/1023/10,
FO 371/75828. Consequently the decision to recognise the People's Republic of China meant
that it would no longer recognise the Nationalists. However, the Chinese Nationalist
Ambassador to London was informed that the British Consul in Formosa would continue to
maintain de facto relations with the local authorities. See 'Recognition of Chinese Communist
Government', Bevin, minute, 23 December 1949, F19460/1023/1O, FO 371/75830 and
memorandum of conversation by Sprouse, 16 December 1949, FRUS, 1949, VoLIX, pp.224-226.
See also Ritchie Ovendale, 'Britain, the United States, and the Recognition of Communist China',







This study has examined the part Britain played in the development of East Asia from
1944-1949. The period in question witnessed the defeat of Japan, the division of Korea
and communist victory in China. Britain did not play a dominant role in the formulation
of Western policy towards East Asia, nor did it want to. Both World War and Cold War
priorities dictated that Britain direct its resources to Western Europe, the Middle East
and Southeast Asia. The situation was made worse by Britain's declining economic
position. This did not mean, however, that the British were prepared to abandon East
Asia. British imperial and economic policy towards East Asia formed one of many
components in Britain's foreign policy that aimed to sustain British world power in the
emerging postwar world. In the Second World War and the Cold War, imperial interests
would therefore dominate Britain's policy towards East Asia. The result of pursuing such
a strategy in this region meant that close co-operation with anti-imperialist America
proved difficult to achieve. The dilemma for Britain was that it wished to perpetuate its
imperial position in order to secure influence, world power and independence from the
United States. Yet, there was also the need for American resources to help defeat Japan
and protect Western civilisation from communism. Perhaps more so than in Western
Europe and the Middle East, the British often felt there was little room to manoeuvre in
East Asian politics. Consequently, Britain was either forced to follow or modify
American policies while trying to maintain its imperial interests.
From I 944, Britain struggled to resurrect its pre-war prominent voice in East Asian
affairs as Stalin and Roosevelt began to bilaterally settle Chinese and Korean issues. This
signified that Britain was losing its status as a world power of the first rank. The British,
concerned, sought ways in which to restore its global power but this led to a policy of
cross purposes in Whitehall. On the one hand, Britain saw its imperial position in Asia as
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a visible sign of power that had to be restored. On the other, a role in the final assaults
on Japan was deemed necessary to secure a voice at the peace table and procure
American co-operation for the next war. Britain could not pursue both simultaneously
and this left British wartime and postwar strategy in a shambles. In addition, the United
States found it hard to back a British imperial strategy or allow British participation in the
final assaults on Japan which they considered their 'show' The American desire to
distance itself from imperialist Britain in Asia and maintain an exclusive hold on the
direction of policy and strategy towards East Asia, continued into the postwar period.
The prospect of close Anglo-American consultation for the region remained dim. Other
features of British policy during 1944-1945 also set the stage for postwar British attitudes
towards East Asia. For example, there remained a tendency on the part of British
planners to underestimate the potential impact that China could exert on the postwar
world and Churchill, in particular, was guilty of this. Similarly, the British were too ready
to dismiss the wider significance that concessions to the Soviet Union in China and
Korea might have. The continuing inclinations to ignore these long term implications
often stemmed from the short term belief that they posed no immediate threat to British
imperial interests inside China, Hong Kong and Southeast Asia.
These short term considerations were evident in British policy towards Korea. After
initial Foreign Office soundings that Britain would want to play a part in Korean affairs,
a consensus grew in Whitehall that it would be financially and politically undesirable.
Korea was deemed to hold no particular interest for Britain's foreign policy aim of
securing its imperial position in Asia and this led to a certain amount of diffidence
towards Korean affairs. Still, the British did formulate a view for Korea, particularly as
the United States and Soviet Union were precariously separated by the 38th paralleL
Initially, the United States hoped to settle the Korean issue with the Soviet Union on a
bilateral basis. Once this American policy started to run into trouble and the Cold War
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began to emerge, a Western' policy for Korea was unlikely to culminate. By 1948-1949,
the British, immersed in Berlin, Malaya and the defence of Hong Kong, showed no
interest in rolling back communism in Korea and could not perceive the wider Cold War
implications of Korea turning communist until it was far too late. The Truman
administration, for its part, dismissed the possibility of British help in Korean affairs and
consultation remained minimal. But the United States, unlike Britain, did appreciate that
a communist domination of Korea could damage its Cold War credibility and undermine
its position in Japan. Yet, previous experience in China saw the Americans unwilling to
accept another Asian continental commitment and this led to a confused American
strategy of withdrawing from Korea under UN cover and providing economic aid. These
mixed signals led British officials to believe that Korea remained very low on the
American list of priorities and that it could be written off.
One reason for Britain's underestimation of the value of East Asia in the developing
Cold War was that traditionally minded Foreign Office officials could not really believe
China, and k
that TaNn.,,1 were capable of operating democracy as 'successfully' as Britain. This view
was vividly highlighted in Japan. The British did not believe that postwar Japan had
embraced democracy as wholeheartedly as MacArthur proclaimed. With centuries old
experience of imperial rule in Asia, there is little wonder that the British deemed Asian
peoples to be politically backward. Henceforth, during the occupation of Japan, British
concern focused on the revival of traditional Japanese ways and, compared to the United
States, Britain was reluctant to accommodate Japan as a Cold War asset. Instead, imperial
and economic concerns dominated British thinking towards Japan. For example, British
officials felt that a reinvigorated Japan could pose a threat to Britain's imperial and
Commonwealth interests in the Asia-Pacific while witnessing an increase in competition
for British exporters. The British had also recognised, since 1944, that a Japanese
collapse could destabilise Asian-Pacific trade thereby spreading chaos to Britain's
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imperial colonies in Southeast Asia. Japanese economic breakdown was of great concern
to British officials as this could have led to the diversion of much needed American
economic assistance from Western Europe to Japan. The last scenario, in particular,
rather than the endorsement of a Cold War strategy for East Asia, saw the British move
gradually towards accommodating America's 'reverse course' policy for Japan. After its
hard fought victory over Japan, the United States was willing to proceed unilaterally in
the formulation of its policy towards Japan. Furthermore, the small British contingent in
BCOF and UKLM's inability to secure Britain's interests other than through SCAP, left
little room for the British to manoeuvre. These events demonstrated Britain's declining
influence in East Asian affairs and dealt a blow to one of its foreign policy objectives in
maintaining Britain at the forefront of world powers.
In China, these influences on British policy towards East Asia continued. The British
did not devise its policies in a Cold War framework until 1949 and even then, Cold War
17 CCP. pofr1iaL is 'wcIy w,emztec fi-A,eienin u^. (64tnd U5S.
thinking was dominated by imperial and commercial concemsThere is no doubt that
the British underestimated the potential of the Chinese communists to rule China and
disregarded the effect that this might have on Britain's imperial position in Asia. One
explanation for this poor analysis stemmed from Britain's traditional experience in
Chinese affairs. Since Britain's arrival in China during the nineteenth century, warlordism
and political factionalism perpetuated a British belief that China could not be run
effectively by a single political entity. In 1945, Britain therefore felt it was possible to
restore its prewar imperial and commercial interests in China and Hong Kong. Such a
return would signify that Britain's power was truly global. The political map, of course,
had changed. American influence sought to remove age-old imperialist ways inside China
and the British found it hard to reassert itself Political turmoil in China eased the
pressure for a British return somewhat but it would prove short-lived as the strength of
the CCP began to increase. As Mao's power base gradually expanded in China, a
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co-ordinated Western policy to tackle communism in China was difficult to achieve.
Firstly, as in Korea, Britain was not in position to provide fmancial help for Nationalist
China. Secondly, America's opposition to imperialism saw them demur from working
with the British in a region where the United States also sought to benefit economically
from its prominent role in the Asian-Pacific war. In fact, Anglo-American economic
rivalry inside China remained a feature well into the late I 940s. The United States hoped
they could stabilise the situation in China by despatching the Marshall Mission and
providing economic help to the Chinese Nationalists. The problem was that Chiang
Kai-shek was no more likeable a figure than Syig man Rhee. Once the United States
failed to thwart the outbreak of civil war in China and appeared unableA prevent
economic chaos because of Chiang's determination to defeat Mao, the Truman
administration found it hard to devise a policy for China other than to wait for the 'dust
to settle'. The British were critical of this stance but provided no policy alternatives that
could rollback communism in China. In part, this attitude stemmed from the fact that
Britain, and in particular its intelligence bodies, underestimated the ability of the CCP to
control the whole of China. Even when, in 1949, the British considered that a
communist-dominated China could be the precursor to Southeast Asia turning 'red',
Britain still sought to preserve its imperial and commercial position in Asia. The British
sent forces to Hong Kong, aimed to keep a 'foot in the door' in China and decided to
recognise the CCP that led to a consequent abandonment of Chiang in Formosa.
This thesis hopes to demonstrate that British policy in East Asia from 1944-1949 was
dominated by the desire to protect Britain's imperial position in Asia and consequent
world power status which formed a major part of Britain's foreign policy. It appears that
the task of directly defeating Japan and devising a Cold War strategy for East Asia were
often pushed aside by the British in favour of imperial concerns that could rejuvenate
Britain's global standing. American Cold War policy towards Asia has often been
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criticised, even by British officials at the time. In its defence, the United States was at
least more far sighted than Britain and attempted to devise strategies for East Asia with a
view to their Cold War implications. The British appeared extremely reluctant to think in
Cold War terms for East Asia and provided few alternatives that could revitalise Western
power in China and Korea. This failure to underestimate the potential effect that the East
Asian region could have on the Cold War leads one to conclude that Britain cannot
evade responsibility for the disastrous Western policies that evolved for China and
Korea. Finally, perhaps more so than any other region, Britain's misperceptions towards
the region and the stru1e to impinge its influence on the evolution of East Asian affairs
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